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THE
CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT STUDIES
Vol. XLVII

CONCEPT OF POETIC BLEMISHES
IN
SANSKRIT POETICS

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Bechan Jha

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CONCEPT OF POETIC BLEMISHES
IN
SANSKRIT POETICS

BY

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Thesis approved for the
D. Litt. degree of the Patna
University.

To

My Guru

Dr. Sathkari Mookerjee



OPINION

M. M. Gopinath Kaviraj

M. A., D. Litt.,

Padma Vibhushana.

Dr. Bechan Jha has rendered a useful service to the cause of literary criticism in Sanskrit by his critical and systematic study of the problem of 'blemish' (doṣa) in Sanskrit Poetry. He has approached the problem from different points of view and discussed it in all its aspects and bearings, in course of which he has made a careful survey of practically the entire field from Bharata down to Mammaṭa. In this connection he has taken note of the views of eminent critics like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Rudraṭa, Ānanda-Vardhana and Mahima Bhaṭṭa. His own exposition is generally marked by clarity, precision, critical discernment and thoroughness. I congratulate him on his valuable production and I sincerely believe that every earnest student of Sanskrit Poetics will find it useful and appreciate his labours in the field.

*Sigra, Varanasi. }
8th. Jan. 1965 }*

Gopinath Kaviraj

FOREWORD

It gives me unmixed pleasure to be invited by the author to write a foreword to his remarkable book on literary defects. From very ancient times which cannot be precisely dated speculations on merits and flaws of literary compositions began to crystalise into more or less definite shapes. What constitutes the secret of the aesthetic appeal of poetry still remains a matter of speculation. Such has also been the fate of what are considered as flaws which mar or detract from the effects produced by indifferent or bad poetry. In India we have got a systematic development of the study of this important problem from the Nāṭya-śāstra of Bharata down to Mammaṭa and Vtśvanātha. Mammaṭa is deservedly esteemed as the paragon of the writers on Sanskrit poetics. But his reputation rests on a skilful marshalling of data and adjustment of the topics in a systematised form and not on originality. From the recent discovery of older works it has become obvious that Mammaṭa is indebted to his predecessors to a degree far more extensive than it was possible to imagine in the past.

Dr. Jha has given a systematic exposition of the subject which enables a modern scholar to discern the historical links of the course of evolution of thought. The obligation of Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa to Mahima Bhaṭṭa in the treatment of literary defects is, though unacknowledged, immense. Of all the chapters which are undoubtedly possessed of value, the most remarkable is the treatment of Mahima Bhaṭṭa's speculation on literary drawbacks in the present work. Mahima Bhaṭṭa's treatment of this important topic is diffused and cumbrous. Dr. Jha has

done a service to the cause of Sanskrit scholarship by his remarkable representation. He had to omit many a detail in order to focus attention on the salient features. Mahima Bhaṭṭa is an original writer and his treatment of Doṣas is a **tour de force**. Dr. Jha may necessarily share with the original author a claim to appreciation and serious consideration. His work is exhaustive; nothing of importance has been omitted and he has avoided the temptation of inflating his treatment with jejune details. I am definitely persuaded that his book will receive unqualified appreciation from scholars who are interested in the subject. This work has fetched him the D. Litt. Degree of Patna University, a fitting recognition of his work. I am optimistic that this work will find a place in every respectable library of India.

Calcutta

5th December 1964.

Satkari Mookerjee.

ABBREVIATIONS

A. Bh.	Abhinava Bhāratī commentary on the Nāṭya-śāstra
A. K.	Amara-Koṣa
A. P.	Agnipurāṇa
A. S. B.	Asiatic Society of Bengal
A. T.	Ātmatattva-viveka of Udayanācārya
B. G.	Bhagvad-Gītā
Bhāmaha	Kāvya-lāṅkāra-sūtra-of Bhāmaha
Bhāravi	Kirātārjunīya of Bhāravi
Br. Dev.	Bṛhad devatā
Dh. Ā.	Dhvanyāloka.
Ekāvalī	Ekāvalī of Vidyādhara
Encl. R. E.	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics by Rapson
G. O. S.	Gayakaward Oriental Series, Baroda
Hist. Alaṅk. Lit.	History of Alaṅkāra Literature of Mm. Dr. P. V. Kane
Hist. Skt. Poet.	History of Sanskrit Poetics by Dr. S. K. De
J. A. S. B.	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
K. Ā.	Kāvya-darśa of Daṇḍin
K. K.	Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khāḍya of Śrīharṣa
K. P.	Kāvya Prakāśa of Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa
K. Pr.	Kāvya-Pradīpa of Govinda Ṭhakkura
Locan.	Commentary of Abhinavagupta on the Dhvanyāloka.
M. B.	Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali

N. C.	Naiṣadhīya-carita of Śrīharṣa
N. K.	Nyāya-Kusumānjali of Udayana
N. Ś.	Nāṭya-Śāstra of Bharata
N. S. or N. S. G.	Nyāya-Sūtra of Gautama
Pāṇini	Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini
R. A. S.	Royal Asiatic Society
R. G.	Rasagaṅgādhara of Jagannātha
Rudraṭa	Kavyālaṅkara of Rudraṭa
Ś. B.	Śāṅkara-bhāṣya on Bhagavad Gītā
S. D.	Sāhityadarpaṇa
S. D. S.	Sarvadarśanaśaṅgraha
S. K.	Siddhānta Kaumudī of Bhaṭṭojīdikṣita
S. K. Ā.	Sarasvatī-Kaṇṭhābharṇa of Bhoja
S. Kā.	Sāṅkhya Kārikā
S. M.	Sidhāntamuktāvalī
Ś. V. or Māgha	Śiṣupālavadha of Māgha
Tait. up.	Taittirīyopaniṣad
T. S.	Tarka Saṅgraha
T. V.	Tantra Vārtika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa
V. B.	Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra
V. P.	Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari
V. S.	Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kāṇāda
V. V.	Vyakti-viveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa
V. V. V.	Vyakti-viveka-vyākhyāna of Ruyyaka
Vāmana	Kavyālaṅkāra-Sūtra of Vāmana
Vidyānātha	Pratāpa-Rudra-yaśo'-bhuṣaṇa of Vidyā- nātha
Yāska	Nirukta of Yāska
Y. S.	Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali

PREFACE

Sanskrit Poetics, in spite of its antiquity still contains remarkable thoughts and speculations, which have every right to be regarded as striking contributions in the field of literary criticism. The poets did not follow the code of rules, recipes and prescriptions to produce their works. They followed the guidance of inspiration and created works of artistic excellence. Poets have vision of truth in their own way and accordingly have their philosophy or what is called *Weltanschauung*. They had the natural aptitude for spotting out the aspect of beauty and joy in this otherwise arid, matter-of-fact world. Nature revealed her secrets to poets, the secrets of beatitude, which elude the observation of the scientist. The professional philosopher, who approaches and studies Nature with instruments of logic and endeavours to arrive at synthetic and consistent interpretation of reality, also is not competent to deal with the aesthetic side. The rainbow inspires the poet by its beauty and the poet communicates his visions to appreciative critics and enables them to have the same experience recreated in their mind. It may please the physicist to decry the poet's representation as the play of fancy uncontrolled by the rules of logic, or the methodological devices of scientists; but this will be an unfortunate finding. It should be understood that reality has an infinite number of facets. The scientist's field of study does not exhaust the entire gamut.

The poet ought not to feel discouraged if his representation does not appeal to persons of special interest and aptitude. The poet on the other hand, like the philosopher, cannot ignore or under-estimate the value of the scientist's conclusions. Bhāmaha has aptly sized up the situation when he expounds the poet's mission in the following words :-

There is no science, no art, which does not provide the *wherewithal* to the poet to construct his poetry. It is true that the poet depends on a specialised kind of imagination for envisaging reality. But this imagination has a logic of its own. The poet has also a methodology and he cannot be an indisciplined reckless rattler of verses.

The critic certainly came after the poet. He is also a sort of kindred spirit with the poet. He is enraptured by the poet's creation. But to understand it, he seeks to find out the laws and the principles which underlie and guide the poet's inspiration in well-defined channels of expression. In other words the critic is scientific and logical in his approach. He discovers the rules as they are immanent in poetry produced by the best poet.

The poet's instruments are words and meanings. He also puts them in different metrical forms. As such the poet has to conform his composition to the rules of grammar, metrics and prosody. Furthermore the poet cannot take undue licence with the laws of society, morals, religious condition and conventional etiquette. Bharata is insistent on the observance of the conventional code of behaviour, dress, manner of conversation, etiquette and decorum, which have received sanction of society for a long time. As we have observed before the poet is not free from the restraint of rules. But these rules and restraints are not imposed from outside by any authority *ex-cathedra*. These rules are the spontaneous expression of the poet's mental movements. His inspiration will not be perfect if he does not find adequate vehicles of competent diction. But there is a deeper and profounder aspect, which gives the poet and his creation the stamp of the individuality of his genius. Words and meanings are determined by convention and no man can make free with it. Kātyāyana has formulated his first *Vārtika*, the rule of grammatical exigesis—*siddhe śabdārtha-sambandhe*—words and meanings and their relations are unalterable *fait accompli*. But ordinary words and meanings are not competent enough to give unfettered expression to the poet's surging emotions and

thoughts. He therefore invests the words with an unwonted power. The words become symbols in stricter sense in his hand and they suggest what they cannot denote by their primary power of signification—*Abhidhā*. The secondary denotation called *Lakṣaṇā* is also bound by rules of logic and is incompetent to convey any further meaning that is not logically connected with the primary meaning. But the power of suggestion (*Vyañjanā*) has almost unlimited scope. It communicates subtle nuances and shades of meaning which the poet intends. Milton voices this truth—'where more is meant than meets the ear'. This constitutes, according to Ānandavardhana and his faithful and powerful exponent, Abhinavagupta the life and soul of poetry.

It is the critic who has investigated the realm of poetry and has tried to discover the laws and rules which govern it as immanent principles. It is natural that the findings have been tentative and the thoughts and speculations of subsequent generations have compelled the revision of older findings. It is not my purpose to deal with all these different aspects, which have been dealt with in several standard works. I propose to deal with a rather unpleasant seamy side of this beautiful subject. As observed before the poet has his own logic though it is not the formal logic of academies. Mahimabhaṭṭa in his stately work *Vyaktiviveka*, tried his level best to bring these poetic rules within the compass of formal logic. His work is a monument of unorthodox ingenuity, which has not succeeded in carrying conviction. He ploughs a lonely furrow. poetry is not amenable to the rules of formal logic. But it is not a reckless enterprise either. It has a logic of its own. The infringement of the laws of the logic of poetry and rules of social life will detract from the merits of the poet's work. These are offences and faults, which are to be avoided by the poet.

In my proposed thesis, I shall occupy myself with treatment of these faults and blemishes, which mar the effect the poet wants to produce. I shall follow the classification of the *Ālaṅkārikas*, the writers of Indian poetics in the main and go further afield to modern writers. I shall evaluate the results

achieved by my predecessors and give my re-actions where I differ.

I owe a profound debt of gratitude to professor Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, Director, Nawa Nālandā Mahāvihāra, Nālandā, and formerly Sir Ashutosh Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Calcutta University for his acts of kindness, encouragement and advice, and to Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. Gopinath Kaviraj for his kind opinion and blessings.

I am also indebted to my teacher Kaviśekhara Pandita Śrī Badarīnatha Jha, Professor, D. S. Sanskrit College, Muzaffarpur, who evinced great interest in progress of my studies of Alāṅkāra Śāstra.

I consider it my duty to record my thankfulness to the writers whose works I have consulted and derived benefits from.

Patna, College
22nd September, 1960 }

B. JHA

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System of Transliteration adopted for the
Devanāgarī alphabet

Vowels

(i) Simple vowels : a, ā, i, ī, u, ū, ṛ, ṝ, ḷ

(ii) Diphthongs : e, o, ai, au

Consonants

(i) gutturals (Velars) : K, Kh, g, gh, ṅ

(ii) palatals : c, ch, j, jh, ñ

(iii) cerebrals : ṭ, ṭh, ḍ, ḍh, ṇ

(iv) dentals : t, th, d, dh, n

(v) labials : p, ph, b, bh, m

Semi-Vowels

y (palatal),

v (labials)

Liquids

r (cerebral),

l (dental)

Sibilants

ś (palatal), ṣ (cerebral) s (dental)

Aspiration

h.

Pure nasal

ṁ-Anusvāra (after sonna)

Voiceless spirants

ḥ (visarjanīya), ḥ (jīhvāmūlīya), ḥ (upadhmānīya)

**CONCEPT OF POETIC BLEMISHES IN
SANSKRIT POETICS**

CONCEPT OF POETIC BLEMISHES IN
SAIBERKAT POETICS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A word of apology is needed for the choice of the subject-matter of my research. It is a matter of gratification that scholars have made researches in the various branches of Indian culture, both in the West and in the East. As regards the study of *Alaṅkārasāstra*, that is, Sanskrit Poetics, a general survey of the contour has been made by Dr. Jacobi, Mm. Dr. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De and also Dr. Raghavan and others. Recently Dr. N. N. Choudhary of Delhi University has published his researches on the most fundamental topics and problems of Sanskrit Poetics, and they go deeply into the knotty problems and controversial issues which have exercised the minds of generations of writers and scholars. Dr. Choudhary has followed the method adopted in the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* of Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa which is a classical work. I propose to follow up his line of study involving the detailed consideration of the texts and begin with the chapter on *Doṣas*—literary defects and if circumstances permit I contemplate to deal with the subjects treated in the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* in the remaining chapters. I have finished my study of the problem of literary defects as treated by Indian writers in the original Sanskrit texts down to the latest contributions.

I need not dwell upon the importance of the subject of my research which I have tried to elucidate in the last chapter of the present dissertation. The methodology I have followed is both historical and speculative. I have begun from Bharata who is the first writer to deal with literary defects in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* as a side issue. There seems to be no reason for doubting the existence of a prolonged course of speculation on defects of words and meanings previous to Bharata. Much

misunderstanding is due to the bad choice of words and constructions of sentences particularly when they are obscure or ambiguous. In the *Nyāyasūtra*¹ we meet with certain defects of linguistic expressions which are regarded as evidence of scholastic delinquency in the formulation of logical arguments. These defects have also been taken up for study in Sanskrit Poetics. But as the aim and object of literary criticism are wider than those of logic the list has been supplemented by writers on Poetics. Logic has little to do with literary grace or aesthetic perfection. But literature, particularly *belles lettres* are concerned with graceful terms of expression and the aesthetic and emotional values of sound and sense. Bharata sets the ball rolling. It is a pity that all ancient works preceding Bhāmaha are lost. There is obviously a gap of centuries between Bharata and Bhāmaha.

After treating of Bharata's classification of literary defects as elucidated by Abhinavagupta I have taken up Bhāmaha's treatment of the subject. Bhāmaha's text as available to us is far from perfect. It is also a matter of profound disappointment that Udbhaṭa's commentary on Bhāmaha's work *Kāvya-lankāra* is also not available. Certain views have been ascribed to Udbhaṭa by later writers. There is no doubt that Udbhaṭa's commentary, had it been available, would have made our knowledge and understanding of Bhāmaha richer and more comprehensive. Without this much desiderated help we are left to our own resources. I have tried my best to make Bhāmaha's classical work intelligible to the modern reader. Bhāmaha had a logical turn of mind. He propounded the thesis that "all sciences and arts, grammar, semantics, logic and philosophy are contributory to the evolution of a poet's

-
1. N.S.G., V. 2. 1.—Pratiññāhāniḥ Pratiññāntaram Pratiññāvirodhaḥ Pratiññāsaṃnyāsaḥ Hetvantaram Arthāntaram nirarthakam avijñātārtham apārthakam Aprāptakālam Nyūnam Adhikam Punaruktam Ananubhāṣaṇam Ajñānam Apratibha Vikṣepo Matanjna Paryyanuyojoyopekṣaṇam Niranuyoḥyanuyogo' pasid-dhānto Hetvābhasasca Nigrahasthānāni.

work."² He himself admits that this constitutes a heavy burden but the poet cannot shirk the responsibility. There is no doubt that the poet must be a man of genius. But his genius must have a field of data to operate upon. The deeper and wider the range of his study, the better and richer becomes his work. Genius (śakti) must be re-inforced and supplemented by scholarship (Vyutpatti), which gives as it were, the ballast to the ship of the literary product.

Bhāmaha is perhaps the only writer who has introduced logical fallacies into the category of literary defects. He was conversant with the logical and epistemological contributions of Vasubandhu and Dinnāga. He does not give evidence of his acquaintance with Dharmakīrti and it seems justifiable to place him chronologically before Dharmakīrti who must have flourished by the end of the 7th cent. A. D. Bhāmaha is no doubt influenced by Bharata and he adopts the classification of Doṣas given by the latter *mutatis mutandis*. One easily notices the advance made by Bhāmaha upon Bharata's treatment.

I have treated Daṇḍin next who flourished towards the beginning of the 7th Cent. A. D.³ I do not propose to enter into tangled problem of chronology as to which of the two, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, is prior. There are points in favour of each being the predecessor of the other. There are also texts which seem to suggest unmistakably that each was acquainted with the views of the other. I am inclined to think that Daṇḍin came after Bhāmaha. In literary grace Daṇḍin should be given the palm of superiority over Bhāmaha. But Bhāmaha is more logical and scientific. He is not a lover of elaboration like Daṇḍin. It is a matter of historical fact that Bhāmaha's influence on subsequent writers on Sanskrit Poetics is more pronounced and specific than that of Daṇḍin. Of course, Daṇḍin is respected by all. Daṇḍin's influence on Vāmana, Bhojarāja and lastly on Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha, the writer of

2. Bhāmaha, V. 4—

Na sa śabdo na tad vācyaṁ na sa nyāyo na sā kalā /
Jāyate yaṁ na kāvyāṅgam aho bhāro mahān kaveḥ //

3. S. K. De, Hist. of Skt. Poet., Vol. I, p. 70.

the celebrated classic the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, is indubious. In his treatment of literary defects Daṇḍin inclines more to Bharata than Bhāmaha. He curtly dismisses⁴ the logical subtleties introduced by Bhāmaha.

I have treated Vāmana next. He flourished some time between 750 and 850 A. D.⁵ He quotes from the *Veṇīsaṁhāra* and the *Śiṣupālavadha*. Vāmana is a sober writer possessed of deep insight and capacity for critical judgment and logical analysis. He is the most systematic writer in the old school. He, for the first time, differentiates between Śabdaguṇa and Arthaguṇa and Śabdadoṣas and Arthadoṣas which are treated in a lump by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. He has adopted all that is good in his predecessors and assimilated them in his treatment of Doṣas when he gives unmistakable evidence of his original contributions. His work is a classic noted for its studied brevity, clear exposition and depth of insight. In his conception of Poetry, he inclines more to Bhāmaha than Daṇḍin.⁶ In his preference for Guṇas and Rītis he evidently follows in the footsteps of Daṇḍin and makes a remarkable advance. In his treatment of Doṣa he sets up a pattern which is followed by subsequent writers. His distinctive classification of Śabdadoṣas and Arthadoṣas, as we have just observed, is a definite step forward which makes for clear understanding. In the course of treatment of individual doṣas I have pointed out the points of agreement and difference between him and his predecessors.

After Vāmana I have come down to Rudraṭa who, as it appears from the name, may have belonged to Kāśmir. He

4. K. A. III. 127.

Pratiñāhetuḍṣāntahānir doṣo na vidyate /
Vicāraḥ karkaśaḥ prāyas tenālīḍbena kiṁ phalam //

5. S. K. De, *Skt. Poet.*, Vol. I, p. 82.

6. Cf. Bhāmaha's definition of Poetry 'śabdārthau sahītau kāvyam' with that of Vāmana 'Kāvyaśabdo'yaṁ guṇalāṅkāra-saṁskṛtayoḥ śabdārthayoḥ vartate' and contrast with that of Daṇḍin—'īśārtha-vyavacchinā padāvalī.'

seems to have flourished sometime in the 9th Cent. A. D.⁷ Except Daṇḍin, all these authors most probably flourished in Kāshmir and made their motherland the cradle of Alāṅkāra-śāstra. Rudraṭa undoubtedly succeeded Vāmana and internal evidence evinces his deep acquaintance with works of the previous authors just surveyed by us. Rudraṭa had an open mind, generous outlook and acute understanding, fine aesthetic sense and a wonderful mastery of Sanskrit idiom. He writes in excellent Āryā metre and his style is compact without being obscure. One may notice eclecticism in him but this is not the outcome of indiscriminate choice. He adopts Bhāmaha's definition of Poetry and accords co-equal status to sound and sense. He is not a blind compiler but exercises his independent judgment. In treating of *śleṣa* (double-intender) he differs from Udbhaṭa who propounds the singular thesis that wherever there is a combination of *śleṣa* with another Figure of Speech *Śleṣa* will have the upper hand. Rudraṭa strikes an original note and asserts that in *upamā* (simile) even a Verbally similar attribute⁸ though admitting of two meanings, may serve as the common attribute. Thus *upamā* in combination with *Śleṣa* will prevail over the latter. His view is endorsed by Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha who quote Rudraṭa's *ipsissima verba* in support of their contention against Udbhaṭa's thesis. Rudraṭa again seems the first writer amongst the ancients to admit *Rasa* as an important factor of Poetry. He does not relegate *Rasa* to the rank of a figure of Speech as has been done by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin; nor does he accept Vāmana's view that a *rasa* is a constituent element of *Kānti*—a literary quality.⁹ He however leaves out the consideration of the relative importance of *rasa*, *guṇa* and *alāṅkāra*, and

7. S. K. De, *Skt. Poet.*, Vol. 1. I, p. 88.

8. K. P., p. 521—'Sakalakalam puram etat jātam samprati sudhā-mṣubimbam iva' ity ādau śabdamaṭrasāmye'pi s3 yuktaiva. Tathā hy uktam Rudraṭena—'sphuṭam arthālāṅkarav etāv upamā-samuccayau kintu Āśritya Śabdamaṭtram sāmānyam ihā' pi sambhavataḥ //

9. Vāmana, III. 1. 14., *Diptarasatvaṃ Kāntiḥ*.

their inter-relation. He is again the first writer to broach the issue of *rasa-doṣas* which have assumed the most prominent position in the works of Ānandavardhana, Maṃmaṭa and others who are loyal to the Dhvani theory. We thus notice a remarkable advance in Rudraṭa's treatment of Poetry and particularly of Doṣa. Rudraṭa, of course, could not find a school of his own but he was the precursor of the modern school and particularly Rasa-school. His work abounds in original speculations. He strikes the modern reader with admiration for his unbiassed judgment, independence of thinking and his liberalism which makes him accept all that he considers good in his predecessors. He has again given his considered views on the relation of morality¹⁰ and artistic creations. We have shown in our treatment of Doṣas listed by him the points of his agreement and divergence.

Ānandavarahana is a prodigy who eclipses his predecessors by his stupendous genius. He propounded the Dhvani theory which marks a remarkable departure from the old schools. Abhinavagupta observes that the *Dhvanyāloka* is the first work which gave a systematic treatment of the theory of Dhvani, though it was a moot question among his elder contemporaries. His theory did not find easy acceptance. As is usually the case with the promulgator of an original theory, he provoked a strong criticism from his contemporaries and also from subsequent writers. Bhaṭṭanāyaka seems to have been the most powerful critic who wrote the book, *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* or *Sahṛdayadarpaṇa* for the demolition of Dhvani theory. It is a cause of profound disappointment that this work has been lost. We only get stray quotations from his work which show the astounding intellect of the author. After him Mahimabhaṭṭa wrote his celebrated work the *Vyaktiviveka* in which he has sought to demonstrate¹¹ that the so-called Dhvani is only a

10. Rudraṭa XIV. 12—

Na hi kavinaṁ parādārā cṣṭavyā na'pi copadeṣṭavyā /

Kartavyataya'nyeṣām na ca tadupāya' bhidhātavyaḥ //

11. V. V. p. 6 'Darpaṇo hṛdayadarpaṇākhyo dhvanidhvamsa-granthaḥ'.

case of inference¹². He has most ruthlessly attacked Ānandavardhana and revels in pointing out his defects both in composition and the subject matter. Kuntaka, of course, preceded Mahimabhaṭṭa and tried to prove that Dhvani was nothing but different instances of *Vakrokti* (a figure of speech). Next, Kṣemendra in the *Aucityavicāracarcā* has tried to subsume Dhvani under *aucitya* (propriety). It is a matter of wonder that all these writers in spite of their extraordinary ingenuity and skill failed to overthrow the position of Ānandavardhana. It is no doubt that Abhinavagupta did yeomen's service to the cause of Dhvani. But Mahimabhaṭṭa came after him and also criticised his defence. Mahimabhaṭṭa was shown to be in the wrong by Ruyyaka who wrote a commentary on the *Vyaktiviveka*. The sole purpose of the commentary seems to be the refutation of Mahima's contentions. No doubt Ruyyaka may be accused of disloyalty to the original text which usually a commentator has to defend as a part of his task. Ruyyaka's service to the Dhvani theory is stupendous. He also wrote a commentary on the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* of Maṃmaṭa and as such must have been his successor.

Before we deal with Maṃmaṭabhaṭṭa's contributions, we have to consider Mahima's work. Though an implacable critic of Ānandavardhana his ingenuity and scholarship are objects of envy and he has profoundly influenced Maṃmaṭa. Mahimabhaṭṭa's treatment of *doṣa* is remarkable. He does not deal with verbal defects (*śabda-doṣas*) or *rasadoṣas*. He has formulated only five classes of literary defects and his treatment is original and elaborate. Maṃmaṭa has adopted many of his views without explicit acknowledgment. We have drawn attention to these issues in our treatment of Mahima's lucubration on *doṣas*.

Bhojarāja of Dhārā has written two voluminous works on Poetics, viz., the *Sarasvatikaṇṭhābharāṇa* and the *Śṅgāra-Prakāśa*. It is in the *Sarasvatikaṇṭhābharāṇa* that he deals

12. V. V., I. 1—

Anumāne'ntarbhāvam sarvasyaiva dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum/
Vyaktivivekaṃ Kurute praṇamya Mahimā Parāmvācam//

with the conventional topics of Poetics, viz., *guṇas*, *doṣas*, *alaṅkāras*, *rītis* and *rasa*. The most remarkable feature of this work is love of elaboration of details. The author is a reactionary and shows his preference for the old school. He has sought to subsume Dhvani under the literary excellence called *gāmbhīrya* (depth of meaning)¹³. He has inflated the list of *doṣas* and *guṇas*. He makes occasionally wise observations. But in the main he does not show much originality or depth of insight. He is much too prolix. He has not been able to attract followers and obviously has failed to bring into discredit the theory of Dhvani.

In the *Agnipurāṇa* we find the same reactionary spirit as we do in Bhojarāja's *Sarasvatikaṇṭhābhāraṇa*. The section on *alaṅkāras* in the *Agnipurāṇa* is the work of a mediocre intellect. It is difficult to determine whether the *Agnipurāṇa* preceded Bhojarāja's *sarasvatikaṇṭhābhāraṇa* or followed it. There is no doubt that the compiler of the *Alaṅkāra* section of the *Agnipurāṇa* is posterior to Ānandavardhana whose Dhvani theory is criticised by the former. The treatment of *doṣas* in the *Agnipurāṇa* does not show any originality and follows the time-honoured convention.

The prestige and popularity of Ānandavardhana are not the accidents of good luck. The chief merit of Ānandavardhana lies, in our humble judgment, in the wonderful synthesis of the categories and concepts of Poetics in an organic unity. He admits *totidem verbis* that *rasa* is the ultimate essence of Poetry which the poet suggests by words and meanings. *Guṇas*, i. e., literary excellences conveyed by graceful turns of expression, select choice of sounds and syllables and also appealing sense are reflected in the mental dispositions produced by them which invariably accompany the experience of *rasa*. What are regarded as beauty and grace of word and meaning are so because they contribute to the mental disposition and attitude appropriate for the aesthetic enjoyment. This enjoyment is *rasa*. Ānandavardhana is the first thinker, who makes *guṇas* the direct qualities of *rasa*,

13. S. K. A. I, 73—'Dhvanimattā tu gāmbhīryam'.

and words and meanings are their remote ancestors¹⁴. The so-called *riti* or style, which was held by Vāmana to be the soul of poetry, is thus psychologically traced to *rasa*-experience as its accompaniments. There is a charm in the style of composition but its aesthetic appeal is derived from its organic relation with *rasa*-experience. Poetry must culminate in *rasa*. The plot, the delineation of characters and the description of events and actions and of natural scenery—all culminate in *rasa*-experience. The so-called *alaṅkāras* (Figures of Speech), which consist in turns and twists of verbal expression and the novel combination of ideas, are appreciated only because they make the words and their meanings the competent vehicle of *rasa*. The poet's diction differs from the humdrum commonplace and hackneyed modes of expression of the common man and woman because it (poetic diction) is the exponent of poet's original approach and artistic view of things. The poet finds unusual relations which may appear fanciful to the uninitiated. He finds the beauty of the moon and the lotus in the face of a charming damsel. These unusual relations are expressed in different ways of expression which are called Figures of Speech, *alaṅkāras*. These *alaṅkāras* are the embellishments of words and meanings. They have a charm of their own and strike admiration in the hearts of a man of aesthetic taste.

Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa found in these modes of expressions the essence of poetical charm. It was Ānandavardhana who assessed their true value and assigned them to their proper position in the hierarchy of aesthetic values. The *alaṅkāras* are to be prized in proportion to their contribution to *rasa*. Their importance consists in their capacity to make words and meanings the reflector of *rasa*¹⁵. *Rasa* regarded as an objective

14. Dh. A. II. 6—

Tam artham avalambante yeṅgināṃ te guṇāḥ smṛtāḥ /
Aṅgāśritās tv' alaṅkāra mantavyāḥ kaṭakādivat //

15. Dh. A. II. 16.—

Rasākṣiptatayā yasyā bandhaḥ śakyakriyobhavet /
Aprthag yatnanirvartyaḥ so'laṅkāro dhvanaumataḥ //

fact inherent in words and meanings is equivalent to the Platonic conception of beauty. Beauty enjoyed is *Rasa*. *Alaṅkāras* are of value in so far as they contribute to the beauty of Poetry.

Ānandavardhana is emphatic that *Alaṅkaras* should not overshadow beauty and *Rasa*. If they require extra-effort for their creation they become so many hindrances. Art requires restraint and discipline. Too much of anything defeats its purpose. Ānandavardhana is rightfully intolerant of the artificial decorations and ingenious manipulation of words as in *yamaka*¹⁶ and the so-called pictorial poetry (*citra Kāvya*). They must be shunned in the delineation of soft sentiments like *Śṛṅgāra* (Erotic), *Śānta* (quietistic), *Karuṇa* (pathetic, etc.). We thus find a strictly judicious and intelligent appraisal of different factors of the apparatus of poetry. This has resulted in a synthesis which is lacking in ancient writers.

Mammaṭabhaṭṭa is the writer of a standard work which has become a classic in the field of poetics. It is no doubt a difficult work but it is a paradox that its difficulties have contributed to a large extent to its wide study. It has attracted commentators from every corner of India. The chief merit of this work, in our humble opinion, consists in its thoroughness and balance. Mammaṭa is a close follower of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Considered topic by topic the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* is not a very original work. Almost all the views embodied in the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* are derived from the works of his predecessors. His indebtedness to Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta is overwhelming in magnitude. But he has produced a work which is original in its texture. The elements have all been taken from the previous writers but they have been so dovetailed that they form a new pattern.

Mammaṭabhaṭṭa does not show his mettle in treatment of *Alaṅkāras*. The scientific classification of *Alaṅkāras* was

16. Ibid, II, 15—

Dhvanyātmabhūte Śṛṅgāre yamakādīnibandhanam /
Śaktāṁ api pramāditvaṁ Vipralambhe Viśeṣataḥ //

made by Ruyyaka in the *Alaṅkārasarvasva* which has been followed by the subsequent writers with minor change of detail. But Mammaṭa excels in treatment of *doṣas*. He is not unduly elaborate and prolix like Bhojarāja. Again he is not much too brief as Ānandavardhana. Ānandavardhana has only dealt with *Rasadoṣas*. Mammaṭabhaṭṭa follows Ānandavardhana with meticulous attention and care. He has however been more elaborate than Ānandavardhana. Mammaṭa is fortunate in his commentators among whom we find Govinda Ṭhakkura occupying the position of the doyen of exponents. We have preferred Govinda Ṭhakkura's interpretation in the majority of cases. In Mammaṭa's treatment of *doṣas* we find a comprehensive analysis of the several classes of literary defects. He begins with the verbal defects which relate to words, syllables and sentences. He has shown the defects which are common to all of them and also the peculiar defects which belong only to sentences. His classification of Arthadoṣas is almost perfect. In controversial issues we have had the help of ingenious subtle distinctions drawn out by Govind Ṭhakkura. In treatment of *Rasadoṣas* Mammaṭa, as we have observed before, scrupulously adheres to the plan adopted by Ānandavardhana. Mammaṭa knows how to be brief and also comprehensive. His commentators have supplied the necessary details which make Mammaṭa's work self-content and self-sufficient.

We have not dealt with Hemacandra's treatment of *doṣas* since we do not find in it anything new. So also Viśvanātha, the author of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* does not give any additional information. A student of the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* will find in these works only a re-statement of Mammaṭa's views and opinions. As regards later writers we only find new illustrations and examples which are however only adoptions of those given by Mammaṭabhaṭṭa. Vidyādhara in the *Ekāvalī* follows the line of the treatment of Mahimabhaṭṭa. We have drawn attention to this fact in our treatment of Mahimabhaṭṭa's speculations on *doṣas*. Mahimabhaṭṭa has been elaborate and has gone deep. Vidyādhara only imitates Mahima without his logical skill.

CHAPTER II

TREATMENT OF DOṢA IN BHARATA'S NĀṬYAS'ĀSTRA

The Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata is regarded to be the oldest extant work on the theory of Sanskrit Poetics. It is divided into 36 chapters according to some recension and into 37 chapters according to others. The date of the Nāṭyaśāstra is not certain, but it may be taken to be anterior to Bhāsa and Kālidāsa. Kālidāsa, in the *Vikramorvaśīya*, mentions that Bharata staged a drama called *Lakṣmīsvayamvara* before the celestials. Several scholars¹ have discussed this problem of the age of Bharata and various dates have been assigned to him. But the view that he flourished in the beginning of the Christian era appears to be more plausible.²

There is no doubt however that Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* in the earliest available work on Poetics. It is principally concerned with dramaturgy and deals with all the aspects of theatrical performance. Bharata's conception of Poetry is dramatic. The word Nāṭya means drama. The *anukarṇa* representation of the exploits of gods, demons, kings, householders as well as of the great sages in this world, is called drama.³ Drama is a copy of life,⁴ mirror of custom and reflection of truth. The principal theme of the Nāṭyaśāstra is the drama. It is encyclopædic in its scope. It discusses various other things directly

1. Vide, P. V. Kane. S. K. De (Hist. Skt. Poetics), Vol. I. p. 21.

2. Prof. E. J. Rapson, *Enc. Rel. Ethics*, Vol. IV, p. 886 and Mm. Pt. H. P. Sastri, J. A. S. B. 1913, p. 307.

3. N. S. XIX, 145—

Devatanām ṛṣṇāmca rājnām cotkṛṣṭa medhasām /
pūrvavṛttānucaritam nāṭakam nāma tad bhavet //

4. N. S. XIX, 144—

Yo'yaṃ svabhāvo lokasya nānāvasthāntarātmakaḥ /
so'ṅgādyabhinayairukto nāṭyam ityabhidhīyate //

or indirectly connected with it. The subject-matter of the Nāṭyaśāstra is divided broadly into (a) What drama presents as its ultimate objective, that is, *rasa* and (b) the means of its presentation. The latter is technically called *Abhinaya* (acting) which is divided into four types :—

- (i) Āṅgika—relating to the artistic poses of body,
- (ii) Vācika—relating to beautiful speech,
- (iii) Āhārya—relating to dress and make-up and
- (iv) Sāttvika—relating to the various emotive states.

The original meaning of the word *Rasa* is *Somarasa* in the Veda. By process of natural transference *Rasa*, Ānanda and Ātman were identified.⁵ In the Vaiśeṣika System it is one of the 24 *guṇas* defined⁶ as ‘*rasanāgrāhyo guṇo rasaḥ*’, that is, the quality, which is cognizable through the sense of taste is *Rasa*. Thus it is physical in character. In Āyurveda it means the essence extracted from food by the digestive system. In ordinary parlance it stands for juice of fruit or flower. In the context of Aesthetics it means æsthetic pleasure. It is the central element of beauty. Bharata analyses this concept and explains its manifestation. In the sixth chapter of his Nāṭyaśāstra Bharata speaks of essentiality of *Rasa*. He says, “*Nahi rasād ṛte kascid arthaḥ pravartate*” and ‘*Vibhāvā*’ *nubhāvavya-bhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ*.’ This Sūtra of Bharata has been interpreted in various ways.

The four types of *Abhinaya* mentioned above are the means of the representation of *Rasa*. Among them the *Vācika Abhinaya* is mainly concerned with the subject of Poetics. Bharata in the seventeenth chapter of his Nāṭyaśāstra gives an account of poetic elements, namely, *Lakṣaṇa*, *alaṅkāra*, *doṣa* and *guṇa* which are related to *Rasa*.

Bharata’s chief concern is dramaturgy and the technique employed in the composition of drama. But as verbal expe-

5. Tait. Up. 7—

Raso vai saḥ, Rasaṃ hy evā labdhvā nandi bhavati.

6. T. S. p. 25.

ssion occupies a dominant place⁷ in drama and the diction is in the main of dignified character he has to deal with various ways of expression and the modes which add beauty, force and dignity to speech have been treated incidentally. He has set forth certain Figures of Speech in this connection. As defective expression detracts from the beauty of verbal and formal aspect of poetry, Bharata has taken note of defects and blemishes which are to be avoided by the dramatists. The list of defects propounded by Bharata appears to be the oldest formulation and later writers have made it their starting point. The subsequent development is speculations of several centuries. We, with this prefatory remark propose to deal with the list of doṣas (defects) detailed by Bharata in his Nāṭyaśāstra.

Bharata enumerates ten types⁸ of faults in poetic composition such as,

- I. Gūḍhārtha—circumlocution,
- II. Arthāntara—superfluous expression,
- III. Arthahīna—want of significance,
- IV. Bhinnārtha—defective significance,
- V. Ekārtha—tautology,
- VI. Abhiplutārtha—want of synthesis,
- VII. Nyāyādapeta—logical lapse,
- VIII. Viṣama—unevenness metrical defect,
- IX. Visandhi—hiatus, and
- X. Śabdacyuta—grammatical impurity.

Further each doṣa is defined by Bharata and elaborately explained and illustrated by Abhinava in his commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra as follows :—

I. *Gūḍhārtha* (circumlocution) is 'Paryāya-Śabdābhihita'.⁹ Abhinava explains the term to mention a thing by means of a manufactured synonym. An example of this defect is 'Ekādhika

7. N. S. XIV, 2.—

Vāci yatnas tu kartavyo Nāṭyasyaīṣā tanuḥ smṛtā /
Ānganaipathyasattvāni Vākyārthaṃ Vyañjayanti hi //

8. Ibid, XVI. 88.

9. Ibid, XVI. 89.

nava-Vimāna' for Daśaratha. Abhinava further adds that proper names cannot be denoted by synonyms¹⁰. Bhāmaha calls it 'gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna'. It is regarded as the blemish because it defeats the purpose of the speaker and tends to perplex the sense of the reader. There is no justification for making a long winded statement when the same thing can be expressed more directly and intelligently. The speaker's purpose is to make his intended meaning understood by the auditor. And it is certainly bad form and perhaps also taste to make statement which is deliberately calculated to bewilder his auditor for whose edification and delight it is meant. This is certainly a defect and highly objectionable in Poetry.

II. *Arthāntara* (Superfluous expression) is 'Avarṇyaṃ Varṇyate yatra'¹¹ i.e. when anything not to the point is described, it constitutes the fault called *Arthāntara*. This is regarded so because it is uncalled for repetition simply because it expressly states what is implicitly contained in the essential nature of the subject.

Abhinava gives an example of this defect as 'Cintā moham anaṅgam aṅga tanute Vipreksitaṃ subhruvaḥ'—The beautiful lady's look spreads indeed love as well as anxiety and insensibility. Here the mention of anxiety and insensibility is not needed. Love includes these states of mind and thus they are understood and should not be mentioned. 'Uktārthānām aprayogaḥ'¹².

It is comparable to what is called by Kant analytical proposition, where attributes predicated directly are deducible from analysis of the subject. Though such statements are not nonsensical but are of illogical character.

It may not be out of place to observe in this connection the appropriate remark of Śrīharṣa in the *Naiṣadhiyacartī*¹³ that

10. AB. on N. S. XVI. 89—'na hi yadṛcchāśabdāḥ paryāyabhājaḥ'

11. N. S., XVI. 89.

12. M B. I. 23. Vol. II, p. 89.

13. NC. LX. 8—

Āye mamodāsītamēva jihvayā dvaye'pi tasmīnnanati prayojane /
Garau girāḥ pallavanārthalāghave mītañca sūrañca vaco hi
vāgmitā //

these are the two enormous defects as harmful as poison to speech, viz., excess of elaboration culminating in mere verbosity and dearth of corresponding import. Effective speech consisting in a few measured words pregnant with meaning, this is the real eloquence.

III. *Arthahīna* (incoherence) is divided into (a) *asambaddha* (contradictory) and (b) *Śāvaśeṣa* (incomplete).¹⁴ An expression which is irrelevant or which remains incomplete is a case of the defect *arthahīna*. Abhinava illustrates such an expression—*Adyāpi smarati rasālasam mano me Mugdhāyāḥ Smaracaturāṇi ceṣṭitāni*, i.e., my unconscious mind still recalls the amorous sportings of the little unsophisticated damsel. Here the *mugdhā* heroine is described as clever in the art of love and amorous tactics designed to attract the admiration of lover. This suffers from the incompatibility of ideas indulging in self contradiction. There is juxtaposition of incompatible ideas almost as preposterous as a square circle. There can be no logical connection between the subject and the predicate.

(b) *Śāvaśeṣa*—Abhinava illustrates by '*Sa mahātmā-bhāgyavaśān mahāpadamupāgataḥ*'. This may be construed as *mahātmā bhāgyavaśāt mahāpadam* and may mean that the high minded person through good luck reached high position or the high minded person fell into trouble through ill luck. Here the sentence admits of two cold constructions yielding two meanings, one giving a pleasurable information, the other an unpleasant one. Ambiguity is by its very nature deceptive and puzzling. In the case under consideration, one meaning spoils the effect of the other. Of course, the context may help in deciding the particular meaning meant by the sentence. But a sentence which fails to give a meaning self contained and which depends on extraneous consideration for its completion is indeed a defective one. It does not reflect the credit on the speaker. It only shows his incapacity to give unfettered expression to his intention. Taken by itself the sentence yields the meaning, which is calculated to create confusion and doubt. This is the reason why such statements are censured.

14. N. Ś. XVII. 19.

IV. *Bhinnārtha* (defective significance) is divided into three kinds,¹⁵ viz. (a) *abhivijñeyam*—where the relationship of different parts of speech is not straight and easily understandable but is interrupted by irrelevant expression. The example of such an expression is as follows :—

‘Jvaram bhuñjīta sañjātamalapākam ciraṣṭhitam /
Ajā-dugdho-danaṃ hanyāt tridoṣotkopasambhavam //

Here the subject, object and verbs are interspersed between. One word is followed by another the meanings of which are not susceptible to direct syntactical relation. Of course, the whole sentence is not open to the charge of unintelligibility or irrelevancy if the words are put in logical order which is not found in the sequence of words in the sentence. Of course, in poetry for exigency of metre words are put in such a way as to require readjustment in simple prose. Where the syntax is intelligible without undue effort it is not regarded as a fault. It is worthwhile to observe that the logicians lay down three conditions for the construction of sentence, They are called—(a) *Ākāṅkṣā* (mutual dependence), (b) *Yogyatā* (competency and relevancy) and (c) *Sannidhi* (proximity) of the relevant words. Thus the third condition is not observed in the first example given by Abhinava. The logicians assert that if there is an unconscionable interval of time, say an hour, this is in respect of time and another is in respect of utterance—‘*Girir bhuktamagnimān Devadattena*’. The mountain is eaten on fire by Devadatta. This arrangement of words is very unfortunate or juxtaposition as you may call it. As they are juxtaposed without regard to logical connection.

It seems from the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali¹⁶ that ill juxtaposition of words which is tabooed by logicians, is not regarded as an impediment to understanding of the relation of the word’s meaning, provided the sentence is capable of yield-

15. N. Ś, XVI. 90-91.

16. M. B. I. 1. 58 *anānupūrvyeṇāpi samniviṣṭānāṃ yatheṣṭam abhisambandho bhavati/ tadyathā - anadvāham udahāri yā tvam harasi śirasā kumbhaṃ bhagi ni saccinam abhidhāvantaṃ adrakṣiriti.*

ing a consistent meaning by readjustment of words in natural order.

In the Nyāyabhāṣya¹⁷ of Vātsyāyana we come across a statement which is very interesting to students of semantics 'Yasya yena hi sambandho dūrasthasyāpi tena saḥ'. The purpose of this statement is that the distance does not stand in the way of relationship of the meanings of words. Arthataḥ sannikṛṣṭānām ānantaryamakāraṇam'.

So very aptly Abhinava observes that this is rather excusable.

Second type of this defect is (b) grāmyam (vulgar or which is not refined). Abhinava illustrates it as 'Bhadre bha-jasva mam idante dāsyāmi'. 'O lady, love me and I shall give you this'. This expression is bad in form and offensive to good taste and decorum. It is the meaning that constitutes the fault. The first variety is rather a defect of sentence and thus of a verbal nature.

The third type of defect is (c) Vivakṣito'nya evārtho yatrā-nyārthenā bhidyate, the changing of the intended sense to un-intended one by insertion of subordinate clause. Example of which is given 'Syāccedeṣa na Rāvaṇaḥ'. This is quoted from the *Mahāvīracarita*. Here Rāmachandra in opposition to Lakṣmaṇa's forthright condemnation of Rāvaṇa sets forth commendable habits of his character, but inserts the clause 'provided he was not Rāvaṇa'. This implies that apparently good features are rather found in an undesirable person. This is also in consonance with Rāvaṇa's general character. Bravery in a man of vicious character is not worthy of praise. Here Rāmachandra chimes in with Lakṣmaṇa. But the last sentence 'Kva nu pu-naḥ sarvatra Sarve guṇāḥ'—where can one find all virtues in one person—again contradicts the previous assertion. This is also a case of defect of meaning.

V. *Ekārtha* (tautology) 'aviśeṣābhidhānam yat'.¹⁸ means indiscriminate use of many words for a single purpose. Abhinava cites an example of this defect as:—'Kundendu hāra-hara-

17. V. B. on N. S. G. 1. 2. 9.

18. N. Ś. XVI. 92.

hāsa-sitaṃ yaśaste. Your fame is white like a kund flower, the moon, the garland of pearl, and the laughter of Śiva. Here all words have practically the same purport. Any one simile would have been enough. Each simile here serves the same purpose and hence tautology has occurred. Here we may state that *yaśaḥ* is regarded to be white in poetic convention. *Hāsa* is also regarded white. It consists of re-duplication of the same idea without adding to sense or improving the effect. But one may legitimately pose a question why should such a reduplication be regarded as a fault when you find such repetition in Śāstras, particularly dealing with religion and ethics? In the hymn to the goddess Sarasvatī it is described almost in the same form, e.g. 'yā kundendu-tuṣāra-hāra-dhavalā'. In the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavadgītā* you find the immortality of soul is described repeatedly in many verses. Abhinavagupta is of course conscious of this fact. He observes that in the śāstras the main purpose is to produce an indelible impression on mind of the enquirer of the truth of the proposition. Śaṅkarācārya observes¹⁹ that mere reduplication is not a fault because it serves a legitimate purpose and produces some salutary effect. The mystery of self is not easily intelligible and so the assertion of it in different verses, in different manners and in different words is quite necessary to persuade the reader to accept its truth. Accordingly Abhinavagupta observes²⁰ that poetry is not an ethical description and does not seek to convey moral lesson. So here the reduplication is a fault. Thus the hymn to Sarasvatī is not guilty of this defect because it is to produce an unshakable belief.

VI. *Abhiplutārtha* (Want of Synthesis). *Yat paden samāpyate*²¹ i.e. when a sentence is completed with each foot of a

19. S. B. on B. G. II, 24. na eteṣāṃ ślokanām paunaruktyam codanīyam.....ḍurbodhatvād atmavastunaḥ punaḥ punaḥ prasaṅgam āpādyā sabdāntareṇa tad eva vastu nirūpayati.

20. A. B. on N. S. XVI. 92 Na hi Kāvyaṃ sastravad upadeśyam, Kaścit kiñcij jānīyād iti pravartate.

21. N. S. XVI. 92

verse it is an instance of this defect. An example of this blemish is :—

‘sa rājā nītikusalaḥ saraḥ kumudaśobhitam
Sarvapriyā vasantaśrīr grīṣme mālaticāgamah’

Here all the four feet contain four complete sentences which are not connected with one another by sense. A verse should be one organic whole yielding a complete proposition in which each part contributes to the whole. In the example mentioned above practically we have four sentences and four propositions having no logical relation with one another. This only indicates the poor craftsmanship of the poet and also his lack of the sense of propriety.

VII. *Nyāyādapeta* (Logical lapse) is defined as *Pramāṇa parivarjitam*²² i.e. an expression devoid of reasoning is an example of this blemish. Abhinavagupta divides it into two (a) *deśakālaviruddha*—defying the limitation of place and time and (b) *Kalāsāstrādi-viruddha*—contradicting with established notions of arts and science etc.

Bhāmaha also follows Bharata and states ‘*deśakālakālā-loka-nyāyāgama-virodhitā* (IV. 28)’

This is the logical lapse of impropriety consisting in statement which is divorced from and is in conflict with the accredited testimony of the recognised sources of knowledge. Abhinavagupta gives two varieties of this defect. The first is opposed to or incompatible with time and place and the second is one which is at variance with the established conclusion of the science of Aesthetics and different disciplines (*Śāstras*). He has given the example of the first type :—

Sauvireṣvasti nagarī Mathurā nāma Viśrutā
Akṣoṭanārikelāḍhyā Yasyāḥ paryanta bhūmayāḥ

‘There is city called Mathurā in Sauvira (the Punjab), whose vicinities abound with oilnuts and coconuts.’ The city of Mathurā is not situated in the Punjab but it is situated in the United Provinces. This shows the lamentable want of the knowledge of geography on the part of the writer. Oilnuts

grow in Kashmere and coconuts in the seaport of Madras and the Gangetic Plain of Bengal. Coconuts flourish in the adjacent regions of the sea and oilnuts in cold mountainous regions. This is in conflict with geographical and topographical data. Abhinavagupta has not given any instance of the second type of defect. Perhaps on the ground that we can easily infer to the examples of such impropriety, e.g., if the Buddhist is represented defending the personality that will be flagrantly inconsistent with his creed because the Buddhist does not believe in the metaphysical reality of a person. Again if a Naiyāyika is to be found to declare the objective world as an illusion like the vijñānavādins it will be a case of logical and philosophical contradiction.

VIII. *Viṣama* (metrical defect) is defined as 'vṛttabhedaḥ'.²³ Lapse in the metrical structure is called metrical defect. If in one verse you find the mixture of two metres, it is a case of *viṣama*. It causes the absence of symmetry. An example of this defect is :—

Avi paśyasi saudham āśritām avirala sumanōmālabhārīṇīm
Here the intended metre is the *vaitālīya*, in the second foot of which there should not be a collocation of six short letters as we have here. Hence this is the defect called *viṣama*. Here the rule of *vṛtta* is not followed.

IX. *Viṣandhi* (disjoined) is defined as *Anupaśliṣṭa śabda*²⁴ i.e. when words, which should combine in sandhi, are kept separate constitute the defect called *viṣandhi*. Here we may note that grammatically want of euphonic combination in a sentence, prose or verse, does not constitute a case of solecism. Sandhi is compulsory²⁵ in a word, which constitutes a part of speech, in *upsarga* and verbal root and in the compound. In other cases it depends on the writers and speakers. But in a verse Sandhi is regarded as compulsory in hemistich. It is made compulsory by poetic convention.

23. N. S. XVI. 93

24. *Ibid.* XVI. 94

25. S. K., p. 175—

Samhitaikapade nityā nityā dhātūpasargayoḥ/

Nityā samāse vākye tu sū vivakṣām apekṣate//

X. *Śabdacyuta* (grammatical impurity) is defined as *Aśābdasya yojanam*.²⁶ If the expression consists of ungrammatical words, it is a fault because it cannot give any meaning. *Abhinavagupta* has not given its example thinking it to be very much known.

It deserves to be mentioned in this connection that *Bharata* was perhaps the originator or one of the ancient writers on poetical merits and demerits. He has not a clearcut division of *Śabdadoṣa* (formal defect) and *Arthadoṣa* (metieral defect). As a matter of historical fact the logical demarcation of formal from material defects occurred at a very late period. It is only in *Vāmana* we find the first logical division of it. *Vāmana* and *Daṇḍin* virtually toe the track of *Bharata*. Though there is some noticeable improvement in treatment. Furthermore *Bharata* was interested in dramaturgy and his reference to purely poetic composition is only a matter of subsidiary importance with him. Of course these poetic defects are common to Drama. The germs are developed in subsequent works on poetics. It however shows that even in ancient times the science of criticism was not unknown. Poetry or Drama never enjoyed the prerogative of unmixed and indiscriminate admiration. There were critics who evolved the standard of evaluation of the relative merits. Originally three principles, viz., the figures of speech (*alaṅkāra*), merits (*guṇas*) and defects (*doṣas*), occupied the minds of critics. With the growth of logical thought the standard of criticism arose higher and higher in this field. Ultimately we come to *Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa* who consolidated the results of these speculations of centuries, which were carried on without interruption for a long period of time. Thus it has become imperative for the modern scholars to trace the evolution of the concepts of the poetics, which became clearer and more logical in each subsequent stage. It is rather a pity that progress in original thinking came to a dead stop with *Mammaṭa*. His successors only dittoed his views with slight difference. There were, however, some original thinkers in the field of Sanskrit poetics, such as

Appaya Dikṣita and Jagannātha. But their works are fragmentary in character and do not cover the entire gamut of poetical speculations. It will be our endeavour to trace out changes and developments both in form and matter from the comparatively primitive stage to latest historical developments in field of speculation on defects.

CHAPTER III

BHĀMAHA'S SPECULATION ON DOŚA

A comparison of treatment of *dośas* by Bharata and Bhāmaha clearly shows that the latter has followed the former and has taken some of the poetic faults in name and substance from Bharata's work. But we cannot lose sight of one important fact that Bhāmaha in his elaborate treatment is certainly ahead of his predecessor. Besides dealing with the list of ten faults of Bharata he has spoken of other sets of faults and enumerated ten more such defects which relate to literary composition, such as those of logic and simile. At the same time it is interesting to note that he does not agree with Bharata that *dośas* are positive entities and mar poetic beauty universally. He maintains that under special circumstances they enhance the poetic effect also. For instance the blemish of *Ekārtha* (redundance)¹ under the influence of fear, sorrow, jealousy as also of delight and wonder will heighten the poetic effect. All his successors agreed with him on this point, which we shall show in the proper context. In his list he speaks of faults which arise from improper use of usual words or collection of words forming a clause or sentence and also improper and unmusical sounds. Here, of course, we do not find any *fundamentum divisionis* and phonetic, verbal, material faults and also faults of individual words and flaws of sentences are all lumped together. The logical classification and division were effected by Mammāṭabhaṭṭa and his followers. Bhāmaha has included what are purely logical defects in the list of literary blemishes, though they have literal bearing on literary composition. Here we see a distinctive advance in the conception and elaboration of literary faults from the inchoate tabulation of faults in Bharata. It is quite surmisable that all these advances were made possible by the speculation of previous

1. Bhāmaha, IV, 14—

Bhayaśckābhyaṣṭyāsu harṣa-vismayayorapī/

yathā'ha gaccha gaccheti punaruktam na tad viduḥ//

writers referred to by Bhāmaha, but they are only names to us as their works are not extant.

It is extremely a knotty problem whether Bhāmaha preceded or succeeded Daṇḍin. *Prima facie* Bhāmaha seems to controvert some of the views of Daṇḍin and the latter too, seems to condemn him in several places. This mutual recrimination confronts a modern student with an intractable problem. It is probable that they follow different schools founded by previous writers, though both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin have received respectful recognition from subsequent writers like Abhinavagupta. Bhāmaha's definitions of *alaṅkāras* have been quoted with approval by Abhinavagupta. Daṇḍin's extreme elaboration of *upamā* and also other *alaṅkāras* does not seem to have much influenced the later writers. Bhāmaha's criticism of the division of Poetry into *Gauḍī* and *Vaidarbhī* is not approved by Daṇḍin, but Vāmana and Rudraṭa have elaborated his conception of *Rīti* (style or mode of composition). Ānandavardhana has given a critical appraisal of the merits of the form of composition, of letter, words, compounds which are the distinguishing marks of the *Rīti* (style). He has shown that the different forms and styles are not possessed of intrinsic merits but are necessary media of *Rasa*. After all Bhāmaha and so also Daṇḍin are persuaded that the charm of Poetry lies in the selection of words and their different modes of expression which constitute *alaṅkāras*. They include even *rasa*, etc. under different *alaṅkāras*. Vāmana, though more scientific and precise than the two, does not find anything other than *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras* as the inner essence of Poetry.

The *guṇas* are nothing but the agreeable sounds and meanings. It is therefore quite natural that Bhāmaha does not speak of *Doṣas* (faults) other than those pertaining to *Śabda* (word) and *artha* (meanings—primary or secondary). Rudraṭa among the ancient writers, speaks of *rasadoṣa*. Ānandavardhana regards *Rasa* as the most fundamental principle of Poetry and he develops the conception of defects of *rasa* with precision and insight.

But for the work of Bhāmaha we would have no means to trace the development of the evolution of the speculation in the field of Poetics. Bhāmaha is brief and not elaborate. His diction is not as agreeable as that of Daṇḍin but he shows greater logical insight and sense of proportion than Daṇḍin. Bhāmaha's treatment of *Doṣa* is more comprehensive and more scientific than that of Daṇḍin. It is noteworthy that Daṇḍin is elaborate where Bhāmaha is brief. And sometimes he dismisses with scant courtesy the elaborate treatment of *doṣas* and *alaṅkāras* by Bhāmaha. These two writers are rather complementary to each other. There are points of agreement, but those of difference are much greater than the former. Daṇḍin is more poetical than logical whereas Bhāmaha seems to be the opposite. It is a historical fact that Bhāmaha's influence on later writers in so far as the treatment of *doṣa* is taken into account, is much more pronounced than that of Daṇḍin. Even Vāmana who obviously follows Daṇḍin in the concept of *Riti* and *guṇa*, has taken up the conception of Poetry as consisting of both *śabda* (word) and *artha* (meaning) from Bhāmaha, and his treatment of *doṣa* is influenced by that of Bhāmaha. In spite of their difference both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin are agreed upon the necessity of scrupulous avoidance of defects in poetic compositions.² Both of them are emphatic on the condemnation of bad poetry and Bhāmaha seems to go one step further.

We now propose to deal with *doṣas* in the *Kāvyaṅkāra* of Bhāmaha. We give four lists of defects, two consisting of ten *doṣas* each in the First and Fourth Chapters of his work. In the second chapter he deals with seven *upamā-doṣas* (defects of simile) and lastly he discusses the logical fallacies in the Fifth Chapter.

2. Cf. Bhāmaha, I. 11—

Sarvathā padam apy ekam na nigadyam avadyavat/

Vilakṣmaṇā hi kāvyena duḥsuteneva nindyate//

Daṇḍin, I. 7—

Tad alpam api nopekṣyam kāvye duṣṭam kathaṅcana/

Syād vapuḥ sundaram api śvitreṇaikena durbhagam//

The following is the detailed study of each of these *doṣas*.

A. The First Ten Defects

- I. Neyārtha—Far-fetchedness.
- II. Kliṣṭa—Obstruction of the sense.
- III. Anyārtha—Disappearance of the sense.
- IV. Avācaka—Inexpressiveness.
- V. Gūḍha-śabdābhidhāna—Hidden meaning.
- VI. Ayuktimat—Improper.
- VII. Śruti-duṣṭa—Offensive to the ear.
- VIII. Artha-duṣṭa—Implicitly indecent.
- IX. Kalpanāduṣṭa—Difficult conception.
- X. Śrutikaṣṭha—Unmelodious or harsh in sound.

I. *Neyārtha* (Far-fetchedness) is a fault when the proper meaning does not follow from the logical order of words, but has to be forcibly dragged out by clever persons according to their own desire without any basis on the laws of language. The cardinal rule regarding speech is that all the word should be employed to give the intended meaning. If such words are not employed there is violation of the laws of language. It follows that this defect consists in the use of insufficient words. Daṇḍin appears to support this view indirectly in his statement—

‘arthavyaktir aneyatvam arthasya’

His use of the word ‘*aneyatvam*’ and his example clarify the above statment. An example of this defect is ‘*Māyeya bhadrā*’, i.e., deceit is auspicious. Bhāmaha calls it ‘*Aśādhvi prakalpanā*’ (improper supposition). Deceit is never auspicious, so this statement is an improper supposition. If however we introduce ‘*Veṇudāreḥ*’ and understand the *Māyā* belonging to *Veṇudāri*, then there is some sense. He was an *asura* (demon) and so his *māyā* may be useful for some good purpose and being an *asura* he must excel in *māyā*.

II. *Kliṣṭa* (Obstruction of the sense) is a defect in which the comprehension of intended meaning is remote and the composition is laboured. Bhāmaha³ does not elaborate it but

3. Bhāmaha. I. 88—

Neyārthaṃ nīyate yukto yasyārthaḥ kṛtibhir balāt/

Śabdanyāyanupārūḍhaḥ Kathaṅcit svābhisandhinā//

briefly defines as “*Kliṣṭam vyāvahitam vidyāt*”, i.e. where the meaning is obstructed it becomes the case of the flaw called *Kliṣṭa*. Vāmana agrees with this view and illustrates it as—

‘*Dakṣātmaajādayita-Vallabha-Vedikānām*’

i.e., Chandrakāntavedikānām (of silver platforms). This meaning can be comprehended only in a very roundabout way and thus it is a defect. It puzzles the mind of the hearer and is censured.

III. *Anyārtha* (Disappearance of the sense) is a defect where the accepted meaning of a word is absent. An example of this defect is given by Bhāmaha—

‘*Vijahrus tasya tāḥ śokaṃ kṛdāyām*’,

i.e., they disported his sorrow in love’s dalliance. This nonsensical statement is caused by upsarga ‘*vi*’. Because the root ‘*hr*’ if preceded by ‘*vi*’ means to play and not to take away. In the example cited above the intended meaning is ‘they took off his sorrow by playing’ but by using ‘*vijahruḥ*’ the meaning is changed. The *upasarga*⁴ changes the meaning of the verbal roots, e.g. *Āhāra*, *saṃhāra*, *Vihāra*, etc.

IV. *Avācaka* (Inexpressiveness) is an expression which is not universally accepted as connected with the intended meaning. It is a fault because it is unintelligible to the reader. Bhāmaha gives an example of this fault as—

‘*himāpāhāmitradharaiḥ Vyāptam Vyoma*’,

i.e., the sky is covered with clouds. Here the word ‘*himāpāhāmitradhara*’ is made to evolve the meaning ‘cloud’. *Hima* is snow, its *apahā* (destroyer) is fire, its *amitra* (foe) is water and that which carries it (water) is a cloud. This roundabout expression is certainly a defect and it is called *avācaka* by Bhāmaha. Bhoja⁵ takes it to be an example of the defect *Kliṣṭatva*.

V. *Gūḍha śabdābhidhāna* (Hidden meaning)—use of difficult expression with a hidden meaning is a defect. Poetry with

4. S. K. p. 175. *upasargena dhātvartho balādanyaḥ pratiyate/ prahārāhārasaṃhāra vihāraparihāravat//*

5. S. K. A. I. 11 – *dūre yasyārthamvittiḥ Kliṣṭam neṣṭam hi tat satām.*

such an expression fails to appeal even to a learned reader who finds it difficult to appreciate the beauty on account of it. An example of this defect is—

‘asitartitugadricchitsvahn̄kṣitām patir advidṛk,
amidbhiḥ śubhradr̄ḡḍṛṣṭair dviṣo jeghniyīṣṭa Vah’,

i.e., ‘May the son of fire destroy your foes entirely by his white and terrible glances; he, who is the piercer of mountain and lord of the inhabitants of Svarga and is possessed of more than two eyes’. Here in this verse we find the clear example of Gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna. (a) asitarti, he who has a black (asita) path (ṛti)—Fire, his son (tuk) is Lord Skanda. (b) adricchit = piercer (chit) of a mountain (adri). (c) svahn̄kṣitām patiḥ—the lord (pati) of the dwellers (Kṣitām) of heaven (svah). He is the commander of the army of gods. (d) advidṛk— not having two (dvi) eyes (ḍṛk); hence, many-eyed, may destroy again and again (jeghniyat) your enemies (vaḥ dviṣaḥ) with his fearful (amidbhiḥ) and white (śubhra) glances (ḍṛṣṭa). We may note the difference between this *doṣa* and *avācaka*. Here meaning is directly conveyed though not apparent. While in the *avācaka* the intended meaning is not traceable to the word directly.

VI. *Ayuktimat* (Improper) is a fault if a poet makes the cloud, the moon, the wind, the bee, the bird Hārta or Ca-kravāka the messenger in Poetry. How can creatures without speech or with indistinct speech perform the duty of a messenger? Such delineations do not fit in with reason. Hence, it suffers from impropriety which is a great defect. However, Bhāmaha modifies his statement and observes that if these are addressed by one from an excess of longing it is not a fault. In the face of Kālidāsa’s Meghadūta which is a perfect piece of Poetry how can this objection stand? Thus he declares that such employment is justified if it is done by poets of outstanding genius.

VII. *Śrutiduṣṭa* (offensive to the ear). This defect occurs where words conveying good sense remind of another vulgar meaning. Bhāmaha enumerates some words which are objectionable and defective, e. g.

Viṭ—means Vaiśya (merchant class); also excrement.

Varcas—‘valour’, also ‘semen’

Klinna—'wet', also 'drenched in blood'.

Chinna—'cut', also 'broken'.

Vānta—'given out' also 'vomited'.

Pravṛtti—'engagement', also 'discharge'.

Pracāra—'broadcasting', also 'motion'.

Dharṣita—'insult', also 'outrage on woman'.

Udgāra—'an outflow', also 'belching'.

Visarga—'release', also 'emission', and

Yantrita—'fixed up', also 'bound in intercourse'. Bhāmaha further gives a list of words which give as a whole good sense but their portion reminds a bad sense, e. g. *hiranyaretāḥ* (fire). Here the whole word '*hiranyaretāḥ*' means 'fire', whereas the part '*retāḥ*' reminds one of the bad sense 'semen'. The following words belong to this class—*sambādha*, *pelava*, *vākkāṭava* and the like. Objection to the use of such words lies in the fact that they remind vulgar meaning which is repulsive to the hearer for whose edification Poetry is composed. Vāmana regards it as an example of *āślīla* because they produce the feeling of shame (*vrīḍādayi*).

VIII. *Arthaduṣṭa* (implicitly indecent) is a fault when a statement uttered gives also an idea of improper significance, e.g.

hantum eva pravṛttasya stabdhasya vivaraīṣṇaḥ/

Patanam jāyate'vaśyam Kṛcchreṇa punarunnatiḥ//

IX. *Kalpanāduṣṭa*—If two words are so juxtaposed that out of them a new combination comes out which suggests indecent meaning, it constitutes a case of *Kalpanāduṣṭ*, e.g.

'sa śauryābharāṇaḥ'

This expression denotes one whose ornament is valour. But in bringing together the two words *saurya* and *ābharāṇa* we get the combination of *yābhā* which means sexual intercourse. Hence, it is a blemish. This has been regarded by later writers as a case of *Visandhi*.⁶

6. Vāmana II. 2. 7-8. Virūpapadasandhi visandhiḥ and padasandher vairūpyam viśeṣo' śīlatvaṃ kaṣṭatvaṃ ca.

Cf. Rudraṭa VI. 14 who illustrates Visandhi as 'mantharayā bharata āhutaḥ'.

X. *Śrutikaṣṭa*—is unmelodious or harsh in sound. Words like 'ajihladat' are harsh of sound. People with sensitive hearing do not like them. Bhāmaha further states that words like 'gaṇḍa', 'klinna', etc. are *grāmya* and are not used by people of refined society. Bhāmaha however observes that some of these objectionable words lose their deterring effect and attain grace due to peculiarity of their position; just as collyrium though despicable in itself enhances beauty when applied to the beautiful eyes of a damsel. Green leaves appear pretty when interwoven With flowers in a garland. Thus the word 'gaṇḍa' is *grāmya* if used alone but becomes graceful when combined with words like 'pāṇḍu'. This idea of the inconstancy of some of the faults observed by Bhāmaha is taken up and elaborated by later writers which we shall observe in their proper context.

B. The Second List of Ten Doṣas

- I. *Apārtha*—absence of collective meaning.
- II. *Vyārtha*--with conflicting statement.
- III. *Ekārtha*—tautology.
- IV. *Sasaṃśaya*—ambiguity.
- V. *Apakrama*—reversal of order of statement.
- VI. *Śabdāhīna*—ungrammatical.
- VII. *Yatibhraṣṭa*—deviation from the rules of metrical pause.
- VIII. *Bhinnavṛtta*—metrical defect.
- IX. *Viśandhi*—disjunction of euphonic combination.
- X. *Deśa*—*kāla*-*kalā*-*loka*-*nyāyāgama* - *virodhi* — inconsistency with regard to place, etc.

I. *Apārtha* (absence of collective meaning). That combination of words which as a whole has no meaning, constitutes a fault called *apārtha*, e. g. 'Ten pomegranates, Six cakes' etc. In this connection the observation of Patañjali⁷ may be noted. He says, "A string of unconnected words such as cow,

7. *Mahābhāṣya*. I. p. 38—"gaur aśvah puruṣo hastī : Daśa dādi-māni śadapūpāḥ Kuṇḍamajājinam palālapindah adharorukam etat kumāryāḥ sphāyikṛtasya Pitā pratisinaḥ."

horse, man, elephant does not convey a complete sense as there is no connection between them owing to lack of *Ākāṅkṣā* (Syntactic Expectancy). The same view has been maintained by the *Mīmāṃsaka*⁸ also.

A word is a collection of letters having a meaning and ending in nominal or verbal termination. Collection of words dependent on each other constitutes a sentence relating to a single idea. This simple distinction of a sentence as a collection of words is found as early as in the *Bṛhaddevatā*⁹.

Bhāmaha raises a question that how can there be congregation of things which do not co-exist at the same time and in the same place. *Varnas*, i. e. syllables are uttered successively and when the second is uttered the first is perished. But the sentence is felt as one unit. It is on this ground that Vaiyākaraṇa's postulate *sphoṭa*, a metaphysical entity which is eternal and imperishable. This succession of syllables does not affect the numerical identity of *sphoṭa*. *Sphoṭa* is not generated but only made manifest by the syllables uttered in succession. There are degrees of clearness in manifestation. The first and successive syllables are not contributing factors to the clearness of manifestation, which attains its maximum when the final syllable is uttered. This is the theory of *Sphoṭa* sponsored by Vaiyākaraṇas from very ancient times. According to them the word is eternal (*nitya*). Bhāmaha has adversely criticised this theory. He, therefore, sets forth the theory of Naiyāyikas, who also do not believe in any eternal word. One of the theories accounts for the synthetic unit of words and sentences by appeal to experience. Those who believe that words are momentary sounds have to admit that when the first syllable is uttered it perishes immediately and so does not co-exist with second or third, etc. How can there be a grouping or collection of such evanescent entities? A

8. T. V. I. P. 455—

“Ākāṅkṣā sannidhānaṅca योग्या ceti ca trayam /
sambandhakāraṇatvena kṛtam nānantaraśrutih //

9. Br. Dev. 11. 117 “Padasaṅghātajam vākyam varṇasaṅghātajam padam.

group or collection is only possible for things which co-exist, e. g. books, men, etc. This is out of the question with regard to syllables (*varṇas*). Yes, one of the theories maintains that though the syllables are evanescent and perish immediately after they are uttered, their impressions persist and these combined with last syllables give the notion of whole word or sentence. Of course all these theories have been subject to controversies and none has commanded universal acceptance. Bhāmaha is aware of this controversy and so he does not commit himself to any particular theory. Being of a logical bent of mind, he is not afraid of logical and metaphysical issues. He therefore takes stock of logical defects which are set forth in works of logic and does not think that they are irrelevant from the standpoint of literary criticism. Daṇḍin disposes of this question by a short remark that these are stiff for the students of poetics. Here lies the fundamental difference of these two exponents of the discipline. Bhāmaha is inclined to raise the literary criticism to the level of science (*śāstra*) whereas Daṇḍin is averse to philosophical speculation, which he considers to be out of place in a work on poetics (*Alaṅkāraśāstra*), Bhāmaha however does not enter into a detailed analysis of different theories for avoiding a diversion. He implicitly refers the curious students to standard works of logic. He now comes to the matter of present discussion, viz. poetic demerits.

Apārtha is a blemish that when the collection of words does not give a related whole, but consists of rather several unconnected statements, it becomes *apārtha*, i. e. lacking in collected meaning such as 'ten pomegranates, six cakes' etc.

II. *Vyārtha* (with conflicting statement).¹⁰ When the subsequent statement contradicts the previous one it is the case of the defect called *Vyārtha*, e. g.

sakhi mānaṁ priye dhehi laghutāmasya mā gamah /
bhartus chandānuvartinyaḥ prema ghnanti na hi striyaḥ //
i. e., 'O friend : do show your anger towards your lover,

10. Bhāmaha. IV. 9.

Pūrvāparārvāghātād viparyayakaram.../

do not become mild to him; women who follow the wishes of their husbands do not hamper their love'. Here '*mānam dhehi*' (show anger) and '*chandānuvartinyaḥ*' (followers of husband's wishes) are opposed to each other and thus produce contradictory effect.

III. *Ekārtha* (tautology)¹¹—where statements convey the same meaning as stated before, it is a case of *Ekārtha*. It is called *Punarukta* by other writers. It is divided into *śabdapunarukta* and *arthapunarukta*. Bhāmaha does not exemplify the former and calls it *sthūla* (obvious). He further notes that repetition is not defect if the same word is repeated under the influence of fear, sorrow, jealousy, etc., e. g. "gaccha gaccha", i. e. go away, go away. Bhāmaha however exemplifies the *arthapunarukta* as follows—

Tām utkamanasaṃ nūnam karoti dhvanir ambhasām /
 Saudheṣu ghanamuktānām praṇālimukhapātinām //

i. e., "the sound produced by the rain falling from the clouds on the roof of the house and discharging through the mouth of spouts render her anxious". Here the word '*utka*' includes the meaning of '*manaḥ*' in its own meaning and so the use of the word '*manas*' is futile. Daṇḍin follows Bhāmaha. His example is—

utkām unmanayantye bālām tadalakatviṣaḥ /

i. e., 'the clouds which are the same colour as her hair, make the unsophisticated girl highly perturbed'. The *raison d'être* of the defect lies in purposelessness of the repetition of the sense.

IV. *Saśaṃśaya* (ambiguity), It is defined as—

Śruteḥ sāmānydharmānām viśeṣasyānudāhṛteḥ /¹²

i. e. the State of conflicting judgment of mind is called doubt, which arises from the recognition (hearing) of properties common to many objects but with no differentiating quality set out. Where the speech produces the above—described

11. Ibid. IV. 12.

Yad abhinnārtham anṇyaṃ tad ekārthaṃ pracakṣate /

12. Ibid. IV. 17.

state of mind it constitutes the defect *Śasaṃśaya*. The sentence is meant to give a definite meaning and not an indefinite one which tends to create confusion and tension in the readers' mind. An example of this fault is—

Vyālavanto durārohā ratnavantaḥ phalānvitāḥ /

Viṣamā bhūbhṛtas tebhyo bhayam āśu pramādinām //

'Kings or mountains are causes of fear to the careless, which (kings or mountains) are with rogues or snakes, are difficult to access or to climb, possess gems, have fruits and are crooked'. Here the hearer is in doubt as to whether the verse refers to a king or to a mountain because both of them have the common properties—such as, *vyālavattva*, *durārohatva*, *ratnavattva*, *phalānvitatva* and *viṣamatva*, and the differentiating quality is wanting. It is obvious that *Bhāmaha* gives the *raison d'être* of doubt as a physical event in conformity with the *Nyāyasūtra*¹³ of *Gautama* and the *Bhāṣya* of *Vātsyāyana*.¹⁴

V. *Apakrama*—Reversal of the order of statements. Syntactical regularity demands that the things attributed should follow the order of the first statements. Violation of this regularity results in defect *Apakrama*¹⁵. The example of this defect is—

rathāṅgaśūle bibhrāṇau pātām vaḥ śambhuśārṅgiṇau /

'Māy Śiva and Viṣṇu protect you; they, who carry the disc and trident'. Now it creates confusion in the mind of hearer due to the reversal of the statement of adjectives.

VI. *Śabdahīna* (ungrammatical)—It is a defect in which the words are not approved by the rules of *Pāṇini* and *Kātyāyana*. This is vital defect because it is not found in the usage of *āpta* (authoritative person). The word '*āpta*' is significant and has been defined in the *Nyāya Bhāṣya* as *āptaḥ khalu śākṣātkṛtadharma*¹⁶, i. e. one who has perceived things by his

13. N. S. I. 1. 23.

14. Vide V. B. on *ibid*.

15. *Bhāmaha* IV. 20.—

yathopādeśaṃ kramaśo nirdeśo'tra kramo mataḥ /

tad apetam viparyāsād ity ākhyātām Apakramam //

16. V. B. I. 1. 7.

own intuition. He must be free from *bhrama* (error), *pramāda* (invigilance) and *vipralipsā* (will to deceit). Patañjali defines it, 'āpto nāmā'nubhavana vastutattvasya kārtsnyena niścayavān'.

Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa has also quoted in his work *Mañjūṣā*—*'āptaḥ pratyayitā-viśvastaḥ'*. An example of this fault is—

Sphurattaḍidvalayino vitatāmbho garīyasaḥ /
tejas tirayataḥ sauraṃ ghanān paśya divo'bhitāḥ //

'Look at the clouds all round the sky which are encircled with flashing lightnings, which are big With water and obstruct effulgence of the sun'. Here the use 'divo'bhitāḥ' is against the rule of Kātyāyana—'abhitāḥ paritāḥ samayānikhaṣāhāpra-tiyoge'pi'¹⁷ by which the objective case is enjoined with the word 'abhitāḥ' but here the genitive case has been. 'Divam abhitāḥ' would have been the correct form.

VII. *Yatibhrāṣṭa*—Deviation from the rules of metrical pause. It is a blemish where the rules of metrical pause—caesura—have been ignored. As for example,

Vidyutvantas tamālāsītavapuṣa ime vāribāhā dhvananti /
'these clouds, shining with lightnings and dark as the *tamāla* trees are thundering', Here the *yati* (caesura) falls between the letters *ā* and *si* of the word *asita* which is the middle of the word. It is against the rule of Metrics. Vāmana¹⁸ has clearly and elaborately discussed and pointed out that *yati* in the middle of the nominal and verbal forms is a fault.

VIII. *Bhinnavṛtta*—Metrical defect. Where the use of long or short vowel is in the wrong place or there is absence or short vowel is in the wrong place or there is absence or abundance of them it constitutes the defect called *Bhinnavṛtta*. As for example,

Bhramati bhramaramālā Kānaneṣūnmadā' sau /
Virahitaramaṇiko 'rhasyadya gantum //

'this garland of intoxicated bees is roaming round the forest; you, separated from sweet-heart, should go now'. Here in the fourth quarter of this verse there is omission of one syllable, the want of which makes the quarter jar upon the ear.

17. Kātyāyana on Pāṇini II. 3. 2.

18. Vāmana. II. 2. 3-4.

IX. *Visandhi*—Disjunction of necessary euphonic combination. It is a defect when there is absence of euphonic combination in a verse. Bhāmaha cites an example of this defect as—

Kānte induśīroratne ādadhāna udamśunī /

Pātām vaḥ śambhuśarvānyau... .. //

‘May Śiva and pārvati protect you, who wear beautiful and resplendent moon and forehead gem’. Here there is no *sandhi* between the final letter of the first word and the initial letter of the second word. Similar is the case with the following words also. Such a collocation of words is rhetorically a defect although it is not ungrammatical because the dual number ending in *i*, *ū* and *e* are called *Pragṛhya* and are debarred from sandhi by the rule of Pāṇini. It should be noted that in poetry this type of euphonic licence is permissible if it occurs only once.

X. *Deśa-kāla-kalā-loka-Nyāya-Āgama-Virodhi*. This is very obvious and Bhāmaha takes them up one by one separately.

(a) *Deśa-Virodhi*—inconsistency with regard to place. “Yā deśe dravyasambhūti rāpi vā nopadiśyate. Tattat virodhi Vijñeyam svabhāvāt tad yathocyate”, i. e., whichever object is described as being produced in certain countries or as not being so produced, in describing the country contrarywise, it becomes a defect named *Deśavirodhi*. e. g.

Malaye Kandaropānta-rūdha-kalāgarudrume /

Sugandhi-kusumā namrā rājante devadāravaḥ //

The trees of *Agaru* and *Devadāru* are not available in tropics of the south in which the Malaya mountain stands. *Agaru* is available in Agartala of Tripura State and *Devadāru* trees in the Himalaya region. This shows the poet’s poor knowledge of the geography and hence it is defect.

(b) *Kāla-Virodhi* is a defect where the statement is inconsistent with the season, e. g. to describe mango blossoms in the winter is a defect named *Kālavirodhi*.

(c) *Kalā-Virodhi*—inconsistency with regard to crafts is a flaw—

Kalā saṃkalanāprajñā śilpānyasyāś ca gocaraḥ /
Viparyastaṃ tathaivāhus tadvirodhakaraṃ yathā //

Kalā includes fine arts and mechanical crafts. A statement in violation of the rules governing them is liable to be defect called Kalā-virodhi. This may again be subdivided into different types due to difference of arts. Bhāmaha cites an example of a statement against the rules of Music and says that contradiction in the case of other arts also constitutes a blemish.

(d) Loka-Virodhi-inconsistency with worldly usage. World is divided into immovable (inanimate) and moveable (animate). Divergence from the nature of them is a fault. A statement inconsistent with regard to the nature of the world will make poetry unreal, e. g.

teṣāṃ kaṭataṭabhraṣṭair gajānām madabindubhiḥ /
prāvartata nandī ghorā hasty-aśva-ratha-vāhinī //
Dhāvatām sainya-vāhānām phena-vāri-mukha-cyutam /
Cakāra Jānudaghnā'pān pratidiṃ mukhamadhvanaḥ //

Here army of the elephants and horses is described. The ruts coming out from the cheeks of the elephants flow in the form of a big river and the foam coming out from the mouth of the horses make the path knee-deep with water. This description is too much exaggerated to make it real. Such poetry produces repulsion in the mind of the reader for whose edification it exists.

(e) Nyāya stands for śāstras—Nyāyāḥ śāstrāṇi—which deal with three ends of life (tri-varga), viz. Dharma (duty), Artha (wealth) and Kāma (pleasure). To this list we may add Daṇḍanīti (Political Science) etc. That which does not conform to these śāstras is called Nyāyavirodhi (contradictory to science). As an instance of this defect Bhāmaha refers to the famous story of Vatsarāja Udayana in the Br̥hatkathā.

“The king of Ujjayini wanted to marry his daughter with Udayana. He thought that only he (udayan) would make a good match but he was his enemy and the King of Ujjayini wanted to imprison him. He thought out a device.

Vatsa took delight in trapping elephants by melody. He used to produce it by playing upon a lute which he had got from Vāsuki. The King of Ujjayini got a dummy elephant prepared to deceive him after the pattern of the Greeks who had also sent a wooden horse with warriors to defeat the Trojans. He put a good many warriors in it under the command of Sālaṅkāyana. They attacked him while he was alone in the forest. But it was not easy to defeat him. He is described to fight bravely and killed many warriors. Ultimately he was attacked from behind. He fainted and was taken prisoner”.

Bhāmaha shows the defect of diplomacy in this version that Udayana is described without a spy. He fails to know the deceit of the elephant with a hundred warriors in it. There can be no government and state-craft without a spy (cāra)¹⁹. Bhāmaha shows that it is against common experience that Udayana killed many of the warriors and the latter even with several types of weapons could not kill Udayana.

Thus the improbability lies in the fact that a number of warriors were killed by a single individual. Bhāmaha makes attacks against poets who so narrated Udayana's story as to run counter to the dictates of Śāstra and worldly experience. The poet appears to be very careless in describing such absurd situations and events. This also reflects on his knowledge of warfare and things of battle. Bhāmaha means to emphasise that a poet should be equipped with knowledge of arts and sciences so that he can give a faithful picture of the activities of the heroes and heroines and the dramatic personae. Thus in 'Namo' stu tebhyo vidvadbhyo ye'bhiprāyam kave rimam / sāstralokāvapāsyāivam nayanti naya-vedinaḥ' // Bhāmaha gives here an ironical compliments to a poet who does not

19. S. V. II. 117—

Anutsūtrapadanyāsa sadvṛttiḥ sannibandhanā /

'Sabdavidyeva no bhāti rājanītir apaspaṣā //

cf. Malli's quotation from the Nītivākyaṃṛta on Bhāravi I. 4

“Svaparamaṇḍale Kāryākāryāvalokane cārās cakṣuṃṣi Kṣiti-patīnām”.

know how to describe the ways of a king and utterly ignores the science of warfare and human experience.

(f) Āgamavirodhi—A description which is contradictory to scriptures (Āgama) constitutes a fault, since Dharma-Śāstras are final authorities. You cannot ask reasons for their assertions nor dictate terms (Niyogaparyanuyogānarhatvāt). The example given by Bhāmaha is not clear. His successors, however, like Daṇḍin and others have given clear examples. To bathe during the night is prohibited and if it is described without special occasion like the Lunar eclipse, it would involve the breach of the injunctions laid down in the Scriptures.

C. The Seven Faults of Simile

Bhāmaha Mentions seven faults of Simile (upamā-doṣas) after his predecessor, Medhāvin.²⁰ They are—

- I. Hinatā—Deficiency.
- II. Asambhava—Impossibility.
- III. Liṅgabhedha—Disparity of gender.
- IV. Vacobhedha—Diversity of number.
- V. Viparyaya—Dissimilarity.
- VI. Upamānādhikatva—Redundancy in upamāna.
- VII. Asādrśya—Dissimilarity.

I. *Hinatā*—Deficiency in the standard of comparison (upamāna) is a defect of simile. It is repulsive to the fine taste of a connoisseur. As for example—

Sa mārutākampītapītavāsā bībhṛat
 salīlaṃ śaśībhāsam abjam /
 Yadupravīraḥ praḡṛhitaśārṅgaḥ
 sendrāyudho meghaivā'babhāse //

'The hero of Yadu clan, with his yellow dress shaking from the wind, playfully bearing his conch which shone like the moon and holding his śārṅga bow looked like a cloud accompanied with a rainbow'. Here Lord Kṛṣṇa, who is wearing

yellow garment, bearing his moon-white conch and holding his bow śārṅga is compared with a cloud with rainbow. This simile is defective because here with the *upameya* there are three adjectives while with the *upamāna* only one is set out. The features corresponding to the 'pitavāsah' and 'śaśibhāsa-mabjam' are not set out in the *upamāna*. That is, the two objects the moon and the lightning which resemble the conch and yellow garment have been left. Hence the defect Deficiency.

II. *Asambhava*—Impossibility—is a fault when something absolutely impossible is mentioned. Bhāmaha quotes a verse of Śākhāvardhana to illustrate it.

niṣpetur āsyād iva tasya dīptāḥ śārāḥ
dhanurmaṇḍala madhyabhājah /
Jājvalyamānā iva vāridhārā dinārdha-
bhājah pariveśiṇo'rkāt //

'The burning arrows emerged from the middle of his bended bow. They looked as if they were coming from the mouth; just as effulgent showers of water falling from the sun at midday when surrounded with a halo'. The burning arrows coming from the bows are compared with effulgent showers of rain falling from the sun. But how could the burning stream of water fall from the sun? This comparison is certainly impossible and defective. It should be noted that Mammaṭabhaṭṭa takes it to be defect of the meaning and remarks that it is an impropriety (*anaucitya*) of meaning.

III. *Liṅgabhedā*—Disparity of Gender—is a fault when the gender of the object compared is different from that of the standard of comparison. For example—

avigāhyo'si nārīṇām ananyamanasām api /
Viṣamopalabhinnormir āpagevottīrṣataḥ //

'You are unfathomable even to ladies devoted to you as a river whose waves are broken by rugged stone to a person desirous to cross it'. Here the *upameya* (object compared) 'tvam' (the King) is masculine while the *upamāna* (the object compared with) 'āpagā' (river) is feminine. Similarly 'nārīṇām' and 'uttīrṣataḥ' are in different genders. Thus this type of simile suffers from the disparity of gender.

IV. *Vacobheda*—Diversity of Number in simile—is a fault when the *upamāna* (object compared with) and *upameya* differ in number. In the above-cited example, the words 'titirṣataḥ' and 'nārīṇām' have different numbers; the former is in singular whereas the latter has plural number. Thus it is a case of the Diversity of Number which is a fault.

Bhāmaha raises an objection here that diversity of gender cannot be treated as a blemish in view of the usages of great poets. There are several examples that words like *pāṇiḥ* of masculine gender are compared with the words like *kamalam* of the neuter gender. In reply to this objection Bhāmaha admits that such usages are indeed frequent but he adds that such comparisons between words of the masculine and feminine gender is not desired.

According to others the difference in gender between standard of comparison and object compared is absolutely prohibited. Daṇḍin²¹ brushes aside this point simply remarking neither difference in gender and number nor inferiority or superiority at which the critics are not displeased is sufficient to constitute a blemish in simile. Vāmana in his *Kāvyālaṅkāra-Śūtra* clearly mentions that disparity of genders in cases of masculine and neuter is allowable. The forms of the two words in the two genders are similar, e.g. 'Candram'iva mukhaṃ paśyati'. But where the forms are different such diversity of genders however is not allowable, e. g. 'Induriva mukhaṃ bhāti'. Though the Kāmadhanu observes that the expression 'evaṃprāyantu necchanti' indicates audāsīnya (indifference) of Vāmana in this matter. Vāmana relaxes this rule in cases of simile employed in ordinary parlance, e.g. 'sa tasya chāye'va.' Here Śaḥ (masculine) is compared with chāyā (feminine).

V. *Viparyaya*—is dissimilarity between *upamāna* (the object compared with) and the *upameya* (the object compared). Dissimilarity may be due to *hinatva* (inferiority) and

21. K. A. II. 51—

na liṅgavacanā bhinne na hinādhikā'tpi vā /
upamādūṣaṇāyā'laṃ yatrodvego na dhīmatām //

adhiakatva (superiority). And thus this defect is of two types. Bhāmaha exemplifies these two types in the following order :

(a) *Viparyaya* of the inferior type—

Kvacid agre prasaratā Kvacidāpatya nighnatā /
 Śuneva sārāṅgakulaṃ tvayā bhinnam dviṣāṃ balaṃ //

‘You have broken the army of your enemy sometime marching forward and sometimes attacking all on a sudden just as a dog worries the herd of deer’. Here ‘tvayā’ (the brave king) is compared with the ‘śunā’ (the dog) which is obviously quite inferior to the former. Impropriety is the root cause of this defect.

(b) *Viparyaya* of the superior type—

ayaṃ padmāsanaśīnaś cakravāko Virajate /
 yugādaḥ bhagavān brahmā vinirmitsur iva prajāḥ //

‘This cakravāka seated on the lotus appears like Lord Brahmā desirous of creating the world at the beginning of creation’. Here cakravāka bird has been compared with Brahmā, far superior to the former. Mammaṭa includes these two types of *viparyaya* into *hinapadatva* and *adhiakatvatva* respectively.

VI. *Upamānādhiakatva* — Redundancy is a fault when a superfluous object is mentioned with the *upamāna*. An example of this defect is quoted from the work of Rāma-śarman—

sa pītavāsāḥ pragṛhīta-śārṅgo
 manoḥjābhīmam vapur āpa Kṛṣṇaḥ /
 Śatahradendrāyudhavān niśāyāṃ
 Saṃsrjyamānaḥ śaśineva meghaḥ //

‘Kṛṣṇa, clad in yellow garment and holding the bow śārṅga in his hand appeared both beautiful and terrible. He looked like a cloud with lightning and rainbow, and accompanied with the moon’. Here Lord Kṛṣṇa is compared with the *upamāna* cloud possessed of lightning and rainbow and having contact with the moon. Thus it is clear that the first two objects of *upamāna*—side, viz., lightning and rainbow, have their counterparts yellow garment and śārṅga bow of the

upameya, but with regard to the contact with the moon on the upamāna-side its counterpart on the side of upameya is not stated. Mammāṭa²² remarks that this example involves the defect of Redundancy in absence of any mention of the conch and the like in connection with the upameya.

VII. *Asaḍṛṣatā*—dissimilarity is a defect when there is no resemblance between *upameya* and *upamāna*. Thus the comparison is not appealing to the hearts of 'sahṛdaya' e. g.

vanē'tha tasmin vanitānuyāyinaḥ
 Pravṛtta-dānāṇḍrakaṭā mataṅga-jāḥ /
 Vicitrabarhā-bharaṇāśca barhiṇo
 babhur, ḍivī, va' mala-vigrahā grahāḥ //

Here the infatuated elephants and peacocks with variegated plumes are compared with shining planets. Bhāmaha points out that this is the example of defect 'asaḍṛṣatā' as there is no resemblance between elephants and peacocks and planets either in point of brilliance or fierceness.

After having enumerated the defects which detract from effectiveness of the simile, Bhāmaha embarks on a discussion of the logic underlying these rhetorical defects noted by writers of poetics headed by Madhāvin. He has set forth seven types of defects of simile. Among which *hinatā* (deficiency) of *upamāna* (the object with which a thing is compared) and excess of *upamāna* have been mentioned. We have already alluded to the logical bent of Bhāmaha. This does not allow him to acquiesce in what has been stated by his predecessor without examination. He raised the question of similarity being assumed in quantitative terms. First of all he sets out the proposition that no two objects can be similar in every respect.²³ This was noted by Indian Philosophers, who spoke of the diversity (*vaicitrya*). According to Sāṅkhya creation is possible only by disturbance of equilibrium in Primordial matter (*Prakṛti*). Absolute equa-

22. K. P. 774. 'atro' pameyasya 'Sankhāder anirdēśe śāśino grahaṇam atiricyate ityadhikapatatvam'.

23. Bhāmaha, II. 43. 'Sarvaṃ sarveṇa sārūpyaṃ nāsti bhāvasya kasyacit'.

lity is found only in the dissolution of the world in undifferentiated matter. No two things are absolutely similar. This feature of nature of things was first formulated in precise language by Leibnitz. He called the law—the Identity of Indiscernibles. McTaggart in his *Nature of Existence* formulates this law more explicitly as the diversity of reals. There are no two things exactly alike. There are many interesting stories of the Queen of Prussia who was also a pupil of Leibnitz disputing the truth of the law. But critical examination with microscope proved the truth of Leibnitz's contention. Bhāmaha evidently anticipates Leibnitz and asserts that things may be similar only in certain respects and not in every respect. Absolute similarity will entail identity. If any two things are discerned they must not be identical.

We have tried to bring out the logical implication of Bhāmaha's position. Granting the truth of Bhāmaha's contention one may legitimately pose a question about the nature and quality of similarity that may be regarded as the condition of simile (upamā).

There are thinkers who hold that similarity is an ultimate category which cannot be reduced to simple terms. In India Prabhākara held this view. Among modern thinkers Hobhouse also maintains this view. The Naiyāyikas have disputed this claim and maintained that similarity is constituted by the possession of a large number of common attributes. 'tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhūyodharmavattvam'. It is postulated that similarity is a relation or quality between two numerically different things, i. e. which are not identical. 'Tādātmyapratyogitākobhāvo bhedaḥ'. But this definition of Naiyāyikas, it must be admitted, suffers from vagueness and imprecision. How many common attributes constitute similarity? This is clear from the nature of the cases not determinable in mathematical terms. It has been shown by Vidyādhara²⁴ in his work *Ekāvalī* that any thing can be likened to any other thing in respect of the attribute of existence. But this does not constitute the ground of similarity necessary for simile. Poets

24. *Ekāvalī*, P. 197. 'Sādharmyam tu guṇa-kriyārūpam anugatam iha bhaved ekenaiva śliṣṭena-śliṣṭenopādānam arhati'.

have taken latitude in comparing things which may have only a dubious similarity necessary for simile. Poets have taken latitude in comparing things which may have only a dubious similarity and wide difference. It is highly creditable on the part of Bhāmaha, a very ancient writer (if not the oldest) of Poetics that he was aware of the problem. He accordingly propounds that only resemblance which is regarded as appropriate by the poets and critics should be deemed sufficient ground of similarity in simile (upamā). Besides, the convention of poets should also be the decisive factor. A lady's face is compared to the full-orbed moon. The similarity is superficial. The effulgence of the moon and brightness of a young damsel's face can be regarded as iimilar by a stretch of imagination.

In Sanskrit Poetry the face of a beautiful woman and even of a handsome young man is frequently compared to the moon. It must however be laid down that the similarity between terms of comparison should be striking and made as full and adequate as appeals to the poetic sense of the poet and critic. Bhāmaha cites an example,

Sūryāṃśusammilitalocaneṣu
dīneṣu padmānilanirmadeṣu /
Sādhvyaḥ svageheṣviva bhartṛhīnāḥ
Kekā vineṣuḥ śikhināṃ mukheṣu //

In this verse the simile is inadequate because the points of similarity are not explicitly stated in upamāna. In the verse cited as an example of *Assambhava* 'niṣpeturāsyād' etc. the simile is regarded as preposterous. Bhāmaha observe that one cannot compare the moon with the fire. But he concludes the discussion by affirming the exceptions and limitation of the dictum that similarity should be set forth in respect of all points between the upamāna and upameya. As regards the question of impossibility he offers a wise caution. In upamā and *utprekṣā* similarity may be drawn between a real and an imaginary datum.

Thus in verse

puñjibhūtam iva dhvāntam eṣa bhāti mataṅgajaḥ /
saraḥ śaratprasannāmbho nabhaḥ-khaṇḍam ivo'jhitam //

an elephant is compared with darkness massed in a lump and a lake with lumped water is compared to a piece of the firmament. So the defects of similarity constituted by deficiency or improbability should not be pushed too far and hard. So far as the figures of speech are concerned, the basis of similarity need not be mathematically calculated or logically real. The criterion of similarity should be one which is calculated to bring home the comparison without giving rise to a feeling of repugnance. As has been observed by Daṇḍin²⁵—

yatrodvego na dhīmatām.

we felt compelled to enter into this tangled discussion in order to remove a possible misconception and elucidate the far-reaching implications of Bhāmaha's pithy assertions. After all a problem can be understood only by meticulous analysis of all its aspects and bearings. Poetics aims at unfolding the logic of poetry, though apparently poetic conceits may not be congruent. This is our apology for making this apparent digression, which however may help an inquisitive mind to comprehend the significance of the poetic figures employed by poets.

Bhāmaha is the first systematic writer of poetics so far as the available data are taken into account. He gives a treatment of faults of poetical composition on a logical basis taking the clue from standard work on logic. We shall see later on that the conception and treatment of poetic defects have taken a different course, more aesthetical than logical in subsequent speculations. Logic has its place even in poetry within an aesthetic frame-work. Poetry cannot be absurd. Originally it seems logic dominated the literary critic's mental horizon. This is almost obvious from Bhāmaha's treatment of logical fallacies in his speculation on poetic defects. Bhāmaha is conscious of the incongruity of logical discussion in poetry and therefore makes an apology for embarking upon this question of the epistemological problems as a prelude to his task of literary criticism.

25. K. Ā. II, 51.

The logical defects arising from the omission or bad formulation of the thesis (*Pratijñā*), probance (*Hetu*), probandum, (*sādhya*), etc., through they have remote bearing on poetry are still being discussed with a view to acquainting the students of poetry with logical problems in general outline. On account of the difficulty students of mediocre intellect are afraid of the study of scientific work. "My idea", says Bhāmaha, "is to give the students an opportunity to understand abstruse problems through the medium of poetry."²⁶ The poet's is an arduous task. He has to compose the poetry of which word, meaning, logic and aesthetics form ingredients". This is in substance the justification of Bhāmaha. There is truth in his contention that poetry cannot ignore reality and the philosophers' analysis of its characteristics. With these apologetic words, he enters into the question of *pramāṇas* (sources of knowledge) and *prameyas* (objects of knowledge).

Bhāmaha undoubtedly appeared in time when the Buddhist logicians dominated the academic field. And so he follows the pattern of epistemology ushered in by Vasubandhu and Dinnāga. There are two *pramāṇas* (sources of knowledge), viz. perception and inference. Of these perception takes note of the peculiar features which mark out an individual from others of the same class. Inference is concerned with only generic features of a thing. Thus the inferred fire is not any particular individual but a general sort which can fit in with all members of the class. In this context Bhāmaha discusses the definitions of perception given by Vasubandhu and Dinnāga. These definitions have been subjected to criticism by Uddyotakāra and his exponents. Dinnāga defines perception as a species of cognition free from *Kalpanā*. *Kalpanā* is stated to consist of the association of name, class-character, substance, etc. This *Kalpanā* is an ideal contraction of the mind and has nothing to do with the nature of a real. Vasubandhu's cryptic

26. Bhāmaha V. 2—

Prāyeṇa durbodhatayā'sāstrād bibhyaty amedhasaḥ/
Tadupacchandanaṇyaīṣa hetu nyāyalavoccayaḥ//

definition—'tato'rthāt' is also on the same line based upon the presupposition that the particular alone is real.

This is refuted by Bhāmaha. He avers that without a class-character the individual has no being.

Next he examines the thesis of the Buddhist idealist that it is consciousness which appears bifurcated into subject and object. In this view the particular is only an appearance. As regards Vasubandhu's contention that perception is correspondent to a real object and it is only "rūpa" (coloured matter) which is real, it only amounts to the assertion that our perceptions of chairs and tables etc. are illusions. Bhāmaha obviously does not subscribe to these extreme views.

He now defines inference in terms of Buddhist definition—as a cognition which arises from a probans (*liṅga*) possessed of triple form. A true probans must exist in the subject (*pakṣa*) and be found in the kindred instances (*sapakṣa*) e.g. kitchen for the inference of fire and be absent in a counter-instance (*vipakṣa*), e.g. a lake. It may be defined as based upon the observation of an object invariably associated with another. Thus smoke is a ground of inference of fire because of its necessary concomitance (*vyāpti*) with fire. The subject is the locus of the attribute about which there is difference of opinion between the proponent and opponent. Thus the statement of this subject together with the disputed attribute is called *pratijñā* or thesis. There may be several defects of thesis (*pratijñā*) :

(1) Self-contradictory—my father is a celibate monk from his boyhood.

(2) The second is illustrated by a case which is a subject of dispute. 'The soul exists or *prakṛti* exists', the existence of soul or *prakṛti* is disputed by others e.g. Buddhists.

(3) The third case is one of contradiction of an accepted conclusion. Thus sound is perishable according to Vaiśeṣika and eternal according to Mīmāṃsaka. If the Vaiśeṣika asserts—sound is eternal, it will be a case of contradiction of *siddhānta* (accepted conclusion).

(4) The fourth case is illustrated by the contradiction of a position which is universally accepted. 'The body is pure'—

this is in flat contradiction with assertions of all schools of philosophy. Similarly the assertion that there are no *pramāṇas* is a case in point.

(5) What again is accepted by all and not subject to doubt does not require an express statement. This will only be a truism. As for example "sound is audible", "Fire is hot."

(6) The sixth statement which contradicts a fact which is perceived by all or asserts an attribute which is opposed to perceptual evidence is another case. Thus, "Fire is cool", "Colour does not exist", "The moon is hot". These are the faults of thesis.

Now the defects of probans : A probans must be accepted by both the parties as (1) existing in the subject, (2) existing in the like case—homologues, (3) absent in the opposite case—heterologues. The infringement of any one constitutes the defects of probans (*hetu*). Of course the proponents' thesis is opposed to that of the opponent so also the probans (the middle term). If a probans is not acceptable to either party it will be abortive. The *sapakṣa* or homologue is similar to the subject (*pakṣa*) on account of the presence of the probandum in it. In other words, it must be an undisputed instance of the probans and probandum existing in it.

The heterologue is one which is entirely dissimilar to the *pakṣa* (subject) in that the probans and so also the probandum are absent in it. The true probans must be present in the *pakṣa* (subject or minor term), present in homologue and absent in the heterologue. An example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) is the statement of a homologue in which 'hetu' and 'sādhya' are present. A counter example will be one where both are absent.

Confutation (*dūṣaṇa*) consists in the omission of probans, subject or the like. This is called deficiency. A statement of an excessive factor will be equally a defect called excess. There are certain species of false confutation (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*) based on mere analogy. These are called *jātis*, i.e. specious refutations.

These are logical topics which have no bearing on *kāvya* (poetry). Bhāmaha also admits this and so refrains from

elaboration. He expressly states²⁷ that these defects have been employed differently in poetry. Poetry is concerned with empirical truths and scriptures and scientific treatises are concerned with real truth. Thus the propositions—(1) 'The firmament is black like the sword', (2) 'Sound comes from distance', (3) 'The water of the ocean is the same' (4) 'Stability of the great lights of the universe is wonderful'. These statements pass muster in poetry, though scientifically and metaphysically they may not be correct.

In ordinary parlance *pratijñā* means promise which consists in acceptance of an act to be done. This may be classified into four heads on the basis of *dharma* (religious merit), *artha* (temporal advantage), *kāma* (enjoyment), and *kopa* (anger). The first is illustrated thus : Puru promised to take old age of his father upon himself and he did so. This exemplifies the fulfilment of a promise ending in religious merit. The example of Hanumat in successfully tracing Sītā in consonance with his promise is the case of fulfilment of *pratijñā* ending in temporal advantage. King Vatsa promised to procure Vāsavadattā, the daughter of Mahāsena and he did it. This is the case of the third type. Bhīma's vow to drink the gushing blood of the enemy and his successful accomplishment is an illustration of the fourth type. Any other type of vow which should not be undertaken, nor the vow following under the four types should be abandoned. The breach of promise of Duryodhana that he would fast to death and his abandonment of it for the recovery of his kingdom exemplifies fault of breach of promise. Yudhiṣṭhira's vow not to decline a challenge to gamble in dice is an instance of a vow which is opposed to the second approved type. Its fulfilment entailed the loss of his kingdom. So it is the case of a bad vow. A vow of Bhīma to live like a celibate is in opposition to the claims of normal enjoyment (*Kāma*). Jāmadagnya (*Paraśurāma*) had to aban-

27. Bhāmaha, V. 33—

Tajjñāiḥ kavyaprayogeṣu tatprāduṣkṛtam anyathā/
Tatralokāśrayaṇaṁ kāvyam āgamās tattvadārśinaḥ//

don the vow of killing Kṣatriyas after being defeated by Rāma. This consists in the breach of the fourth type.

Bhāmaha²⁸ refers to certain statements in which the thesis is not stated but understood by implication. Rhetorical questions are instances in point.

The triple character of probans is no doubt the indicator of the probandum. But it is understood by the formulation of the question itself. By concomitance in agreement (*anvaya*) and that in difference (*vyatireka*) also sometimes suffice for arriving at conclusion, e.g. 'There is a big lake around this forest'. This is deduced from hearing the cries of the birds and smelling the fragrance of lotuses. Though these grounds are not stated, they are known from experience and easily understood from the context.

There is of course reason for every conclusion but it may not be employed and an implicit reason is also as effective as an expressed one. There may be statements which contain reason as an adjective of the subject (Minor term). e.g. 'The night became devoid of the sun being illumined by bright lamps'. The sunset is, here, affirmed to be the result of illumination by poetical fancy.

The poetical reason or probans is also liable to be vitiated by the triple defects which violate the triple character of probans. Bhāmaha gives several examples of these defects due to ignorance or doubt or false knowledge. Thus the statement—'The Kāśas captivate the hearts of people by fragrance of their flowers'. This is a wrong statement because the Kāśa has no fragrant flower; it is evidence of the ignorance of the speaker. The poetic reason—fragrance of flower—is non-existent in the subject. Take again the statement "All these are to be understood as harmful or injurious on account of their vicinity to water". This is calculated to give rise to doubt because it is not established that all things growing in the neighbourhood of water are harmful. Another statement "Certainly this is

28. Bhāmaha, V. 46—

Kimindriya dviṣā jñeyam ko nirākriyate'riribhibh/

Ko vā gatvaram arthibhyo na yacchati dhavam laghu//

cakora because it has white corners in the eyes”—is based on false knowledge. The *cakora* bird is known for red corners in its eyes. So this statement gives false information and reason “white corners” is falsely attributed to the bird.

The *dr̥ṣṭānta*²⁹ (example) consists in stating a parallel to the subject. Bhāmaha does not illustrate it because of its obviousness. The kitchen in which smoke and fire are found together is cited as an example for inferring fire in the hill on the basis of smoke observed in it.

Bhāmaha now refutes the contention that simile is a case of inference. There is no statement of ‘*hetu*’—probans in simile. The statement of probans and probandum is only appropriate in the cases already noticed. ‘The face is like a lotus’ is a case of simple simile without reference to probans and probandum. The simile above is entirely different from the following statement—‘You are pre-eminent even in this fallen age, just as you have been taught by men of superior intellect and wisdom; just as people were in the older age (*Kṛtayuga*)’. Here one comes across a probans and probandum along with an example. But examples are not always illustrative of concomitance of probans and probandum, e.g.

Bharatas tvam Dilīpas tvam...etc.

‘You are Bharata, you are Dilīpa’ etc.

Having disposed of defects based on logical grounds Bhāmaha vouchsafed certain salutary instructions regarding the use of words. Even one word, provided it is correct, is to be preferred to new fangled expressions which are of doubtful purity. The reversal of this procedure ends in reversal of one’s reputation. A form of poetry, which is repulsive and difficult to understand, is regarded as charmless though it may voice a beautiful sentiment (*rasa*).³⁰

29. Bhāmaha. V. 27—

Sādhyena līṅgānugatistadabhāve ca nāstītā/

Khyāpyate yena dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ sa kilānyair dvidhocyate//

30. Bhāmaha V. 62—

Ahṛdyam asunirbhedaṁ rasavattvepy apeśalam/

Kāvyaṁ kapitthamamaṁ yad keṣāñcittādr̥śam yathā//

Bhāmaha's instructions regarding the use of certain images are illustrative and not exhaustive. He sums up this none-too-pleasant discourse by making significant observations. A word and meaning which are original, that is to say, not used in humdrum commonplaces and have a strikingly original look, are conducive to invest poetry with beauty. They constitute embellishment of speech. Bhāmaha admonishes an ambitious poet to avoid words which are contradictory in sense of unintelligible meaning and which require to be padded out by insertions of superfluous words and which are calculated to confound the reader.³¹ He gives a suitable example in which these defects are present in abundance.

Elātakkolanāgasphuṭa bakulalatā candanaspandanādhyah
 Śṛṅgākarpūracakrāgaru kamanaśilādhyāmakāvyaṭṭatīrah /
 Śaṅkhavrātākulāntastimimakarakuḷākīṇavīcipratāno
 Dadhre yasyāmburāśih śaśikumudasudhākṣhīrasuddhām

sukṛttim//

'The ocean bore his fair fame which resembled in whiteness the moon, the white lily, nectar and milk—the ocean whose shores were covered with trees of the following descriptions—cardamoms etc. whose edges were full of conches, the expanses of whose waves thronged with fishes like timi, makara, etc. In the example the adjectives of the ocean and also of fame are absolutely superfluous without adding to the sense.

Practically Bhāmaha's work on poetics ends with the Fifth Chapter. The Sixth Chapter consists of the discussions of certain grammatical forms and their meanings. Incidentally he criticises the theory of *Sphuṭa* and the Buddhist theory of 'apoha'. He prescribes certain grammatical forms which may be used in poetical composition. He ends the Sixth Chapter by paying handsome tributes to Pāṇini.³² It is remarkable that Vāmana follows the example of Bhāmaha and gives as supplement to his work the last chapter called 'Śabdaśuddhi prakaraṇam'.

31. Ibid. V. 67—

Viruddhapadamasvarthaṃ bahupuraṇamākulam/

Kurvanti kāvyam apare vyāyatābhīpsayā yathā//

32. Bhāmaha. VI. 63. Śradheyam jagti matam hi Pāṇinīyam.

CHAPTER IV

DANDIN'S CRITIQUE ON DOSAS

Next after Bhāmaha, from the point of view of both the chronology and the evolution of the conception of poetry, comes Daṇḍin (circa 700-750 A. D.).¹ There is no doubt Daṇḍin like Bhāmaha, expresses his indebtedness to his predecessors. He does not mention any one of them by name but he gives clear evidences of utilising their works. His work *Kāvyaḍarśa* occupies a prominent place among the works of Poetics (Alaṅkāraśāstra), both on account of the clearness of exposition and merits of style. The book is intended as a guide to aspirants after literary fame and not an exhaustive treatise on literary criticism.

Daṇḍin's conception of Poetry is materially different from that of Bhāmaha. Bhāmaha defines Poetry as '*śabdārthau sahitaḥ kāvyam*', i.e., words and meanings together constitute poetry. He lays stress on the intimate association of word and meaning and their co-equal status. It is obvious from the word '*śabdārthau*' in the definition of poetry. *Śabdārthau* is in Dvandva compound in which all the constituent members have the equal status.² Neither of them is subordinate of the other. According to Bhāmaha poetry is constituted by figures of speech which are forms of statement different from the ordinary mode of speech. This is called *Vakrokti*. A sentence gains in effectiveness in proportion to its departure from the ordinary mode of speech, ordinary manner of statement. Bhāmaha raises the question whether these figures of speech have bearing on word or sense or both. There were some thinkers before Bhāmaha who held that words or expressions (śabda) held the predominant position and alaṅkāras have relevance to them. In one word it is good diction (sauśabdyā) which constitutes the beauty of poetry. Meaning plays a subordinate part.

1. S. K. De, *Skt. Poet.* Vol. p. 70.

2. S. K. p. 67 'Ubhayapadārthapradhāno Dvandvaḥ'

Bhāmaha, on other hand, holds that both word and meaning are important. So both of them are substrata of *alaṅkāra*. Neither of them is *Bahiraṅga*—external embellishment. This fundamental standpoint of Bhāmaha was adopted by Kuntaka in his erudite work *Vakroktijivita*. The word 'sahitau' in Bhāmaha's definition of poetry is very significant. Kuntaka lays stress on the ultimate co-relation of word and meaning which calls *śabdārtha-sāhitya*. *Sāhitya* as the name of *belles letters* is perhaps derived from this pregnant expression of Bhāmaha.

Daṇḍin as is usual with him tries a divergent note. His definition of poetry makes diction (*padāvali*) the central element of which the meaning is the subordinate ally. This view was taken by Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha³, who defines poetry as word expressive of delectable meaning. It is to be noted however that except Jagannātha no remarkable writer on poetics has accepted the position of Daṇḍin. Mammaṭa follows Bhāmaha almost *verbatim* in his definition of poetry as 'śabdārthau kāvyam'. Of course he being the follower of Ānandavardhana does not accord exclusive importance to *alaṅkāra*. Ānandavardhana too, seems to agree with Bhāmaha in regarding word and meaning both as co-essential elements of poetry.

Daṇḍin defines poetry as series of words replete with delectable meaning.⁴ The other scholars have shown what constitutes the body and what the embellishments of poetry. The body consists of a series of words calculated to aptly convey a desired meaning. Daṇḍin at first differentiates between two things which are different from each other, one of which is the body and the other is embellishment. Daṇḍin further describes *kāvyaśarira* and gives the attribute *iṣṭa* to the sense (*artha*). The second element of the *kāvya* consists of the *alaṅkāras*. The word *alaṅkāra* is used in general sense of embellishment and not in the narrow sense of figure of speech. Thus Daṇḍin is the first to deal with the body of poetry. The other elements *doṣas*, *guṇas* and *mārgas* are all ancillary to it.

3. RG. p. 9. 'ramaṇyārthapratipāḍakaḥ śabdaḥ kāvyam'

4. K. Ā. I. 10 Śarīram tāvad iṣṭārtha-vyavacchinṇā padāvali

Daṇḍin holds that even a slight blemish should not be overlooked in poetry. It is sure to mar the effect of poetry just as even a slight leprous spot renders a handsome body loathsome. He vehemently emphasises the importance of good expressions and says, "If the light called word did not illumine the affair of the world then these worlds would be shrouded in complete darkness. By the favour of words the worldly transaction is accomplished".⁵ He further warns the poet to be very careful and cautious about the use of it. He says, "Word well used is declared by the wise to be the wish-milking cow; but the same ill-used, however, manifests only the ox-nature of the speaker." Thus Daṇḍin insists upon avoidance (*heyatva*) of *doṣa* (poetic flaw) as the very word indicates—*duṣyati iti doṣaḥ*—it has a deterring effect on poetry.

With this brief preamble we now pass on to our subject of discourse—the treatment of *doṣas* by Daṇḍin. In the third chapter of the *Kāvyādarśa* he speaks of *doṣas*—poetic defects—to be avoided in poetic compositions. He accepts the second list of *Bhāmaha* in name, substance and even in order of enumeration. His definitions of *doṣas* correspond to those of *Bhāmaha* in idea and expression. All this will be clear as we proceed with the treatment of the individual defects. *Bhāmaha* has given the list of *doṣas* and in the end has simply observed that *doṣas* sometimes become *guṇas*. But Daṇḍin illustrates every *doṣa* and shows with appropriate example how it turns to be *guṇa* under special circumstances. The ten *doṣas* of Daṇḍin are as follows :

- I. Apārtha—absence of complete meaning,
- II. Vyārtha—self-contradictory,
- III. Ekārtha—tautology,

5. K. Ā. I. 4—

idam andhantamaḥ kṛtsnam jāyeta bhuvanatrāyam/
yadi śabdābhavayam jyotir āsaṃsāram na dīpyate//

cf. Yāska, 1. 2 'anīyastvācca śabdena samjñākaraṇam vyavahārārthaṃ loke' and Bhartṛhari, I. 123—

Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdanugamādrte/
anuviddham iva jñānam sarvaṃ sabdena bhāṣate//

- IV. Sasamśaya—doubtful utterance,
- V. Apakrama—non-sequent,
- VI. Śabdahīna—grammatical mistake,
- VII. Yatibhraṣṭa—defective in Caesura,
- VIII. Bhinnavṛtta—defective in metre,
- IX. Visandhi—non-coalition,
- X. Deśakālakalālokanyāyā'gama Virodhi—inconsistent with place, etc.

I. *Apārtha*⁶—when word or sentences as a unified whole yield no meaning it is a case of defect called *Apārtha*. Daṇḍin however observes that this would be faultless assertion in the case of the delirious, of the intoxicated, of the infants and of discomposed minds. As for example,

Samudraḥ pīyate devair aham asmi jarāturaḥ /
amī garjanti jīmūtā harer airāvataḥ priyaḥ //

'The ocean is being drunk by gods ; I am stricken with old age ; these clouds are roaring ; Airāvata is dear to Indra.' These four sentences of the above verse have no mutual relationship and thus they fail to give a composite meaning. Hence it is a defect.

II. *Vyārtha*⁷—when the earlier statement conflicts with the later on account of contradictory senses it is a fault called *Vyārtha* (self-contradictory). It may happen in a single sentence or in one composition. For example,

Jahi śatrubalaṃ kritsnaṃ jaya viśvambharām imām /
na ca te ko'pi vidveṣṭa sarvabhūtānukampinaḥ //

'Kill the entire force of your enemy and conquer this earth ; there is no enemy to you, who are compassionate towards all beings.' This statement is obviously self-contradictory and faulty. Daṇḍin however declares that such assertions are sometimes appreciated when they are indicative of a peculiar

6. K. Ā. III. 128—

Samudāyārthasūnyam yat tadapārtham itīṣyate/
unmatta-mattabālānām ukter anyatra duṣyati//

7. Ibid, III, 131—

ekavākye prabandhe vā purvāparaparāḥatam/
viruddhārthatayā Vyārtham//

condition of the mind of the speaker. He cites the following instance—

paradārā'bhilāṣo me katham āryasya yujyate /
pivāmi taralam tasyāḥ kadā nu daśanacchadam //

'How the desire for another's wife be proper to a person of noble parentage like myself? Oh, when is it that I can drink the nectar of her tremulous lip?' Here a young man in the first moment is conscious of his noble family and thinks it improper to have attachment to another's wife. But in the next moment his mind is peculiarly engrossed by overpowering influence of passion which drowns the logical sense and moral propriety. Such statements are not regarded as inappropriate in the case of those persons who are not in normal situation.

III. *Ekārtha*⁸—where what is stated before without qualification is again stated verbally or in sense is called *Ekārtha* (tautology). As for example,

utkān unmanayantyete bālāṃ tadalakatviṣaḥ /
ambhodharās taḍitvanto gambhīrāḥ stanayitnavāḥ //

'The girl in her longings is highly perturbed by these clouds—that have the colour of her hair'. Here words *ukta* and *unmanas* convey the same sense of having longings and *ambhodhara*, *taḍitvat* and *stanayitnu* are synonyms and mean cloud. Hence they constitute the defect called Tautology. Daṇḍin however is aware of its transitory (*anitya*) nature and states that Tautology is not always a defect; on the other hand, it is an embellishment, if some sort of an extreme compassion and the like is intended to be conveyed. As for example,

hanyate sā vārarohā smareṇā'kāṇḍa vairiṇā /
hanyate cārusarvāṅgī hanyate mañjubhāsiṇī //

'She is being distressed, that damsel of beautiful buttocks, by god Cupid, suddenly turning into an enemy; she is being killed, that damsel whose limbs are fascinating; she is being killed, that damsel of sweet speech'. Here the verb 'hanyate' has been

8. Ibid, III. 135—

Aviśeṣeṇa pūrvoktaṃ yadi bhūyo'pi kīrtiyate/
Arthataḥ'śabdato vā'pi tadekārtham mataṃ yathā//

repeated verbally with a view of expressing extreme compassion and sympathy.

Bhāmaha also takes such cases as exceptions to this fault, he says when the same word is repeated from the influence of fear, sorrow, etc. it is not a *doṣa*. Vāmana, as we shall see below, agrees with this view and contends that when there is a desire of expressing *Viśeṣārtha* (special meanings) words like '*karṇāvatamṣa*' do not suffer from this defect because special significance is connoted by them.

IV. *Sasaṃśaya*⁹—If expressions intended for the sake of bringing about certainty give rise to doubt, that is, the defect known as *sasaṃśaya* (dubious). As for example,

manorathapriyālokarasa-lolekṣaṇe sakhi /
Ārād vṛttirasau mātā no kṣamā draṣṭumīdṛśam//

'O friend, you are with eyes agitated with passion for seeing your lover who is dear to your wish. The mother is in the distance (or near), she will not be able to see (or tolerate) such thing'. Here the expressions—'*ārād vṛttiḥ*' and '*na kṣamā draṣṭum*' are doubtful. '*ārāt*' means distance and proximity both.¹⁰ Such doubtful utterances mar the beauty of Poetry. Daṇḍin however observes that if such expression is purposely used to create doubt it ceases to be defect and turns out just an embellishment. As for example,

pasyāmy anaṅgajātaṅkalaṅghitām tām aninditām /
Kālenaiva kaṭhoreṇa grastām kiṃ nas tadāśaya //

'I see that that flawless beauty is overpowered with an affliction caused by Cupid (by no physical disease) but is under the influence of unbearable season (just the god of death), what purpose is served then by our looking upto you?' This speech is dubious as to whether the lady is afflicted by cupid or by the heat of the season. The lady messenger uses this in frolic with a special purpose to confound the young lover. It assumes the form of *alaukāra*.

9. K. Ā. III, 139—

Nirṇayārtham prayuktāni saṃśayaṃ Janayanti cet/

Vacāṃsi doṣa evāsau sasaṃśaya iti smṛtaḥ//

10. A. K. p 241 'ārād dūrasamīpayoḥ.

V. *Apakrama*—where the sequence of enumeration is not conformed to in a subsequent reference to the things, it is a case of the defect *apakrama*.¹¹ As for example,

sthitinirmāṇa saṃhāra hetavo jagatām amī /
śambhu nārāyaṇāmbhojayonayaḥ pālayantu vaḥ //

‘These gods Śambhu, Nārāyaṇa and Brahmā (lit. lotus-born) may protect you; the causes of maintenance, creation and dissolution of these three worlds’. Here the lack of natural order in mentioning Nārāyaṇa, Ambhojayoni and Śambhu creates difficulty in syntactical construction (*anvaya*) and understanding the meaning of the sentence. Hence it is a defect. Daṇḍin states that this violation of the sequence is not regarded as defect provided a special effort is made for the ready comprehension of the reference in order. For instance,

bandhutyāgas tanutyāgo deśatyāga iti triṣu /
ādyantāv āyatakleśau madhyamaḥ kṣaṇikajvaraḥ //

‘Of the three the leaving of kinsmen, the leaving of one’s body and the leaving of one’s motherland—the first and the last bring a long injuring pain whereas the middle one is evanescent’. Here the syntactical relation is not difficult to comprehend because the reference to each is quite definitely stated. In strict conformity to the literal procedure the last should have been stated after the first and second. But here this specific reference to the first and last in one expression and the middle in the last by definitely expressive word do not put strain on the understanding of the order. Hence it is not regarded as a blemish.

VI. *Śabdahina*¹²—is grammatical mistake. The use of words, the usage of which (1) has no warrant from grammatical rules and (2) no sanction by the convention of the poets

11. K. Ā., III. 144—

Uddeśanugūṇo’rthānām anuddeśo na cet kṛtaḥ/
apakramābhidhānam taṃ doṣam ācakṣate budhāḥ//

12. Ibid., III. 148—

Śabdahīnam anālakṣya-lakṣya lakṣaṇa-padhatih/
padaprayogo’śiṣteṣṭas śiṣteṣṭas tu na duṣyati//

constitutes the defect śabdahīna. Thus it is clear that a word which is grammatically wrong is, no doubt, defective. But a word grammatically correct and not sanctioned by the convention of the poet is also regarded to be a case of this defect. For example,

avate bhavate bāhur mahīm arṇavaśakvarīm/
mahārājan na jijñāsā nāstityāsām girām rasaḥ//

‘Your arm protects the earth, which has the ocean for its girdle. O great king, there is nothing to be known’. In these words, there is no *rasa* of any kind. Here the words, *avate*, *bhavate*, *śakvarīm* and *mahārājan* are grammatically wrong. The root ‘*ava*’ is sanctioned in the *parasmaipada* termination. The use of *ātmanepada* is a case of the transgression of the rule of Pāṇini.

Similarly *bhavate* for *bhavataḥ*, *arṇavasakvarīm* for *arṇavaśakarīkām* and *mahārājan* for *maharaja* are examples of grammatical impurity (śabdahīna).

The second type of this defect is the use of words like *daivata* in the masculine gender. This word though also masculine in gender is never used by poets in it. The root *han* has got the sense of going and killing but by convention poets use it in the latter sense. Thus the use *Kuñjaṃ hanti kṛśodari* (the slender-bodied one repairs to the forest) is a case of śabdahīna. It is called *cyutasamskṛti* by letter writers. Agnipurāṇa however calls it *aśādhutva*.¹³

VII. *Yatibhraṣṭa*¹⁴—The separation of words at particular places in the verse is called *yati*, a composition lacking in this is a case of defect *yatibhraṣṭa*. For example,

strīṇāṃ saṅgitavidhim ayam ādityavaṃśō narendrah
Paśyaty akliṣṭarasam iha śiṣṭair ametyādi duṣṭam//
Kāryākāryāṇy ayam avikalāny āgamenaiṇ paśyan
Vaśyām urvīm vahati nṛpa ityasti caivām prayogaḥ//

13 A. P. p. 232 ‘Śabdaśastraviruddhatvam aśādhutvam...’

14. K. Ā. III. 152—

‘Slokeṣu niyāstānaṃ padacchedaṃ yatim viduḥ/
tad apetaṃ yatibhraṣṭaṃ śravaṇōdvejanaṃ yathā//

'The king, born in solar race, witnesses with experts the musical performance, full of aesthetic pleasure as given by these women. This king superintending the duties in conformity with the śāstras supports the earth'. Here in this verse which is an example of Mandākrāntā metre there should be *yati* (pause) after the fourth, sixth and seventh letters which have been left out and therefore it is a case of *yatibhraṣṭa*. It is regarded as a serious defect because it has a jarring effect on the ear.

VIII. *Bhinnavṛtta*¹⁵—Metrical defect—where a shortage or excess of syllable or incorrect disposition of long and short vowels occurs it constitutes the defect called *bhinnavṛtta*. This defect, says Daṇḍin, is highly reprehensible. Examples are—

indupādāḥ śīśirāḥ sprśanti...../

'The cold rays of the Moon are touching (it)'. This foot of the verse suffers from the shortage of a syllable and

sahakārasya kisalayāny ādrāṇi...../

'The mango-blossoms are wet'. This has an excess of syllables. Incorrect disposition of long and short vowels is illustrated in the following verse :

Kāmena vāṇā niśitā vimuktāḥ mṛgekṣaṇāsu.....//

'The sharp arrows have been darted by the cupid at the fawn-eyed damsels'. In this foot the incorrect use of long vowel *kā* in '*kāmena*' is also an example of *bhinnavṛtta*.¹⁶ Similarly,

smarasya vāṇā niśitāḥ patanti/

Vāmekṣaṇāsu//

Here the use of short vowel *sma* in the first word is a case of *bhinnavṛtta* because an *Indravajrā* metre starts with a long vowel.

15. K. Ā. III. 156—

Varṇānām nyūnatādhikye guru laghv ayathāsthitiḥ/
tatra tad bhinnavṛttam syād eṣa doṣaḥ suninditaḥ//

16, Kusumapratimā. p. 346—

upajātivikalpānām siddho yadyapi saṅkaraḥ/
tathāpi prathamam kuryāt pūrvapādākṣaram laghu//

IX. *Visandhi*¹⁷—Non-coalition of words without the reason of the grammatical rule is a defect called visandhi. Regarding the rule of coalition Bhaṭṭojidikṣita observes that it is compulsory in a single pada, in verb and prefix, and in compound. But in a sentence it is on the option of the speaker to employ it. But in poetry when words are not euphonically joined it is regarded as a fault though grammatically it is not incorrect. Daṇḍin however may permit non-coalition if it is due to the rule like—*plutaṣṭapragṛhyā aci nityam*.¹⁸ It may however be noted in this connection that such non-coalescent use of pada is not permissible if occurring more than once. Daṇḍin refutes the view of Bhāmaha who does not like Visandhi even on the ground of *pragṛhya*—

mandānilena calatā aṅganāgaṇḍamaṇḍale/

luptam udbhedi ghaṛṇāmbho nabhasy asmad vapuṣy api//

‘The gentle breeze has taken away the growing drops of perspiration upon the cheeks of the women and also upon our person in the month of śrāvaṇa. Here the last syllable ‘ā’ of the word *calatā* is not combined with the first vowel ‘a’ of the word *aṅganā*. Daṇḍin however permits it when it is due to *pragṛhya*. As for example,

mānerṣye iha śīryete strīṇām himaṛtau priye/

āsu rātriṣv iti prājñair āmnātaṃ vyastam īdṛṣam//

‘O darling, in these nights of winter the pride and pretended anger of women vanish away’. This is not the case of visandhi because non-coalition here is due to *pragṛhyasamjñā*.

X. *Deśādivirodhi*¹⁹—Not conforming to the place, time, etc. Here Daṇḍin states that a poet has to observe the propriety accepted by the tradition and convention about country, mountain, forest, nation, day, night, season, arts such as dancing, singing, behaviour proper to movable and immovable

17. K. A. III. 159—

na saṃhitām vivakṣāmiti asaṃdhānam padeṣu yat/

tad visandhīti nirdiṣṭam na pragṛhyādi hetukam//

18. Pāṇini I. 1. 11 and 6. 1. 129.

19. K. A. III. 166.

word, logic and scriptures. If in all these anything whatsoever contrary to the convention is described by a poet out of carelessness, it is called the defect *Deśādivirodhi*. The following examples will clarify the point—

(a) *Deśavirodhi*—

Karpūrapādapāmarśasurabhir malayānilaḥ/
Kaliṅgavanasambhūtā mṛgaprāyā mataṅgajāḥ//

‘The malaya-breeze is sweet-scented on account of the touch with camphor-trees. The elephants born in the forests of Kaliṅga resemble the deer in their size’. These statements are non-conforming to the country. Camphor-trees do not grow on the malaya-mountain. In Kaliṅga elephants are not found. This shows the poor topographical knowledge of the poet. Such descriptions will render the poetry unreal.

(b) *Kālavirodhi*—

padminī naktam unnidrā sphuṭaty ahni kumudvatī/
madhur utphullaniculo nidāgho meghadurdinaḥ//
śravyahamśagiro varṣāḥ śarado mattabarhiṇaḥ/
hemanto nirmalādityaḥ śisirāḥ slāghyacandanaḥ//

‘The lotus blooms at night, the lily comes into full beauty in day ; the spring makes the *nicula* break open, while the summer days are cloudy. The voice of swans is delightful in rainy season and the autumn makes the peacock excited ; the sun shines clearly in Hemanta season while sandal-paste is appreciated in winter’. All these are contrary to the natural facts.

(c) *Kālādivirodhi*—Daṇḍin briefly deals with the mode in which contradiction with arts takes place :

Viraśṅgārayor bhāvau sthāyinau krodhavismayau/
Purṇasaptasvaraḥ so'yaṁ bhinnamārgaḥ pravartate//

‘The dominant passion of the Heroic and the Erotic are wrath and astonishment. Here is being enchanted a melody consisting of all the seven notes from which discordant sounds are excluded’. These statements are all antagonistic to the established convention of arts. The sentiments of the Heroic and the Erotic do not have wrath (*Krodha*) and astonishment

(*Vismaya*) as dominant passions (*sthāyibhāva*). *Utsāha* and *rati* (valour and love) are universally accepted as their dominant passions. Similarly, *bhinnamārga* can not be *pūrṇa-saptasvara*.

(d) *Lokavirodhī*—It is the case of conflict with the ordinary experience of the world the example of which is given in the following verses :

ādhūtakeśaro hastī tīkṣṇaśṛṅgas turaṅgamah/
gurusāro'yam eraṇḍo niḥsāraḥ khadiradrumah//

(e) *Nyāyavirodhī*—when the statement goes against the established tenets of *Hetuvidyā*—the science of Logic, it is the defect *Nyāyavirodhī*. For example,

satyam evāha sugataḥ saṃskārān avinaśvarān/
tathāhi sā cakorākṣi sthitaivādyā'pi me hṛdi//

'Lord Buddha is correct to state that *Saṃskāras* (impressions) are permanent and hence that lady having eyes like those of *cakora* remains in my heart even today'. This proposition will be a case of *Nyāyavirodhī* on the part of a Buddhist. The Buddhist's supposition is that all things are momentary (*sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam*)²⁰ and all things are transient (*sarvaṃ anityam*).

Again,

Kāpilair asadudbhūtiḥ sthāna evopavarṇyate/
asatām eva dṛśyante yasmād asmābhir udbhavāḥ//

'The followers of Kapila rightly remark that the world grows from non-existence (wicked only prosper) because we do notice the growth of wicked persons'. This assertion illustrates contradiction of *sāṃkhya* position which believes in *satkāryavāda* (theory of the pre-existent cause). The cause is nothing but the unmanifested effect and the effect is manifested cause. Kapila maintains that the effect is existent only in latent state in the cause. It is made patent by causal operation, it is not newly created. The oil is already in oil-seed but by the causal operation of the efficient force it is brought out in a manifested condition. The only difference between the cause

and the effect is that the cause is not manifest as effect to the senses whereas as by causal operation it becomes perceptible.²¹

Śabda nityaḥ—the sound is eternal. This proposition on the part of the exponent of Vaiśeṣika will be a case of *apasiddhānta*—wrong assertion. Their supposition is that words are impermanent whereas the Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaraṇās hold that they are permanent. A contrary statement on the part of these philosophers will be a case of Nyāyavirodhi.

(f) *Āgamavirodhi*—Daṇḍin records also cases of conflict with scriptural authority. For example, a Brāhmaṇa who has not performed the ceremony of *agnyādhāna* is not authorised to do the sacrifice called *vaiśvānara* on the birth of his son. Further who is not vested with sacred thread (*yajñopavīta*) is not entitled to study Veda. A description of this adds in violation of Scriptural injunction causing the defect *āgamavirodha*—conflict with Scriptural authority.

Daṇḍin however records cases where instances of conflict with reality, convention or scripture are made inoffensive by the skill of poet under peculiar circumstances. Due to poet's imaginative power these deviations do not seem unnatural and cease to be defect. As for example,

tasya rājñāḥ prabhāveṇa tadudyānāni jajñire/
ādrāmśukapravālānām āspadam sursākḥinām//

'Due to prowess of the king his garden became the abode of celestial trees whose tender leaves furnish ladies with fresh garments'. Here the deviation of place is obvious. The celestial trees do not grow on the earth. But these descriptions serve to accentuate the unwanted majesty of the king and are regarded to get beyond the range of flaws. And again,

rājñām vināśapisunaś cacāra Kharamārutāḥ/
dhunvan Kadambarajasā saha Saptacchadodgamān//

'The violent wind foretold the ruin of the king as it blew

21. Cf. Sāṅkhyakārikā 9

asadakaraṇādudupādānagrahaṇād sarvasambhavābhāvāt/
śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhavācca sat kāryam//

and cf. Gītā 11.16—Nā'sato vidyate bhāvo nā'bhavo vidyate sataḥ/

shaking the sprouts of *saptacchada* trees along with pollen of *Kadamba* flowers. Here the co-incidence of rainy season with autumn is described as an ill-omen because of its unnaturalness, cf.

akāle phalapuṣpāṇi deśavidravakāraṇam/

'The calamity in the country is inferred if fruits and flowers grow out of season'.

And 'lastly,

prameyo' pyaprameyoṣi saphalopy asi niṣphalaḥ/

Ekas tvam apy aneko'si namas te viśvamūrttaye//

'Though knowable, you cannot be known, though full of fruits you have to win no fruit ; though one you are multiform, I pay you homage, O Viśvamūrtti'. Though conflicting ideas are expressed such assertions do not lead to any blemish as they serve to emphasize the infinite and indescribable nature of God.

CHAPTER V

VĀMANA'S CONCEPT OF DOṢA

Vāmana (c. 750-850)¹ defines Poetry as consisting of word and meaning embellished by *guṇas* and *ālankāras*. These latter serve to contribute to the beauty and excellence of poetry. This can be effected by the avoidance of blemishes and appropriation of excellent forms of expression and Figures of Speech. What constitutes *guṇas* (excellences) and *ālankāras* (beautifying forms of expression) can be understood by study of the science of Poetics such as set out in the present work. Ultimately Vāmana finds in style (*rīti*) the very soul and essence of Poetry--*ritir ātmā kāvyasya*. *Riti* (style) consists of the composition and juxtaposition of distinctive expressions. The distinctiveness is formed by the *guṇas* which he defines later on. Of these there are three different styles of composition (*ritis*) which have been made conventional in Vidarbha.. Gauḍa and Pāncāla and are respectively called Vaidarbhi, Gauḍi and Pāncālī. He lays special emphasis on *Pratibhā* (genius) as the main spring of Poetry. This genius is a sort of felicity which is acquired by prolonged cultivation in past life. This is in sketch the introduction to the subject of Poetics by Vāmana.

As already stated Vāmana recognises the fact that the *doṣas* (defects) detract from the beauty of poetry and *guṇas* are contributory to it. In accordance with this dictum, he sets out the different blemishes. Some *doṣas* (blemishes) are by nature the opposites of excellences (*guṇas*). They can be easily deduced from study of the nature of *guṇas* (excellences). Yet elaboration of these types of blemishes or defects is resorted to for convenience of understanding and easy comprehension.

Vāmana's poetic theory presents remarkable advancement of ideas on those of his predecessors. The vague and unsystematic description of *doṣas* disappears in his treatment. He deals with this topic systematically and elaborately. Here we find distinct improvement in approach and clarity of conception. In his *Kāvyaalaṅkārasūtra* Vāmana lays down that *Kāvya* (poetry) is acceptable on account of *alaṅkāra* (in the wider sense of beauty), poetic beauty is gained by avoidance of *doṣas* and acceptance of *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras*.² It is to be noted that he gives precedence to *doṣahāna* (avoidance of blemishes) over acceptance of *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras*. Gopendra in his *Kāmadhenu*,³ an excellent commentary on the *Kāvyaalaṅkārasūtra* of Vāmana, observes that Vāmana has significantly put the word *doṣa* first to indicate that the poet must be careful and avoid *doṣas* in his composition. This procedure is probably inspired by the maxim that evil should be averted prior to one's pursuit of desired object.

The whole of the second chapter (*adhikaraṇa*) of Vāmana's work deals with *doṣas* and is aptly called *doṣadarśana* (a notice of defects). We have seen that Bharata held that *doṣas* in poetics are positive entities and *guṇas* signify nothing more than their negation. For the first time in the history of Sanskrit Poetics Vāmana goes directly against the opinion of Bharata and maintains that *doṣas* are opposite to *guṇas*⁴ and they may be known by implication. One may raise an objection that when *guṇas* are positive elements in Poetry an exposition of them in the first instance will entail knowledge of the precise nature of defects⁵ and this makes separate treatment of *doṣas* a superfluity. Vāmana however anticipates such an objection on the part of the critic and answers that *doṣas* are dealt with

2. Vāmana. I. I. 3. 'sa doṣa guṇā' laṅkāra hānā' dānābhyām'.

3. Kāmadhenu on Vāmana I. I. 3. 'istānuvarittanāt kuryāt prāga-niṣṭa nivarattanam' iti nitya guṇālaṅkāradānāt pūrvam doṣahānam eva kavinā kartavyam iti sūcayitum doṣahānasya prathamato nirdeśaḥ kṛtaḥ.

4. Vāmana II. I. 1 'guṇa-viparyayātmāno doṣāḥ'.

5. Ibid. II. I. 2. 'arthatastadavagamaḥ'.

separately only for the sake of clear understanding⁶ by the neophyte and not for experts. He therefore classifies them under the following four heads :

- A. Pada-doṣa—defects of words.
- B. Padārtha-doṣa—defects of the meaning of word.
- C. Vākya-doṣa—defects of the sentence and
- D. Vāk्यārtha-doṣa—defects of the meaning of the sentence.

This divisions of defects was appreciated and consequently adopted by other writers like Mammaṭa.

As regards *pada-doṣas* Vāmana has the following sub-classes :—

- I. Asādhū—grammatically wrong,
- II. Kaṣṭa—unmelodious,
- III. Grāmya—vulgar,
- IV. Apratīta—unknown and
- V. Anarthaka—meaningless.

I. *Asādhū*—It is contrary to the rules of grammar. Bha-rata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin call it śabdahīna. An example of this defect is

anyakāraka-vaiyarthyam.

Grammatically it is wrong and it should be anyatkārakavaiyarthyam, because the addition of *duk* is compulsorily enjoined by the rule of Pāṇini.⁷ This is after all ungrammatical expression and it shows the utter incompetence of the writer or the speaker. Of all defects solecism is worst and most repulsive. It has therefore been given the place of priority by Vāmana.

II *Kaṣṭa*—A word which is unmelodious or harsh in sound and is unpleasant to the ear—*śrutivirasam*⁸—is a defect. For example,

acūcurac caṇḍi kapalayos te

Kāntidravam drāg Viśadaḥ śaśāṅkaḥ/

6. Ibid. II. I. 3. 'saukaryāya prapañcaḥ'.

7. Pāṇini. VI. III. 99. aṣaṣṭhy-atītyāsthasya'nyasya dug āsīrāsāsthāsthitotsukotikāraka-rāgaccheṣu.

8. Vāmana II. I. 6.

'O angry one, the clear moon has stolen the lustre of your cheeks'—Here the word *acūcurat* and *drāg* are harsh and jarring to the ear. Bhāmaha⁹ and Abhinava¹⁰ have given examples of this fault in words like *ajihladat* and *tṛṇedhi* respectively. The logic of this defect consists in the fact that it offends the sense of hearing and thereby alienates the sympathy of the reader. It injures the case of poets and receives short shrift at the very first utterance.

III. *Grāmya*—A word which is rustic and is not caused by the learned but only by common people who are not refined in speech is the defect *grāmya*.¹¹ For example,

Kaṣṭam Kathaṃ roditi phūtkṛteyam /

'Oh, how she cries with puffing sound'. Here the word *Phūtkṛtā* is the speech of rustic. This is slang (*grāmya*). Bhāmaha does not mention it but illustrates it in words like 'gaṇḍam apy apare necchanti' and here this '*gaṇḍa*' is slang. Vāmana further adds some more words to illustrate this point as *talla*, *galla* and *bhalla* which are endorsed by Mammaṭa who illustrates—

tāmbūlabhṛtagallo'yaṃ tallam jalpati mānuṣaḥ/

IV. *Apratīta*—A word which is used only in technical treatises (*sāstramātraprayukta*)¹² is a case of defect *apratīta*. Vāmana means to say that the poet should not use vulgar words and equally they should also not use the technical terms which are used in different branches of science alone. It should be marked that Vāmana is the first to introduce the defect called *apratīta*. His example is

Kiṃ bhāṣitena bahunā rūpaskandhasya santi me na guṇāḥ/
guṇanāntariyakam ca premeti na te'styūpālabhaḥ//

'What is the use of my saying much? I know I am wanting in the excellence of physical organism; and as love also is the invariable concomitant of that excellence I do not complain'. Here word *rūpaskandha* and *nāntariyaka* are not the part of

9. Bhāmaha. I. 53, yathā'jihladat ityādi śrutikaṣṭam ca tad viduḥ.

10. Locana P. 214, Śrutikaṣṭastu adhaksīt aksotsīt tṛṇedhītyādi.

11. Vāmana. II. I. 7 'lokamātra-prayuktaṃ grāmyam'.

12. Ibid. II. I. 8.

current coin. The former is a technical term of the Buddhist philosophy and the latter is that of the Nyāyaśāstra. Therefore these are the examples of the defect *apratīta*. The use of such expressions in poetry only gives the impression of obtrusive pedantry. Now the pride of learning as of virtue gives offence off hand to a man of taste. Of course people of particular profession are fond of talking shop. But there should be a limit to it. The use of such learned terminology in ordinary parlance seeks to put up a barrier between academic people and ordinary men. By using such expression and putting on academic airs seek to separate the learned section as an intellectual aristocracy from the common run. It is too obvious an offence to require further comment.

V. *Anarthaka*—When a meaningless or superfluous word is inserted in the sentence simply to fill up the gape (*pūraṇārtham*)¹³ it constitutes the defect called *anarthaka*. Vāmana contends that poets sometimes insert indeclinable particles like *ca*, *tu* and *hi* for the sake of filling up the requisite number of syllables in the metre and when such insertion does not serve the purpose of lending a graceful form to the sentence it is regarded as superfluous. It obviously points out the weakness of the poet and his poor command of language. And thus it prejudices his case in advance. As for example,

uditas tu hāstikavinīlamayaṃ

timiraṃ nīṭīyā kiraṇaiḥ savitā/

‘The sun has risen after having drunk up, with his rays the darkness which was as densely black as a group of elephants’. Here the particle *tu* has been inserted only for the sake of metre. Neither its meaning ‘*bhedāvadhāraṇa*’ (differentiation) is suited to the context nor its introduction brings home any grace to the composition. Vāmana gives an exception to it and states that when such insertion of particle adds to the beauty of the composition—it is not a blemish. As for example,

na khalv iha gatāgatā nayanagocaram me gatā/

‘Passing hither and thither she did not come within the range of my eyes’. Here the word *khalu* serves to add grace to the

13. Vāmana, II. I. 9.

sentence and hence it is not a case of flaw. Bhāmaha calls it *bahupūraṇa*. Vāmāna has given it a correct name which has been adopted by later writers.

The following are sub-classes of *Pdāṛthadoṣas* :

- I. Anyārtha—Deviation from the conventional meaning.
- II. Neyārtha—far-fetched sense.
- III. Gūḍhārtha—used in an uncommon meaning.
- IV.—Aślīla—vulgar meaning.
- V. Kliṣṭa—distant meaning.

I. *Anyārtha*—when a word is used in a sense entirely different from its accepted denotation (*rūḍhicyutam*)¹⁴ and the intended sense is deducible only from the etymology, it is the case of *anyārtha*. Vāmāna observes that the ordinary misuse of the word is not meant by his sūtra, say, the use of the word 'ghaṭa' (a jar) for 'paṭa (cloth) is too manifestly wrong to be mentioned. Persons who do not understand even such manifestly wrong uses are not fit for instruction in the niceties.

As for example,

te duḥkham uccāvacam āvahanti

ye prasmaranti priyasaṅgamānām/

'Those people experience great pain who recall the association of dear ones'. Here the word 'āvahanti' meaning 'doing' is used in the sense of 'carrying' which is deducible from the root *vah*—to carry. Similarly *prasmaranti* meaning 'forgetting' is used in the sense of 'remembering excellently' which may be deduced from the etymology of the root *smṛ*—to remember.

Vāmāna here draws attention to the fundamental rule of meaning. These are words whose meaning is determined only by component parts analysed in etymological derivation. For example, the word *pācaka* (the man who cooks) is derived from the root *pac* and *aka* (the agent-suffix). These are called *yaugika* words derived from the combination of two verbal forms, the root and the suffix. Though it is held by some linguists that all nominal bases are derived from verbal roots¹⁵

14. Vāmāna II. I. 12.

15. Niruk'ta I. 12 'tatra nāmāny ākhyātājāni iti śakṭāyanaḥ nairuk'ta-samayaś ca. na sarvāṇi, ti gārgyaḥ Vaiyākaraṇānācikaḥ'.

but it is recognised that etymology does not in all cases bear on the conventional meaning of the word. A word should be used to denote a meaning which is sanctioned by popular usage. The linguists' speculations regarding the genesis of word from a radical have little influence upon its current meaning. Thus *āvahati* means 'doing' but is used here in the sense of 'bearing'. Again *prasmarati* is used in the sense of 'remembering with vividness'. Though the meaning is derived analytically from the prefix *pra* and the root *smṛ*. It is not the acceptance of the word. *Prasmarati* means *vismarati* (forgets) This is summed up in the dictum :¹⁶

‘anyad hi śabdānāṃ vyutpattinimittam,
anyacca pravṛttinimittam’

i. e., the etymological and the conventional meanings in which the word is used are not necessarily the one and the same.

II. *Neyārtha*—When a word is used in fanciful meaning (kalpitārtham)¹⁷ which is guessed out with great difficulty it is the case of defect called *Neyārtha*. *Vāmana* means to say that the meaning desired to be conveyed is such as the word is never known to have, e.g.

sapadi paṅktivihaṅgama-nāma-bhṛt-
tanayasamvalitaṃ balaśālīnā/
vipulaparavatavarṣi Śitaiḥ śaraiḥ
plavagasainyam ulūkajitā jitaṃ//

‘The army of monkeys led by the sons of Daśaratha was defeated by the conqueror of Indra by means of sharp arrows showering thousands of mountains’. Here the word ‘paṅkti vihaṅgama-nāma-bhṛt’ is made to signify Daśaratha. *Paṅkti*, a metre consists of foot of ten syllables. Hence *paṅkti dāśa* (ten). *Vihaṅgama* is the name of the bird in general but here it will give the meaning of a particular bird ‘*cakrayāka* = *ratha* (chariot). Thus the whole word means *daśaratha*. Again the word ‘*ulūkajitā*’ is made to signify ‘*Meghanādena*’. The word *Kauśika*¹⁸ denotes *uluka* (owl) as well as *Indra*. Thus *Indra* and *uluka* are regarded forcibly to be synonyms and

16. S. D. P. 36.

17. *Vāmana* II. J. 13.

18. A. K. p. 398 Mahendra-guggulūlūka-Vyālagrāhiṣu kauśikaḥ.

Indrajita is spoken of as *ulūkajita*. These are examples of the defect *Neyārtha*. Vāmana here clarifies that use of words like 'rathāṅga-nāmā' for the bird 'cakravāka' is not tabooed. Such usage has been accepted in common and is regarded as having its remote and indirect indication (*lakṣanā*) well recognised (*nirūḍha*). There are two kinds of *lakṣanā-nirūḍhā* (well established by long usage) and the one that has recourse to for producing an effect. Thus word *kuśala* means skilful though its primary meaning might have been 'one skilled in collecting 'kuśa' (sacred grass)'. Though it is a secondary meaning it is regarded as good as primary meaning because of long usage. When the relation between primary and secondary meanings is far-fetched and much too strained the secondary meaning does not meet with approval. It is called *Neyārtha* whose meaning is to be deduced with extraordinary difficulty.

III. *Gūḍhārtha*—A word that has more than one signification and if it is used in a rare signification (*aprasiddhārtha prayuktam*¹⁹, it constitutes the defect called *Gūḍhārtha*. As for example,

sahasragor ivā'nīkaṃ duḥsahaṃ bhavataḥ paraiḥ/

'Your army is as invincible by your enemy as the army of Indra'. Here the word 'sahasragū' is used to denote Indra. This meaning can be got at by taking the word 'go' in the sense of eye—Indra having thousand eyes. But this signification is not generally attached to it. The strain required to arrive at a meaning spoils the charm of poetry. It is called 'Gūḍhasabda-bhidhāna' by Bhāmaha.

The poet should not forget that his mission is to communicate thoughts and feelings to his audience. If he makes his meaning understood by reason of unfamiliar and unusual expressions he fails to that extent. Not only the poet but even ordinary speakers and writers should try to make themselves understood without much ado. Circumlocution, unless it yields additional meaning calculated to add to the charm of the expression, also comes under this head. One of the secrets of good style is to avoid unintelligible expressions. A good poet's, as also a good writer's, thoughts are deep enough and require reflection

on the part of the reader. If the writer aggravates the difficulty by using word in strange senses they only show his bad craftsmanship. Padmapāda and Vācaspati give the compliments to Śaṅkarācārya for lucidity of his diction inspite of the profundity of the meaning—*Bhāsyam prasanna-gambhiram*.

IV. *Aślilārtha*—It is indecorous word. It is of two kinds. (a) A word which has a double meaning with one which is unparliamentary (asabhyārthāntaram). For example the word *varcas* means glory, splendour, and also human excreta.

(b) A word which is used in harmless meaning, but when taken by parts it may smack of indecency and indecorum (asabhyasmṛtihetuḥ). For example the word *Kṛkāṭika*, the part of which *kāṭikā* reminds an indecent meaning of the bier (preṭayāna).²⁰

The word '*srila*' means which has grace, and *asrila* means ungraceful. It is derived from '*a-śri*' (kāntyabhāva), absence of loveliness. It is further divided into three sub-classes, viz.

(a) rousing shame. Words like *Vākkātavam* and *hiraṇyaretas* mean harshness of expression and fire respectively but their parts *kāta* and *retas*, give the indecent significances of male organ and semen respectively. (b) rousing disgust, e.g. the word *kapardaka* means shell but its part *parda* has a vulgar sense. or (c) rousing the sense of foreboding evils, e.g. *saṁsthitaḥ* means established and also dead.

Bhāmaha includes this defect in his *Śrutiduṣṭa* and *arthaduṣṭa*.

Vāmana cites exceptions²¹ to his defect. Words whose indecent meanings are (a) concealed (*guṭṭa*), (b) indicated (*Lakṣita*) or entirely shrouded (*saṁvita*) are not regarded as defective. By 'concealed' is meant such words the unparliamentary meaning of which is not known in common, e.g. the word '*sambādha*'. Its famous meaning is obstacle (*sambādhe suravīnām*) while the other indecent meaning of 'male organ' is concealed. Similarly the words like *Janmabhū* (motherland) and *subhagā* (beautiful) have their indecent meanings farfetched

20. Kāmadhenu quotes Vaijayanti : 'Preta-yānam khaṭiḥ kṛkāṭiḥ'.

21. Vāmana II. I. 16 'na guṭṭa laksita saṁvṛtāni'.

and shrouded by the common usage and as such these expressions are approved forms. Vāmana in support of his contention quotes

samvitasya hi lokena na doṣā'nveṣaṇam kṣamam /
Śivaliṅgasya samsthāne kasyā'sabhyatva-bhāvanā //

'It is not proper to hunt out flaws of words that are accepted in ordinary usage. When indecent significations are entirely shrouded from view; for instance, what man can have any notion of impropriety with regard to the *Śivaliṅga* (the icon of Śiva)', It is only man with morbid mentality or extremely censorious indisposition or anti-religious bigotry who can scent any indecent suggestion. Vāmana concludes that words which are understood to have decent meaning by all should not be regarded as unparliamentary and an indecent import should not be read into it with labour.

V. *Kliṣṭa*—A word whose meaning is arrived at in an indirect and roundabout manner (vyavahitārtha pratyayam)²² is called defect *kliṣṭa* (laboured). In other words it is a case where a word is used in a sense that does not proceed from it directly but is associated with it in a remote way, e.g.

Dakṣātma-jā-dayita-vallabha-vedikānām /
Jyotsnājuṣām Jalalavās taralaṃ patanti //

'Drops of water are falling upon the platforms of silver in the moonlight'. Here the meaning 'the platform made of moon-gems' of the word 'dakṣātma-jā-dayita-vallabha-vedikānām' is not directly conveyed and understood. It is known in a roundabout manner. *Dakṣātma-jā* means the daughter of *Dakṣa* (star), her *dayita* (beloved) is the moon, and *dakṣātma-jā-dayita-vallabha-vedikānām* means *candrakāntavedikānam* (the platform made of silver gems). Obviously it is an involved expression which yields the intended meaning by putting unwonted strain on the understanding of the reader. Vāmana, however, maintains that word whose meaning is understood without labour is not a case of this blemish. For instance—*kāñcīguṇasthānam*—the girdle zone (waist).

It is no doubt a case of circumlocution. But it is not always regarded as an offence if its meaning can be easily understood. In the example cited the meaning is understood by regular intellectual gymnastic. But if any such expression has the sanction of usage it would not be regarded as fault.

Vāmana observes that these two faults 'aśīla' and 'kliṣṭa' may occur in sentences also and thus they may be regarded as faults of sentences as well. We may note here that Vāmana has followed Bhāmaha and has accepted all his defects except 'avācaka' and 'ayuktimat'—dealt with in the first chapter of Bhāmaha's work. Defects of the sentence (*vākyadoṣas*) are the following :—

- I. Bhinnavṛtta—deficiency in metre,
- II. Yatibhraṣṭa—misplaced caesura, and
- III. Visandhi—unharmonious euphony.

I. *Bhinnavṛtta*—It is a metrical defect when it involves the breach of the rule of the metre (*sva-lakṣaṇa-cyuta-vṛttam*),²³

ayi paśyasi saudham āśritām /
avirala-sumano-māla-bhāiṇīm //

'Do you see (the lady) on top of the house, adorned with a garland of thickly studded flowers? This is an instance of the metre 'vaitāliya'. Here in the second foot six short syllables are used continuously which is against the rule.

II. *Yatibhraṣṭa*—That in which the caesura is so misplaced as to make the sentence unmelodious and unpleasant (*virasa-virāmaṁ*)²⁴ is called a defect 'yatibhraṣṭa' (misplaced Caesura). It occurs (a) when a verbal root or nominal stem is broken up or (b) where the coalition of vowels is omitted. Examples are as follows :

(a) example when the verbal root is broken up—

etāsāṁ rājati sumanasāṁ dāma kaṇṭhāvalambi

'the garland of flower hanging by the neck of these (women) looks beautiful'. It is an example of the metre called *mandā-krāntā*. According to the rule of prosody this metre requires caesura on the 4th, 6th and 7th syllables of foot. Here the

23. Vāmana, II. II. 2.

24. Vāmana, II. II. 3.

fourth syllable is 'rā' of the verb 'rājati'. This leads to the breaking up of the verb 'rāj' which is a defect. Similarly the breaking up of a nominal stem due to caesura leads to this fault.

Vāmana points out an exception to this defect. He observes that breaking up of words at a point other than verbal root or nominal stem is not regarded as defect, e.g.,

Śobhām puṣyaty ayam abhinavaḥ sundarīṇām prabodhaḥ
'This fresh awakening of beautiful girls enhances the charm'. This is the foot of the metre *mandākrāntū*. Here the caesura is on the fourth syllable 'Ṣya'. It disjoins the conjugational affix 'ti' and the root is left intact. Hence it is not the case of misplaced Caesura. Similarly in the case of the noun where it disconnects the noun with declensional suffix and does not break the nominal stem, it is not the case of this blemish. Vāmana further adds a condition that where the disjunction is due to the collusion of vowel-sounds, it is not the case of this blemish.

Vāmana anticipates an objection to the separate treatment of misplaced Caesura (*yatibhraṣṭa*) from the defect of metre (*bhinnavṛtta*). Caesura forms a part of metre, so misplacement of Caesura should be considered as a defect of metre and as such should not be regarded as a different defect. In answer to this objection and in support of his position Vāmana contends that though Caesura is an essential part of metre the wrong use of it does not constitute metrical defect. The definition of a metre and that of a Caesura are different and therefore the two should not be confounded. A metre consists in the adjustment of long and short syllables. If the number and arrangement of syllables do not exceed or fall short of the requisite condition, there will be no defect in the metre. Misplacement of Caesura does not involve the breach of metre. It offends the poetic sense by reason of the unjustifiable split-up of an individual nominal stem or verbal root. The commentator points out that if the Caesura be properly placed and there be maladjustment of long and short syllables it will be a case of breach of the metre. If the arrangement of long and short vowels be properly observed there is no case of metrical defect, but there may be a wrong use of Caesura, So the two cases should be kept apart.

It should not be considered that too much importance has been attached to metre. There is a saying 'one can put *maṣa* for *māṣa* which is quite unjustifiable for the sake of preserving metrical purity but under no condition breach of metre.'

'*api māṣam maṣam kuryāt Chandobhaṅgam na kārayet*'

III. *Visandhi*—The cacophonous is that where the collusion of words is unharmonious. Collusion is of two types, one is of vowel sounds and the other is mere juxtaposition, the drawing together of words. When it turns into an unharmonious euphony it is regarded as a flaw called *visandhi*. This unharmonious euphony is of three kinds, (a) the disjoined, (b) the indecorous and (c) the discordant.

(a) Disjoined—where each word stands apart by itself without being combined the adjacent syllables of other words when such combination is possible by rule, it is a defect. We may note the observation of Mammaṭabhaṭṭa on this topic. He says that even a single omission of the collusion is a fault, where it is omitted without any reason except the wish of the speaker or writer, but when the omission is due to grammatical rule precluding the combination then it is to be regarded as cacophonous only. When in a single verse there are more than one omissions it is a defect according to poetic convention.²⁵

As for example,

Meghānilena amunā etasminnadrikānane /

lolālakānubaddhāni ānanāni cakāṣati //

Here the combinations have been omitted between the words *anilena* and *amunā*, *amunā* and *etasmin*, and again between *anubaddhāni* and *ānanāni*.

And again,

Kamale iva locane ime anubadhnāti vilāsapaddhatiḥ /

Here the collusion is omitted on account of grammatical rules precluding such collusion in the case of dual case-endings. Although it is not ungrammatical but such collocation of words is rhetorically reprehended.

25. Kāmadhenu on Vāmana II. II. 8. 'atra pragrhyādihetukam visandhi na bhavati iti sakṛt prayoga-viśayam idaṁ draṣṭavyam, asakṛt-prayoge tu duṣṭam eva'.

(b) Indecorous—It is that collusion which indicates something indecent suggestive of shame (*vriḍā*); disgust (*jugupsā*) and inauspiciousness (*amaṅgala*). Examples are :

(i) Shame—virecakam idaṃ nṛttam ācāryābhāsajitam /
Here the sound *yābha* in the combination *ācāryābhasa* is shameful.

(ii) Disgust—
Cakāṣe panasaprāyāḥ puri ṣaṇḍamahādrumaiḥ /
Here due to juxtaposition the sound of *śepa* in the combination of words *cakāṣe* and *panasa*, and the sound of *puriṣa* in the combination of words *puri* and *ṣaṇḍa*, are suggestive of disgust.

(iii) Inauspiciousness—
Vinā śapathadānābhyāṃ padavādasamutsukam /
Here the collusion of words *vinā* and *śapatha* brings the sound of *vināśa* (destruction) which is inauspicious.

(c) Discordant—when the collusion of vowel sounds is painful to the ear it is a case of defect. For example.

mañjaryy udgamagarbhās te gurvā ābhogā drumā babhuḥ /
Here the collusion of vowel sounds in *mañjaryyu* and *gurvā* are unpleasant to the ear.

After disposing of the formal defects of the sentences Vāmana introduces those of the meanings of sentences. These are six in number—

- I. Vyārtha—incompatible.
- II. Ekārtha—redundant.
- III. Sandigdha—dubious.
- IV. Ayukta—improper statement.
- V. Apakrama—break of sequence.
- VI. Loka-vidyā-viruddha—opposed to popular and scientific conceptions.

I. *Vyārtha*—when the meaning of one word contradicts with that of other (*vyāhatapūrvottarārtham*)²⁶ it is a defect called *Vyārtha*. As for example,

adyā'pi smarati rasālasaṃ mano me
mugdhāyāḥ smaracaturāṇi ceṣṭitāni /

'My longing mind still recalls the amorous sportings of the unsophisticated simple girl'. The statement 'amorous sportings of the unsophisticated (*mugdhā*)' is incompatible. A *mugdhā* is uninitiated to the artful tactics of love-making. *Mugdhā* is *ratau vāmā*.

II. *Ekārtha*—when a word expresses a meaning which has already been conveyed by another word (*uktārtham padam*)²⁷, it constitutes the defect called *ekārtha*. For instance,

*cintā*moham anaṅgam aṅga tanute viprekṣitaṁ subhruvaḥ /
'O friend ! the glances of the one having charming eyebrows produce in my mind thoughts of love giving rise to anxiety and stupefaction'. Love expresses itself of the form of *cintā* (anxiety) and *moha* (stupefaction). Thus the mention of both *cintā* and *moha* becomes superfluous. Vāmana however contends that redundancy is not regarded as a blemish if additional meaning is intended to be signified.

Vāmana seems to be the first writer to draw attention to cases of apparent pleonasm. Here the specific mention of a word the meaning of which is included in that of the substantive does not appear to involve pleonasm, but is not really one since it gives an additional meaning by implication. For instance, the word *jyā* means the string of a bow, so in the expression *dhanurjyā* the mention of bow (*dhanus*) is likely to strike one as redundant. But it is a legitimate form of expression since it implies that the string is actually attached to the bow. The string of the bow may be kept loose from it. So the specific mention of *dhanus* in *dhanurjyā* is justified. Pleonasm is a defect when the meaning of two expressions is actually one and the same without a shade of difference. The exception cited above shows that it is not a case of mere duplication.

There are other expressions such as *Karṇāvataṁsa* (earring), *Śravaṇa-kunḍala* (ear ornament) and *śiraḥśekhara* (the garland on the head). The word *avataṁsa* means an ornament of the ear; so the express mention of *karṇa* (ear) as an adjective is superfluous. Similarly the remaining two words

śravaṇa and *śiraḥ* are apparently superfluous. But the express mention of adjectives ear etc. is significant of an important fact. It implies that the ornaments are actually attached to the ear and in case of *śekhara* which means head garland the mention of *śiraḥ* (head) as the qualifying adjective is likely to appear as superfluous. But it conveys the meaning that the garland is actually mounted on the head.²⁸ It is not necessary that the ornamental decoration should be actually associated with parts of the body—they are fit to adorn. Likewise expression *muktāhārā* is apparently a case of redundancy because *hāra* means a necklace of pearls. So, the express mention of *muktā* as qualifying adjective is redundant. But it is justified because it means that the necklace consists of pearls alone and not mixed with other gems. Similarly *mālā* which means a garland of flowers need not be qualified by *puṣpa* (flower). But the expression *puṣpamālā* is significant because it means a garland of excellent flowers. Of course the word *mālā* (garland) is also used in such expressions as *ratnamālā* (garland of gems) and *śabdāmālā* (garland of words) and they have no reference to flowers. But these uses are figurative and the word garland is used in a metaphorical sense. The word *mālā* (garland) used *tout court* means a garland of flowers and nothing else.

Again the expression *kari-kalabha* is also an exceptional case. *Kalabha* means a young offspring of an elephant; so, the use of *kari-kalabha* smacks of repetition. But here it means that the young one is virtually a full-fledged elephant by reason of its strength and height. Similarly an apparent repetition is not to be censured if the mention of the qualifying adjective is needed in giving an additional significance. For example,

jagāda madhurāṃ vācaṃ viśadākṣarasālinīm /

‘He spoke sweet words with distinctly articulated syllables.’
Speaking implies the use of words but not of special quality.

Vāmana has cited these examples as exceptions because they are found to be used by men of unquestionable authority

28. Vāmana, II. II. 14. ‘Karnāvatamsa śravaṇakuṇḍala-siraḥ śekharaṣu karnādinirdeśaḥ sannidheḥ’.

and mastery of diction. He however utters a word of caution. One should not make use of such expressions if they are not sanctioned by authoritative use.²⁹ Thus the use of *nitambakāñci* (a girdle on the buttock) which is unwarranted because that is the meaning of the word *kāñci* and the express statement of the word *nitamba* (buttock) constitutes pleonasm. So also with *uṣṭra-kalabha*. In one word, one should not multiply such uses on analogy without the sanction of tradition.

III. *Sandigdha*—The sentence which, due to mention of common properties or due to non-mention of distinguishing features, gives rise to doubt (*saṁśayakṛt*)³⁰ is the case of a defect called *sandigdha* (dubious). As for example—

sa mahātmā bhāgyavaśān mahāpadam upāgataḥ /

It is dubious if this sentence means that the high-minded person unfortunately (*abhāgyavaśāt*) fell into trouble (*āpadam upāgataḥ*) or fortunately (*bhāgyavaśāt*) reached a high position (*mahā-padam upāgataḥ*). Such sentences are bound to create confusion in the mind of the reader when there is absence of crucial evidence such as the context and the like.

IV. *Ayukta*—That sentence the meaning of which is illusory due to *māyā* etc. (*māyādikalpitārtham*)³¹ is the case of the defect *ayukta*. Vāmana does not illustrate it. The *Kāmadhenu* however cites an example from the *Vidagdha-mukha-maṇḍana*—

prāhur vyastam samastam ca dvir vyastam dviḥ samastakam /
tathā vyastasamastam ca dvir vyastakasamastake //

Vāmana means to say that riddles, puzzles and also mystic utterances are instances of this defect.

V. *Apakrama*—A sentence where the idea expressed is not in proper sequence (*kramahīnārtham*)³² is called *apakrama*

29. Vāmana, II. II. 19. 'tadidam prayukteṣu' tadidam, uktam prayukteṣu nāprayukteṣu, na hi bhavati yathā śravaṇa kuṇḍalam iti tathā nitamba kañci ityapi. Yathā vā kari-kalabha iti, tathā uṣṭrakalabha ity api.

30. Idid. II. II. 20.

31. Idid. II. II. 21.

32. Vāmana, II. II. 22.

(unsymmetric). There should be a definite order and relationship in the subject and predicate of the sentence. If order and relationship are reversed the sentence suffers from this defect. As for example,

Kīrtipratāpau bhavataḥ sūryācandramasoḥ samau /
 'Your fame and glory are like the sun and the moon'. Here it is desired to express that fame is like the moon and glory is like the sun. Such is the poetic convention. And thus the word 'moon' (*candra*) should have preceded the sun (*sūrya*). *Candrasūryau*, therefore, should have been proper instead of *sūryācandramasau*.

Vāmana gives an alternative explanation of his dictum that the prior mention of the more important thing in a sentence is a *Krama* and the absence of this constitutes the defect *apakrama*. In the light of this explanation he illustrates :

turaṅgam atha mātāṅgaṃ prayacchā'smai madālasam /
 'Give him a horse or an intoxicated elephant'. Here the presents should be mentioned in order of their value. A more valuable thing is named before a less valuable one. The elephant should, therefore, be mentioned before the horse. Mammaṭa calls it *duṣkrama*.

VI. *Loka-vidyā-viruddha*—This comprehends *deśa* (place), *kāla* (time), *loka* (world) and *vidyā* (science). Thus a statement which is opposed to experience and expresses ideas contrary to nature of these, constitutes a defect. Vāmana splits it up into two—(a) *Lokaviruddha* and (b) *Vidyāviruddha*.

(a) *Loka-viruddha* : *Loka* includes *deśa*, *kāla* and *loka*. when a description is opposed to *deśa*, *kāla* and *loka* it alienates the sympathy of the audience. A few examples will clear this point :

Deśaviruddha—

sauvīreṣv asti nagarī Mathurā nāma viśrutā /
 Akṣoṭa nārikelāḍhyā yasyāḥ paryantabhūmayah //

In the State of Sauvīra (the Punjab) there is a famous city called Mathurā, the lands of which are full of walnuts and coconuts'. This statement is improper as it expresses ideas

against experience. Mathurā is not situated in Sauvīra, nor do walnuts and coconuts grow in lands adjacent to it. The *Kāmadhenu* states that walnuts are found in the mountainous regions as Kashmir and Mathurā is on the bank of the river Yamunā in Uttara Pradesh (formerly United Provinces). Coconuts grow neither in Mathurā nor in Sauvīra. It grows only in the seacoast or the Gangetic Delta.

Kālaviruddha—

Kadamba-kusumasmeram madhau vanam aśobhata /
'The forest shone with flowers of *Kadamba* in spring'. This statement is contrary to the nature of time. *Kadamba* blossoms during the rains and not during spring.

Similarly, if the poet makes a statement against the nature of things it shows the poor knowledge of the poet and is a defect. The *Kāmadhenu* however contends that descriptions which have the sanction of the convention of poets lose the nature of defects and are regarded as embellishments due to the convention dominating everything which is current among poets. For example—³³

Susitavasanālaṅkāṛāyāṃ kadācana kaumudī
mahasi sudṛṣi svairam yāntyāṃ gato'stam abhūd vidhuḥ /
tadanu bhavataḥ kīrtiḥ kenāpy aglyata yena sā
priyagṛham agān muktāśaṅkā kva nāsi śubhapradaḥ //
'Once a certain woman dressed in white garments and ornaments was going at her sweet will when the moon disappeared; after that your fame was sung by somebody, by means of which she went to her lover's place without fear. Where are you not a source of happiness?'

This is also a case of poetic exaggeration but it does not strike a student of poetry as absurd because poets stretching over generations have likened fame to a white substance. A sweet diction is again likened with milk and so it is described 'śroṣyasi srotapeyam'.³⁴ There are many such poetic conventions which

33. *Kāmadhenu* on *Vāmana*. II. 2. 23. Lokaviruddham api kvacit
kavi-samayaprasiddheḥ prābalyāt na duṣṭam.

34. *Meghadūta*, 13.

have been taken by the poets and readers as variety of the first order. At any event their reality is not called in question on account of the longstanding custom.

(b) Vidyā-viruddha—It comprehends the principles of (i) arts and (ii) sciences. Statements which are contrary to the established principles of arts and sciences (Kalā-caturvargaśāstra-viruddhāni) constitutes this fault.

Kalāviruddha—

Kālīṅgaṃ likhitam idaṃ vayasya patraṃ
patraññair apatitakoṭikaṇṭakāgram /

‘O friend, this is a Kālīṅga letter having its corner not turned down’. That is the characteristic of the Kālīṅga that the alphabets are written with curves on their heads. But here it is described that the letters are without such overhead curves. This is opposed to the art of writing in vogue in Kālīṅga.

Śāstraviruddha—

Ahaṅkāreṇa jīyante dviṣantaḥ kiṃ nayaśriyā /

‘Enemies are conquered by pride. What is the need of policy?’ This statement is against the view of Political Science (*arthaśāstra*). The enemies are to be conquered by observance of the rules of Statecraft but not by pride. And again,
devatābhaktito muktir na tattvajñāna sampadā.

‘Salvation is attained by devotion to gods, not by knowledge of Reality’. This obviously contradicts the contention of the śāstras which proclaim salvation by knowledge. It is the conclusion of all the systems of Indian Philosophy that our bondage and loss of freedom are due to the ignorance of the ultimate truth, and salvation is achieved by true knowledge.³⁵ But *Bhakti* (devotion to God) has a place of paramount importance in the lives of spiritual aspirants. But *Bhakti* (devotion) must be enlightened by the knowledge of the object of love and cannot be blindly directed. Again, *Bhakti* leads to knowledge. God is pleased by devotion of the individual and exhibits His true nature and that of the world and the relation of the indivi-

35. NSG : I. 1. 1. ‘pramāṇaprameya.....nigrahassthānānāṃ tattvajñānān niśreyasādhigamaḥ’.

dual and of God in their full bearings. It is said in the *Gītā* in which the way of the Divine Love is described as the way of perfection that "by devotion and love the devotee knows Me and knowing Me in reality as I am he enters into Me",³⁶ This is also the interpretation of Svāmī Vivekānanda. He admits *parā bhakti* (supreme devotion) and *parā vidyā* (supreme knowledge) are one and the same thing. Even Śrīdharācārya, the celebrated commentator of the *Gītā* who is noted for his theistic preferences has not been able to throw knowledge of the Truth overboard. He avers that knowledge is the function of devotion just like the hot burning of the fuel is the necessary condition of cooking.

Thus we see that Vāmana deals with *doṣas* elaborately. We find the distinct improvement in his approach and clarity of conception. For the first time in the history of Sanskrit Poetics he classifies *doṣas* under four heads which we have already discussed. At the end of the treatment of these *doṣas* Vāmana observes that these defects are to be known by poets for their avoidance. There are *sūkṣma-doṣas* also which have been dealt with in the chapter on *Guṇas*. His commentator further elaborates this point and finds out the underlying significance. He says that the four types of *doṣas* discussed above are to be taken as the *sthūladoṣas* (gross faults) which can be detected even by men of superficial knowledge. Vāmana has again divided them into two different aspects, viz., (a) *sthūla doṣas*, defects which mar poetic beauty in general and (b) *sūkṣma doṣas*³⁷ which are not competent enough to hinder the charm of poetry. These *sūkṣma doṣas* do not detract so much from the poetic beauty as the former but they are to be avoided in the best types of compositions. Thus the distinction of *nitya* (constant) and *anitya* (transitory) *doṣas* was also perhaps hinted at by Vāmana. They may be opposites of *guṇas* and correspond to *viparyaya doṣas* of Daṇḍin. They prevent poetry reaching perfection.

36. *Gītā* XVIII. 55.

Bhaktiā mām abhijānāti yāvān yaś cā'smi tattvataḥ /
tato mām tattvato jñātvā viśate tad anantaram //

37. Kāmadhenu. p. 67. 'Sūkṣmāḥ kāvyasaundaryā kṣepānatikṣamāḥ'.

They may not rob poetry of its rightful place in the domain of poetical art, but stand in the way of reaching the highest top of excellence.

Vāmana enumerates six *upamā doṣas* in the second *adhyāya* of the fourth *adhikaraṇa* of his work. They are as follows :—

- I. *Hinatva*—deficiency.
- II. *Adhikatva*—excess.
- III. *Liṅgabhedā*—difference in gender.
- IV. *Vacanabhedā*—difference in number.
- V. *Asādrśya*—absence in resemblance, and
- VI. *Asambhava*—improbability.

We deal with them in their proper order.

I. *Hinatva*—where *upamāna* (the object compared with) is inferior to *upameya* (the object compared) in (a) caste (b) magnitude (c) quality, it constitutes the defect *Hinatva*—deficiency of simile.

(a) Caste (*Jāti*)—

Cāṇḍālair iva yuṣmābhiḥ sāhasaṃ paramaṃ kṛtaṃ /
‘You have done the act of daring as a *cāṇḍāla*’, Here the comparison of brave man with *cāṇḍāla* is too broadly offensive to the taste.

(b) Magnitude (*Pramāṇa*)—

Vahnispuliṅga iva bhānur ayaṃ cakāsti
‘The sun shines like the spark of fire’. This is the case of inferiority of magnitude. The comparison of the great sun with insignificant spark of fire is improper.

(c) Quality (*dharma*)—

Sa munir lāñchito mauñjyā Kṛṣṇājinapaṭaṃ vahan /
Vyārājan nīlajīmūtabhāgāśliṣṭa ivā’ṃśumān //
‘The sage with girdle string and putting on the black antelope skin, appeared like the sun surrounded by dark clouds’. Here *taḍit* (the lightning) corresponding to the girdle string made of *muñja* is not mentioned in the *upamāna*, the sun. It is the case of *Hinatva*—due to deficiency of essential qualities in the *upamāna*. It cannot be contended that the statement of the black mass of

cloud involves the flash of lightning because the two are not necessarily concomitant. The rule of implication or involvement holds good only in cases where, on account of necessary concomitance the presence of one implies that of the other. So, the expressed statement of the latter is not necessary, e.g.

‘.....madhupr̥ṣatpingāḥ payobindavaḥ’

‘drops of water resembling yellowish drops of honey’, or,

‘Kanakaphalakacaturasraṃ Śroṇibimbam’

‘hips are as smooth as a seat of gold’.

The raindrops are compared to yellowish drops of honey. The yellowish shape is not mentioned because it is implied by the yellowish colour of honey. Such is also the case when the buttocks of a lady are compared with a square plate of gold. The yellow colour is not mentioned because it is invariably concomitant with gold. There is a definite deficiency of the corresponding qualities in *upamāna* but this is not regarded as a fault because all the qualities stated together serve to make it fit object of comparison (*upameya*) to the *upamāna*, ‘Chaste ladies bereft of their husbands’, as in the example—

Suryāṃśu sammīlita locaneṣu dīneṣu padmānilanirmadeṣu /
Sādhvyaḥ svageheṣu iva bhartṛhīnāḥ kekā vineṣuḥ śikhinām
mukheṣu //

II. *Adhikatyā*—The same law governs the cases of excess. Examples are—

(a) Caste—

Viśantu viṣṭayaḥ śighraṃ rudrā iva mahaujasah

‘Let the servants (viṣṭis) enter like the mighty *Rudras*’. There is a gulf of difference between the *upamāna* and the *upameya*, in respect of status. So also in the following case which illustrates extraordinary excess in respect of magnitude.

(b) Magnitude—

‘pātālam iva nābhis te stanau Kṣitidharopamau’

‘Your navel is like netherworld and breasts are like mountains. All these cases serve to show that there is glaring disparity between *upamāna* and *upameya* and as such the similitude is inadequate and inappropriate.

As has been pointed out in the *Kāmaadhenu* that cases of deficiency and excess in respect of social status and magnitude have relevancy to individual object. But the case of disparity caused by the deficiency or excess in terms of comparison involves comparison between two propositions (*vākyaārtha*). The attributes of *upamāna* and *upameya* are stated in the form of sentence. The comparison, then, extends to the terms together with their qualifying adjectives. Deficiency and excess are relative terms and the presence of one in either term involves the opposite in the other. The *raison d'être* of the defect lies in the deficiency of similitude and parallelism between the two terms constituted by this excess or by diminution of the common qualities, which form the basis of similarity.

Though there is divergence of opinion among philosophers whether similarity (*sādrśya*) is an ultimate category (*padārtha*) as held by the Prabhākara School of *Mīmāṃsists* and Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* or is a syntactic concept constituted by a number of striking common attributes between two numerically distinct concepts as maintained by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school.³⁸ It is undeniable that similarity is understood on the basis of common attributes. The difference is more metaphysical than epistemological. Even those who maintain that similarity is an ultimate category irreducible to any one of these categories, endorsed by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school, have to admit that similarity is revealed by common attributes though not constituted by the latter. The problem of poetics fortunately steers clear of this metaphysical tangle. The essential point in simile is the question of similarity as understood by a student of Poetry who may be unconcerned with Metaphysics. The similarity must be strikingly adequate and graceful. The defects enumerated above only tend to show that the basis of comparison in the simile under consideration does not fulfil the requisite condition.

38. NSM, p. 59—*Sādrśyam api na padārthāntaram, kintu tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhūyodharmavattvam. Yathā candrabhinnatve sati candragatāhladakadimattvam mukhe candrasādrśyam.*

III. *Liṅgabheda*—When difference of gender occurs between *upamāna* and *upameya* it is a defect, e.g.,

Sainyāni nadya iva jagmur anargalāni
Here the object compared *sainyāni* (armies) is in the neuter whereas its *upamāna* is in feminine gender.

IV. *Vacanabheda*—When there is difference in number of *upamāna* and *upameya* it is a fault, e.g.

Pāsyāmi locane tasyāḥ puṣpaṃ puṣpalīho yathā /
Here 'aham' (understood) is singular while its *upamāna* *madhulīhaḥ* is in plural, and again, *locane* (dual) is compared to *puṣpaṃ* (singular). This is an example of disparity of Number.

V. *Asādrśya*—when there is absence of resemblance in the qualities of *upamāna* and *upameya* (*apratita-guṇa-sādrśyam*)³⁹ it constitutes the fault of simile.

grathnāmi kāvyasāśinam vitatārtharaśmim
Here there is no resemblance between the qualities of poetry and moon. It is a clear case of *asādrśya*.

VI. *Asambhava*—when something absolutely improbable is described it is a case of *asambhava*, e.g.,

cakāsti vadane tasyāḥ smitacchāyāvīkāśinaḥ
'Smile looks beautiful on her shining face' as the moonlight on the blooming lotus'. The blooming of the lotus-flower with the moonlight is impossible. Hence the above statement is an instance of *asambhava*.

Difference in Number and Gender is regarded as a defect in so far as it detracts from the understanding of similarity between *upamāna* and *upameya*. Where by reason of long usage, tradition or common ways of looking at things the similitude is not affected by the formal difference of number and gender and the like the simile is regarded as perfect. As a matter of fact there should be concordance between *upamāna* and *upameya* and the elements of this concordance must not overwhelm the similarity between them.

Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* propounds a rule of exegesis (*paribhāṣā*)—'nañ iva yuktam anyasadṛ-

39. Vāmana. IV. II. 16.

śādhikaraṇe tathā hy arthagatiḥ'. It means a word with negative prefix *na* or with *iva* as a suffix denotes a different object which is similar because this is the way in which the meaning of such expression is understood. Thus 'many men say a non-Brāhmaṇa should be appointed for the task'. The word 'non-Brāhmaṇa' means not anything different from Brāhmaṇa stock or stone but a human being who is like a Brāhmaṇa in other respects than caste. But the crux appears in the expression—*anyasadrśādhikaraṇe* (an object similar but different). According to Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophers 'similar' means different because similarity is predicable only of two numerically different objects. But here different (*anya*) and similar (*sadrśa*) are both mentioned as the adjectives of *adhikaraṇa* (*dravya*). Either of them is redundant but Patañjali who is very critical and scrupulous in the use of words cannot be charged with ignorance of the implication of the word employed by him. He is the last man to commit looseness of expression. According to him similarity is an ultimate category which is compatible even with identity. Similarity is indefinable because it is analysable into proper constituents. It can be described as that which is the object of the sense of similarity—*sadrśam iti dhīviśayatvam sādṛśyam*. So the doctrine that similarity is an ultimate category is as old as, if not older than, Patañjali. Prabhākara, the founder of the school of *Mīmāṃsā* called *gurumata* only resurrects an old theory. Hobhouse upholds this theory of ultimacy of similarity. It is not reducible to identity in difference as contended by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory.

Thus it may be observed that Vāmana has followed his predecessor and accepted *upamādoṣas* as catalogued by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. He however does not accept *Viparīyaya upamādoṣa* as both of the varieties, viz., *hīnopamā* and *adhikopamā* have been included in the general *hīnatva* and *adhiakatva*. It is clear that he has been influenced by Daṇḍin in this respect. Vāmana, like Bhāmaha, does not take an exaggerated statement as a defect in simile.

CHAPTER VI

RUDRATA'S EXAMINATION OF DEFECTS

Rudraṭa evidently came after Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa and Vāmana. He flourished between 825 and 875 A. D.¹ He does not simply reproduce the thoughts of his predecessors or blindly follow them in the expression of his own views. He has given abundant evidence of his originality. He has utilised the contributions of his predecessors and made some remarkable advance and introduced new concepts. It is sure that he was deeply influenced by Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* and his chapters on *rasa* and incidentally the different varieties of heroes and heroines are definitely reminiscent of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*. In the old school Rudraṭa seems to be the first writer on poetics to introduce *rasa* as a prominent element² of poetry. It is however not clear whether he makes *rasa* a co-ordinate factor of poetry with *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras*. He evidently assigns a very important place to *rasa* but makes it a means to the realisation of *caturvarga*, the fourfold end of life, Dharma (Religious merit), Artha (Economic affluence), Kāma (Enjoyment of legitimate pleasure of the world) and Mokṣa (ultimate emancipations from the limitations of life of worldly existence). In this he seems to be influenced by Bhāmaha's views: 'The cultivation of good poetry brings efficiency in fourfold end of life, and produces fame and pleasure'.³ But he evidently prepares the way for the supremacy of *rasa* in poetry which has been advocated by subsequent writers. It is not deniable that Rudraṭa has exercised far-reaching influence on the later writers.

1. S. K. De, Hist. Skt. Poet. Vol. I. p. 28

2. Rudraṭa, I. 4 'Jvalad ujjvalāvākprasaraḥ sarasaṁ kurvan mahā-kaviḥ kāvyam'

3. Bhāmaha, I. 2

'dharmārtha kāma mokṣeṣu vaicakṣaṇyaṁ kalāsu ca /
prītiṁ karoti kīrtiṁ ca sādhu-kāvyanibandhanam //

His justification of poetry on the ground of its yielding various advantages⁴ is endorsed by Mammaṭa and others.

His conception of poetry is in line with that of Bhāmaha. He accords co-equal status to śabda (diction) and artha (meaning). Though he agrees with Daṇḍin in many cases he does not seem to endorse the extraordinary view of Daṇḍin regarding the character of Kāvya (poetry) in which artha has been subordinated to śabda. But Rudraṭa is noted for his eclecticism. His conception of śakti (power) also called *pratibhā* (genius) is in agreement with that of Daṇḍin. And his definition of *Vyutpatti* (the knowledge of different branches of study) is taken up by Mammaṭa with the difference that Rudraṭa regards it as conducive to the emergence of power for poetic composition, whereas Mammaṭa makes it one of the triple condition of poetry. Following Rudraṭa's *Ipse dixit* Jagannātha seems to chime with Rudraṭa regarding the efficiency of knowledge for the development of poetic power. The assertion of Rudraṭa that all words and meanings provide the wherewithal to the poet to produce his composition is only a paraphrase of Bhāmaha's dictum.⁵

All the ancient thinkers were of the opinion that the poet must have first hand knowledge of the world in all its aspects. This will make his creation rich in quality and edification. Rudraṭa is emphatic in his insistence upon the equipment of the poet. His treatment of alaṅkāras both formal and material is a record of the advance and improvement he made upon his predecessors. His definitions and illustrations are his own production. They show clearness of conception and mastery of diction. In spite of all these striking traits of originality, freshness of outlook and broad liberality of spirit are strong enough to shake off the prejudices fostered by traditions in the alaṅkāra school. It is nothing short of a miracle that Rudraṭa had no follower and consequently no school was founded in

4. Rudraṭa, I. 4 to 10 Verses ; K. P., P. 6.

Kāvyaṃ yaśasc' rīhakṛte vyavahāra-vidē śīvetara-kṣataye /
sadyaḥ para-nirvṛtaye kāntā-sammita-tayo' padeśa yuje //

5. Rudraṭa, I. 19 and cf. Bhāmaha, V. 4

his name. It is difficult to assign him to Alaṅkāra School of Bhāmaha, to Rīti School of Vāmana or to Rasa School although he incorporated in his work the characteristic contributions of these schools. In one word he was eclectic in his views and taste though he is very seldom led under contribution by modern writers. He seems to pave the way for the advent of the modern school headed by Ānanda-vardhana.

Of course we do not find in Rudraṭa's work any anticipation of *Dhvani* theory. Furthermore the logical assessment of *guṇa*, *alaṅkāra*, *rīti* and *rasa* is not found in Rudraṭa. This was reserved for modern school. Rudraṭa seems to be a solitary figure in the field of Sanskrit poetics but he was the first man of the old school to trace the importance of *rasa*.⁶ His examples are apt and appropriate. Though he has devoted considerable space to the treatment of *śabdālaṅkāras* like *yamaka* (chime), *śleṣa* (paranomasia), he always utters a word of admonition that the poet should make judicious use of them at the end of every chapter. In the course of his discourse on *śleṣa* in chapter IV of his work he has expressed his view that even a mere similarity of verbal expression also can function as the link between *upamāna* and *upameya*, just as the similarity of meaning, quality or action does. In the controversy between the followers of Udbhaṭa and Mammaṭa followed by Viśvanātha regarding the independence or otherwise of *śleṣa* as a figure of speech both Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha quote Rudraṭa's opinion in support of their contention. In spite of the fact that Rudraṭa did not find a successor to continue the development of his views he has won esteem and appreciation from later writers.

As we have observed, according to Rudraṭa, *śabda* (word) and *artha* (meaning) constitute poetry. In this he follows in the footsteps of Bhāmaha. It is remarkable that except Daṇḍin all writers on poetics have given co-equal status to diction and meaning as the constituent element of poetry. Of course Daṇḍin does not ignore the part played by

6. Rudraṭa, XIV. 38

meaning but he makes the latter a subordinate though inevitable appendage of words. This is supported by Jagannātha alone with plausible arguments. These arguments have been shown to be based upon partial appraisal by Nāgeśa. Whatever be the merits of this theory Bhāmaha's original position has been endorsed by all noteworthy writers and commentators.⁷

Rudraṭa holds that guṇas are all negations of faults and thus he follows Bharata. He divides poetic faults broadly into two groups : (1) verbal and (2) material. In the beginning of the second chapter of the *Kāvyaṭīkā* he enumerates six *doṣas* in general and maintains that the absence of these faults constitutes the excellence of poetry. These faults are as follows :

- I. Nyūnapada—deficiency of word,
- II. Adhikapada—excess of word,
- III. Avācaka—inexpressive,
- IV. Duṣṭakrama—wrong position of word,
- V. Apuṣṭārtha—inadequate meaning,
- VI. Acārupada—unpleasant to ear.

These faults have been explained and illustrated by Namisādhū, the excellent commentator of the *Kāvyaṭīkā*.

I. *Nyūnapada*—It is a sentence with absence of an essential word. Due to insufficiency it may cause (a) *duṣṭārtha-pratīti*—Apprehension of undesired meaning or (b) *vivakṣī-tārthāpratīti*⁸—absence of intended meaning, e.g.

Sampado jalataraṅgavilolāḥ
yauvanaṃ tricaturāṇi dināni /
Śāradābhram iva pelavam āyuh
Kiṃ dhanaiḥ parahitāni kurudhvam //

Fortunes are ephemeral like bubbles of water, youth lasts for few days only, life is as fragile and unstable as the cloud in autumn. What is wealth worth? Do good to others'. Here the last sentence—*Kiṃ dhanaiḥ parahitāni kurudhvam*—expresses undesired meaning in absence of the word *Kāryam* after the

7. *ibid*, II. 8

8. Namisādhū on Rudraṭa II. 8

word *dhanaiḥ*. The sentence is *Kiṃ dhanaiḥ kāryam, parahitāni kurudhvam* (what is the use of wealth ? Do good to others). The defect springs from the ambiguity of construction giving two meanings, one good and the other bad. Daṇḍin calls this defect *Neyārtha*.

Namīsādhū⁹ further cites an exception to this defect as

yaś ca nimbaṃ paraśunā yaś cainaṃ madhu-sarpiṣā /

yaś cainaṃ gandhamālyābhyaṃ sarvasya kaṭur eva saḥ //

'The margo tree is bitter to all, whether one cuts it with axe, sprinkles it with honey and butter or whether one decorates it with scent and garland of flowers'. Here the verbs are not stated but they are easily understood. Thus the omission of verbs does not make it unintelligible. Hence it is not a defect.

II. *Adhikapada*—When the same intended meaning which is expressed by word is again conveyed by another word it is a case of the defect *adhikapada* (excess of word) e.g.

Sphārādhvānāmbudālī valayaparikarālokanam premadāmnah /
Here the meaning 'mass of clouds' is conveyed by the word 'ambudālī' and again the use of 'valayaparikara' constitutes this defect. 'Valaya' means 'circle' and 'parikara' means 'mass'. Unnecessary addition of words without corresponding addition in meaning is obviously a fault. This shows that the writer simply wants a padding out for meeting the demand of metre.

III. *Avācaka*—That which does not express intended ideas is a case of this defect, e.g.

lāvaṇyasindhur apareva hi keyam atra

yatrotpalāni śaśinā saha samplavante/

unmajjati dviradakumbhataṭi ca yatra

yatrāpare kadalikāṇḍamṛṇāladaṇḍāḥ //

Here words *śaśi*, *utpale*, *dviradakumbhataṭi*, *kadalikāṇḍa* and *mṛṇāladaṇḍa* are used in the senses of face, eyes, breasts, thighs and arms respectively to which their denotations do not extend. It is true that a lady's face is usually compared with the moon. The sea of loveliness here stands for the lady. The lilies here stand for her eyes, the two lobes of the elephant represent the

9. Namīsādhū on Rudraṭa, II. 8 'atra cheda sekā-lamkārah anuktaḥ api...pratiyante nahi teṣāṃ chedādar anyah vyāpārah iti'.

heaving breasts, trunks of plantain for thighs and stalks of lotus for arms. Here the *upamānas* are stated and *upameyas* are suppressed. This is set forth as a case of *sādhyaवासनā lakṣaṇā* and cited as an instance of the poetic figure *atiśayokti* (hyperbole) in the *Kāvya-prakāśa*. The intention of the speaker is to stress the complete identity of the two in order to bring out the uncommon beauty of the damsel. So the characteristic of this instance as an example of *avācaka* is not accepted by later writers.

Bhāmaha¹⁰ defines it as 'sākṣād arūḍhaṃ vācye'rthe' and gives an example 'himāpahāmitradharaiḥ' (clouds). This is taken to be an example of the defect *Kliṣṭa* by Bhojarāja.¹¹

IV. *Duṣṭakrama*—wrong position of word. This is syntactic irregularity or grammatically wrong position of word. It is illustrated by the following expression—

Vadanty aparṇāmiti tām purāvidaḥ

Namisādhū states that the word 'iti' should have directly followed after 'purāvidaḥ'. It corresponds to Mammaṭa's Vākyadoṣa 'akrama'. PradīpaKāra adds¹² "that this is a nipātadoṣa" and he exemplified as 'udbāhur iva vāmanaḥ'.

V. *Apuṣṭārtha śabda*—inadequate meaning. It is a fault when without special significance several words are used to convey an idea which can be done so by a single one. For instance—

'dvādaśā'rddhārdha locanaḥ' for trilocana (Śiva).

It may be called '*adhikapada*' of Daṇḍin. The circumlocution is absolutely unwarranted as it creates neither a graceful meaning nor an adequate sense.

Namisādhū observes that by use of word 'śabda' in 'apuṣṭārthaśabda' the defect 'apaśabda' is also hinted. It

10. Bhāmaha, I. 41

11. S. K. Ā. I. 11

12. K. Pr., P. 230. akramam avidyamānaḥ kramo yatra tat yatpadā nantaram yat padopādānamucitaṃ tato'nyatra tadupādānam yatretyārthaḥ evaṃ cā'yaṃ doṣo nipāta-viśayaḥ. yathā upasargānām dhātoḥ pūrvam eva prayogaḥ....., udbahur iva Vāmana' ityadāv apyayam eva doṣaḥ.

consists of use of words which are grammatically incorrect. Several examples are quoted by him to illustrate the point. This is the case of solecism. It is called '*asādhū*' by Vāmana. It is Mammaṭa's '*Cyutasamskṛti*'. It is devoid of grammatical purity and is a serious defect, e.g.

'Saṃdhyā-Vadhūm gr̥hya karaṇa'

Here the from 'gr̥hya' is incorrect because the suffix 'ktvā' is changed into 'lyap' in the case of compound only¹³. cf. Pragṛhya, Vigṛhya, etc.

VI. *Acārupada*—unpleasant to the ear. Rudraṭa observes that a poet should be careful to choose and use words.¹⁴ The poetic language should be different from the language of common people. The former should be such as does enhance the grace of poetry whereas the latter is simply an instrument of information. Thus the poet should pick up words which are pleasant to ear and capable of making the composition graceful. An instance of this defect is—

'Tarvāly urvy evarṣe' for 'tarupaṅktir asaṅkatā eva mune' (O sage, the row of trees is wide). This sentence is jarring to ear and defective.

In the sixth chapter of his *Kāvya-lāṅkāra* Rudraṭa takes up the verbal defects (*śabda doṣas*). He subdivides them into two, viz. *Padadoṣas* and *vākyadoṣas*. His *padadoṣas* are as follows.¹⁵

- I. Asamartha—incapable of giving sense,
- II. Apratīta—unintelligible,
- III. Visandhi—ugliness of sandhi,
- IV. Viparītakalpanā—having its meaning such as to be guessed out,
- V. Grāmya—vulgar, and
- VI. Deśya—slang.

They are defined and illustrated in the order :—

13. Pāṇini. VII. 1 37 'Samāse anaṅpūrve kṭvyo lyap'

14. Rudraṭa, II. 9 'Racayet tameva śabdaṃ racanāyā yaḥ karoti cārutvam'

15. idid. VI. 3

I. *Asamartha*—A word which is incapable of giving sense is a case of this defect. Rudraṭa mentions four kinds of it :

(a) A verbal root with a preposition used in a sense which it has without it, e.g. Pra *sthā* in the sense of *sthā*. It is called '*ruḍhicyuta*' and '*anyārtha*' by Vāmana and Bhāmaha respectively. Mammaṭa takes it as '*avācaka*'.

(b) The second type of this is when a root used in a sense given in Dhātupāṭha, is not sanctioned by usage e.g.

'Surasrotasvinīm eṣa hanti'

Here the use of the root 'han' in the sense of going constitutes this fault as it is never used by standard authors but is only found in grammar or dictionary. Vāmana calls it *gūḍhārtha*.

(c) The third type of this fault is when a word used in a sense, which though consistent with etymology, is not sanctioned by usage, e.g. *Jalabhṛt* for ocean, because it means 'cloud' according to usage.

(d) The fourth type is when the sense of a word is not decisive. e.g. 'meghacchavim āruohāśvam'—'he mounted the horse of the colour of the cloud'. Here it is contended that the sense is not clear. Cloud changes its colour as well as shapes. It is difficult to understand what particular colour the horse has got. So the meaning is not decisively understandable. It may be Bharata's '*Sāvaśesa*'.

Rudraṭa sets forth several exceptions to this. Where the meaning of a word is determined easily by *abhinaya* (poses of limbs like hand, etc.), e.g.

Sā sundara tava virahe sutanur iyanmātralocanā yātā /
etāvatIm avasthām yātā divasair iyanmātraiḥ //

Here the meaning of the word 'iyanmātra' (so much) is indicated by gesticulation of hand. It is not a case of the defect *asamartha* so also is the case where the meaning is understood from context or from the accompanying words.

As for ambiguous words the definite meaning is easily understood from the context or accompanying words. This is only a brief summary of the criteria given by Bhartṛhari

and quoted by Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa¹⁶ and others which give the reason to understand the particular meaning.

II. *Apratita*—unintelligible. A word which is used in a sense not sanctioned by usage only on the basis of etymology. It may give a meaning (a) which is doubtful (*saṁśayavat*) or if not doubtful (b) is only forced (*asaṁśaya*). Examples are :—

- (a) *Samśayavat*, e.g. *Himāpahā*. It may mean the sun or fire, as both of them are the destroyer of cold.
- (b) *Asaṁśaya apratita*—includes synonyms which are manoeuvred e.g. 'aśva-yośin mukhārciṣam' for 'Vāḍavā-mukhāgnim'. Namisādhū calls it *alpadoṣa* (a slight defect or peccadillo) because such usages have been accepted by poets.¹⁷

These two '*asamartha*' and '*apratita*' cannot be subsumed under '*avācaka*' because '*avācaka*' is one which does not give the meaning in any situation, but *asamartha* and *apratita* do convey the meaning though owing to absence of convention they are not used in that sense in the particular cases noted above.

III. *Visandhi*—ugliness of sandhi. Sandhi is *saṁhitā*—close proximity of letters. When letters are close they generally combine into new formation. It is brought about in two ways—(a) when there is no sandhi or (b) when the *sandhi* rouses the sense of indecency.

(a) The first type when there is no *sandhi* can be possible in two ways—when the speaker or writer does not like to combine. It may be permissible but in verse this type of disjunction is not tolerated. Secondly grammar

16. K. P. p. 63

'Saṁyogo viprayogaś ca sādhacaryaṁ virodhitā /
arthaḥ prakaraṇaṁ liṅgaṁ śabdasya'nyasya sannidhiḥ //
Sāmarthyam aucitī deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarādayaḥ /
Śabdārthasya'navacchede viśeṣasmṛti-hetavaḥ //

17. Māgha. P. 'Turaṅga-Kāntamukha-havyavāhajvāleḥ bhittvā jalam
ullalāsa.

sanctions some cases where *sandhi* does not take place.¹⁸ These are the cases of 'pluta' and 'praghyā' vowels. This kind of disjunction is also not admissible more than once. Rudraṭa like other poets takes this fault to be serious and warns that such disjunction is to be avoided by all means,¹⁹ e.g.

Kānte induśīroratne ādadhāne udaṃṣuṇī

Here disjunction is due to grammatical prohibition but its repetition causes jarring sensation on the ear and is defective,

(b) When the *sandhi* rouses the sense of indecency, it is a serious defect and should be avoided by all means, e.g.

Mantharayā bharata āhūtaḥ

Here the saṃhitā of the last syllable 'ya' of the word 'Mantharayā' and the first syllable 'bha' of the word 'bharata' give the sound of 'yabha' which arouses the sense of sexual act. It is repulsive and indecent.

IV. *Viparita Kalpanā*—having its meaning such as to be guessed out. A word, whose meaning may appear contrary to intended meaning, constitutes this fault, e.g. 'akāryamitra'—its meaning is a true friend (not attached by consideration of advantages) but it suggests a sense of an associate in criminal acts.

V. *Grāmya*—vulgar. A word, which is improperly used is an instance of this flaw. Rudraṭa gives the following types of it :—

(a) Vaktṛ grāmya. There are three types of speaker by nature, viz. *uttama* (superior), *madhyama* (mediocre) and *adhama* (inferior). Different types of words are to be used by them and a deviation from it constitutes this blemish, e.g. Men of superior status such as king should not address their superior as 'bhaṭṭāraka'.

(b) Vastuviśaya grāmya. If a person of high status like sage is improperly addressed it will be a case of this type

18. Pāṇini, I. I. 11 and VI. 1. 125

19. Rudraṭa, VI. 15 'duraṃ tu varjanīyaṃ viruddha-sandhi prayatnena'

of defect. Bharata has given elaborate cases in appropriate addresses in his *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

(c) The third type of grāmya defect is possible when a word reminds of an indecent meaning, e.g. '*Klinna gaṇḍa*' (wet cheek). It may remind boil emitting pus.

Rudraṭa further observes that disregard of convention in use of well known forms like *raṇita* etc. also constitutes the defect of grāmya.²⁰ Mammaṭa, however, calls it 'prasi-ddhihata'.

VI. *Deśya*—slang. A word which has not got derivation and is used only in a part of the country is *deśya*. Use of such word in poetry is a defect, e.g. *Maḍaha*, *dahaha*, etc. These words though current in provincial dialects, yet do not possess their origin to Sanskrit. They should not find excess in Sanskrit through ignorance. Namisādhū²¹ adds that new words which express suitable meaning and are etymologically derivable from Sanskrit roots may be introduced in Sanskrit idiom. Such as *tāla* (plam tree) is called '*bhūmipiśāca*' (land ghost); *durvā* (grass) is called '*chinno-dbhavā*' (one which springs up into life even after it is cut). *Śiva* is called *mahānaṭa* (a great actor). A tree is called *paraśuruja* (which suffers from axe). These expressions are said to be coined on the analogy of current forms of dialect but they are permissible excession to Sanskrit vocabulary on account of their being expressive of some characteristic attributes of objects concerned.

After survey of some prominent defects relating to individual words Rudraṭa sets forth exceptional cases.²² Thus repetition of words is not a fault if it is inspired by joy, fear, sorrow, astonishment, etc. or used in praise or censure, for instance—'*Vada vada jitaḥ sa śatruḥ*'.

20. Rudraṭa VI. 25

21. Namisādhū on Rudraṭa VI. 27 '*savyutpattikaṃ deśyaṃ kadācit prayuñjita...*'

22. Rudraṭa VI. 29

Vaktā harṣabhayādibhir ākṣiptamanā stathā stuvan nindan /
yatpadamasakṛd vrūyāt tat punaruktaṃ na doṣaya //

Repetition of words or its apparent synonyms or in comprehensive reference (*Vipsā*) is not regarded as a fault. It is also not regarded as a fault if it is current by popular usage. For instance 'Kalakala' in the sense of noise and 'raṇa raṇaka' in the sense of anxiety.

Repetition is also not a fault where it is necessitated for the enlightenment of the hearer. It is used for riveting the attention of the person addressed.

A word having usually a different meaning is used as an expression of admiration. In such cases repetition is not liable to censure. Namisādhū notes certain instances e. g. 'muni-sārdula'—a tiger of sage. This is obviously used for expressing admiration for the prominent sage. Similarly Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee was called the Royal Bengal Tiger. So Dr. Shri Krishna Sinha, the Chief Minister of Bihar, is called Bihar-Keśarī (the lion of Bihar). Again instances like 'cūtabṛkṣa', 'malayācala', etc. though repetition are used as words of praise.

Rudraṭa gives three *vākyadoṣas*²³ :—

- I. Saṃkīrṇa—confused.
- II. Garbhita—parenthetical and
- III. Gatārtha—unnecessary repetition of a thing which has already been stated.

I. *Saṃkīrṇa*—confused. Where the words and phrases of one sentence are mixed up with another sentence and confuse the meaning it is a case of the defect 'saṃkīrṇa'. e.g.

Kimiti na paśyasi kopam pādagatam bahugunaṃ grhāṇemam /
nanu muñca hṛdayanātham kaṇṭhe manasas tamorūpam //

'Oh do you not see the lord of your heart, the abode of qualities, fallen on your feet? Embrace him and give up your anger, the darkness of your heart'. This is the intended meaning of the verse in question, but due to wrong juxtaposition of the word it conveys the undesired sense—'See your anger and give up your lord of heart'. Hence it is a defect. Vidyānātha calls it '*Vākyasaṃkīrṇa*'.

II. *Garbhita*—parenthetical. When a sentence is inserted in the midst of another sentence and conveys its meaning with difficulty it is a case of parenthesis, e.g.

yogyo yaste putraḥ soyaṁ daśavadana lakṣmaṇena mayā /
rakṣaiṇaṁ mṛtyumukhaṁ prasahya laghu nityate vivaśaḥ //

Here 'rakṣa enam' this sentence is inserted in the main sentence by way of parenthesis. As long as it is not taken out, it creates difficulty to understand the meaning of the main sentence. Hence it is a defect.

III. *Gatārtha*—In long description some poets sometimes cannot resist the temptation of describing a scene or a situation in different sentences though one of them is sufficient to describe. This is obviously a repetition and a case of this defect. Verses in the description of the Himalaya mountain in the *Kirātārjunīya* are cited as examples of this defect.

Rudraṭa concludes his discourse by offering some instructions about the composition of poetry.

Rudraṭa mentions the following *arthadoṣas*²⁴ :—

- I. *Apaheṭu*—bad reason,
- II. *Apratīta*—having an unusual sense,
- III. *Nirāgama*—statement against scripture,
- IV. *Bādhayat*—contradictory,
- V. *Asambaddha*—irrelevant,
- VI. *Grāmya*—vulgarity,
- VII. *Virasa*—incompatible sentiment,
- VIII. *Tadvān*—explicit statement of an implicit,
- IX. *Atimātra*—enormity of exaggeration.

They are illustrated in proper orders :

I. *Apahetu*—bad reason. When one part of statement appears as plausible by the reason assigned but is contradicted by the subsequent part of statement it constitutes the defect called *apahetu*.

Tava digvijayārambhe baladhūlibahalatoyajaniteṣu /

Gagana-sthaleṣu bhānoścakram abhūd rathabharābhijñam //

'On the occasion when you were carrying on expedition to

subjugate four quarters with your massive army, the huge masses of dust raised by your soldiers formed solid regions of land in the firmament and in consequence the wheels of the sun's chariot became conscious of the excessive weight'. The poet seeks to eulogise the king for his military exploits by emphasising the enormous number and equipment of his army. The army was so big that in the course of its movement on the earth the solid crust of land was pounded to powder and the profusion of dust created by its massiveness formed solid regions in the firmament. The sun is described in mythology to move in car through firmament from east to west. The wheels of the chariot were caught up in the solid region and by the poetic conceit are said to have experienced for the first time excessive weight of the chariot, On account of obstruction caused by solid blocks of earthy regions formed by masses of dust. The poet is justified in imagining the formation of solid block by massive volume of dust raised by the army. But he is unaware of the absurdity of his imagining the existence of solid regions in vacant sky without any support. So the absurdity of his second statement exposes praise of the king as fulsome flattery.

II. *Apratīta*²⁵—having an unusual sense. when a word is used in a sense in which it has not been used by any poet in spite of the fact that the sense of the word is supported by dictionary, it becomes an instance of the defect 'apratīta'. As for example :—

'Śarad iva vibhāti tanvī vikasat pulakotkare'yam'
'This slim-bodied (lady) with her hair standing on its end shines like the autumn abounding in *pulaka*-trees'. This is an instance of 'apratīta' because the word *pulaka* has never been used in the sense of tree of that name.

III. *Nirāgama*²⁶—statement against Scripture. When a statement does not confirm with *āgama* (scripture), rather goes against it, is a defect. For instance—

25. Rudraṭa XI. 5

26. Ibid XI. 6

Satatam sa rājasūyair ije Viprośvamedhaiśca
 'That Brahmin always performed sacrifices called *Rājasūya* and *Aśvamedha*. This statement is against the authority of the scripture which enjoins that these sacrifices are performed only by an emperor.

IV. *Bādhayat*²⁷—contradictory. If the subsequent statement conflicts with the previous statement of the same speaker, it is a defect called *bādhayat*. For instance—

'Mṛgākṣi netre tavānupameya'

'O fawn-eyed lady thy eyes are without comparison'. This statement is obviously contradictory. In the first place the eyes are compared with those of a fawn and immediately after are described as having no comparison. This defect has been called '*Vyārtha*' by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Vāmana.

V. *Asambaddha*²⁸—irrelevant. When an expression does not bear significance as relevant to the context or to the statement it constitutes a defect. As for example—

'Gatā te kīrtir bahuphenam jaladhim ullāṅghya'

'Your fame has reached far off after crossing the sea which is full of froth'. Here the adjective *bahuphenam* (full of froth) to the sea has no bearing on the extensiveness of the fame.

VI. *Grāmya*²⁹—vulgarity. It consists in inappropriateness in behaviour, in outward appearance, in dress and in speech with reference to country, family, caste, learning, wealth, age, position and character. A poet should never neglect the propriety of the situation. A deviation from the nature of these constitutes the flaw '*grāmya*'. To illustrate it Rudraṭa cites a few instances.

When one describes the forward aggressive behaviour in love on the part of an unsophisticated girl, or describes the spontaneous artlessness ingenuous behaviour of a courtesan, or describes the clever behaviour (urban culture) of common people (rural) or describes the cunningness and deceptive

27. Ibid XI. 7

28. Ibid XI. 8

29. Ibid XI. 9—10

behaviour of highborn ladies, one commits the offence of grāmya.

VII. *Virasa*³⁰—incompatible sentiment. This flaw arises from the description of a sentiment incompatible with what is relevant to the context or situation. Namisādhū comments that this *arthadoṣa* can be better understood from Prabandha Kāvya.³¹ However the following illustration may serve as a bare indication.

Tava vanavāso'nucitaḥ pitṛmarāṇaśucaṃ vimuñca kiṃ tapasā /
Saphalaya yauvanam etat samam anuraktena sutanu mayā //
'You should not resort to forest for practising austerity. Give up grief of death of your father. Make this youthful age (of yours) fruitful by enjoyment along with me who am attached with you'. This is shockingly inappropriate. The son of Hayagrīva went to the city of Narakāsura in order to give him safe conduct to his own. He came to know that Narakāsura was killed by Lord Kṛṣṇa and his daughter was intent upon repairing to forest for practice of austerity. He addresses these words of undisguised lustfulness to her. This absolutely ill-accords with the situation of the girl, who was not in a mood to appreciate amorous advances on the part of an unknown man.

Rudraṭa further points out another type of this *doṣa virasa* that when continuously a *rasa* though appropriate and not out of tune is developed to excess is a case of this defect. Too much of anything is bad—*ati sarvatra varjayet*—an over-elaboration of even *rasa* is bound to create distaste. Nami-sādhū points out the sixth act of the *Veṇiśaṃhāra* as an instance of this defect.

VIII. *Tadvān*³²—explicit statement of an implicit. The statement of a quality or an action which is invariably concomitant with a substance, is a fault. This is done only for the sake of filling the metre. For instance—

30. Ibid XI, 12

31. Namisādhū on Rudraṭa XI, 12 'yasmāt sa viraso'rthadoṣaḥ prabandhebhya mahākāvyaḍibhyaḥ samyag vijñātum sakyate'.

32. Rudraṭa XI, 15

Kvanu yāsyanti varākās taru-kusumarasaika-lālasā madhupāḥ /
bhasmīkṣtam vanam̐tad davadahanenātītvreṇa //

‘where will go the poor black bees who are greedy of the juice of flowers of trees? That forest is burnt to ashes by violent forest-conflagration? Here violence is necessarily inherent in forest fire and the statement of ‘*atītvreṇa*’ is redundant. Such statements are in flagrant violation of the dictum.³²

Sambhava Vyabheciārābhyām Syād viśeṣaṇam arthavat /
Na śaityena na coṣṇena Vahniḥ Kvāpi Viśiṣyate //

An adjective becomes appropriate provided it is compatible with the character of substance (*Viśeṣya*), and is found even in another substantives. Thus to say—fire is cold—is absurd because coldness is unnecessary adjective because it is the necessary alienable quality of fire. But in the expression ‘a blue lotus’ the adjective is perfectly legitimate, since it is possible and also variable. A lotus need not be invariably blue, it may be white as well.

IX. *Atimātra*—enormity of exaggeration. When a description surpasses limit of common experience it constitutes a fault ‘*atimātra*’³³ For example.

‘Tava virahe hariṇākṣyāḥ plāvayati jaganti nayanāmbu’
‘Tears shed by the fawn-eyed lady in your separation drawn all worlds.’ This oversteps the limit. It shows the lack of the sense of proportion. Even when tears are shed in full capacity they can suffice only to wet the clothing. A statement which makes a decisive departure from the norm involves a flaw which shocks one’s æsthetic sense.

It does not, however, constitute an offence when the statement of irrelevant facts shows the absurdity of the behaviour of an eccentric man. Thus with regard to a person who changes his opinions too frequently and is not ashamed of inconsistency a man may say “what can be absurd in this person, who says one thing in the beginning and just opposite in the end, well, it is like the case when one plants the seed of pulse and it turns out to be a plant of rice.” The latter would

32. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

33. Rudraṭa XI. 17.

not be more absurd than what man behaves. Rudraṭa³⁴ points out certain exceptions where even absurdity is not felt as inappropriate. A mad man and idiot or a person distraught with anxiety for his beloved make incoherent statements which do not cause any surprise. As for example—

He haṃsa dehi kāntāṃ sā me bhavatā hṛteti kim mithyā /
Nanu gatiriyam tadīyā vāṇī saive'yam atimadhurā //

'O royal swan give me my beloved, she has been taken away by you how can it be false? Because I find her gait and sweet voice in you.' This statement of a person upset with anxiety in separation from his beloved does not shock æsthetic sense and is not regarded as inappropriate.

Upamā doṣas—

Rudraṭa recognises only four kinds of defects of simile (*upamā doṣas*).³⁵ They are :—

I. Sāmānya śabda-bheda—Where the simile involves split-up of the word expressive of common attribute (which is the ground of comparison).

II. Vaiṣamya—the case of incomplete parallelism,

III. Asambhava—where the standard of comparison is an impossibility, and

IV. Aprasiddhi—strangeness of the standard of comparison.

Rudraṭa further adds that these are the only four glaring defects of simile. His commentator Namisādhū brings out the significance of this statement and observes that Rudraṭa dismisses the views of his predecessors and maintains that there are only four defects of simile and not seven as stated by Medhāvin and Bhāmaha.³⁶ Namisādhū quotes the seven defects of simile of Medhāvin as given by Bhāmaha, viz.

(1) *Hinātā* (deficiency), (2) *Asambhava* (improbability),
(3) *Liṅgavacobheda* (difference in gender and number),

34. Rudraṭa XI. 19.

35. Ibid XI. 24.

36. Bhāmaha II, 39-40.

(4-5) *Viparyaya* (dissimilarity due to inferiority or superiority), (6) *Upamānādhikatyā* (excess of words in the object of comparison) and (7) *Asadṛśatā* (absence of resemblance). Rudraṭa includes these seven types under the four types mentioned above and coins almost new terms.

Namisādhū states³⁷ that Rudraṭa's *sāmānyaśabdābheda* includes not only *līṅgabheda* (difference in gender) and *vacobheda* (difference in number), but also *kālabheda* (difference in tense), *Kārabheda* (difference in grammatical case) and *vibhaktibheda* (difference in case-endings) and is more reasonable and comprehensive. *Līṅgavacobheda* is not a flaw without *sāmānyabheda*. For example—

Anyadā bhūṣaṇam puṃsaḥ Kṣamā lajjeva yoṣitaḥ /
Parākramaḥ paribhave vaiyātyaṃ surateṣviva //

This verse of the great poet Māgha in spite of the presence of difference in gender is not to be regarded as defective. Daṇḍin has also pointed out this position. The two *doṣas* viz. 'hīnata' (deficiency) and *ādhikya* (excess) of *upamā* are covered by *Vaiṣamya* of Rudraṭa. Again these two are not regarded as defects when one desires to express censure or praise. For instance.

Catura-sakṛtjana-vacanair ativāhita-vāsarā vinodena /
Niśi cāṇḍāla ivāyam mārayati viyoginīś candraḥ //

'The days have been beguiled by the diversion of the conversation of clever friends but the moon kills the ladies separated from their lovers like a pariah (proverbially famous for his wanton cruelty) in the night. Here certainly the comparison of the moon with pariah involves a great person with a low-born one. But it does not strike as an inappropriate in the present context because the conduct of the moon towards a helpless girl is shown to be as censurable as that of a cāṇḍāla. Similarly in praise the superiority (*adhikatyā*) or inferiority (*hinatyā*) of the *upamāna* and *upameya* does not appear defective.

37. Namisādhū on Rudraṭa XI. 24. 'Kiñca līṅgavacobhede doṣatvenā' śrīyamāṇe kālakāraka-vibhaktibhedā nā'sritāḥ, sāmānyaśabdābhede tu te'pi saṃgrhītāḥ.'

Rudraṭa accepts the *asambhava doṣa* in *upamā* of old writers. His fourth *upamā doṣa* is '*aprasiddhi*'. Rudraṭa, by implication, rejects '*asādhya*' as a separate defect of simile. The reason for this omission is pointed out by Namisādhū to lie in the fact that dissimilarity is out of the question in simile. If there be not a shred of similarity there can be no simile at all. So dissimilarity between the two terms of comparison cannot be a case of the simile at all. No man in his senses, being aware of the bare nature of simile, can seek to compare them. It is too obviously absurd to deserve a separate enumeration as a defect. Defect of simile only arises when the similarity between the two terms—*upamāna* and *upameya*—is not fully drawn out.

I. *Sāmānya-śabda-bheda*³⁸—when the simile involves split-up of the word, expressive of common attribute it is a case of a blemish in simile. The *raison d'être* of this defect consists in the fact that it necessarily involves in the change of the common attributes in respect of gender (*liṅga*), tense (*Kāla*), grammatical case (*Kāraka*), case-ending (*Vibhakti*) and number (*Vacana*) for possible syntactical construction.

Candrakaleva sugauro vāta iva jagāma yaḥ samutsṛjya /
Dahatu śikhṛiṣa sa kāmam jīvayasi sudheva māmālī //

'He (the hero) is as white as the digit of the moon, he parted forsaking me like the wind, let him burn me like fire, O friend, you are reviving me like nectar'. Here in the first simile he (the *nāyaka*) is as white as the digit of the moon, the word '*sugaurah*' when construed with *candrakalā* (*upamāna*) has to be changed into '*sugauri*'. Here these two words '*candrakalā*' and '*saḥ*' are respectively feminine and masculine. So there is a touch of inappropriateness. The second is—'he parted forsaking me like the wind'. Here the hero's departure (*jagāma*) is past event whereas the wind's movement is perpetual occurrence. This comparison involves change of tense. The wind moves and the lover moved away.

The third is—‘Let him burn me like fire’. Here the word of common attribute is the act of burning. But the lover is an agent of the verb in the imperative mood (*dahatu*), whereas the fire is that of the verb in the indicative mood (*dahati*).

The last simile is—‘O friend, you are reviving me like nectar’. Here the *upmeya* is given in the second person and the *upamāna* in the third person. Nectar restores life as a matter of course and so it is to be stated in the third person. And so in the following example—

‘Kuvalayam iva dīrgha tava nayane’

‘Your eyes are as elongated as leaf of lotus’. Here is difference in number. Even poets of surpassing merits are found to be guilty of such defects. So one should be on one’s guard against such lapses. Rudraṭa here performs the thankless task of a critic, who has to call a spade a spade and does not care to gloss it over by a euphemism like a digging machine.

II. *Vaiṣamya*—The case of incomplete parallelism. Where one of the terms of the *upamāna* or the *upmeya* contains an adjective without corresponding one in the other, it is a case of *vaiṣamya*.³⁹ It may be (a) a categorical or (b) a hypothetical. Examples are in order.

(a) Viparīta rate sutanor āyastāyā vibhāti mukham asyāḥ /
Śrama-vāri-bindu-jālaka-lāñchitamiva Kamalam utphullam //

The face of the beautiful lady in unusual pose of love’s dalliance shines like adorned with network of drops of perspiration induced by excessive labour is compared to a blooming lotus without corresponding attribute like bespattered with drops of dew.

(b) Muktāphala-jālacitaṃ yadīndubimvaṃ bhavet tatastena /
Viparītarate sutanor upamīyeta’nanam tasyāḥ //

‘The face of the beautiful lady in unusual pose of love’s dalliance can be compared with the moon if it be suffused with a net of pearls.’ Here the corresponding quality—*śramavāri*—is not mentioned in the *upameya*. Hence it is a defect.

39. Ibid, XI, 29.

III. *Asambhava*⁴⁰—Where the *upamāna* is impossibility. When the adjectives of *upamāna* (the standard of comparison) are not factually present it becomes a case of this fault. As for instance—

Sutanuriyam vimalāmbara-lakṣyorumṇṇālamūlalālityā /

Ajala-prakṛtiradūra-sthita-mitrā gagana-nalinī 'va //

In this example the beautiful lady (*sutanuh*) is compared to a lotus-plant in the sky (*gagana-nalini*). Here not only the lotus-plant does not grow in the sky but also it is not delivered in a hypothetical way. It is a case of absurd comparison.

IV. *Aprasiddhi*⁴¹—Strangeness of the standard of comparison. Where the *upamāna* (standard of comparison) is strange it is a case of this blemish. Poet should not make *upamāna* of an object which is not sanctioned by tradition. As for example—

Padmāsana-sannihito bhāti brahmeva cakravāko'yam /

Śvapacasyāmaṃ vande harim indusito bako'yam iti //

Here the cakravāka bird is compared with Brahmā, Hari is compared with Śvapaca and the bird 'baka' is compared with the moon. Such *upamānas* are not endorsed by poetic convention. It is a fault.

Rudraṭa concludes his discourse by offering some instruction about the composition of poetry. He maintains in conformity with Bhāmah's theory that it is a figure of speech that adds grace to a poet's language. But he asserts that if the meaning is beautiful, the absence of a formal figure of speech does not make it unworthy performance. But a bald statement of a *dry-as-dust* matter of fact cannot be regarded as a good poetry. For instance '*Devadatta gām abhyāja śuklām daṇḍena*' (fetch the white cow with your stick). But the opening stanza of the *Kirātārjunīya* though bereft of figure is a good poetry because of its lofty import. It is regarded as mediocre poetry by Rudraṭa because he is under the influence of Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa who give the palm to figure of speech. It is

40. Rudraṭa, XI. 32.

41. Ibid, XI, 34.

worthy of remark that Rudraṭa has the aesthetic sense not to dismiss these fine pieces of poetry. Latterly when *rasa* came to occupy the position of pivotal importance in æsthetic speculation the figures of speech were relegated to a subordinate position. They are acceptable only in so far as they contribute to the comprehension of *rasa*. *Rasa* is the only important thing in poetry and poetry does not suffer from the omission of figures of speech if it breathes a beautiful sentiment.

Rudraṭa seems to be fully alive to the æsthetic significance of charming meaning which is competent enough to rouse *Sahṛdaya's* delight. He advises a poet to create poetry which may have delightful meaning for which he coins a new name 'puṣṭārthālaṃkāra'.⁴² But poetry where both the formal figures and delightful meanings are absent, is called by him 'yatkiṃcit'. Namisādhū also says that a poet should not have any room for such statement which has neither beautiful sense nor figures of speech in spite of its being free from rhetorical flaws.

Thus at the end of his speculation on defects of word Rudraṭa like his predecessor points out how defects cease to be so when they occur in imitation. Other writers like Bhoja and Mammaṭa also hold the same view. The fact of the matter is that a poet has to depict the various types of men and nature in diverse and complex circumstances. When a mad man or a fool is imitated his nonsensical utterances quoted by poets do not reflect any discredit on the poet.

Namisādhū shows an instance in which a friend of the poetess Vikaṭānitambā deplores her friend's ill-fortune of being wedded to a man who is nothing short of an idiot. It is a pity that Vikaṭānitambā has been given in marriage to a man (who has not even the elementary knowledge of orthoepy or orthography) who, for instance, uses *māṣa* (pulse) for *māsa* (month) and who cannot correctly pronounce *uṣṭra* (camel) and omits either 'r', or 'ṣ' i. e. he pronounces it as 'uṣṭa' or 'uṭra'.

We shall show in details how defects cease to be defect in special circumstances when we shall examine Mammaṭa's position.

42. Rudraṭa, VI. 46 'puṣṭārthālaṃkāram madhyamam api sādaram racayet'.

CHAPTER VII

ĀNANDAVARDHANA'S APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

Ānandvardhana, a contemporary of Avantivarman of Kashmir (855-883 A. C.) is by universal consent the promulgator of the *Dhvani* theory and-as such his epoch-making work *Dhvanyāloka* is made the point of departure from the ancient schools. According to Bhāmaha¹ word and meaning are the basic elements of poetry and their superiority or excellence is constituted by *Alaṅkāra* since *Guṇas* and *vyttis* are included under *Alaṅkāras*.² In Daṇḍin we come across the distinction of *Guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras*. But he regards the *Guṇas* as the very life of Vaidarbha style³ and for that matter of poetry as such though the logical basis of differentiation of *Guṇas* from *Alaṅkāras* is not formulated by him in explicit form. Vāmana effected this desiderated improvement. He gave the different classification of *Guṇa* as formal (*Śabdaguṇa*) or material (*Arthguṇa*). These *Guṇas*⁴ constitute according to Vāmana the essence of *Riti* or Style. And style in the ultimate analysis consists in the juxtaposition of sound and sense. In Rudraṭa we find a definite advance, in that he incorporated all the elements described by previous writers as *Guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras* and adds *Rasas* as an essential element in addition to the previous categories. Though Rudraṭa laid emphasis on *Rasa*, he does not definitely accord primacy to it over the other elements. It is in perfect conformity with the position taken up by Rudraṭa that he for the first time gives us the list of defects which detract from *Rasa*. He sets forth two *Rasa-doṣas* viz, Abrupt interception of *Rasa* which makes it inchoate and undeveloped. In other words the failure of development of

1. Bhāmaha I. 16. śabdārthau sabitau kāvyam.

2. K. A. II. 1. kāvyāśobhākarān dharmān alaṅkāraṇ pracakṣate.

3. K. A. I. 42. iti Vaidarbha-mārgasya prāṇa dāśa guṇāḥ smṛtāḥ.

4. Vāmana. III. I. I. Kāvya-sobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmāḥ guṇāḥ.

Rasa to its full stature makes poetry defective and charmless. Another serious defect is according to Rudraṭa the over-elaboration of *Rasa*. It suffers by excess whereas the former by truncated development. Rudraṭa is highly eulogistic of the function of *Rasa* in poetry and one may feel tempted to regard him as the precursor of the modern school in which *Rasa* became the central essence, nay, the soul of poetry. But Rudraṭa seems unclear regarding the relative status of *Rasa*, *Gūṇa* and *Alaṅkāra*. What he lacks is preciseness of conception and definiteness of expression. Rudraṭa is not free from the drawbacks inherent in eclecticism. We find in the *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhā-bharaṇa* of Bhojarāja the same limitation which arises from the eclectic attitude. Though Bhojarāja, King of Dhārā in Mālvā, is the putative author of the work and came long after Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta he has distinctive preference for the old schools. He repudiates the theory of suggestion (*Dhvani* theory), propounded by Ānandavardhana. In this he seems to be influenced by Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, who were proteges of King Muñja, his predecessor. These two were the authors of the *Daśarūpaka* and its commentary, an excellent work on dramaturgy. Though these two authors gave pre-eminence to *Rasa* they refuted the contention of Ānandavardhana and his followers that *Vyañjanā* or *Dhvani* (suggestion) is the vehicle of *Rasa*. In the *Agni-Purāṇa* which is a sort of encyclopaedia we come across a section of *Alaṅkāra*. The author⁵ of this treatise unmistakably criticises Ānandavardhana and seems to be aligned with Bhojarāja. They may be regarded as reactionaries so far as the *Dhvani* theory is concerned.

Ānandavardhana is deservedly admired by the subsequent writers, who consolidated and popularised the *Dhvani* school as the pre-eminently modern school of thought in poetics. He (Ānandavardhana) has a capacious intellect and comprehensive outlook. He does not ignore the findings of his predecessors and puts them in proper position in relation to *Rasa-dhvani*.

5. A. P. 345, 18. eṣām ekatamasyaiva samākhyā dhvanir ityataḥ.

As we are for the present concerned with the treatment of poetic defects (*kāvya-doṣas*), we have to restrain ourselves from the examination of the merits of the *Dhvani* theory and the wonderfully synthetic conception of poetry in which the previous speculations of *Guṇas*, *Ritis* and *Alaṅkāras* and *vyttis* are all integrated into an organic whole. Ānandavardhana observes that *Śabda* and *Artha* (words and expressed meanings) from the body of poetry and *Rasa* and *Bhāva* are the soul of it. *Guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras* are only contributory elements to *Rasa*. In fact they derive their utility and charm from *Rasa*. In so far as they subserve the manifestation of *Rasa* they are to be considered as useful elements of poetry. *Alaṅkāra* and *Guṇas* serve to heighten the capacity of words and meanings for conveying *Rasa* to the appreciative critics. Apart from the relation of *Rasa* they have no particular significance and poetical charm. *Doṣas* are in the same position with *Guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras* with reference to *Rasa*. *Doṣas* (defects) verbal or material are those obstructive factors which detract from the realization of *Rasa*. Ānandavardhana is aware of verbal defects (*śabda-doṣas*) such as *śruti⁶-duṣṭa* (harshness) and unmelodious expressions which produce an unwelcome impression upon the reader and thus fail to rivet the sympathetic attention of the reader to the beauty of poetry. Ānandavardhana has shown that the so-called *Guṇas* which were supposed by Daṇḍin and Vāmana to be concomitant with the juxtaposition of letters and words are in reality bound up with *Rasa*. Thus the quality of sweetness (*Mādhurya*) is apposite to the *Raudra*, the sentiment of anger and the like. The quality called *Ojas* which is unfolded by spirited diction characterised by long compounds is really worthy of acceptance, because it helps the manifestation of sentiments such as *Raudra*, the sentiment of anger. *Alaṅkāras* too have direct relevance to word (*śabda*) and meaning (*artha*) which are made by them fit vehicles for different sentiments. All the beauty and charm that have been credited to *Alaṅkāras* are really derived from their competency to suggest the *Rasa*.

6. D. Ā. II, 11. śruti-duṣṭādayo doṣā anityā ye ca darśitāḥ, dhvanyātmany 'eva śṛṅgāre te heyā ity udāhṛtāḥ.

Similarly defects are to be shunned because they hinder the realisation of *Rasa*. The defects have been shown to be eternal and necessary (*Nitya*) and also ephemeral (*Anitya*) according as they prove to be invariably obnoxious or occasionally innocuous. Thus harsh sounds are defects only in relation to the sentiments of love (*Śṛṅgāra*) and the like. But outside these sentiments they are not regarded as defects because they do not spoil the sentiment. On the contrary they are quite in keeping with such sentiments as the heroic (*vīra*) and the furious (*Raudra*). Old writers such as Bhāmaha noticed that these *doṣas* are not universal but they could not seize hold of the secret. It is from relation to the sentiment which is suggested by the words and meanings that these *doṣas* derive their *raison d'être*. This classification of defects as universal and occasional is capable of explanation only in the *Dhvani* theory. *Dhvani* is the suggested meaning and is shown to be of three types, viz., *Vastu* (matter of fact), *Alaṅkāra* (figures of speech) and *Rasa* (sentiment). It is the last type which is the *Dhvani par excellence*: The other two types are only possessed of relative value because they are independent of the expressed meaning (*vāc्यārtha*), while they culminate in *Rasa*. It is only the emotive value of poetry which gives it a distinctive character. Poetry is not an intellectual discourse nor is it a mere historical account of events. Because it evokes an emotional response in a man of æsthetic taste and sense of beauty, poetry has exercised an eternal influence upon the human mind. Historical truth, fidelity to the events of nature and consistency and harmony with the accepted conclusions of science and philosophy cannot be overridden by the poet, since this act of infringement will make the poet's work appear as unreal nonsense. The poet's approach to truth is from an angle of vision which is different from that of the scientist, historian and philosopher. The poet's appeal is to the heart and not particularly to the intellect. But as we have just said, the poet cannot give a wide berth to the truths discovered by the different disciplines without running the risk of being sus-

7. Locana P. 85. Tena rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastv'alaṅkāra-dhvanī tu sarvathā rasaṃ prati paryāvasyete.

pected of ignorance ending in the creation of a fantastical picture. This will stultify the poet's mission. We must be made to feel that Rāma, Sītā and Rāvaṇa were real persons. The beauty of the *Kādambarī* cannot be appreciated unless the reader is persuaded of the reality of Candrāpīḍa, Kādambarī and Mahāśvetā. It is for this reason that the writers of Sanskrit poetics (*Alaṅkāraśāstra*) have laid due emphasis upon *Vyutpatti* i.e. intellectual equipment of the poet.

The chief merit of Ānandavardhana lies in the harmonization of the truths, discovered by previous writers following the rule of thumb, in a hierarchy of poetic values in which *Rasa* occupies the uppermost position. Defects are defects only if they have an adverse effect upon the evolution of the sentiment. The *Guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras* are not mere embellishments of diction or the brute facts conveyed by them. They are regarded as things of value in so far as they contribute to the manifestation of the emotive properties of poetry. If poetry does not produce an emotional effect it ends in failure. In conformity with these fundamental laws of poetry Ānandavardhana formulates only defects which retard or spoil the realization of *Rasa*. In one word he deals with *Rasa-doṣas* alone and leaves to subsequent writers the task of a comprehensive treatment of poetic faults. This task was performed with consummate ability by Maṃmaṭabhaṭṭa in his classical work *Kāvya-prakāśa*.

It may not be out of place to advert to certain sage observations of Ānandavardhana regarding the choice of appropriate words. In the sentiment of love harsh sounds must be avoided. Moreover long compounds should be studiously shunned. The poet must not aim at creating skilful feats of verbal jugglery which are pre-eminently exemplified by such artificial figures as *yamaka*⁸ etc. The attention of both the poets and readers is diverted from the central theme to the task of unravelling the tangle of words. Even poets of acknowledged superiority could not resist the temptation of exhibiting their skill in the

8. D. A. II. 15. dhvanyātma-bbūte śṛṅgāre yamaṅk'di nivandhanam, śaktāvapi pramāditvaṃ vipralambhe viśeṣataḥ.

manipulation of strange words. These verbal tricks are nothing but legerdemain. The poet must not deliberately divert his attention to the creation of figures of speech but only concentrate on the use of words and meanings, acts and events, which have particular bearing on *Rasa*. If figures of speech come out spontaneously without requiring special attention and effort for that purpose they are to be accepted.⁹ The language of the poet must conform to the sentiment. If the diction is out of tune with the *Rasa* it is convicted of inappropriateness (*Anaucitya*). Ānandavardhana specifies the different varieties of poetic compositions such as prose, romances, epics, drama and lyrics. He gives salutary instruction regarding the use of proper diction. He is not tired of harping on the appropriateness of diction to the sentiment.

The story or the plot may be borrowed from the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas* or may be entirely invented by the poet himself. The plot however is to be managed and adjusted in such a way as all the incidents do converge on the realization of the principal *Rasa* or sentiment. The poet need not indiscriminately record all the facts of the story when it is borrowed from the *Rāmāyaṇa* or the *Mahābhārata*, which are regarded as the store-house by all poets. The poet must exercise his discretion in omitting what is antagonistic to his purpose and should exercise his liberty to create any episode in conformity with the principal *Rasa*. The playwright must not slavishly follow the directions of the dramaturgical works. These directions are rather provisional and not universal. Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa in the second act of the *Veṇiśaṃhāra* introduces a love scene in obedience to the direction of Bharata. This is entirely out of tune with the principal heroic sentiment. This is an instance of lapse from propriety. The incidents ought to be so adjusted as not to lose their remote or immediate bearing on and relevancy to *Rasa*. For this purpose also there should be appropriate stimulation and suppression of the relevant and irrelevant sentiments. The principal senti-

9. D. Ā. 11. 16. *Rasākṣiptatayā yasya bandhaḥ śakyakriyo bhavet/*
apṛthag yatna-nirvartyaḥ so'laṃkāro dhvanau mataḥ //

ment must not be lost sight of and if by pressure of circumstances it may be shoved to the background for the time being, it must be revived and brought to the foreground, as soon as the occasion arises.

Ānandavardhana properly elaborates this idea in the commentary on the *kārikās* 10-14. The *vibhāva* i. e. the hero and heroine and environment, the abiding sentiment, the passing emotions all should be so depicted and the acts and words should be so adjusted as they should form as a whole an organic expression of principal sentiment. The acts and words must not strike the reader as something inappropriate or absurd. The principal character may be a divine being or an ordinary human. It will be the height of impropriety if supernatural acts are attributed to a mere human being. So if a human being is described as crossing the seven oceans and doing such other impossible feats this will only spoil the sentiments in spite of the graceful description of the poet. There are of course found anecdotes which are impossible for a human being, however great or exalted he may be. Thus the description of king Śātavāhāna as visiting the region of the divine *Nāgas* (serpents) strikes one as gross exaggeration and as false account. The element of verisimilitude is essential for the sympathetic appreciation of *Rasa*. Lack of verisimilitude offends against the rules of propriety and ultimately ends in fiasco.¹⁰ As regards the five Pāṇḍava brothers, they are neither entirely human nor entirely divine but a combination of both. So the supernatural exploits credited to them do not offend the aesthetic sense. Abhinavagupta observes that only those events are to be described and depicted which do not give a jolt to the aesthetic sense of the reader¹¹. Thus when one describes that a king who is merely a human being, crosses the seven seas, it at once strikes the reader or audience as

10. D. Ā. p. 330—

anaucityād ṛte nānyat rasabhaṅgasya kāraṇam /
prasiddhaucityabandhas tu rasasyopaniṣat parā //

11. Locana, p. 331. yatra vineyānām pratīti-khaṇḍanā na jāyate
tādṛg varṇanīyam.

absurd and so it fails to produce the edifying effects upon the audience. About Rāmcandra and the like there is a long-standing tradition behind them which does not allow it to break the sense of verisimilitude. But the poet must be on his guard against the ascription of such super-human exploits to a character which is created by him *ad hoc*.

Ānandavardhana is never tired of emphasizing the supreme fact that the poet should concentrate all his efforts and resources on the creation of *Rasa*. The Indian concept of *Rasa* is equivalent to the European concept of beauty. As Shelly says, "A thing of beauty is joy for ever". Beauty unrealised in experience is as good as non-existent and when realised and enjoyed it is indistinguishable from what the writers on poetics have described as *Rasa*. Of course Bhāmaha has spoken of *cārutā* which is nothing but beauty. Vāmana also has observed that poetry is acceptable when it is possessed of *Alaṅkāra* (embellishment.) This embellishment is defined as beauty. But whereas the ancient writers were persuaded that the beauty of poetry derives from sonorous sounds (*Guṇas*) and clever turns of speech (*Alaṅkāras*) which constitute poetic figure, Ānandavardhana first discovered for us the philosophy of beauty. He has shown that sound and clever manipulation of words and meanings have by themselves no absolute value. Their value is relative to their efficiency in contributing to the creation of *Rasa*, which is a unique experience of aesthetic pleasure entirely distinct and different from the pleasure accruing from the satisfaction of material needs. It stands in a class of its own with which the fleeting pleasures of senses have nothing in common. This *Rasa* is a kind of spiritual experience and is more akin to the experience of the divine joy of the mystic. Just as beauty springs from the symmetrical adjustment of the physical ingredients, as for example, pieces of stone or wood or colour, or canvas, so also *Rasa* arises from the co-ordination of *Vibhāvas* (heroes or heroines, dramatic personae and the fitting natural environment) and a dominant passion (*sthāyībhāva*) which is never submerged by the influx of passing emotions (*vyabhicāribhāvas*) and their expression in physical medium (*Anubhāva*). The ultimate resultant is the arousal of

a pervasive sentiment of joy in the minds of the appreciative experiencers and this is called *Rasa*.

1. The plot, which develops through a series of events both favourable and unfavourable, is only the physical medium through which *Rasa* has to unfold itself. Ānandavardhan has given a few sage observations regarding the fit use of events and incidents which should not mar the verisimilitude. He refers to the *Ratnāvalī* in which the plot progressively adjusts itself to the evolution of *Rasa*. Apart from the propriety and verisimilitude of the story and of events and vicissitudes, the poet must take particular pains to avoid the creation of sentiments which are destructive of one another.¹² This is the first condition. Apt illustrations are given. In describing a *vibhāvo* (a character) who is characterised by the sentiment of quietude (*śāntarasa*) arising from the realization of the futility of material advantages and pleasures, the poet must not introduce the sentiment of love as developed by the same person. Again when there is misunderstanding or the heroine is offended by a real or fancied misbehaviour of her lover the lover should not be made to appease her anger by description of the futility of worldly things. Similarly the hero must not lose his temper and put forth gesture of fury when the beloved is abdures. The breach of this rule constitutes the flaw called mutual hostility of sentiments.

2. Too much elaboration even of relevant things again constitutes a drawback. If for instance the poet in course of his delineation of love in separation (*vipralambha śrṅgāra*) dwells on the beauty of hill or natural scene with extraordinary verve and gusto and employs difficult metres and figures like *yamaka* it will spoil the aesthetic effect. Kālidāsa's *Meghadūta* is a perfect example of poetic art and the portrayal of scenic beauties which abound in it, but does not hamper the evolution of love. There is a continuous shift of scenes, but all are made to converge on the central theme, the indomi-

12. D. Ā. III, 18—

virodhi-rasa-sambandhi-vibhāvādi-parigraha /
vistareṇā nvitasyā'pi vastuno'nyasya varṇanam //

table desire for union of the hero with his sweetheart. The creation of art requires relentless self-restraint and the poet has to avoid the elaborate description of the career of persons even in whom both the poet and the readers may be deeply interested. For instance in the *Abhijñāna-śākuntalam* the poet does not care to cater to the curiosity of the reader or the audience by describing the fortunes of Priyamvadā and Anasūyā. Bhavabhūti does not satisfy our curiosity regarding Ūrmilā, the spouse of Lakṣmaṇa. Likewise Bāṇabhaṭṭa does not interest himself in the career of Patralekhā, who is only used as a foil to Kādambarī. If the poet yielded to the importunities of the reader he could not create a work of art. In other words the performance would have no beauty and consequently no *Rasa*.

3. The third drawback arises from the interruption and resuscitation of suspended *Rasa* in unseasonable moments.¹³ Ānandvardhana gives a hypothetical case : Suppose that love between the hero and the heroine is fully developed and each is satisfied with the reciprocation of the other, the hero is found to occupy himself with something else. This means abrupt interception of the development of the sentiment. Analogously the description of the frivolous love episode in the second act of the *Veṇiśaṃhāra* between Duryodhana and Bhānumatī in the tense situation of heightened heroic sentiment is an instance of inexcusable impropriety. Ānandavardhana observes that such lapses on the part of poets occur on account of their pre-occupation with the plot or slavish conformation to the directives of text-book writers. The poet forgets that it is his principal mission to create beauty and *Rasa*.

4. Furthermore if a poet has succeeded in the creation of *Rasa* to its fullest development and again takes it up and dwells upon it with great avidity it will end in stultification of *Rasa*, just like a beautiful flower crumpled and withered by over-much manipulation.

13. D. Ā. p. 361. akāṇḍa eva vicchittir akāṇḍe ca prakāśanam.

5. The inappropriateness in speech and conduct¹⁴ and also of the styles of composition such as *Kaśikī*, *Bhārati*, etc. which are contributory to the development of *Rasa* spoils the æsthetic effect. If for instance the hero imitates the conduct of vulgar persons in expressing his desire for the enjoyment of the heroine's company, that will spoil the whole æsthetic effect and alienate the sympathy of the audience. Even a poet like Kālidāsa is found to be guilty of excess in the delineation of grief (*śoka*) of Rati, the spouse of Madana (God of love). But the poet's perfect craftsmanship does not make the reader feel an unwelcome jerk or cloyed by the surfeit of grief. But poets of lesser ability must avoid this temptation. The secret of art, as we have observed before, lies in self-control. He must never lose sight of the truth that too much even of a good thing produces unhealthy reaction.

But it is found that even opposite sentiments are introduced by a poet and yet it does not spoil the æsthetic effect or interfere with the development of principal sentiments. It is inevitable that events in life do not run a smooth course. There are jolts and jerks even in the best-ordered life of a man. Our plans are found to be thwarted by unexpected obstacles and sometimes the visitation of ill-luck creates a stalemate. For instance in the *Abhijñāna-śakuntalam* the rejection of the expostulation of Śakuntalā and of her relations by King Duśyanta and the disappearance of Śakuntalā create a void and reduce the king to an irredeemable sense of despair. The course of love is snapped. But the pathos of the king's situation evokes feelings of commiseration in the audience. Certainly love is here baffled by pathos. But this is only a temporary set-back, ultimately love triumphs and the couple are united. Accordingly Ānandavardhana with his extraordinary æsthetic sense and critical acumen observes that the conflict of sentiment does not mar the æsthetic effect if the opposite situation is to be worsted by or made subservient to the prin-

14. D. Ā. III, 19.

pariposam gatasyāpi paunaḥ paunyena dīpanam /
rasasya syād virodhāya vṛtyanaucityam eva ca //

cipal. Thus in the illness, emaciation and the pining of the lovers in separation owing to obstruction of their union do not produce a 'destructive effect if they are shown to be temporary phases or act as a foil to the principal sentiment of love. If there is death of either it will mean tragedy. This is not a fault if the poet intends to create the pathetic sentiment (*Kāruṇa-rasa*) and the tragic end is the logical expedient to it. But this is certainly out of place and inopportune if the sentiment of love be the dominant key-note. If there is death there should be a hope of re-union after reasonable lapse of time. This is found to be the case in the *Kādambarī*. The flame of love is not extinguished because there is assurance of the re-union of lovers. In the *Raghuvamśa* the death of Indumatī makes King Aja perfectly desolate and no amount of consolation succeeds in saving his life. But after death the king and queen are reunited in heaven. Ānandavardhana gives illustrations both from long epics and novels and also from solitary verses. In all such cases the conflict is temporary and provisional. Ultimately the principal sentiment gains the upper hand. There will be naturally different sentiments of conflicting nature, but one sentiment should be made the dominant key-note. If the opposite sentiments do not tend to destroy or neutralize the principal sentiment there is no shock to the æsthetic sense.

There are sentiments which are not inherently hostile to one another. For instance, the *Vira* (the heroic) and *Śṛṅgāra* (the erotic) ; *Śṛṅgāra* (the erotic) and *Hāsyā-rasa* (the comic) ; the *Raudra* (the furious) and *Vira-rasa* (the heroic) ; and also *Raudra* (the furious) and *Adbhuta-rasa* (the wonderful) are not constitutionally opposed to each other. The cause of love is subserved by the heroic when the hero's prowess culminates in the acquisition of the lady-love. Comic scenes and witticisms are obviously conducive to the growth of love. Even the furious (*raudra*) ends in the winning of the hand of the bride and thus subserves the erotic ; but there should not be any expression of anger or cruelty to the heroine. The heroic (*Vira-rasa*) may culminate in wonder by its achievements. Of course this is not true of all sentiments.

There is conflict between the erotic and the loathsome, heroism and cowardice, the furious and the erotic. There is innate hostility and incompatibility between these pairs. But the conflict is overcome if the other sentiment is not allowed to reach optimum development. Ānandavardhana quotes a verse "The beloved is weeping in one corner and there the bugle of battle is ringing, the soldier's heart is tossed between love for his wife and his enthusiasm for the fight."

Here neither of the sentiments is given the upper-hand. Even in long poems of epical dimension or a full-length drama the conflict is overcome by allowing only a subordinate position to opposite sentiments. As regards the opposition of sentiments which occur only in one identical medium, it can be avoided if they are distributed between different persons. Thus the courage of the hero and the cowardice of the opponent, even if developed to the maximum level, do not give rise to conflict. again the conflict between two hostile sentiments can be overcome if a sentiment agreeable to both is introduced in the interval.¹⁵ Thus in the *Nāgānanda* of Śrī Harṣa the development of love on the part of the hero who is by nature inclined to asceticism is overcome by the introduction of the sentiment of wonder in between. This also holds good in stray verses. A poet describes the fate of fallen soldiers in a battle in the following way.¹⁶ "They are adorned with garlands of Pārijāta (of heavenly flowers) and they look upon their dead bodies dragged by jackals while they are tightly embraced by celestial damsels and so on."

Here there is description of the love and the loathsome in the same person. But the conflict is overcome by the introduction of the heroic in the interval.

15. D. Ā. II, 26.

ekāśrayatve nirdoṣo nairantarye virodhavān /
rasāntara-vyavadhinā raso vyaṅgyaḥ sumedhasā //

16. D. Ā. p. 395.

bhū-reṇu-digdhān-nava-parijāta-mālārajo-vāsita bāhu-madhyāḥ /
gādham śivābhiḥ parirabhyamānān surāṅganā-śliṣṭa-bhujāntarālāḥ, etc.

Ānandavardhana winds up the discourse by offering certain wholesome admonitions. The poet must avoid conflict which is calculated to destroy the principal sentiment. He must be particularly on his guard in delineation of love which is the tenderest and most delicate of all. A slight opposition is enough to destroy it. The poet must be very careful and alert with regard to this particular sentiment. A slight deviation caused by loss of vigil and inadvertence will result in a fiasco.

CHAPTER VIII

MAHIMABHATTA'S EVALUATION OF DOṢA

Mahimabhaṭṭa (c. 1020—1060 A. C.)¹ wrote his work *Vyaktiviveka*, one of the most original contributions in the field of literary criticism. His principal objective is to demolish² the Dhvani theory of Ānandavardhana, his predecessor and compatriot. In the first chapter he has subjected to scathing criticism the definition of dhvani set forth by Ānandavardhana and contended that the whole conception of dhvani as the preponderating significance of poetry is based on wrong presupposition and vitiated by *petitio principii*. In the second chapter he treats of literary defects and herein he is in his best form. It must be admitted even by a blind admirer that Mahima's genius was more destructive than constructive. He was not afraid of incurring unpopularity. It is surprising that he had no follower and so he could not found a school as Ānandavardhana did. He was a master of Buddhist logic and quotes Dharmakīrti's texts in support of his position to clinch the argument.

He is more fortunate in regard to his treatment of literary defects. Ruyyaka who has written a commentary on his work is more of a critic than an expositor. However in the introduction to his commentary on chapter II, he pays handsome tribute to Mahimabhaṭṭa and calls him a man of stupendous intellect—*Mahāmati*³. Mahimabhaṭṭa does not deal with *Rasadoṣa*⁴ which is more integral (*antaraṅga*) to poetry than

1. Hist. Alam. Lit. Dr. P. V. Kane p. XCIV.

2. V. V. p. 152—

Anumāne'ntarbhāvaṃ sarvasyaiva dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum /
Vyaktivivekaṃ kurute praṇamya Mahimā parāṃ vācam //

3. V. V. p. 152 'tadevaṃ mahāviduṣāṃ mārgam anusṛtya saḥdaya-sikṣādarāya vicārayato'sya Mahāmater na kaścit paryanugaleśasyā-vasaraḥ.

4. V. V. p. 149. Tatra vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicāriṇām ayathāyatham yo viniyogas tanmātra-lakṣaṇam ekam antaraṅgam ādyair evoktam iti neha pratanyate.

defects of form and meaning which are external (*bahiraṅga*). He Simply refers to Ānandavardhana by way of approval. He does not deal with formal defects, i. e., the defects of language. He only enumerates five defects and shows their extensive application to cover a majority of cases. They are no doubt external (*bahiraṅga*) to the essence of poetry, i. e. aesthetic beauty resulting in aesthetic joy—*rasa*. It must be noted at the outset that Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa follows Mahimabhaṭṭa and the strength of his treatment is to a large extent derived from Mahimabhaṭṭa's original speculation. In the concluding stanza of his work Mahimabhaṭṭa expresses his hope in the following words.⁵ "Having set forth views which have not been stated by any of my predecessors, I hope that I would be an object of recollection by coming generations of scholars particularly for my researches (on defects) which provoke the derisive laughter of critical students or for the attempt to provide the entertainment (to scholars) by novel speculations on the nature of reality". Originality is usually suspect with scholars. One's errors are always original and very seldom one hits upon a new discovery. An original writer may provoke criticism and become a butt of ridicule or an object of admiration. Mahimabhaṭṭa's circle of admirers have been very few and he has received cheap sarcasm from many. Śrīharṣa at the end of his work *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* is effusive in his admiration for Mahimabhaṭṭa's work *Vyaktiviveka* which he considers to be a new organ of vision for the whole community of poets.⁶

Though Mahimabhaṭṭa deals only with five classes of defects, his treatment is extremely elaborate. It is not possible

5. V. V. p. 456—

Anyair anullikhitapūrvam idaṃ bruvāṇo
nūnam smṛter viśayatām viduṣāṃ upeyāṃ /
hāsaikakāraṇagaveśanayā navār-
thatattvāyamarśa-paritoṣa-samīhaya vā //

6. KK. p. 414—

Doṣaṃ Vyaktiviveke'muṃ kaviloka-vilocane /
Kāvya-mīmāṃsiṣu prāptā-mahimā Mahimā'dṛta //

to give within the campus of the present dissertation a comprehensive and exhaustive exposition of Mahimabhaṭṭa's meticulous deliberations in detail. The subject is fascinating though likely to be boring for its burgeoning into infinite details. We however propose to give a modest appraisal of the solid results achieved by the author and have to eschew studiously the minutiae which have bearing only on the idiosyncrasies of Sanskrit idiom. Mahimabhaṭṭa specifies the five defects as follows :—

- I. Vidheyāvimarśa—subordination of the predicate.
- II. Prakramabheda—breach of uniformity and symmetry.
- III. Kramabheda—breach of sequence entailed by misplacement of prepositions, adverbs, conjunctive particles and pronouns *et cetera*.
- IV. Punarukta—tautology.
- V. Vācyāvacana—non-statement of what ought to be stated or statement of what ought not to be stated.

As for his definition of literary defect we have already given a considerable treatment of it in connection with Govinda Ṭhakkura's emendation of Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa's definition. In brief a literary defect is defined to be one which causes obstruction to the realisation of *rasa* experience—directly or indirectly.⁷ Mahimabhaṭṭa begins with a verse of Kuntaka and shows that it is vitiated by the defect *Vidheyāvimarśa*.

saṃrambhaḥ karikāmeghasakaloddeśena siṃhasya yaḥ
sarvasyaiv sa jātimātraniyato hevākaleśaḥ kila /
ityāśādvirdakṣayambudaghatābandhe py'asaṃrabdhavān
yo'sau kutra camatkṛteratiśayaṃ yātv ambikākeśarī //

Here *asaṃrabdhavān*, *yo'sau* and *ambikākeśarī*—these three are cases of *Vidheyāvimarśa*. The negative particle 'na' has been compounded and this results in perverting the meaning intended by the poet. The emphasis is on negation. The

7. V. V. p. 152. Vivakṣitā-rasādi-pratīti-vighna-vidhāyitvaṃ nāma samanya-lakṣanam.

lion of Goddess Gaurī is shown to be *sui generis*. It ought not to be put under the same class with ordinary lions. It is a natural disposition of lions to show their mettle towards an elephant or a roaring cloud. But the lion of the Divine mother is unperturbed even toward the Divine elephants of the quarters or the massive rows of clouds which rise on the eve of the deluge (*pralaya*) of the whole world. This is the idea of the verse written by Kuntaka. We have already shown that the compounding of negative particle 'na' with a noun serves to conceal the prominence of negation and this is inexcusable when negation is meant to be the predicate. And exactly this has been done by Kuntaka. Secondly, the expression *yo'sau* is meant to convey the idea of *which* and *that*. The immediate juxtaposition of *asau* with *yah* is not capable of expressing these two facts. It only lays emphasis upon the relative pronoun *yah* and cannot stand for the demonstrative pronoun. In this connection Mahimabhaṭṭa dilates upon the role played by the relative and demonstrative pronouns *yat* and *tat*. The two stand in an indissoluble syntactical relation and the suppression of one, particularly of the demonstrative pronoun, makes it incomplete. The relative pronoun is always subordinate and the demonstrative is the predominant element. If the demonstrative is suppressed or made a part of the relative the predicate given by the demonstrative will not be understood *per se*. Mahimabhaṭṭa confirms this law of intimate association⁸ of relative *which* and demonstrative *that* by copious illustrations. He also opines that the syntactical requirement of *yat* (*which*) can be satisfied only by *tat* (*that*) and not by other pronominal forms such as *adas* (*yonder*) or *idam* (*this*). He again contends that these two pronouns should be stated explicitly and not be allowed to be merged, one in the other, by euphonic combination. This has been done in *yo'sau*. Thirdly the compound *ambikākeśari* is unfortunate. The glory and pre-eminence of the lion is due to his association with the Divine mother in the capacity of Her *vehicle*. This can be set forth only by emphasis upon *Ambikā*—the Divine mother. It should be stated separa-

8. 'yat-tador nitya-sambandhaḥ.'

tely as *ambikāvāḥ keśari*, i. e. the lion belonging to *Ambikā*—the Divine mother.

We have already shown the logical necessity of the order of sequence in a sentence. The subject should be stated first because it is already known and the predicate thereafter because it is an unknown attribute which is asserted of the noun-subject. Pre-eminence belongs to the predicate and this is indicated by its position in the sentence.⁹ We now propose to deal with the question why the compounding of the predicate with the subject deprives the former of pre-eminence. Furthermore Patañjali asserts in the *Mahābhāṣya* that the predicate is always an adjective of the subject and as such must be subordinate to the latter. Secondly the meaning of the compound and the meaning of the sentence expounding it should be identical. If the pre-eminence of the predicate is sub-ordinated in the compound and is expressed only in explanatory sentence the rule of identity of meaning will be sacrificed. The contention of Mahimabhaṭṭa and the followers, viz. Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa, Viśvanātha etc. that the predicate is superior in status to the subject has therefore no logical basis.

In reply to this contention Mahimabhaṭṭa observes that there are three types of pre-eminence (*prādhānya*) attaching to members of a verbal proposition. The adjective necessarily qualifies the substantive and imparts excellence to the latter. In this regard the adjective is subordinate to the substantive. But the superiority of the substantive is only verbal (*śabda*). The second type is determined by material truth irrespective of verbal status. The third is decided by reference to intention of the speaker (*vivakṣā*). Thus in the Vedic injunction (*Vidhi*) *graham-saṁmārṣṭi*¹⁰—one shall clean the vessel of the *soma* juice, the verb is the principal element as it denotes action and in Vedic sentences action is the main thing which comple-

9. V. V. p. 372.

Anuvādyam anukṭvaiva na vidheyam udṭrayet /
Na hy alabdhvā' spadam kiñcit kutracit pratitiṣṭhati //

10. It is in '*leṣ lakāra*' and indicates *vidhi*—injunction, command etc.

tes the import of the sentence. But the real superiority belongs to the vessel the object of the verb *sammārṣi*. According to the rule of exegesis set forth in the *Mīmāṃsā* system pre-eminence really belongs to the element which is not known before. Thus in this example we find only two types of superiority illustrated—one purely formal and belonging to the action denoted by the verb and secondly material superiority belonging to the object *graha* which has not been stated in any other antecedent sentence. The third type is only found in poetical statements. For example—

He hasta dakṣiṇa mṛtasya śiṣor dvijasya
Jivātave viṣṛja śūdra-munau kṛpāṇam /
Rāmasya pāṇir asi nirbhara garbha khinna
Sītā-vivāsana paṭoḥ karuṇā kutas te //

Here in the clause *rāmasya pāṇir asi*—‘thou art the hand of Rāma’, *rāmasya* (of Rāma) is verbally the adjective of *pāṇi* (hand). It is the hand of Rāma and not of any other person. This is the obvious import of the sentence and in form the adjective ‘*Rāmasya*’ is subordinate ; but if we look deep into the intention of the speaker the formal adjective has pre-eminence over the noun. Rāma here accuses himself of cruelty and mercilessness for having banished Sītā for no offence of her own. And this cruel disposition is transferred to the hand because it belongs to Rāma. So the adjective is significant because of the implication of cruelty. This implication is conveyed by the word *Rāmasya* (of Rāma) only when it is stated separately and not in compound as *Rāma-pāṇiḥ*.

Mahimabhaṭṭa cites Pāṇini’s¹¹ rule in support of his contention. Pāṇini says that the sixth case-ending should not be elided when abuse is meant e. g. *Vṛṣalyāḥ Kāmukaḥ*—the lover of a low caste woman and *dāśyāḥ putraḥ*—the son of a female slave and such like expressions imply opprobrium which derives from the adjectival expression in the sixth case-ending. It is not bad to be a lover, or a son of a woman ; but to be a lover of a low caste woman or the son of a slave is an unenviable distinction. This injunction of Pāṇini that even in com-

11. Pāṇini VI. III. 21 ‘*śaṣṭhyā ākrośe.*’

pound the opprobrious adjective should retain its free status by keeping the suffix intact shows that the adjective is more important than the substantive. But there is a logical contradiction involved in the postulation of both pre-eminence and subordination in the adjective. The predicate is necessarily an adjective because it qualifies the subject and as such must be subordinate to the latter. Again being a real predicate conveying a new information it should be the dominant factor and the subject is affirmed to be subordinate to it. Assuredly the same thing cannot be subordinate and principal both. But this is what Mahimabhaṭṭa stipulates for. The defect involved in the suppression of the supremacy of the predicate in the compound has been dwelt upon at length by Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa, but he has not stated reasons for giving the palm of superiority to the adjective over the substantive. This anomaly is not overcome by its status even as predicate; being an adjective all the while.

This is no doubt a serious objection taken at its face value. But Mahimabhaṭṭa has already spoken of three types of superiority. Formally the adjective may have a subordinate status in the sentence, but by implication it may be superior to the substantive. There is no doubt a logical opposition between superiority and non-superiority provided both belong to the same type. The opposition is not real like that between being and non-being (*bhāvābhāvor iva*); nor is it between terms of the same status. The superiority of the predicate is real and its inferiority is only formal. In poetry it is the poet's intended meaning that has an aesthetic appeal which is regarded as the most important factor. The superiority of the predicate is derived both from his significance (*arthataḥ*) and also from the poet's intention (*vivakṣātāḥ*). Because these types of superiority have not the same status and also because they do not belong to the same universe of discourse, opposition between them is only apparent. So the objection based upon logical incompatibility does not hold water.

Let us now discuss the second objection that the compound (*samāsa*) and the explanatory sentence (*vigraha-vākya*)

should have an identical meaning and this is incompatible with the assertion, that in the compound the predicate loses its superior status. It is true that such compounds are entirely correct according to grammatical rules. Mahimabhaṭṭa in reply to this contention asserts that the position he maintains is perfectly in conformity with Pāṇini's rule.¹² Pāṇini makes *sāmarthya* i. e. competency and relevancy the ruling condition of compound. In *samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*¹³ the word *samartha* is highly significant. The traditional exponents have only taken a superficial and narrow view of competency. They give out the meaning of *sāmarthya* as consistency with syntactical relation (*vyapekṣā*). The words which are competent to be compounded must stand in necessary syntactical relation with one another and when compounded¹⁴ they must lose their separate identity and become one word. Accordingly a part of a compound, particularly the subordinate element, cannot be syntactically construed with another word standing outside the compound. But this interpretation does not give out the full significance of the adjective *samartha*. If a compound fails to convey the meaning expressed by the explanatory sentence in all its aspects it should be regarded as a case of unauthorised and unwarranted licence. Thus the compound *Ṛddhasya rājamāiṅgaḥ* in the sense of *Ṛddhasya rājñah mātāṅgaḥ* i. e. the elephant of the rich king—is not a legitimate form because the compound fails to express the meaning of the sentence. The rule of the identity of meaning breaks down. This is too plain not to be understood. But superficial grammarians have not been able to understand that the compounding of a predicate with a subject is equally a case of its legitimate form; because the two forms of expression, one compound and the other free sentence, do not convey the same

12. V. V. p. 228 na cā'yam arthaḥ svamanīṣikayaiva asmābhir upakalpītaḥ, kin tarhi, acāryasyāpy abhimata eva. Yad ayam samāsavidhau samartha-grahaṇam kṛtavān.

13. Pāṇini II. I. 1.

14. V. V. p. 233—

Vidheyo'ddeśya-bhāvo'yaṁ vaktum vṛtyā na pāryate /
yat tenā'nabhidhānam vā samartha-grahaṇam ca vā //

significance. Thus the compound *ambikākeśari* is not only rhetorically but also grammatically unwarranted in the sense of *ambikāyāḥ keśari*. In the sentence the adjective retains its predominance which is lost in the compound. So the compound *ambikā keśari* is as illegitimate as *Ṛddhasya rājamātangaḥ*.

The difference in import between the two forms of expression is capable of being realized only by a person who is not only conversant with the ordinary rules of grammar but endowed with an aesthetic sense.¹⁵ It is only persons who are totally lost to aesthetic appreciation and are satisfied with the superficial meaning of the rules and also of sentences think that there is no difference in meaning. In poetry particularly the dictionary meaning does not suffice. This is the logic of the defect *vidheyāvimarśa* in compound.

To sum up. In a sentence compound between an adjective and a substantive is not permissible¹⁶ if the adjective is meant to impart special excellence or otherwise to the substantive or if the adjective is given as the predicate. A compound is legitimate only if the two stand in mere syntactical relation. The word *samartha* in Pāṇini's rule is meant to exclude not merely words out of syntactical relation, because this is too trite a commonplace fact. That words which have no syntactical relation should not be compounded is too obvious to need a specific injunction. It is on the same footing as the expressions—Parents should be honoured. The implication is obvious that one is called upon to respect *his own* parents. It is not necessary to add the adjective 'one's own' to parent in the sentence. So the meaning of the word '*samartha*'—'competent' is something more than the trite commonplace of being

15. V. V. p. 233. Kavīnām eva eṣa viśayo na khaṇḍikopādhyānām ity anavagata-tadabhiprāyair upekṣitam etat.

16. V. V. p. 242—

yatrotkarṣo'pakarṣo vā viśeṣyasya viśeṣaṇāt /
tad eva vā vidheyam syāt samāsas tatra neṣyate //
Anyatra tvārtha-sambandha-mātre vaktum abhīpsite /
Kāmacāras tadarthaṃ hi samarthagrahaṇam kṛtam //

compatible with syntactical relation. Its implication extends to the cases of subject—predicate relation as set forth above. In other words the subject and predicate should not be compounded on account of inadequacy of the compound to express such a relationship.

II. *Prakrama-bheda*—Breach of uniformity and symmetry. We have dealt with this in our treatment of the defects in the *Kāvya-prakāśa*. Mahimabhaṭṭa gives copious illustrations. The *raison d'être* of the defect lies in the consideration that there should be symmetry between the initial (*upkrama*) and the final (*upasaṃhāra*) forms of expression. The breach of uniformity and harmony gives a jolt to the understanding of the meaning of the sentence. It is as disreeable as jerks and jolts experienced by a passenger in a conveyance running along an uneven road. An objection has been voiced against the rigid uniformity insisted on by Mahimabhaṭṭa. After all the variation in verbal expression does not impair the understanding of the meaning without hitch. It is the uniformity of the meaning that is important and the variation of the verbal expression is immaterial.

Mahimabhaṭṭa answers the objection as follows :—The uniformity of initial and the final forms of expression partakes of the character of subject and predicate. If there is no difference in meaning the same expression should be used. A different expression rather tends to make the meaning appear as different. The opponent's contention holds good in scientific treatises (*śāstra*) but it is out of place in literary composition in which both word and meaning have co-equal importance. It is for this reason poetry and *belles-lettres* are put in a separate category. This branch of literary composition is called *sāhitya*, because words and meaning form one organic whole and are of co-equal status.¹⁷ Mahimabhaṭṭa contends that the difference of expression entails a hitch in the understanding of the meaning and this is an obstacle to the realisation of

17. V. V. V. p. 268. 'na cā kāvyē śāstrādivad artha-pratily-arthaṃ śabdamaātram prayuḃyate sahitayoḥ śabdārthayos tatra prayogāt. Sāhityaṃ tulyakakṣatvena nyūnātirikatatvam.

rasa. The difference in the symmetrical and assymmetrical expression is not merely a formal difference but affects the understanding. This is evident from the change of assymmetrical into symmetrical shape. For instance :—

Śuci bhuṣayati śrutam vapuḥ
 praśamas tasya bhavaty alaṃkriyā /
 praśamābharaṇaḥ parākramaḥ
 sa nayāpādita-siddhi-bhūṣaṇaḥ //

Here the difference is not felt on account of the beauty of expression employed by the poet. The poet's use of different turns of expression causes a hitch in understanding the symmetry. But because the turns of expression by virtue of their strikingness as different figures of speech have their special appeal, they do not make the defect caused by want of symmetry felt by an indiscriminating reader, but it must strike a *connoisseur*. We deliberately restrain ourselves from going into the detailed examples given by Mahimabhaṭṭa in order to avoid prolixity. In point of fact it ought to be said that he has been rather hard upon poets of undisputed celebrity. His treatment is extremely logical and the defects alleged by him appear too fastidious. In Mahimabhaṭṭa's defence it may however be observed that precision in the choice of word and meaning cannot be lightly brushed aside. A critic must stand by the norm and ideal in spite of the fact that it is not attainable or has not received the attention it deserves from the poets of undisputed merit. Poets may fail to satisfy a fastidious precision like Mahimabhaṭṭa.

III. *Kramabheda*—Breach of sequence entailed by misplacement of prepositions, adverbs, conjunctive particles and pronouns. Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa has followed Mahimabhaṭṭa in his treatment of this defect. Mahimabhaṭṭa says that the pronoun should not be stated before the noun for which it stands. He cites the following line as an instance of this defect. 'Tirthe tadiya gajasetubandhāt pratīpagām uttarato'sya gaṅgām / 'In her landing formed by rows of elephants constituting an embankment he crossed the Gaṅgā.' Here the pronoun *her* stands for the Gaṅgā, and is not intelligible without reference

to *Gaṅgā* which is stated later. As a rule the pronoun should come after the noun. And again.

‘Navajaladharaḥ sannaddho’yaṁ na dr̥ptaniśācaraḥ’

“It is a new patch of cloud and not a demon in armour.” Here the adjective *sannaddha* should not have been stated before the negative particle ‘*na*.’ Besides, the natural order of statement is reversed. The pronoun *ayaṁ* should be placed after *navajaladharaḥ* and not before the substantive *dr̥ptaniśācaraḥ*. The first impression that it is a demon is rebutted by the assertion that it is nothing but cloud. The order of the statement should be on a par with “this is motherpearl and not silver (*śuktikeyaṁ na rajatam*).” The pronoun this should be construed with the real substantive and not the false appearance which is rebutted by the former. Again the misplacement of conjunction gives rise to a false construction. As for example—

‘Kalā ca sā kāntimaṁ kalāvatas

tvam asya lokasya ca netrakaumudī’

Here the second *ca* should be placed after *tvam*. These details are concerned with syntactical construction. The wrong placement of adjectives, pronouns, etc. makes a false construction possible. This should be particularly avoided in poetry which should deliver its meaning in as straight forward a manner as possible. The difficulties caused by misplacement of these expressions are comparable to those occasioned by mispunctuation in modern sentences. In this connection we may refer to the view that proximity (*sannidhi*) of words is a necessary condition for the understanding of syntactical relation. It has however been argued that syntactical construction is determined by logical relation. One should not make too much of physical proximity of expressions. Mahimabhaṭṭa does not combat this contention but points out in defence that the misplacement of conjunction and preposition, etc. is to be avoided particularly in cases where they can be logically construed with particular parts of speech. For instance *iti* is a particle which is to be placed after a sentence or clause which is complete in itself. If it is placed before or in the midst it is apt to give a wrong impression just like the wrong insertions of quotation marks.

IV. *Paumaruktya*—tautology. Mahimabhaṭṭa refers at the outset that tautology has a pointed reference to repetition of meaning and not mere words. If words convey different meaning the repetition of words does not constitute an offence.¹⁸ As for example—

Hasati hasati svāminy uccai rudaty api roditi /
Draviṇa-kaṇikā-kṛitam yantram pranṭyati nṛtyati //

Here apparently same words are repeated but they convey different meanings. Mahimabhaṭṭa makes an allowance for the repetition of the same word with the same meaning in the case of *lāṭanuprāsa*. In this figure though the words have the same meaning they stand in different syntactical relation. It is rather an exception which proves the rule. Further a word should not be repeated when a pronoun will do. A pronoun not only refers to the noun stated before in isolation but also when it is a part of compound. So the same words should not be repeated even when it occurs in compound, but referred to by a pronoun; in default it will be a case of tautology. If the meaning of the suffix and of the original word be the same it is a case of plain tautology. For example, *asviya-saṃhatibhiḥ*. Here the word *asviya* has the sense of plurality because it means a collection of horses and again *saṃhati* means collection. And then again the use of plural number in *asviya-saṃhatibhiḥ* rather aggravates the tautology. In the example '*Visakisalaya-cccheda-pātheya-vantaḥ*' the use of possessive suffix *matup* is tautologous because the meaning is understood from *bahubrihi* compound without it. We have already drawn attention to cases where the possessive suffix *matup*, *ini*, etc. are added, though the meaning could be derived from the construction of the expression in *bahubrihi* compound. This is not regarded as a case of tautology when additional meanings are implied. Further the use of *taddhita* after a nominal stem gives rise to tautology if the meaning be the same without it. Thus in *jāmbave-pallavāni*—the leaves of the *jambu* tree, it does

18. V. V. P. 288. paunaruktyam āritam ekam evābhyupagantūṃ yuktam na śabdān tasyāritābhede, saty aduṣṭatvāt.....na hy arthābhede śabdasāmye' pi kascid doṣaḥ.

not give an additional meaning to what is understood from the plain statement *jambu-pallavāni*. Then again *Vanyakarī* and *tadiya-mātanga* are cases of tautology because the same meaning is understood without the *taddhita* suffix. Again if the adjective be peculiar to a noun the mention of the noun is a case tautology, e.g. '*śitakiranābharaṇo bhavaḥ*.' Here the word *bhavaḥ* is unnecessary because the adjective *śitakiraṇabharaṇaḥ* (one who has the cold-rayed (moon) as an ornament) implies none else but *Śiva*, because it is an exclusive attribute of the latter. The repetition of the particle *iva* expressing simile when only one suffices will be a case of this defect, e.g.

Dine dine sã parivardhamānã labdhodayã
cāndramasīve rekhã//
Pupoṣa lãvaṇyamayãn viṣeṣãn jyotsnãntarãṇīva
kalãntarãṇī//

Here the repetition of the second *iva* is superfluous and hence gives rise to tautology. Again when a metaphor is possible a simile should not be used because a metaphor implies similarity. Thus in

'śātaḥ syāmālatāyāḥ paraśur iva
tamo'raṇyavahner ivārciḥ'.

Here the simile should be suppressed by eliding *iva* (like) because the resulting metaphor implies it.

Ruyyaka however regards these expressions as cases of *utprekṣā* and not of *upamā*. There is a subtle difference between *upamā* and *utprekṣā*. The former is determined by similarity (*sādṛśya*) and the latter by presumption of identity (*tādātmya-sambhāvanā*). So these are not proper cases of tautology according to Ruyyaka. It may however be contended that even if *utprekṣā* be meant insertion of *iva* is unnecessary because the presumption of identity which is the essence of *utprekṣā* is understood without this particle. Thus in expression "*cumbatīva rajanīmukham śaśi*" *iva* is not necessary. The sentence "the moon kisses the mouth of the night" implies that it is not a case of actual kissing which means the contact of two mouths¹⁹ of two persons and this is not literally possible of

19. S. K. P. 187. *Cubī vaktra-samyoge*.

inanimate objects like the moon and the night. By implication it means not actual kissing but something like it. So the addition of *iva* is superfluous.

In this connection, Ruyyaka joins issue with the author. He points out that there is an additional charm when different forms of expression constitute different figure of speech. It is true that a metaphor is stronger than simile²⁰ and so also a hyperbole which treats similar things as identical. If this were the yardstick to measure the propriety or impropriety of figures, then in all cases a metaphor or a hyperbole may be preferred to a simile. After all, figures of speech are striking modes of expression which spring from the imagination of poets. This extraordinary capacity for imagination is called genius. It is neither necessary nor desirable that rigid limits should be set to the exercise of the poet's imagination. It is for this reason that newer and newer turns of speech are being created without interruption and the human language is enriched by them instead of being exhausted like a mine eviscerated of its contents. The possibilities and potentialities of language for countless variations by permutation and combination of new ideas are unfolded by succession of poets coming one after another. The logical justice of the different forms of expression accounted as different figures of speech is derived from the poet's intention. Thus when similarity is meant the simile becomes the appropriate figure. When identity is asserted of two things it becomes a case of metaphor, e.g. *mukham candraḥ*—the face is the moon. If this identity is expressed between a given term and another not given it may become a case of *utprekṣā* provided the identity is in the process of formation. If on the other hand the identity is imagined to be complete it will be a case of *atiśayokti*—hyperbole. In this way striking union of diverse concepts has given rise to untold varieties of striking expressions and the process has not come to a dead stop. The resources of language, which is only an instrument in the hands of a man of genius, are simply inexhaustible

20. V. V. V. P. 303. upamā' pṛkṣayā hi rūpakam atiśayoktir vā
balīyāsī, na-ca evaṃ prayujyate vivakṣayā nānāivāt.

like those of nature. Ānandavardhana²¹ asserts this truth with his extraordinary insight. Mahimabhaṭṭa's egregious logical predilections are responsible for this love of brevity. Mahimabhaṭṭa forgets that poetry is not a science like grammar or logic.²² Grammarians are enamoured of brevity which has given rise to the maxim²³ that grammarians look upon the economy of even half a syllable as an occasion of joy like the birth of a son. But extreme brevity breeds boring monotony and even Pāṇini has not made a fetish of it. So he uses *Vibhāṣā*, *anyatarasyām*, *vā*, etc. in order to relieve boredom. Patañjali²⁴ compliments Pāṇini for diversity of procedure adopted by him in framing his rules. To revert to the original case the creation of *utprekṣā* in preference to *rūpaka* (metaphor) gives an additional charm, although Mahimabhaṭṭa seems to apply his blind eye to the telescope.

Mahimabhaṭṭa quotes from the works of Kālidāsa, Bhāravi, Māgha and other poets of reputation several examples of tautology. He lays particular stress on an important principle that what is implied should not be explicitly stated. Again if the poet pads out a sentence by words which do not contribute additional meaning or convey any meaning which is not understood by implication it is a case of vicious tautology. Mahimabhaṭṭa has exposed the disutility of mere bombast and tinsel which has proved an irresistible temptation even to poets noted for their mastery for verbal expression. Let us quote a few samples which have been mercilessly slashed by Mahimabhaṭṭa.

Kara-kalita-niśātotkhāta-khadgāgradhārā-
dṛḍhatara-vinipātacchinna-duṣṭari-kaṇṭhaḥ/

21. Dh. Ā. P.—

Vācaspati—sahasrāṇām sahasrair api yatna-taḥ /
nibaddhā'pi kṣayaṃ naiti prakṛtir jagatām iva //

22. V. V. V. 303. na hi idaṃ kāvyam lakṣaṇa-śāstram, yena mātrālāghavam cintyate. Tatrāpi vā na niyamena lāghavam āsritam mahadbhiḥ.

23. 'ardha-mātrā-lāghavena putrotsavam manyante vaiyākaraṇāḥ'.

24. M. B. 'Vicitrā hi sutrasya kṛtiḥ Paṇineḥ'.

"One who has cut up the throat of the wicked enemy with a sword of sharp edge held with the hand and striking firmly". Here nine words are superfluous and they should be excised without the least regard for the poet's feeling. The idea can be expressed by four words only *Khadge-chinnārikaṇṭhaḥ* (one who has cut the throat of enemy with his sword). The adjectives *Karakalitaniśṛta* and *utkhāta* are silly superfluities. It goes without saying that the sword should be seized firmly with the hand and should be whetted and lifted up. And again the qualification that it has sharp edge is known by implication and does not require an express statement. The adjective that it should strike with firmness and the adjective 'wicked' added to the enemy are useless appendages because without these incidents and qualities the enemy's throat cannot be cut. So it is an instance of hopeless tautology which merely makes an empty noise. Further in the verse

'Śidhurasaviṣaya-pānakriyā-Vaśāvāpta-janm-madavivaśā' /
 "The intoxication which derives its genesis from drinking the liquor of wine". Here seven words are superfluous and only *śīdhumada-vivaśā* will suffice and the rest are only given to produce a high sound. It will not serve our purpose to consider all the examples given by Mahimabhaṭṭa. They are good intellectual exercises for a student of literature. But one thing should be noted. Though unnecessary words should be avoided by poets, they must not be as bald, terse and precise as the writer of a logical definition. Poets and students of poetry are required by Mahimabhaṭṭa to go through the grind of logical training in order to be able to infer all the ideas implicitly contained in the words selected with a view to extreme economy. Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa seems to strike the middle course by avoiding the *Scylla* of bombastic elaboration and the *Charybdis* of extreme brevity befitting a logical definition. He does not lay undue emphasis on uniformity of expression which gives rise to the fault called *Kathītapadatā* (repetition of the same word) which betrays the poverty of the vocabulary of the poet. Again the same manner of expression will only give rise to *anavikṛtatā* (mannerism). There should be variation of expression and of manner of statement in poetry. The

symmetry of the initial and final expression on which Mahimabhāṭṭa sets inordinate value is needed in a philosophical work and not in poetry. It cannot be denied that there is too much of logicity in Mahimabhāṭṭa's treatment.

The next and the last defect mentioned by Mahimabhāṭṭa in called *Vācyāvacana* which is a blanket term.

V. *Vācyāvacana*—non-statement of what ought to be stated and statement of what ought not to be stated.

Practically all rhetorical faults enumerated by Mahimabhāṭṭa in the previous discourse fall under this head. They are all cases of mis-statements. In this connection he embarks upon the discussion of the possibility of *śabdaśakti-mūlādhyani* i. e. suggestion of another meaning by words susceptible of double meaning. He shows that that is not possible. Mahimabhāṭṭa's critical observation on lapses of poets exposed by him in their writings are both intriguing and edifying. We select one or two examples to show the keen assessment made by the author.

Prāptā nitambaśparsaṃ snānottirñāyāssyāmalāṅgyāḥ/

Cikurā rudanti jalabindubhir bandhasyeva bhayena//

The idea is this "the long hairs of the beautiful lady after her bath are hanging loose and falling on her buttocks. They are letting fall drops of water and the poet imagines that the hairs are weeping in fear of being bound up again. Mahimabhāṭṭa observes that the act of weeping is the principal factor and thus should have been made the case of *utprekṣā*. The other fact 'fear of bondage' will be automatically understood. The imagery of drops of water as drops of tears *eo ipso* will make the imagination of fear of bondage intelligible. He sums up as follows. The addition of an adjective which only sets forth the character of the noun already known and which is not inspired by poetic fancy should be omitted. The addition of such adjectives only serves to fill up the exigencies of metre. The addition of adjective in '*atererlocanaśuktimauktika maṇer*', 'the fire born out of the eye of the sage Atri' only fills up the metre because it states a fact which is known by everybody.

In this connection a question is raised regarding description of Nature or natural phenomena which has been a favourite pastime of poets. It is called *svabhāvokti*—description of nature. Is it permissible or not? In reply Mahimabhaṭṭa observes that a verbal description of facts does not usually give a vivid picture of the thing described. An object has twofold character: first, generic (*sāmānya*) and the second specific (*viśeṣa*). Words only give out the general character of the thing which is after all an unreal abstraction and a vague concept. The specific nature is only envisaged by perception. But words of poets who are gifted with genius can give a vivid intuition of a thing described by them. Genius is a kind of capacity for glimpsing the real nature of things which flashes forth when the poet's mind is engrossed in the contemplation of words and meanings suitable to the evolution of *Rasa*.²⁵ This genius is akin to divine intuition by means of which all things are intuited by God. Hence the poet succeeds in giving a pen portrait of natural factors which present the natural objects with all their vividness to the reader's mind. It is a case of true *svabhāvokti*. Knowledge by description (i. e. mediate knowledge) here culminates in knowledge by acquaintance (that is, immediate intuition) to use the terminology of Bertrand Russell. Mahimabhaṭṭa quotes two examples of which the last is the description of the deer chased by Duṣyanta as the target in the *Abhijñāna-śakuntala*.

Gṛīvābhaṅgābhirāmaṃ muhuranupatati etc. Here the description of facts serves to present the deer as an object of direct perception to the reader.

The defects classed under the head *avācyaśloka* are illustrations of defects already treated by the author himself. In one word all defects are cases of statement of what is not worthy of being stated or cases of omission of what ought to be stated. Mahimabhaṭṭa concludes by subjecting the famous

25. V. V. P. 390—

Rasānugūṇa-sabdārtha-cintā-stimīta-cetasah /

Kṣaṇam svarūpa-sparśotthā prajñāiva pratibhā kaveḥ //

verse²⁶ of Ānandavardhana 'Kāvyasyātmā dhvaniḥ' etc. to an insisive analysis and proposes an amendment.

We have been compelled to avoid elaborate treatment of Mahimabhaṭṭa's most original and astounding study of poetic defects. We have however focussed attention upon cases which involve far-reaching discussion of principles. We are tempted to think that Mahimabhaṭṭa is the original promulgator of these five types of defects and he shows their extensive application. It must be admitted that he shows his amazing originality. Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa borrows materials together with many of the examples from the Vyaktiviveka without explicit acknowledgement. The author of the *Ekāvali* has only given a faint echo, In spite of the extravagance of logicity Mahimabhaṭṭa's analysis and exposition of this important problem deserve careful study by students of poetics and literature. We are conscious of the imperfections of our treatment of Mahimabhaṭṭa which are necessitated by paramount considerations of maintaining balance and compactness of our dissertation. Mahimabhaṭṭa by himself deserves careful meticulous study and thorough exposition which is reserved by us for a future occasion.

CHAPTER IX

MAMMAṬA BHATṬA'S EXAMINATION OF DOṢA

Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa (1050 A. D. to 1125 A. D.)¹ is a scrupulous follower of Ānandavardhana and Abhinava gupta. He believes that *rasa* is the pivotal essence of poetry and defects of poetry, which were previously formulated on empirical grounds have been traced by him to the fundamental principle of *rasa*. This is in full accordance with Ānandavardhana's standpoint. But Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa is not prepared to dismiss or disregard the findings of the old school as is the case with his definition of poetry. He assigns the old concepts and categories to definite places without leaving out their bearing on the central principle of *rasa*. It is, however, not open to denial that Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa does not pretend to be as precise in his definitions as has become the custom with writers nurtured in the dialectic of the *Navya Nyāya* School. His definition of poetry (*kāvya*) has been the fashionable target of attack by subsequent writers as for example, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha. His definition of *doṣa* is also not free from clumsiness. His commentators have to struggle hard in order to give it a logical shape. Judged by the strict standard forged in the arsenal of the *Navya Nyāya* School, Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa is not as exact master of the art of definition. But his prominence lies in marshalling of data in compact style. His definitions, however, loose as they may appear, are not logically fallacious. A modern student particularly with a grounding in the *Navya Nyāya* discipline might wish that the terms of definitions should have been more carefully weighed. Thanks to the loyalty of the commentators the definitions interpreted by them have been reduced to logical formulation,

1. Hist. of Alam. Lit. (P. V. Kane) CVI.

S. K : De, Op. Cit. p. 160.

precise and comprehensive enough to satisfy the requirements of logic and consistency.

We now propose to get down to brass tacks. Mammaṭa defines *doṣa* (defect as *mukhyārtha-hatiḥ*. It is the substantive clause, but unfortunately all the words are not free from ambiguity. *Mukhyārtha* has been shown to be the primary meaning of the word in chapter II of the *Kāvya Prakāśa*, but that meaning does not suit the context and the logical requirements alike. And Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa definitely asserts that the word "Mukhya" here stands for *rasa*, because *Rasa* is the principal meaning of poetry. Again the word "hati" which is derived from 'han'—to kill, is also not unambiguous. Taken by itself and *tout court* it would mean destruction, but that meaning would be extremely inappropriate. In the gross the word *hati* has been explained as *apakarṣa*, i.e. detraction; but even this amendment does not make it free from difficulty and from being a source of confusion. *Rasa* is here used not in its usual acceptance. It is to be understood in its secondary sense. It means whatever is an object of the act of relishing (*rasyate*) and thus *Bhāva* and also *Rasābhāsa* and *Bhāvabhāsa* come within its purview. The necessary recourse to *Lakṣaṇā* (secondary power) is not a commendable procedure. It is a general rule of exegesis that the conventional meaning, i.e. the meaning fixed by usage is independent of and overrides the etymological meaning (*rudhir yogād baliyasi*). In cases where the meaning intended by the writer is to be determined by etymology, that can be secured by departing from the conventional sense and by having recourse to *lakṣaṇā*—the secondary denotation. This has been done by Mammaṭa and his commentators by regular *tour de force*.

Apart from the difficulties mentioned above the definition would not apply to defects in species of poetry which are not influenced by *rasa*. This has been called *citra-kāvya*—pictorial poetry. It is not regarded as high-class work, but still is not tabooed by Ānandvardhana and Mammaṭa. There is no *rasa* in such poetry, but only striking use of words and primary meanings. It only aims at showing the poet's skill in the use of unusual words or unusual combination of words which

rather quicken the ingenuity of the reader and does not care to evoke an aesthetic appreciation. In order to make the definition applicable to such pieces of composition he asserts that *vācyārtha* (the expressed meaning) should also be included in the *mukhyārtha*. Not only this, even the verbal expressions should come within the ambit of *mukhyārtha*, i. e. the principal meaning. The expressed meaning (*vācyārtha*) is the vehicle of the suggested sentiment (*rasa*) and the actual verbal expressions are also to be comprehended by it as they are the necessary means of the understanding of the expressed and suggested meaning. The expression “*śabdādyāḥ*” does not seem happy. ‘*Śabda*’ here stands for expressive word, i. e. a word which signifies a meaning. The word “*ādyā*”—*et cetera* stands for the constituent syllables (*varṇas*) and the style of composition (*racanā*). The latter have no meaning, yet a defect in them spoils through a circuitous process the manifestation of *rasa*. Therefore they are also to be taken into account. The *et cetera* (*ādyāḥ*) is used to effect this inclusion. This could have been conveniently avoided by taking the word ‘*śabda*’ in the etymological sense of being what is uttered (*śabdyate*). This etymological meaning is wide enough to include not only words significant of meaning, but also those constituent elements and also the resultant combination of sentences, because they all share the common property of being voiced by the vocal organ. Of course, this would have necessitated the surrender of the primary meaning of *śabda* and recourse to secondary meaning. But Mammaṭa is not afraid of secondary meanings as “*Mukhya*” and “*Hati*”, “*Rasa*” and also “*Vācya*” have been taken in the secondary sense. And the commentators have to use ingenuity in evolving a justifiable meaning.

In spite of all the emendations the definition does not cease to cause trouble. The word “*hati*” in *mukhyārtha-hati* is a hard nut to crack. As we have observed before it cannot be taken in its primary sense of destruction. It cannot be taken as synonymous with “*abhāva*” (negation), which has four varieties, viz., pre-negation (*Prāgabhāva*), post-negation (*pradhva-*

ṃsābhāva), absolute-negation (*atyantābhāva*) and also reciprocal-negation (*anonyābhāva*) of identity, i. e. the numerical difference of things. The meaning *apakarṣa*—detraction or degradation does not include all cases. Only those defects which detract from the emotional effect produced by *rasa* would come under it. But it would fail to include those defects which serve to preclude the realisation of *rasa* by the omission of a necessary condition of it. Here *rasa* will fail to materialise, so the question of detraction or degradation of *rasa* is ruled out. The commentator Govinda Ṭhakkura, whose commentary is a masterpiece of logical skill and poetical sensibility alike, voices the charge of the critic facetiously as follows. “The definition is just like a very small coverlet of too poor a couple which when drawn up by one leaves the other entirely exposed”².

Govinda Ṭhakkura, however, saves the definition from the charges. Of course he admits that detraction or degradation does not fit in with all the situations, It is particularly irrelevant to cases where the primary is not expressed at all, as we shall see in the case of defect *anarthaka* (insignificant) and *asamartha* (incompetent). Govinda Ṭhakkura interprets *hati* (*apakarṣa*) deterioration or degradation in an altogether different sense. The essence of *doṣa* (defect) lies in its being the condition of the obstruction or frustration of the understanding of intended meaning. In poetry which is possessed of *rasa* the poet's intention is the understanding by the reader of the meaning which is possessed of *rasa*. uninterrupted and uneffected. In compositions, which have no pretension to *rasa*, the understanding of the meaning of a striking character is the intention of the poet, Now defined as such the definition applies to all cases. Thus in defective poetry there is failure of *Rasa* experience or the deterioration of *rasa* or interruption of *rasa*. In poetry devoid of *rasa* (*nirasa kāvya*)

2. K. Prad. P. 169.—‘tad etat lakṣaṇam atidaridradampatyoh
Kṛśatara-nisāvagunṭhanīyavaśanam iva ckena apakṣyamāṇam
aparam pariharati’.

there is either the meaning not apprehended at all, or the apprehension is delayed or it has no striking effect. Thus in all cases there is the common failure of the understanding of the meaning intended by the speaker. Sometimes this failure of understanding is directly effected as in the defects of *Rasa* and in other cases indirectly by a circuitous process as in the defects of *śabda* (word) and *artha* (meaning). In the latter case sometimes the word fails to present a meaning as in *asamartha* (incompetence) etc. Sometimes it is delayed as in *nihatārtha* (suppressed meaning) where the usual meaning is understood first and obstructs the intended meaning. Sometimes the meaning is not understood at all as in *cyuta-saṃskṛti* (solecistic expression). There are some defects such as *nirarthaka* (meaningless) which do not convey any sense and yet are used to fill up the gap. These words produce an unhealthy reaction in the critic's mind who understands the futility of these expressions used by the writer, because he could not find an expressive word in its place. This shows the poverty of his vocabulary. Secondly, the reader might be unnecessarily exercised for finding a suitable meaning which it has not. Sometimes such a word is used as gives out an opposite meaning; this gives rise to defect called *viruddhamatīkṛtva*, i. e. conveying the opposite sense. All these issues will be discussed in connection with the treatment of individual defects. There are defects which are universally and necessarily reprobated. They are to be avoided under all circumstances. There are other defects which cease to be so under special circumstances.

Though broadly speaking there are two defects relating to the form (*śabda*) and content or meaning (*artha*). It is expedient to divide the defects into three categories, (1) formal, pertaining to *śabda* (*padadoṣa*); (2) material, relating to the meaning (*arthadoṣa*) and (3) one relating to the sentiment (*rasa-doṣa*). After all it is *Rasa* which is the most important principle of poetry. It has been rightly designated as the soul of poetry. We have observed in the course of the treatment of Ānandavardhana's position that the *raison d'être* of defects lies in its adverse influence upon the evolution of *rasa* and

the figures of the sound and sense derive their justification from their contribution to the realisation of *rasa*. They are all subservient to the main theme of poetry which is *rasa*. Even the plot, the delineation of character and embellishments are all dependent upon *rasa*. They are acceptable so far as they are found to be serviceable to this principal objective. Defects are condemned because they do disservice to the cause of *rasa*. If they do not adversely effect the emergence of *rasa* they are not regarded as defects. It will be shown that some defects (*doṣas*) under some circumstances turn out as excellences (*guṇas*). This fact has been noticed by ancient writers like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin also, but they could not go into the bottom of it. They were guided by the rule of thumb. It was Ānandavardhana who discovered their inward significance and their logic by pointing out the relevancy to the emotional effect of poetry.

One issue about the method adopted by Mammaṭa in statement of poetic defects (*doṣas*) demands examination. Mammaṭa first dealt with the defects of words (*Pada Doṣas*) and then the defects of Parts of words (*Padāmśa Doṣas*), the defects of sentence (*Vākya-doṣas*), the defects of meaning (*arthadoṣas*) and the defects of sentiment (*rasa doṣas*) in successive order. Is there any logic behind this procedure? A haphazard treatment of all sorts of *doṣas* cannot commend itself. There must be a logical justification in the classification and the treatment of individual cases. It is obvious that word as expressive of meaning should call our attention first. As regards sentences they are only a combination of words. And so one can come to understand it better if the constituent elements (words) are understood first. The latter is the Pre-supposition of the former. But why should Mammaṭa treat of defects of words (*padadoṣas*) prior to the defects of parts of words (*Padāmśa-doṣas*)? In later development of logical thought the question of relevancy of sequence (*saṅgati*) came to occupy an important position. In all scientific thought which is governed by logical considerations the critical reader is expected to demand an explanation why one topic is treated before or after another.

This is the problem of *saṅgati*,³ i.e. logical relevancy, which occupies a position of importance in the Mīmāṃsā-school. It is understood that the author of a work must discuss issues which logically arise from the Previous statement. He writes in response to an actual or hypothetical question likely to be put by the student or the enquirer of truth for whose edification the book is supposed to be written. Now all assertions logically considered, are in the nature of answers to questions implicitly or explicitly posed. The next assertion must be such as naturally satisfies the question of the student. A general statement is first made. This leads to the statement of detail because that is what is wanted to be understood. This is in a nutshell the nature of relevancy. The question and answer must relate to one and the same thing. If one asks for the price of gold and if the price of butter is quoted that will be a case of glaring irrelevancy.

We have made this digression in order to bring out the logical significance of the question propounded before. The question is why should defects of words (*Pada-doṣas*) be given the place of honour in the order of treatment in preference to defects of the parts of words (*padāmśa-doṣas*)? The answer is given by Govinda Ṭhakkura as follows. It is the consideration of expediency and logical economy which have led Mammaṭa to adopt the order. The defects of parts of words (*padāmśa-doṣas*) are fewer in number and are identical with those of defects of words (*pada-doṣas*). So after treating (*upadeśa*) defects of words (*pada-doṣas*), Mammaṭa speaks of defects of parts of words (*padāmśa-doṣas*) by way of extension (*atideśa*). This constitutes economy. But if the process were reversed the same advantage could not be secured, because he would have to give fresh definitions of those defects of words (*pada-doṣas*) which are not included in the list of defects of the parts of words (*padāmśa-doṣas*). The definitions of defects of words (*padadoṣas*) apply to corresponding defects of parts of words (*padāmśa-doṣas*) and so only a backward reference would suffice in the treatment of the latter.

3. Anantarābhidhānaprayojakajijñāsajanakajijñānaviśayatvaṃ saṅgatiḥ—the usual definition of *saṅgati* given in *Navyanyāya*.

We have dealt with some important logical questions. Firstly we have subjected Mammaṭa's definition of defect (*doṣa*) to an incisive analysis by application of logical criteria. Ultimately we have given the definition of the *Pradīpakāra*, Govinda Ṭhakkura as the most satisfactory account of the nature of poetical defects. We must note that Govinda Ṭhakkura here follows in the wake of Mahimabhaṭṭa and adopts his definition with necessary modification. According to Mahimabhaṭṭa a poetical defect is a case of inappropriateness which arises from the violation of the conditions of *rasa*-experience⁴. This was pointed out by Ānandavardhana⁵. Mahima regards *rasa* as the sole and sufficient essence of poetry and leaves no room for any other species of poetry, which has no claim to *rasa*. Accordingly he defines a poetic defect as that which thwarts the realisation of *rasa* and *bhāva* etc. Govinda Ṭhakkura cannot adopt this definition, since it does not apply to pictorial poetry (*citra-kāvya*) for which Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa have found a niche in the field of poetry. Accordingly, Govinda Ṭhakkura substitutes '*uddeśya pratīti*' for '*Rasa-Pratīti*' in Mahimabhaṭṭa's definition. We have explained the meaning of this significant expression in our interpretation of Govinda Ṭhakkura's definition. In the second place we have dealt with the question of relevancy (*saṅgati*). This completes our survey of the introductory issues involved in the problem of *doṣa*. We now propose to deal with the table of *doṣas* as given by Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa in his work *Kāvya-Prakāśa* and we will deal with questions which arise in important cases.

Mammaṭa first gives the following *pada doṣas* (defects pertaining to words) :—

- I. Śrutikaṭu—unpleasant to the ear,
- II. Cyutasamskṛti—Solecism,

4. V. V. P. 152. Vivakṣitarasādiratīti-vighna-vidhāyitaṃ nāma sāmānyalakṣaṇam.

5. Dh. A. P. 330—

Anaucityād ite nānyad rasabhaṅgasya kāraṇam /
Prasiddhaucitya-bandhas tu rasasyopaniṣat parā //

- III. Aprayukta—unconventional,
- IV. Asamartha—incapable of giving intended meaning,
- V. Nihatārtha—having its meaning suppressed,
- VI. Anucitārtha improper signification,
- VII. Nirarthaka—meaningless,
- VIII. Avācaka—inexpressive,
- IX. Tridhā'sīla—threefold indecorous,
- X. Sandigda—ambiguous,
- XI. Apratīta—unintelligible,
- XII. Grāmya—vulgar,
- XIII. Neyārtha—a word, having a meaning to be guessed out.
- XIV. Klišṭa—obscure,
- XV. Avimṣṭavidheyāṃsā—having the predicate subordinated and
- XVI. Viruddhamatikṛt—of repugnant implication.

After enumeration Mammaṭa defines and illustrates each of these individual faults. We propose to study these in their proper order :

I. *Śrutikaṭu*—a word, which is painful to the ear due to its harsh syllables, is an instance of the defect *śrutikaṭu* e.g.

anaṅga-maṅgala-grhā'pāṅgabhaṅgī-taraṅgitaiḥ /
āṅgitaiḥ sa tanvaṅgyā kārṭtārthyam labhate kadā //

'When will he (the hero) have his desire fulfilled, being embraced by the slender-bodied lady through her glances, which are abode of cupid (love-god)'.

In the example given, the word '*Kārṭtārthyam*' is harsh and grating upon the ear.

Now what is the logical ground of this defect (*dūṣakatā-bija*)? It naturally grates upon the ear and so produces unwelcome effect upon the mind of the hearer. But this is not invariably found to be true because in the delineation of the furious sentiment (*raudra-rasa*) it does not produce such effect. It may be argued that only when a harsh grating sound is found in the midst of sweet mellifluous sound it is regarded as a fault. But that also is not convincing. It is a fault when it is heard along with mellifluous sweet sound or by its very nature? The first alternative presupposes the knowledge of

particular sentiment conveyed by the sentence, in default of which it will not be a fault. But this is not a tenable contention because the sound effect is different in different persons and the sentiment is realized after the import is understood. The second alternative is also not capable of being proved. Why should it not be deemed a defect if a grammarian is the speaker or hearer ?

In reply it may be observed that the use of words and syllables is entirely at the discretion of the speaker. If a sound produces a repellant effect it should be avoided. It differs from hostile sounds because it is not necessarily grating upon the ear. Sweet and soft sound may also be employed for the furious (*raudra*) and heroic (*vira*) sentiments though out of keeping. This defect of harshness is not universal. If the speaker be a grammarian fond of long compounds and harsh words and also the hearer be such, and again if the sentiment be quite in harmony with harshness such as the furious or if there be no *rasa*, the harsh sound will not be deemed a fault. On the first alternative the speaker being a grammarian is fond of harsh words the audience does not take offence and rather makes allowance for his idiosyncrasy. On the second the grammarian hearer is used to such sounds and is not at all offended. In the third instance the hearer is not affected by it because of its harmony with the sentiment. In the fourth case, i. e. in poetry devoid of sentiment (*nirasa kāvya*) it is not at all a fault because it does not adversely effect any sentiment. Lastly if the writer only quotes the words of some other person he is not to answer for the harshness of the sounds and words, because they are not his own composition.

It may however be objected that when harshness turns out to be a defect only in dependence upon the sentiment or the nature of the speaker, why should we regard it as a verbal defect ? The answer is that even what are regarded as mere verbal defects are not understood as such independently of the meaning. Thus we shall see in the second defect, solecistic expression (*cyuta-saṃskṛti*) that it is incorrect only in the

sense in which it is used. Thus 'nāthate' is incorrect only in the sense of begging and not in other senses, still it is accounted as a verbal defect. What is then the criterion of verbal (*śabda*) and material (*artha*) defect? It is the criterion of causality. If the defect ceases to be on the substitution of a word by a synonym it is regarded as a verbal defect (*śabda-doṣa*), because the meaning is the same and only the verbal expression differs. It is called *śabda-parivṛtti-sahatva*. This is the case also with *alaṅkāras* (figures of speech) and *guṇas* (excellences). If a particular figure, excellence or defect is avoided by substitution of its synonym it is to be regarded as verbal. If on the other hand the change of the words does not involve the change of defect or figure etc. it is to be regarded as the defect of the sense.

Viśvanātha and Vidyānātha call it 'Duśśrava' and 'Paruṣa' respectively. The latter defines it as 'paruṣaṁnāme tad yat syād vihitam paruṣākṣaraiḥ'—the word full of letters—harsh to the ear constitutes the defect called *paruṣa*.

II. *Cyuta-Saṁskṛti*—Solecism. When the rule of grammar is transgressed and a word is used without the grammatical characteristic it constitutes a defect called *cyuta-saṁskṛti* (solecism). This is a serious defect and is admitted by almost all writers of Poetics. The example of it is :—

etan-manda-vipākva-tindukaphala-śyāmodarāpāṇḍura-
prāntaṁ hanta pulindasundara-karasparśa-Kṣamaṁ labhyate/
tat pallīpatiputri kuñjarakulaṁ Kumbhābhayābhyarthanā-
dīnaṁ tvām anunāthate kucayugaṁ pattrāvṛtam mā kṛthāḥ //

'O the daughter of the lord of the village, the elephants being the humble petitioner for the favour of fearlessness request you not to cover your breasts with leaves, the breasts which are black in the centre as half ripe *tinduka* fruit and which are slightly yellow on the borders and tangible by the hands of a handsome Pulinda youth'.

Here the word 'anunāthate' is ungrammatical in the sense of begging. The verb *nāth* takes *ātmanepada* termination only when it is used in the sense of benediction by the rule of Pāṇini—'āśiṣi nāthaḥ'. But in the example mentioned above, the

meaning intended is 'begging' or 'asking favour'; hence the use of the word '*anunathāte*' is vitiated by the fault of solecism. It should have been '*anunathati*' in *Parasmai-Pada* termination. It is a constant (*nitya*) defect. It is called '*apaśabda*' by Abhinavagupta who takes it to be a serious defect because here the meaning is not understood at all. It is *asādhū* of *Bhojarāja*,

III. *Aprayukta*—unconventional. When a word is used in a form which though sanctioned by authority as correct, is not approved and used by poets as a rule, e. g.

yathā'yam dāruṇācāraḥ sarvadaiva vibhāvyaṭe /
tathā manye daivato'sya Piśāco rākṣaso'thavā //

'Since this man is always cruel in his behaviour, I feel that he has a ghost or a demon as his presiding deity'. Here though the word '*daivataḥ*' is quite a proper form being sanctioned in the dictionary in both masculine and neuter gender, yet this form is not used in masculine gender by poets who generally take it in the neuter.

The defect '*aprayukta*' is inconstant (*anitya*) for in the figures of speech like '*śleṣa*' and '*yamaka*' it ceases to be a defect. Poets approve of use of even '*aprayukta*' words for the sake of these figures of speech.

The use of such words is not ruled out. What is the *raison d'être* of the defect? It is not ungrammatical, nor is it devoid of expressive power. But being not used in the form it causes deliberation and hence delays the understanding of the meaning.

IV. *Asamartha*—incapable of giving sense. It is a defect arising from a word used in its etymological sense to which its denotative power does not extend, at least in the form in which it is used in the present context. 'Yat tadartham paṭhyate na ca tatrāsyā śaktiḥ,' e.g.

Tīrthāntareṣu snānena samupārjita-satkṛtiḥ /
Surasrotasvinīm eṣa hanti samprati sādaram //

'Having acquired merits by taking baths in other holy places, he now respectfully goes to the river of gods.'

Here the use of 'hanti' is wrong as it does not yield the sense of going. The verb 'han' is given in the Dhātupāṭha in the sense of both 'killing' and 'going' (han himsāgatyoh).⁶ But it bears the sense of going in restricted cases. e.g. in 'Paddhati' (path), 'Jaṅghā' (fore leg), 'jaghana' (hip), etc., the *han* in them bears the sense of going. But by itself it always means 'killing'. So the use of 'hanti' in the sense of 'going' in the present case is unwarranted. It does not yield the intended sense. Ānandavarddhana⁷ has aptly observed that convention alone is the authority for usage of words and senses.

Bhoja and Vidyānātha call it 'anartha' and define as *ruḍhi-cyuta* i. e. divorced from convention. Further the use of word 'Vidagdha', which means a man of taste and culture, in the etymological sense of being excessively burnt (*viśeṣeṇa dagdhaḥ*) will be guilty of this very defect.

V. *Nihatārtha*—having its meaning suppressed when a word, which has two meanings the common and the uncommon is used in the uncommon one, it constitutes the fault 'Nihatārtha', e.g.

yāvakarasārdra-pāda-prahāra-śoṇita-kacena dayitena /
mugdhā sādhasataralā vilokya paricumbitā sahasā //

'the unsophisticated girl, trembling with fear, was kissed by her lover, whose hair was reddened on account of being hit by her feet painted with lac (*yāvaka*).

Here the word 'śoṇita' generally means 'blood'. But it is used here in its less known sense of 'reddened'. It is an example of 'Nihatārtha'—suppressed meaning. Vāmana, Bhoja and Vidyānātha call it 'gūdhārtha'. Bhoja defines it as 'gudhārtham aprasiddhārtham prayogam bruvate budhāḥ'. The Pradīpakāra observes that it is a fault because the more known meaning presents itself first and the intended meaning being the less known one is understood later. The delay in understanding of the meaning is reason for its being regarded as fault.

6. Pāṇini Dhātu Pāṭha—II.2.

7. Dh. Ā. 272. Śabdārtha-vyavahāre ca prasidhir eva pramāṇam.

VI. *Anucitārtha*—A word which conveys an improper signification and pollutes the desired meaning, e.g.

tapasvibhir yā sucireṇa labhyate
prayatnataḥ satribhir iṣyate ca yā /
prayānti tām āśu gatim yaśasvino
raṇā-śvamedhe paśutām upāgatāḥ //

‘The valiant warriors killed like goats in the sacrifice of war attain immediately to that state which is obtained at long last by ascetics and which is eagerly desired by sacrificers’.

Here the word ‘*paśu*’ conveys an improper sense. The comparison of valiant warriors defying death in battlefield to senseless brutes and sacrificial animals is highly inappropriate since it suggests timidity and fear of death. It is almost similar to *viruddhamatikṛt* (of repugnant signification). But the latter is significant of the opposite sense only in connection with other words. Here the defect is confined to the word itself irrespective of the context. The *nirarthaka* (meaningless) causes revulsion in the mind of the critic who thinks too little of the speaker for using unmeaning word to fill up the metre and the unsophisticated reader will have to rack his brain for finding a justification.

VII. *Nirarthaka*—a meaningless which occurs in poetry for the purpose of merely filling up the metre constitutes the defect ‘*nirarthaka*’ e.g.

utfullakamalakesaraparāgagauradyute mama hi gauri /
abhivāñchitam prasidhyatu bhagavati yuṣmatprasādena //
‘O Goddess Gauri whose lustre is like that of the pollen of the full-blown lotus, may my desires be fulfilled by your kindness’.

Here the word ‘*hi*’ is an unmeaning expletive uselessly put in. It has no significance and does not bring any striking beauty to poetry. It comes in only for fulfilling the requirement of the metre. It racks the reader’s brain for finding the meaning. Thus it is censured.

VIII. *Avācaka*. A word which does not express the intended meaning constitutes the fault ‘*avācaka*’. It differs from the defect ‘*asamartha*’ (incapable of giving the intended meaning) which expresses the sense under certain circumstances.

According to the commentator Govinda Ṭhakkura (a) a word may mean the substantive, but not the adjectival connotation.

(b) it may give the adjectival sense but not the substantive,

(c) thirdly it may not mean both the adjective and substantive, e.g.

(a) avandhya-kopasya vihanatur āpadām
bhavanti vaśyāḥ svayam eva dehinaḥ /
amarṣa-sūnyena janasya jantunā
na jāta-hārdena na vidviṣādarah //

In this verse the word *jantu* means a person which is the etymological meaning—*jāyate iti jantuḥ*. But it is used as an attribute to 'vihanatur āpadām', i. e. one who saves a man from distress and poverty. By contrast the adjectival meaning should be the opposite of it, i. e. one who does not help another by gift of money, etc. But this is not understood from the word '*Jantu*' without further qualification.

The second case of *Avācaka* is exemplified in the following verse :

Hā dhik sā kila tāmasī śaśimukhī dṛṣṭā mayā yatra sā
tadviṣeṣa-rujāndhakāritam idam dagdham dinam kalpitam /
Kiṃ kurmaḥ kuśale sadaiva vidhuro dhātā na cet tat katham
tādṛk yāmavatImayo bhavati me no jīvaloko'dhunā //

'Ah ! the time when that moon-faced lady was seen by me happened to be a dark night, and this the cursed time darkened by mental pain caused by her separation is made a (bright) day. What should I do ? Luck is undoubtedly against me or else why is not the whole universe changed for me into that very night (of our previous union) ?

In this verse the word '*dina*' (day) is used in opposition to '*tāmasī*' i. e. dark-night. The word '*dina*' means only a day not the quality of its being illuminated by sunlight. Here there is no reference to etymology. And again—

Jalam jaladhare Kṣāram ayaṃ varṣati vāridaḥ /
idam bṛmhitam aśvānām kakudmān eṣa heṣate //

Here the use of the word '*jaladhara*' in the sense of 'sea' is unwarranted because it cannot have that meaning. By etymo-

logy it may mean the quality of being reservoir of water but for the substantive meaning 'sea' it is absolutely inexpressive. The conventional meaning is 'cloud' and not 'sea'.

The fault also takes place when the signification of a word is changed on account of a prefix (upasarga-saṃsargād arthāntarāgatam) the word is rendered inexpressive.

Jaṅghā-kāṇḍoru-nālo nakha-kiraṇālasat-kesarāṇi-karālaḥ
Pratyagrā'laktakābhā-prasarakisalayo mañju-mañjira-bhṛṅgaḥ /

bhartur nṛttānukāre jayati nija-

tanū-svacchalāvaṇya-vāpi-

sambhūtāmbhojaśobhām vidadhad

abhinavo daṇḍapādo Bhavānyāḥ //

'Glorious is the Daṇḍapāda (raised feet) of Bhavāni imitating her husband's dance. The Daṇḍapāda which bears the beauty of a lotus grown in the tank of her beauty, which has for its stalk the large thighs, for its filaments, the lustre of its nails and lastly the beautiful anklet for the humming bees'. The word 'Vidadhat' in the sense of bearing or carrying is absolutely inexpressive. It means 'doing'. The root 'dhā' with prefix 'vi' always means 'doing'. It is a constant defect (nitya-doṣa) because it always fails to give intended meaning.

IX. *Tridhā'slilam*—A word which signifies indecency is a defect called 'aślila'. Indecency is three-fold as being suggestive of (a) shame (*Vriḍa*), (b) disgust (*jugupsā*) and (c) inauspiciousness (*amaṅgala*) These are, in their order, illustrated as follows :—

(a) Example of shame—

Sādhanaṃ sumahad yasya yannānyasya vilokyate /

Tasya dhīśāliniḥ konyāḥ sahetārālītām bhravam //

'Who can bear the curved brow of that intelligent man who has great *sādhana* (resources) such as belongs to none else? Here in the word '*sādhana*' we have indecency suggestive of shame and thus it is a defect.

(b) Example of disgust—

Lilā-tāmarasāhato'nya-vanitā-niḥ'saṅka-daṣṭādharāḥ

Kaścit kesarā-dūṣitekṣaṇa iva vyāmiḥya netre sthitaḥ /

Mugdhā kuḍmalitānaneva dadatī vāyum sthitā tatra sā

bhrāntīyā dhūrtatayā'thavā natim ṛte tenā'nisam cumbita //

'He, having marks of kisses of a strange woman, was hit (by his wife) with a sportive lotus and he stood rubbing his eyes as if pained by the pollen of lotus falling in them. The unsophisticated girl stopped there puffing air with her budded mouth into his eyes. And she, either through her mistake or through his cunningness was excessively kissed even without request'.

Here the phrase '*vāyūm dadati*' suggests the repulsive sense of abdominal air passing through excretive orifice. Thus it is a case of indecency.

(c) Example of inauspiciousness—

mṛdupaṇavibhinno matpriyāyā vināśat
ghanarucira-kalāpo niḥsapatno'dya jātaḥ /
rativilulitabandhe keśapāse sukeśyāḥ
sati kusumasanāthe kaṁ hared eṣa barhi //

'The dense and beautiful peacock train whose smoothness is disturbed by mild breeze is left without a competitor with the destruction of my beloved. In the presence of her hair-braids whose smoothness is disturbed by love's dalliance and which are interspersed with flowers, whom could the peacock match?' Here the word '*vināśa*' is indecorous as it signifies inauspiciousness, meaning death.

Now these three different senses have no common connotation and hence the three types should be treated as different defects. They are classed under one name because they all detract from the sentiment. In ornate poetry devoid of specific sentiment it takes away from the striking effect of poetry. It is inconstant and ceases to be a defect when the poet speaks of the loathsomeness of things in order to foster one's contempt for the worldly pleasures. It also is not inappropriate in amorous talks. While treating of this defect Vāmana⁸ has noticed certain exceptions where the indecent sense is suppressed and not felt.

X. *Sandigdha*—ambiguous. When the meaning of a word is doubtful and it confuses the reader it constitutes the case of defect '*samdigdha*', e. g.

8. Vāmana II. 1. 16 na gupta-lakṣitasamvṛtāni. Apavādartham
idaṁ Guptam lakṣitam samvṛtam ca nā'slīlam.

ālīngitas tatra bhavān samparāye jayaśriyā /
 āśiḥ-paramparām vandyām karṇe kṛtvā kṛpam kuru //
 'having been embraced by the fortune of victory in battle and
 having heard the series of benedictions have mercy on the
 prisoner (woman)'.

Here the word 'vandyām' is 'samdigdha' (ambiguous) since
 it is doubtful whether it is a locative case of the word 'vandi'
 and means 'on the captive lady' or the accusative case of
 'vandyā' and means 'laudable' and is an adjective to 'āśiḥpara-
 mparā.' Hence it is defective and ambiguous. It is an incons-
 tant type of Doṣa. It ceases to be a defect where a doubtful
 meaning is deliberately intended by a poet. The reason of the
 defect lies in its failure to give decisive meaning.

XI. *Apratita*—unintelligible. When a word is used in a
 sense which is not recognised in poetry but used in a technical
 sense only in some particular department of learning (yat
 kevale śāstre prasiddham) it constitutes the defect of 'apratita'.
 It is unintelligible to a layman, e. g.

Samyag-jñāna-mahājyotirgalitāśayatājuṣaḥ /

Vidhiyamānam apy etan na bhavet karma bandhanam //
 'To him who has destroyed his subtle predispositions by the
 powerful lustre of his authentic realisation, the actions done
 by him do not become a bondage'.

Here the word 'āśaya' is employed in the sense of subtle
 predisposition. It is a special technicality of the *yoga* philo-
 sophy⁹ and also of the Buddhist Psychology. It is 'apratita'
 in poetry and is not intelligible to a layman. Hence the defect.
 It ceases to be a defect if it is addressed to a professional
 philosopher or is simply cogitated by the person within himself.

Vidyānātha calls it 'apratitika'. 'Śrīvatsa-lāncana expounds
 this term as 'Prati (*Prati śāstre*) item (*jñātam*) yat kiñcit
 śāstra-paribhāṣitam' that which is technically known in parti-
 cular branch of Science.

XII. *Grāmya*—vulgar. A word not used by a refined and
 cultured person but is used only by lower class of people is
 called 'grāmya'. Words are of three kinds, viz. *nāgara* used by

9. YS. II. 12. Kleśamūlaḥ Karmaśayo diṣṭādiṣṭajanmavedhanīyaḥ.

highly cultured persons living in cities (*vidagdhamātra-prayukṭa*), *upanāgara*—used by less cultured people of mediocre culture, and *grāmya*—used by rural folk. If a poet giving up the former two types accepts the third type of words it strikes the reader and spoils the charm of poetry, e. g.

rākāvibhāvarī-kāntasaṃkrāntadyuti te mukham /
tapanīya śīlāśobhā kaṭiśca harate manaḥ //

‘Thy face which has the lustre of moonlit night and buttocks as a golden block ravish my heart’. Here the use of the word ‘*kaṭi*’ is vulgar. When the poet adopts such vulgar expressions eschewing the urban forms he appears to the reader as a man of low taste. It ceases to be a fault when the speaker is a man of low rank without pretension to culture.

XIII. *Neyārtha*—When a word is employed to convey a secondary sense without the sanction of convention or the warrant of an additional charming sense, it illustrates a case of ‘*neyārtha*’ where the meaning is guessed out with much ado. In other words, the secondary sense of words (*lakṣaṇā*) is accepted when there is *rudhi* (tradition) or *prayojana* (purpose). When it is resorted to in a case where these conditions are absent it constitutes this defect. Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa supports his contention quoting the authority of the *Tantra-vārtika* and says ‘*niṣiddhaṃ lakṣaṇikam*’ i. e. the unpermissible secondary sense, e. g.

Śarat-kāla-samullasi-puṇimā-śarvarī-priyam /
Karoti te mukhaṃ tanvi capetā-pātanātithim //

‘O slender one’. Your face gives a slap to the moon, the lord of the autumnal full-moon night’.

Here by ‘giving a slap’ is meant to indicate ‘excelling or vanquishing’. But such indication is neither due to tradition nor to any other special motive. Certainly it is a fault of expression where the meaning is to be guessed out and the reader is puzzled to make out a justification for this roundabout expression. But there is no justification. Words should be used in their primary sense in order to avoid hitch in understanding.

Bhoja defines it as '*svasaṅketa-prakṛiptārtham*'. Vidyānātha follows him and explains it as based on the poet's own invention without proper logic.

A word may be used in a secondary sense if a long convention sanctioning such use is in existence. This is called *Nirūḍhā Lakṣaṇā*, i. e. the secondary denotation. With virtue of long usage it (*lakṣaṇā*) becomes tantamount to *Abhidhā* (primary denotation) in respect of its expressive power, e. g. England and Germany are at war. Here England and Germany stand for their respective nations. But such usages being common the speaker is not called upon to render an explanation. But new-fangled expression used for conveying secondary meanings require justification. The speaker must show that he has departed from the natural use because he wants to suggest an additional meaning which is not otherwise made known. The well-known case of the latter type is 'The man lives on the Ganges'. Certainly one cannot live on the river *Gaṅga* because no house can be built upon the current of water. The deviation from the use of expressive word 'The bank of the Ganges' is justifiable by the communication of suggested meaning 'coolness' and 'sacredness'. The river is known for the sanctity of water and coolness. The use of the same word for the bank implies the sanctity and coolness of the bank also, the qualities of which are a case of transference by reason of close vicinity. To come to the question of '*Neyārtha*' under consideration, it arises from the absence of the sanction either by usage or special meaning.

XIV. *Kliṣṭa*—A word having its meaning interrupted and farfetched, is a case of *kliṣṭa* (obscure). Here the comprehension of sense is delayed because of the pedantic circumlocution, e. g.

Atri-locana-sambhūta-jyotirudgama-bhāsibhiḥ /

Sadṛśaṃ śobhate'tyartham bhupāla tava ceṣṭitam //

'O King, your actions shine like those which bloom by the light of that which is produced by the eyes of Atri'.

Here the meaning is—like the *Kumuda* flowers (lilies), which bloom with the rays of the moon, who again is born

of the eyes of the sage *Atri*. This meaning is certainly far-fetched and obscure. Here the comprehension of the sense is to be made out after a good deal of reflection.

XV. *Avimṛṣṭa-vidheyāṃśa*—It is an expression where the predicate is subordinated (*avimṛṣṭaḥ prādhānyena anirdiṣṭaḥ vidheyāṃśo yatra*). It means that the predicate which ought to be the principal element in a sentence is not represented as principal. A sentence is made of two parts which are connected with each other and stand in relation of principal and subordinate. The principal part is known as *vidheya* and the subordinate part '*anuvādyā*'. The *vidheya* is the predicate of the sentence and the prominent part of it because it is unknown. *Anuvādyā* is the subject and subordinate part of it because it is known. The relation of principal and subordinate which exists between subject and predicate is clearly understood when they are used separately and not compounded. Because in a compound this relation is apt to sink. The *Pradipakāra* Govinda Ṭhakkura¹⁰ clarifies the idea of Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa and states that predicate ought to be employed in the expression that it is known as a principal idea. It must not be subordinated nor should it precede the subject. If it is not properly discriminated it constitutes this fault of *avimṛṣṭa-vidheyāṃśa*.

Mahimabhaṭṭa has dwelt upon this defect at great length. He has laid bare its *raison d'être* with conspicuous ability and logical insight. It should be stated clearly at the outset that this defect is peculiar to the Sanskrit idiom. In English the predication is stated before sometimes particularly in poetry in order to emphasise its importance. But this reversal of natural order is not countenanced in Sanskrit. The logic behind this order is set forth by Kumārila¹¹ and should be regarded as universally valid even for foreign languages.

10. K. Pr. p. 181.

Prādhanyaṃ ca vidhipratīti-yogyatā.

sā ca anupasarjani-bhutatve satyuddesyānantaryam.

11. T. V.

anuvādyam anukṭvaiva na vidheyam udīrayet.

na hy albdhvā'spadam kiñcit kutrācit pratītiṣṭhati.

Though the predicate is sometimes used prior to the subject in English poetry for the sake of emphasis, yet the logical order of precedence of the subject is set out in prose order. Now what is the logic governing the precedence of the subject to the predicate? Kumārila pronounces the following dictum 'The predicate must not be stated without stating forth the subject prior to it. Obviously a quality or action or even a substantive (which is predicated of the subject) cannot settle down without gaining a locus'.

The predicate is more important than the subject because it is not previously known to belong to the latter. In logic, following the classification of Kant, propositions are divided into two classes—verbal and real. In the verbal proposition the predicate follows from the connotation of the subject. Hence it does not give a new information, e. g. 'man is a rational animal'—is a verbal proposition. The predicate only explicitly states the meaning of the subject 'man'. Definitions in general are instances of verbal proposition. They serve a useful purpose by analysing the meaning of the subject which aids the understanding of the connotation of the subject by a neophyte. But it must be admitted that notwithstanding this pragmatic utility verbal propositions are not better than tautology. It is only the real proposition which should be treated as propositions proper. The present consideration of the defect pertains to such propositions.

The subject must be previously known otherwise the predicate will not be understood to belong to it. It will on the contrary necessitate another proposition, if the subject be unknown to the reader. Any statement regarding President Eisenhower will be unintelligible if the person addressed does not know the meaning of it. He can be meaningfully made the subject of a proposition if the hearer or reader is familiar with the great personage. The subject is therefore called '*anuvādyā*', i. e. an object of *anuvāda*, which is a sort of proposition, setting forth in words a fact already known by some other means of cognition. So the statement of the subject already known is absolutely superfluous if it is taken by itself. There is no need to make known the fact which is

already known. The statement of the subject is necessary for the understanding of the relation of the predicate.

The predicate is called *vidheya*—an object of *Vidhi*,¹² defined as the affirmation of an unknown fact, a quality or action and the like. Being not previously known it is the predicate which makes the proposition significant. It follows from the definition that the predicate must not belong to the subject as a part of its connotation. Such propositions are called also synthetic proposition as opposed to verbal or analytical propositions. Logically considered the predicate is the most important part of proposition as it gives a new information. This is the justification of the statement. As we have observed before, a verbal proposition is only a pseudo-proposition.

We have set out the meaning and significance of subject and predicate in a proposition. How we propose to consider the logical necessity, if any, of the sequential order of the two. Kumārila insists that the subject should be stated first and the predicate next. If the order is reversed the predicate would be considered as the subject at the first blush. It will not be a mere verbal defect but effect the very sense. So the order must be scrupulously observed. This defect naturally pertains to a sentence being concerned with two parts. But it may be regarded as a defect of a single word by a technical device. A compound (*samāsa*) though consisting of many words is regarded as one word (*Prātipadika*) by a rule of Pāṇini.¹³ When the subject and the predicate are formed into one compound and predicate loses its superior status being lumped with the subject. Though there is no formal reversal of the order in the compound treated as a whole word the equalisation of the predicate with the subject involved in the compound offends the logical sense. The primacy and superiority of the predicate which stems from its novelty are lost. All the same the difference between a compound and a proposition lies in the reversal of the order in the latter, thereby making the predicate seem as the subject, whereas in the former the two

12. A. S. p. 31. 'Tatrā'jñātārthajñāpakō Vidhiḥ'.

13. Pāṇini I. II. 46 'Kṛtaddhitasamāśāśca'.

are put on the same level. Equalisation of a superior with an inferior involves the same logical offence.

To exemplify this defect the following instances are given :

Mūrdhnāmudvṛtta-Kṛttā'viralā-gala-
galadrakta-saṃsakta-dhārā
dhaute'sāṅghri-prasādopanata-jaya-
jagajjāta-mithyā-mahimnām /
Kailāśollasanecchā-vyatikara-
piśunotsarpi-darpoddhurāṇām
doṣṇām caiṣām kimetat phalamiha
nagarīrakṣaṇe yat prayāsaḥ //

"What is the use of these my heads and arms when I have to make efforts in protecting this city of mine? The heads whose greatness is proclaimed in the worlds through victories gained by the kindness of the feet of the Lord Śiva, which feet were washed by the current of blood incessantly flowing from heads cut off majestically, and these my arms, full of pride manifesting from raising the *Kailāśa* mountain". Here '*mithyā-mahimnām*' is not a subordinate adjunct as it is made here, but the principal predicate and therefore the predominant part of the expression. But it is mixed up with the '*Bahuvrihi*'¹⁴ compound in which the members become subordinate and the predominance is given to another object.

Another example in a 'Karmadhāraya' compound---

Nyastām nitambād avaropayantim
punaḥ punaḥ keśara-dāma-kāñcim /
Nyāsikṛtām sthānavidā smareṇa
dviṭīya-maurvīm iva kāmukasya //

'She (was seen) constantly moving up the girdle of Bakula flowers falling from her hips. The girdle appeared like the second bow string kept by cupid as deposit with her who knows where to place things'.

Here only secondness is to be predicated, but being the first member of a 'Karmadhāraya' compound, it becomes subordinate. This compound is a species of Tatpuruṣa where the last member is predominant.¹⁵ Here the poet should have

14. S. K. p. 87. 'anyapadārtha pradhāno bahuvrihiḥ'

15. S. K. p. 87. 'uttarapadārthapradhānas tatpuruṣaḥ'

said 'maurvīm dvitīyām' and thus given a prominent and emphatic expression to secondness.

And similarly an example of '*nañ samāsa*' is—

Ānanda-sindhur-aticāpala-śālicitta-

Sandānanaika sadanaṃ kṣaṇaṃ apyāmuktā /

yā sarvadaiva bhavato tadudanta-cintā

tāntiṃ tanoti tava samprati dhig dhig asmān //

"She was not quitted by you ever for a moment and she was the ocean of joy and source of captivating your heart. Now even her mention makes you disgusted—woe to us".

Here the predication ought to be prominent negation or directly expressed as '*na muktā*'. In tatpuruṣa compound the meaning of '*nañ*' is subordinated.

The commentator clarifies the contention of Mammaṭa and distinguishes between the two meanings of '*nañ*', viz. (1) *prasajya*—*pratiṣedha* and (2) *paryudāsa*.¹⁶

In the first case the affirmation is subordinate but the negation is predominant and *nañ* a negative particle construed with verb, e.g.

Nava-jaladharaḥ sannaddhoyaṃ na drptaniśācaraḥ

Suradhanur idam dūrākṛṣṭaṃ na tasya śarāsanam /

Ayamapi payo dhārāsāro na bāṇa-paramparā

Kanaka-nikaṣa-snigdha vidyutpriya na mamorvaśi //

'This is the new and dense cloud not a proud demon. This is at a distance a rainbow, and not the bow of that demon. This is the torrent of rain and not a flight of arrows. And this is the lightning bright as a golden line on touchstone, not my sweetheart Urvaśi'. Here the negation is emphatically expressed and not subordinated by compounding and it is the case of *prasajya pratiṣedha*.

But when the affirmation is predominant and the negation is recognised as a subordinate, it is the case of *Paryudāsa* (privation) and here the *nañ* is compounded with another word, e. g.

16. K. P. p. 184.

Taduktam, vidher yatra pradhānatvam pratishedhe pradhanatā /
paryudāsaḥ sa vijñeyo yatrottaraṇaḥ na nañ //

Jugopā'tmānam atrasto bheje dharmam anāturaḥ /
Agr̥dhnur ādade so'rthān asaktaḥ sukham anvabhūt //

i.e. "Though unterrified, he protected himself, though undistressed he cultivated virtue, though ungreedy, he accepted tribute and though unattached, he enjoyed pleasure".

This is an example of *paryudāsa* since the protection of self, etc. are meant to be predicated of the king and the negation is subordinated. So the *nañ* (negative particle) is rightfully made to lose its predominance in the compound because it is not the predicate but something else.

XVI. *Viruddhamatikṛt*—Of repugnant implication. A word, which gives a repugnant implication when some other meaning is intended, constitutes this defect, e.g.

Sudhākara-karākāra-viśārada viceṣṭitaḥ /
akāryamitrameko'sau tasya kiṃ varṇayāmahe //

'What shall I speak of him who is a true friend having his actions as pure as the rays of the moon'.

Here the sense desired to be conveyed is that he is a friend without selfish motive (kāryaṃ vinā mitram), but the implication however is that he is an associate in a criminal action. Thus it is a fault.

Again—

Cirakālapariprāpti-locanānandadāyini /
Kāntā Kāntasya Sahasā vidadhāti galagraham //

i.e. 'having got him after a long separation the beloved embraces her lover in the neck'.

Here the word '*galagraha*' is used to convey the sense of embracing but it conveys the sense of a kind of throat-disease. Thus it is a case of a defect called *virudha matikṛt*, giving out the sense contrary to what is intended.

Again—

na trastaṃ yadināma bhūtakaruṇā santāna-śāntātmanah
tena vyārujatā dhanurbhagavato devādbhavānipateḥ /
tatputras tu madāndha tākaravadhādviśvasya dattotsavaḥ
Skandaḥ Skanda iva priyo 'hamathavā śiṣyaḥ katham vismṛtaḥ//

'He when breaking the bow was not afraid of the husband of Bhava's (Śiva's) wife who is famous for his kindness for the living creatures. His son Skanda who has brought joy to the universe by killing the haughty demon Taraka. But how, I, his disciple and loved like Skanda was forgotten'.

Here the word *Bhavānipati* brings in the notion of another lover of the wife of *Bhava* because the word *Bhavānī* means the wife of *Bhava* and the expression 'the husband of the wife of *Bhava*' naturally suggests that there is a second husband. It is however absolutely repulsive and not intended by the poet. Similarly the expression *Ambikāramaṇaḥ* which means the lover of mother is repulsive and a glaring case of this defect.

Mammaṭa enumerated sixteen *pada doṣas* out of which *kliṣṭa*, *avimṛṣṭa* *vidheyāṃśa* and *viruddha matikṛt* pertain to compound only. Other defects which are described above may occur both in uncompound and compounded words. Leaving out three *doṣas*, viz. solecism—(*cyuta-saṃskṛti*), incapable of giving meaning (*asamartha*) and meaningless (*nirarthaka*) the rest are found in sentences also. Further Mammaṭa states that some of these faults can possibly occur in the parts of words (*padasyāṃśe'pi kecana*). Thus he classifies the *doṣas* definitely once for all.

The defects of words, which have been illustrated in uncompound words may occur in compounded words also. For instance Mammaṭa exemplifies unmelodious (*śrutikaṭu*) as follows :

Sā dūre ca sudhā-sāndra-taraṅgita-Vilocanā /

Barhi-nirhrādanārho'yaṃ kālaśca samupāgataḥ //

"She, whose eyes are charming like waves of nectar, is at a distance; and this season full of the noise of peacocks has arrived". If the words be compounded as "barhinirhrādanārhaḥ" it will be treated as a case of *pada doṣa*.

Now Mammaṭa proposes to treat of *Vākya-doṣas*, i.e. defects occurring in sentences also. He asserts that all the *padadoṣas* (defects of single words) may also occur in sentences¹⁷ with the exception of three, viz. *cyutasamskṛti* (solecism-

tic expression), *Asamartha* (incapable of giving and *nirarthaka* (meaningless). The exclusion of the three defects is not justified by any reason and this has caused a veritable headache to the commentators. It was given out by most of the commentators, so says Govinda Ṭhakkura, that *Vākyadoṣa* is that sort of defect which arises from the relation of one word with another. But this interpretation is dismissed by him as worthless. In the case of *śrutikaṭu* (unpleasant to the ear) the defect occurs in more than one word and yet there is no syntactical dependence to bring this doṣa into existence. There were several harsh words but the harshness of one word does not come into being by dependence on another. There is another objection. Why is not *avācaka* (inexpressive) excluded from the list of *Vākyadoṣas* though it is on a par with *asamartha* (incapable of giving intended meaning)? These are two objections and Govinda propounds the solution as follows :

A *doṣa* (defect) is regarded as a defect of sentence (*vākya*) only when it pertains to several words,¹⁸ which despite the defect are capable of expressing the substantive meaning. In other words, the words of a sentence though vitiated by the defect concerned, are not unmeaning. These three defects solecistic, etc. are all incapable of expressing the intended meaning. So all of them are excluded from the purview of *Vākyadoṣa*. As regards the *avācaka* (inexpressive) there are some varieties of it which are expressive of the substantive meaning and so it is not put on the same level with three defects solecistic, etc. mentioned above.

Govinda Ṭhakkura has given the explanation which is not illogical. But in spite of its ingenuity, it fails to carry satisfaction. Certainly the three defects excluded pertain to words, which are incapable of expressing the intended meaning. But why should not their repeated occurrence be regarded as exces-

Apāśya cyutasamskāram asamarthaṃ nirarthakam /
Vākye'pi doṣāḥ santy ete padasyāmse'pi kecana //

18. K. Prad. p. 187. Vivakṣitadharmipratyāyakeśabdavṛttitvena-
nāpadavṛttitvam evātra vākyavṛttitvam abhipretam.

sively vicious like harshness (*śrutikaṭu*)? This is not clear from the solution offered by the great commentator. Besides a *pada-doṣa* (defect of words) and *vākya-doṣa* are not necessarily determined by reference to their meaning, for instance, *śrutikaṭu*. Furthermore the non-exclusion of '*avācaka*' particularly of the type which does not express the intended meaning both in its connotational and denotational aspect does not differ in any respect from '*asamartha*'.

These questions have been considered by Mahesa-Nyāyaratna in his commentary called '*Vivaraṇa*' on the *Kavya-Pra-kāśa* and we think that his explanation meets the problems squarely and satisfactorily. He observes "A sentence is a combination of words intended to convey one related meaning. A defect which depends upon such a sentence is called *vākya-doṣa* (defect of sentence). This dependence of a defect upon a sentence is of two-fold nature. There are defects which can come into existence only when two or more words are syntactically connected. '*Avimṛṣṭavidheyāṁśa*' is of this type. So also the defects which are peculiar to sentences and not common to individual words. But there are other types of *Vākyadoṣas* which occur in several words in a sentence without being dependent upon the syntactical combination such as '*śrutikaṭu*'. They depend on the sentence since they occur in different words. The repetition of the same defect heightens their viciousness. Thus when several harsh words are used in a sentence the defect becomes intensified. So the relation of dependence of the defects upon sentence reduces to two types, viz.

- (1) One that depends for its origin upon the syntactical combination of words, and
- (2) One that depends for heightening its effect (*svotkarṣāva*). This is illustrated in the case of harshness of sounds.

Now let us examine the three *doṣas* excluded in the light of the findings noted above. The '*cyutasamskṛti*', '*asamartha*' and '*nirarthaka*' are *doṣas* (defects) in the highest degree. So their repetition does not produce any excess. Nor do they depend on syntactical combination of words for coming into

existence. So they cannot be *vākyadoṣas* (defects of the sentence). As regards "*avācaka*" words, they are not as a class unmeaning in spite of the defect. They only fail to denote either the connotation or the denotation. Of course, the third variety where the use of the word '*vidadhat*' (making) in the sense of "carrying" is unmeaning in both the aspects—denotational and connotational. So it stands on the same footing with '*asamartha*' etc. Why should not this type be excluded from *vākyadoṣa* (defect of the sentence)? The answer is that in this type also a logically consistent meaning can be somehow made out, though it may not be satisfactory. So there may be an excess in case of repetition of the defect. We have given the substance of the explanation given in the *Vivaraṇa* and we think that this throws welcome light upon the intractable problem.

Barring solecism (*cyutasamskṛti*), incapable of giving meaning (*asamartha*) and meaningless (*nirarthaka*), the rest are found in a sentence (*vākya*) also; and some of these defects are found in parts of words (*padāṃśa*) as well. Mammāṭa gives example of these faults in detail. We are quoting some of them as specimens :

Example of unmelodiousness in a sentence :

So'dhyaīṣṭa vedāṃstridaśānayaṣṭa
pitṛn atārpsit samamaṃsta banbhūn /
Vyajeṣṭa ṣaḍvargam aramṣta nītau
samūlaghātaṃ nyavadhīd arīṃśca //

"He studied vedas, offered sacrifices to God and oblations to forefathers, honoured his friends, subdued the sixfold enemies, took pleasure in polity and destroyed his foes". Here the defect *śrutikaṭu* (unmelodiousness) occurs in several words "*adhyaiṣṭa*", "*ayaṣṭa*", "*atārpsit*" etc. It is a case of defect of a sentence.

Aprayukta (unconventional) in a sentence :—

Sa rātu vo duṣcyavano bhāvukānām parasparām /
Aneḍa-mūkatadyaiśca dyatu doṣair asammatān //

'May Indra grant you happiness always, and may he strike your enemies with defects like dumbness and deafness'.

Here the words *Duścyavana* and *aneḍamūka* though sanctioned in the senses of 'Indra' and 'deaf and dumb' respectively yet they are not used by poets. These occur in a sentence and make it defective.

Some of these blemishes are possible in the fraction of words (*padāṃsa*). We propose to deal with a few representative instances :—

Alam aticapalatvāt svapnamāyopamatvāt
pariṇati-virasatvāt saṅgamenāṅganāyāḥ /
Iti yadi śatakṛtvas tatvam ālocayāmas
tadapi na hariṇākṣiṃ vismaraty antarātmā //

'It is useless to have attachment to woman which is unsteady and resembles an illusion and is unpleasant in its effect. I do think over this truth for several times but my inner soul does not forget that fawn-eyed lady'.

Here the frequent use of suffix 'tvāt' grates upon the ear. The commentator Govinda Ṭhakkura observes that when only one syllable in a word is harsh and the defect is confined to that portion it is the case of *padāṃśadoṣa* (the defect of the fraction of a word). When two or more syllables are found harsh, It is a case of *padadoṣa*, i.e. the whole word is defective. When such defect is found in several words, it is the case of *Vākyadoṣa*. So we have three types of defects, viz. of fraction of word, or whole word or of the whole sentence. In the case of *Vākyadoṣa* it is not necessary that all the words should be defective. The criterion of *Vākyadoṣa* is that the defect should occur in several words. So it is indifferent that some of words are free from it.

And again—

tad gaccha siddhyai kuru devakāryam
artho'yam arthāntaralabhya eva /
apekṣate pratyayam aṅgalabdhyai
bijāṅkurah prāgudayad ivāmbhaḥ //

'Go for your success, do the work of gods, this is to be done through another object. This work requires an agent for its completion in you, as the sprout needs water before shooting forth'. Here the harsh combination of three consonants, viz.

‘*siddhyai*’ and ‘*labdhyai*’ are examples of unmelodiousness (*srutikaṭu*) in parts of words.

(2) Nihatārtha (suppressed meaning) :—

yas’cā ‘psarovibhrama-maṇḍanānām
sarpādayitrīm śikharair vibharti /
balāhaka-ccheda-vibhaktarāgam
akāla-sandhyām iva dhātumattām //

‘Who bears on peak a heap of mineral substances, which provide with toilet of the celestial damsels. He bears it like the untimely red evening colour intermingled with the pieces of cloud’. Here the part ‘*mattā*’ of the word ‘*dhātumattā*’ has its desired meaning (being possessed of) suppressed by the presentation of the more common meaning of ‘intoxicated’.

(3) Nirarthaka meaningless :—

ādāv añjana-puñja-lipta-vapuṣām śvāsānilollāsita
protsarpad virahānalena ca tataḥ santāpitānām dṛṣām /
sampratyeva niṣekam aśrupayasā devasya cetobhuvo
bhallinām iva pānakarma kurute kāmam kuraṅgekṣaṇā //

‘The fawn-eyed lady is sprinkling her tears, sharpening as it were, the arrows of cupid. The tears of eyes in which at first has been rubbed the jitty-dye, and which after that have been heated, as if it were, by the fire of separation blazing high on account of the hot breath’.

Here the plural number used in ‘*dṛṣām*’ is meaningless since one lady is spoken of and she cannot have more than two eyes. And again the use of the ‘*ātmanepada*’ suffix in ‘*kurute*’ is meaningless since the result of the action of the verb does not belong to the subject. A difficulty arises in connection with the word ‘*kurute*’ and ‘*dṛṣām*’. The case of ‘*ātmanepada*’ in ‘*kurute*’ is on a par with the ‘*nāthate*’ which has been regarded as a case of *cyutsamṣkṛti* (solecistic expression). So unless difference is shown the two cases should be treated as a case of solecistic expression, because it is used to express two eyes and not more.

In the answer to this charge it is to be observed that in the case of ‘*nāthate*’ there is an express injunction that *nātha* takes ‘*ātmanepada*’ suffix only in case of ‘*aśis*’—hoping and

wishing.¹⁹ Its use in the sense begging is therefore ungrammatical. The 'ātmanepada' in 'kurute' is unjoined by the general rule 'kartrabhiprāye kriyā phale' meaning that 'ātmanepada' is used if the result of action denoted by the verb goes to the agent. The implication is that it should not be used if the the result accrues to any other than the agent. It is not implied that it is grammatically wrong if the result does not go to the agent or any other person. There is the difference between two implications positive and negative. The positive is that 'ātmanepada' should not be used if the result goes to another and the negative implication simply means that the result does not accrue to anyone—the agent or another. In the present case of 'kurute' the result is not seen to go to the agent or any other person and it is a case of simple negation. So it is not ungrammatical but pointless.

In the case of plural number it is a case of ungrammatical solecism only when one or two objects are intended to be expressed by it. In the present case the number singular or dual or plural is not specifically intended, yet the plural number is used. So it is not ungrammatical because it is not used to express specifically one or two objects. But plural number should be treated as pointless because it does not express the sense which it is apt to do.

(4) Avācaka (inexpressive) —

cāpācāryas tripura-vijayī kārṭikeyo vijeyaḥ
śaṣṭrayastāḥ sadanam udadhir bhūriyam hantakāraḥ /
astyaiṣv aitat kimu Kṛtavatā reṇukā kaṇṭhabādhām
baddhaspardhas tava paraśunā lajjate candrahāsaḥ //

'Your teacher in archery was the conqueror of the three cities, your subduable was 'kārṭikeya', your abode in the ocean forced by your weapons, and this earth is an object of gift for you. Though all this so, yet my sword the *candrahāsa* is ashamed at competing with your Axe, which cut off the head of 'Reṇukā'. Here in the word 'vijeya' the suffix *kṛtya* 'yat' (a sign of the future passive participle) is inexpressive of the sense of the participle affix 'kta' which is meant here.

19. Pāṇini II.3.55—āśiṣi nāthaḥ

(5) *Aśīla* (indecorous) of three kinds—

(a) Shame (*vrīḍā*)

atipelavam atiparimitavarṇam laghutaram udāharati śaṭhaḥ /
paramārthataḥ sa hṛdayam vahati punaḥ kālakūṭaghaṭitam iva //
'A rogue speaks little. Very softly and sweetly but in reality
he bears a heart made up, as it were, of poison'. Here 'pelava',
the part of the word 'atipelava' suggests an indecent sense of a
secret part of the human body. Hence it is a defect.

(b) disgust (*jugupsā*)—

yaḥ pūyate surasarin mukhatīrthasārtha-
snānena sāstrapariśīlanakīlanena /
saujanya mānyajanir ūrjitamūrjitānām
so'yaṁ dṛṣoḥ patati kasyacid eva puṃsaḥ //

'Only a few fortunate persons happen to see this man who is
purified by bathing in such sacred places as Gaṅgā and others,
and by studying the sciences, who is of high birth and is the
vigour of strong people". Here the part 'pūya' of the word
'pūyate' is indecorous as it suggests the sense of pus coming
out of wound.

(c) Inauspiciousness (*amāṅgalya*)

Vinaya-praṇayaika-ketanam
satatam yo'bhadra āṅga tādr̥śaḥ /
Katham eṣa sa tadvad īkṣyatām
tadabhipreta-padam samāgataḥ //

'O friend ; he, who was the harbour of modesty and love, how
I am to see him now that he has got a position desired by low
people'. Here the use of 'preta' the part of the word 'abhipreta'
implies the meaning of 'dead' and so becomes repulsive.

(6) Ambiguous (*Sandigdha*) :—

Kasmin karmaṇi sāmāthyam asya nottapatetarām /
ayam sādhu-caras tasmād añjalir badhyatām iha //

'In which work his capacity does not shine and as he is of fine
character (or one who was good in the past) show reverence
to him'. Here the part 'cara' of the word 'sadhucaraḥ' is ambi-
guous ; 'cara' may be taken as an affix denoting something that
is past and in that case 'sadhucaraḥ' would mean 'one who

was good in the past'; 'cara' may be a noun derived from *cara*—to behave and in that case the word would mean one who behaves virtuously. Thus it leads to ambiguity, which puzzles the reader.

(7) *Neyārtha* (of general meaning) :—

Kim ucyate'sya bhūpāla-mauli-mālā-mahāmaṇḍ /
sudurlabhaṃ vacobāṇais tejo yasya vibhāvyate //

'What can be said of this king, who is the gem of the head garland of kings. His splendour is difficult to be found even in gods'. Here 'vacobāṇa' is used for 'gīrvāṇa'. The whole word has the meaning of a deity by convention and not by etymology. So the use of other synonymous words for the first part or last part or both is a case of *Neyārtha*. The word 'vacah' means 'word' and the word 'gīh' also means 'word'. Here in the word 'vacobāṇa' the part 'vacah' means the 'gir' by *lakṣaṇā*. But there is neither convention nor special justification for it. So also is the case if the second part of the word is also uttered by synonym.

It may be urged that *Asamartha* (incapable of meaning), *Avācaka* (inexpressive) and *Nihatārtha* (suppressed meaning) should all be treated together as one kind of blemish because they can be put under one head logically on account of their incapability of expressing the intended meaning, whether this inability springs from want of convention or conventional relation between the word and meaning. Govinda Ṭhakkura admits the justice of the contention but only appeals to the tradition, created by the writers on poetics. In spite of their want of logical difference, they serve as good exercise for students. It is for this purpose that Mammāṭa Bhaṭṭa has not departed from the traditional classification.

Thus we have dealt with 'the faults of words (*padadoṣas*) and fraction of word (*padāṃśadoṣas*) and of sentence (*vākya-doṣas*) which are homogenous with those of words and common to both. We proceed to discuss the different class of the faults peculiarly characteristic of the sentence. The following are the *faults of sentence* :—

I. *Pratikūlavārṇa*—having discordant syllables and letters.

- II. Upahatavisarga—having the visarga blunted.
- III. Luptavisarga—having the visarga elided.
- IV. Visandhi—cacophonous due to omission of euphonic combination (*sandhi*).
- V. Hata-Vṛtta—of unrhythmical metre.
- VI. Nyūnapada—deficient in words.
- VII. Adhikapada—redundant in words.
- VIII. Kathitapada—with repeated words.
- IX. Patat prakarṣa—having its excellence falling off.
- X. Samāptapunarātta—resumption of the concluded sentence for the addition of an adjective.
- XI. Ardhāntaraikavācaka—isolation of a word in a distinct half.
- XII. Abhavanmatayoga—failure of an intended connection.
- XIII. Anabhihitavācya—omission of a necessary verbal expression.
- XIV. Apadasthapada—with misplaced word.
- XV. Apadastha-samāsa—having a compound out of place.
- XVI. Saṃkīrṇa—confused.
- XVII. Garbhita—parenthetical.
- XVIII. Prasidhi-hata—disregard of usage.
- XIX. Bhagna-prakrama—violation of uniformity.
- XX. Akrama—irregular in syntax and
- XXI. Amataparārtha—of undesirable second sense.

I. *Pratikūlavārṇa*—A sentence consisting of syllables or letters, which are inappropriate or discordant with the relevant sentiment desired to be described illustrates this fault. The concordance of letters with regard to 'Rasa' has been spoken of by Ānandavardhana. He maintains that *rasa* with unnoticeable sequence flash forth in letter, word, sentence, and composition. Soft letters like 'm', 'p' and 'n' are concordant with erotic sentiment (*śṛṅgārarasa*) and hard letters like 'ś' and 'ṣ' conjoined with 'r' and 'ḍh' are in consonance with it. But these letters employed in relation to the sentiment of disgust (*vibhatsa*) and the like, they certainly intensify them. Maṃmaṭa has followed Ānandavardhana and also echoed his views. Thus this fault should not be confused with the instance of

śrutikaṣu (unmelodious). The distinction between *śrutikaṣu* (unmelodious) and *pratikūlavarṇa* (having discordant letters) being this that the former is simply harshness while the latter may consist even in the smoothness of the letters. The smooth letters which are suited to the sentiments of erotic (*śṛṅgāra*) and quietistic (*śānta*) are deterrents, of sentiment heroic (*Vīra*) and furious (*Raudra*). For instance—

akuṇṭotkaṇṭhayā pūrṇam ākaṇṭham kalakaṇṭhi mām /
kambukaṇṭhyāḥ kṣaṇam kaṇṭhe kuru kaṇṭhārtim uddhara //
'O sweet voiced one, bring about my embrace with that conch necked girl even for a moment. I am full of extreme solicitude and do remove the pain of my neck'. Here the sentiment to be described is erotic to which letters 'ṭ', 'ṭh', 'ḍ' and 'ḍh' conjunct 'r' are opposed.

And again—

deśaḥ so'yam arāti sonitajalair yasmin hradāḥ pūrītāḥ
kṣattrādeva tathāvidhaḥ paribhavastātasya keśagrahaḥ /
tāny evāhita-heti-ghasmara- gurūṇy astrāṇi bhāsvanti me
yaḍ Rāmeṇa kṛtam tadeva kurute droṇātmajaḥ krodhanaḥ //
'This is the country where the lakes were filled with the blood of enemies. The disgraceful calamity in the shape of catching hold of the looks of (one's) father is the same from a kṣatriya. These weapons of mine do shine resplendent, which are the suppressors of the weapons of foes. The wrathful son of Droṇa is doing what was done by Rāma (*paraśurāma*)'. Here the furious sentiment is to be delineated and the exploits of a bravely haughty hero like Aśvatthāman are to be described. Long compounds and harsh sounding words would have been more in keeping with the theme.

In the following example, cited by Mammaṭa, the harsh letters and compounds are quite in tune with the sentiments :

prāga-prāpta-niśumbhaśāmbhava
dhanur-dvedhā-vidhā'virbhava-
tkrodha-prerita-bhīma-bhārgava-
bhujas'tambhāpavidhāḥ kṣaṇāt /
ujjvālaḥ paraśurbhavatv aśīthilas
tvatkaṇṭha-pīthātithir-

yenānena jagatsu khaṇḍaparaśur

devo haraḥ khyāpyate //

‘May this blazing and powerful axe of mine be the guest of the surface of your neck, the axe through which Lord Śiva is known in the universe as ‘*khaṇḍaparaśu*’ (of divided axe); the axe which is being moved by my ‘Bhārgava’s’ pillar-like arms and darted through wrath aroused by the breaking of Śambhu’s bow which was never bent (by any mortal)’. Here due to propriety of the speaker and the spoken the employment of the forceful diction is quite in harmony with the sentiment. In the first three feet of the verse the sentiment of *Raudra* has been delineated by a powerful composition consisting of harsh words and long compounds while in the fourth foot, where love for his preceptor is to be shown, harsh sounds and long compounds have been forsaken.

This new *doṣa* created by Mammaṭa is based on Anandavardhana’s treatment of suggestiveness of letters. Govinda Ṭhakkura, in this connection, observes that if this defect occurs in compound it may be regarded as a ‘*padadoṣa*’ also. This also holds good in the defect called ‘*upahatavisarga*’. According to Govinda Ṭhakkura these *doṣas* are not exclusively characteristic of *vākya* (sentences) alone, but of words also. As such they should have been enumerated in *padadoṣa* also. There is much logic in this contention of the *Pradīpakāra*.

II. *Upahata-Visarga*—Having the visarga blunted. The sentence, where the visarga is transformed into ‘o’ more than once, is regarded as defective because it produces a revulsion of the audience by its strained composition. It is a constant defect. As for example :

dhīro vinīto nīpuṇo varākāro nīpo’tra saḥ /

‘That king is firm, gentle, expert and handsome’. Here the *visarga* is changed into ‘o’ several times consistently and the construction has become terse and defective. This defect is a new creation of Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa.

III. *Lupta-Visarga*—Having the *visarga* elided. A sentence having words where *visargas* are elided more than once, is regarded as defective. As for example—

yasya bhr̥tyā balot-siktā bhaktā buddhiprabhānvitāḥ /
 'Whose servants are strong, devoted and intelligent'. This sentence consists of rejection of visargas and is an instance of the defect in question.

IV. *Visandhi*—It is discordant euphony. This ugliness of *sandhi* is brought about in three ways—(a) when there is a disjunction, though not compulsory, (b) when combination (*sandhi*) gives rise to the sense of indecorousness and (c) when it ends in harshness :

(a) Disjunction is either dependent on the will of the writer (*aicchika*), or compulsory conformable to grammar (*ānuśāsika*).

As for example—

rājan vibhānti bhavataś caritāni tani
 indor dyutiṃ dadhati yāni rasātale'ntaḥ /
 dhīdor-bale atitate ucitānuvṛtti
 ātanvati vijay-sampada-metya bhātaḥ //

'O king, your actions are pure and shining which bear the resplendence of the moon even in the nether world; your strength of arms and intellect are stretched in proper directions, results in your victory and prosperity'. Here absence of *sandhi* in the third line of the verse is due to '*pragṛhya*'. But it is tolerable when it is used only once, but when it is repeated it becomes cacophonous as is the case in the above mentioned example.

(b) Indecorousness of *Sandhi*—

Vegād uddīya gagane calaṇ-ḍāmara-ceṣṭitaḥ /
 ayam uttapate patrī tato'traivā ruciṃ kuru //

'This bird of unrestrained movement having flown to the sky with great quickness, finds it hot there. So make your choice to rest there'. Here indecency is occasioned by *sandhi* between words *calaṇ* and *ḍāmara* and again between *ruciṃ* and *kuru*. The *sandhis* here give rise to sound *laṇḍa* and *cinku* which are suggestive of disgusting sense.

(c) Harshness of *Sandhi*—

urvy asāv atra tarvālī marvante cārvy avasthitiḥ
 'Yonder, at the end of this desert there is a long line of trees well-situated'. Here *sandhis* are harsh and jarring to the ear.

Here Govinda-Ṭhakkura observes that this defect of *Viśandhi* is also possible in compound. And so it may be a case of *padadoṣa*. He has pointed out this possibility in case of '*pratikūlavarṇa*' and '*upahatavisarga*' also. We have already noted this contention relating the *doṣas* referred to. But he offers also a justification of the treatment of *Vākya-doṣa* by Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa and thus disposes of the objection alleging oversight, which is regarded as a serious draw-back on the part of the writer of a scientific treatise. Govinda Ṭhakkura is too loyal a commentator to allow of this charge. He states that the classification of *doṣas* as relating to words (*padas*) and sentences (*vākyas*) exclusively is determined by important logical consideration. The *doṣas* enlisted as *vākya-doṣas* are unmixed with other defects. But when they occur in a compound word they are necessarily mixed up with other defects. Thus in *pratikūlavarṇa* there must be the *doṣa* '*śrutikaṭu*'. In the '*upahatavisarga*' it is necessarily concomitant with '*aprayukta*' (unconventional). Therefore all these objections leave his (Mammaṭa's) withers unwrung.

V. *Hatavṛtta*—This is breach of metre when the metre is marred or broken. This is of three kinds. The first corresponds with '*yatibhraṣṭa*' while the second case covers the '*bhinnavṛtta*' of ancient writers. The third kind is an addition made by Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa. The first variety occurs when the rule regarding the use of '*guru*' (heavy) and '*laghu*' (light) syllables is not observed. Secondly the caesura is wrongly placed and thirdly when a particular group of letters is wrongly employed. A few examples will clear the point :

(a) amṛtam amṛtam kaḥ sandeho madhūny api nā'nyathā
madhuram adhikam cūṭasyā'pi prasannarasam phalam /
sakṛd api punar madhyasthaḥ san rasāntaraviḥ jano
Vadatu yad ihā'nyat svādu syāt priyā-daśanacchadāt //

'No doubt nectar is really nectarlike ; nor is honey otherwise ; a fruit of mango also is very sweet. But let any impartial person with clear knowledge of discriminating taste say if anything in this world is sweeter than the lip of a beloved girl'. Here in the metre of *Harinī* the caesura must be on the

sixth and tenth syllables. This is ignored in the present case. In the fourth foot the sixth syllable 'hā' is inseparably connected with the following word, hence one cannot put caesura on it. Hence this defect.

(b) anyās tā guṇa-ratna-rohaṇabhuvō dhanyā mṛḍanyaiva sā
sambhārāḥ kila te'nya eva vidhinā yaireṣa sṛṣṭo yuvā /
srīmatkāntijuṣām dviṣām karatalātstrīṇām nitambasthalād-
drṣṭe yatra patanti mūḍhamanasām astrāṇi vastrāṇi ca //

'Other are those lands which give birth to such gems of excellence, other is that fortunate earth. Other are those materials with which the Creator created this youth, whom if his enemies or woman of resplendent beauty happen to behold, down slip from their hands or hips, the weapons or garments, agitated as they are with awe and love'. Here composition at 'vastrāṇi ca' sounds feeble due to shortness of the last letter 'ca'. If, however, we change it into 'vastrānyapi' it would sound vigorous and strong, and make good the defect. The ground of fault lies in the slackness of construction. It is a constant defect.

(c) hā nṛpa hā budha hā kavibandho
viprasahasra-samāśraya deva /
mugdha-vidagdha-sabhāntara-ratna
kvā'si gataḥ kva vayan ca tavaite //

'O king ; O wise one ; O patron of poets ; O shelter of hundreds of Brahmins, O jewel of the assembly of the learned, where have you gone and where are we ?' The metre, here, is *Dodhaka* which suits only the comic. It is improperly employed here in the pathetic sentiment.

VI. *Nyūnapada*—Deficient in words. A sentence where an expressive word is wanting (*Nyūnam padam vācakaśabdo yatra*) is an instance of this flaw.

tathābhūtām drṣtvā nṛpasadasi pāñcāla tanayām
vanē vyādhaiḥ sārḍham suciram uṣitam valkaladharāḥ /
virāṭasy āvāse sthitam anucitārambha-nibhṛtam
guruḥ khedaṁ khinne mayi bhajati nādyāpi kuruṣu //
'Having seen the princess of Pāñcāla subjected to indescribable
insul the assembly of kings, having observed for a long

time how we lived in the forest clad in tree-bark along with the foresters, and having watched how we remained in Virāṭa's house secretly engaged in unbecoming works, having seen all it our eldest brother bears anger toward me, and not even now towards the Kurus'. Here the word 'asmābhṭḥ' a subject in connection with verb 'sthitam' and word 'ittham' before 'khinna' are not mentioned. They, however, are essential because without them the meaning is not complete and clear. So it is a defect. The ground of defect is its failure to give rise to intended meaning.

VII. *Adhikāpapa*—redundant in words. A sentence where a superfluous word is employed, is a case of defect. The use of superfluous word creates the confusion of the reader, e.g.

sphaṭikākṛti-nirmalaḥ prakāmaḥ
prati-samkrānta-nisāta-śāstra-tattvaḥ /
aviruddha-samanvito'ktiyuktaḥ
prati-mallās-tamayodayaḥ sa ko'pi //

'That king is clean like the forms of crystal, and has in his heart reflected all profound knowledge of sciences. His statements and arguments are in conformity with śāstras and brings about misfortune to his foes'. Here the word 'ākṛti' (form) is redundant. The desired object of comparison is 'sphaṭika' (crystal) and this word by itself is enough to connote his spotless handsomeness of beauty. Redundancy creates an impression of the writer's want of discrimination between sense essential and unessential. Hence it is a defect.

VIII. *Kathitapada*—With repeated word. Repetition of words is that where a word precisely the same as previously used, is used again without any special purpose. As for example.

adhikaratala-talpaṃ kalpitasvāpa-līlā-
parimilananimīlat-pāṇḍimā gaṇḍapālī /
sutanu kathaya kasya vyañjayaty aṇḍajaiḥ
smara-narapīti-lī ā-yauvarājyābhi-śekam //

'Your cheeks appear with paleness due to pressure caused by supporting them on the palms during sleep. O slender-bodied one, of what young man does this indicate the coronation !

the crown-prince of sportings of monarch Cupid ?' Here the word 'lila' is needlessly repeated. The same word with the same idea used more than once in a sentence implies the incompetency of the poet for finding a new word. It is a new fault observed by Mammaṭa.

IX. *Patatprakarṣa*—Having its excellence falling off : The sentence where alliterative excellence or that of diction gradually recedes without the consideration of propriety relating to content is an example of this defect. This is exhibited in the following verse :

Kaḥ Kaḥ kutra na ghurghurāyita-ghurī ghorō ghūret sūkaraḥ
Kaṃkam kaḥ kamalākaraṃ vikamalaṃ kartum kari nodyataḥ /
Ke ke kāni vanāny araṇyamahiṣā nonmūlayeyuryataḥ
sīmhi-sneha-vilāsa-baddha-vasatiḥ pañcānāno vartate //

'Where will not the boar, terrible with the peculiar sound, make an awful noise ? Which lotus-pond will not the elephant try to make devoid of lotuses ? Which forests will not the wild buffalo tear up by roots ? —Now that the lion lies fascinated by the affection of the lioness'. Here the boar, the elephant and the wild buffalo are delineated as destructive elements with alliterative excellence. But coming to describe the great lion the diction here, instead of rising in excellence, falls down. This defect is also for the first time given a definite shape by Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa.

X. *Samāpta-punarātta*—resumption of the concluded. This defect arises if a speaker employs a further qualification when the relation of the subject with the predicate has been fully understood. As for example—

Kreṅkāraḥ smara-kārmukasya surata-kṛidā-pikīnām ravo
jhaṅkāro ratimañjarī madhulihām līlā-cakorī-dhvaniḥ /
tanvyāḥ kañculikāpasāraṇa-bhujā-kṣepaskhalat-kañkaṇa-
Kvāṇaḥ preṇa tanotu vo nava-vayo-lāsyāya veṇu-svanaḥ //

'May the tinkling of the bangles gliding up and down owing to the movement of arms of the slender-bodied lady for apparently forbidding the removal of her bodice (by you), the tinkling which resembles the twang of Cupid's bow, which

imitates the singing of the cuckoo in the shape of love's dalliance and the humming of black bees in the blossom of love, which plays the role of the sound of partridges in the shape of graceful sportings, all these stimulate and expand your love. And the same acting as the ringing shound of flute for the dancing of your youth'. Here the sentence concludes at 'tanotu-vaḥ'. But the qualification 'navavayolā-syāya veṇu-svanah' wakes up again the sentence already concluded. This last qualification is unnecessary and does not add to the intensity of the effect already produced. Hence it is a defect.

The logic of this defect lies in the consideration that when a sentence is completed, that is to say, when the proposition (judgement) expressed by it is logically self-sufficient, the addition of a further adjectival clause is necessarily of the nature of an after-thought. As the Mīmāṃsist insists and other thinkers also agree, a sentence is completed when it specifies a verb, denoting the principal action. There is, of course, a difference between the Naiyāyika²⁰ on the one hand and the Mīmāṃsist and the Vaiyākaraṇa²¹ on the other as to whether it is the verb denoting action or the principal substantive given in the first case-ending, that occupies the dominant position in a sentence. But this does not affect the issue under consideration, viz. whether it is proper to add a qualifying adjective to the substantive after the sentence is completed.

Indian thinkers have devoted considerable attention to the problems as to what are the logical conditions of the constituent words or concepts for coming into relation with one another. The Naiyāyikas affirm that there are three conditions, viz. (i) *sannidhi* (proximity), (ii) *ākāṅkṣā* (logical dependence of one word upon another word) and (iii) *yogyatā* (mutual compatability). *Ākāṅkṣā* literally means a desire or expectancy and as such it can be a quality of a thinking person. But it is not unusual that a word or a meaning is

20. Prathamānta-mukhya-viśeṣyaka-śābdabodhaḥ-the Nyāya position.

21. Kriyā-mukhya-viśeṣyaka-śābda-bodhaḥ-the position of the Vaiyākaraṇa, and also of the Mīmāṃsist with minor differences between them.

also said to be possessed of *ākāṅkṣā*. In consonance with this usage the Naiyāyikas define *ākāṅkṣā* as follows :

When a word fails to produce the understanding of the syntactical construction in default of another word, this relation is called *ākāṅkṣā*. Whether *ākāṅkṣā* is regarded as a quality of words or meanings or of a thinking person, it is held by the Vaiyākaraṇa of Pāṇini's school as the most fundamental condition of a sentence conveying mutual relation of the words and their meanings.

A sentence is understood to be complete when the *ākāṅkṣā* is satisfied. This *ākāṅkṣā* is, again, of two kinds—first spontaneous (*utthitākāṅkṣā*) and the second occasioned by afterthought (*utthāpyākāṅkṣā*). In the present context the defect called 'Samāpta-punarāttatā', i.e. the resumption to the concluded sentence arises from having recourse to the second type of *ākāṅkṣā*. This is particularly censurable in literary composition in which formal and material perfection are deemed *de rigueur*. This defect is occasioned by the addition of an adjectival clause without making an additional contribution to the meaning. In the instance quoted the addition of the last clause '*navavayolāsyāya venu-syanaḥ*' the ringing sound of the flute for the dancing of youth only ends in repetition without satisfying a logical requirement. But if an additional meaning is conveyed by the adjectival clause, the defect does not arise. The defect in the present case could be avoided if it was given in a form of a sentence which can be effected by the substitution of 'yah' for 'vaḥ', which would give it the formal status of a separate clause. 'The ringing sound of the moving bangles—which plays the role of the music of the flute to accompany the dancing of youth' expand your love'.

Our treatment of this defect will not be complete if we fail to take into account the penetrating analysis of this defect given by Mahādeva-Bhaṭṭa in the commentary usually known as *Dinakarī* on the *Nyāyasiddhānta-Muktāvalī* and the sub-commentary known as *Rāmarudrī*. In the inaugural verse of the *Muktāvalī*²² there is apparently a case of this defect,

cūḍā-maṇi-kṛta-vidhur valayī-kṛta-vāsukih /
bhavo bhavatu bhavyāya līla-tāṇḍava-paṇḍitaḥ //

'With the moon made into his crest jewel, Vāsuki—the king of serpents—made as his grand armlet, may Śiva (Bhava) be the cause of your well-being well-versed in the art of sportive dance called Tāṇḍava'. Here the fourth quarter introduces an adjective though the sentence is apparently concluded in the third quarter. Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa first states in defence that the last clause 'līla-tāṇḍava-paṇḍitaḥ' stands for the substantive (viśeṣya) and is not an adjective, so the defect does not arise. Only in the case of a sentence which is completed and the substantive has been construed with the verb (action) the introduction of an adjective necessitating the reference to the substantive again constitute the occasion of such a literary defect. But the last clause is not an adjective and so does not require a backward reference to the substantive. Hence it is free from this defect.

But this defence seems forced and too ingenious. Without twisting the plain sense of the verse it appears obvious that Bhava (Śiva) is the substantive and the last clause only states an adjective after the sentence having been completed. So the plea that the last mentioned adjective should be treated as a substantive is only an argument too laboured to carry conviction. The commentator himself is conscious of the weakness of his contention and hence proposes another explanation which seems cogent enough. He asserts that the last clause gives the reason for this make-up and preparation on the part of God Śiva. The sentence is not complete without this final clause. Why should God Śiva put the moon on his crest and make Vāsuki his armlet? This question naturally arises and the last clause gives the answer. There is a special occasion which makes this preparation meaningful. God Śiva is going to perform his favourite dance called Tāṇḍava. A dancer must make up his decoration suitable for the purpose. So the sentence in spite of the verb being mentioned before, does not give a completed proposition without the last clause. There is, therefore, no ground for the change of a concluded sentence for the sake

of construing an additional adjective with the substantive, simply because the sentence is not logically complete. The *ākāṅkṣā*, i.e. the logical requirements are not fully satisfied. The defect under consideration arises only in cases where the sentence gives a logically self-sufficient proposition and the introduction of a fresh adjective necessitates a fresh arousal of *ākāṅkṣā* in other words, when the *ākāṅkṣā* is of the type 'Uthāpyā' i.e. occasioned by force, the defect finds its scope. It is not, therefore, plausible to contend that such questions can be raised in every case of a fresh addition of an adjective and so the defect will have no *raison d'être*. The question—what is Śiva like—is rather forced and not spontaneous. In every case of a fresh adjective, one can raise the question, 'what is it (substantive) further like', 'what further attribute has it got? But the question will be pointless if it is raised after a complete statement. The relation between a noun and a verb, or between co-relatives, such as son and father, wife and husband, etc., are not only relevant but logically necessary.²³ Such is also the case with the statement of a reason. The requirement of one for the other is logical and spontaneous. This is 'utthitākāṅkṣā'. In the verse under review the final clause, though delivered as an adjective, states the reason and the logical necessity without which the proposition becomes pointless and this fact exempts the latter from the defect under review.²⁴

XI. *Ardhāntaraika-Vācaka*—The verse in which a word expressing 'hetu' etc. which is implied in the foregoing statement is stated in second half is an instance of this defect. As for example—

23. *Rāmarudri*, p. 3. Kriyā-kāraka-padānām parasparākāṅkṣa niyatā, putrādi-padānām api pratiyogy-ākāṅkṣā niyatā...

24. *Dinakarī* on S. M. p. 2—Vastutas tu vidhoḥ kimiti cūḍāmanī-karaṇam kimarthaṁ vā vāsuker valayikaraṇam ity ākāṅkṣāyām nirākāṅkṣā-pratipattir na sambhavatīti līla-ityādi-viśeṣaṇānuktau vivaksitānvaya-bodhābhāvān nāyam atra doṣaḥ, utthāpyākāṅkṣāyā viśeṣaṇānvaya eva tatprasārāt.

masṛṇa-caraṇa-pātaṃ gamyatām bhūḥ sadarbhā
 viracaya sicayāntam mūrdhni gharmaḥ kaṭhoraḥ /
 taditi Janaka-putrī locanair as'ru-pūrṇaiḥ
 pathi pathika-vadhūbhiḥ śikṣitā vikṣitā ca //

'Put your steps gently as the ground is full of kuśa-sprouts ; therefore cover your head with cloth as the sun is very hot ; thus the daughter of Janaka, on her way, was instructed and seen with tearful eyes by the wives of travellers'. Here the word 'tat' (therefore) ought to be read in the first half of the verse. It has been isolated in the second half and the proposition given in the first half is complete by itself irrespective of the statement of 'tat' (therefore). The first half states that the ground is full of thorny grass and you should walk with slow and cautious steps. This is complete even without the conjunction 'therefore', because it is implied, though not stated. The logic of this defect lies in the absence of logical requirement (*ākāṅkṣā*). The statement of a principal factor, the noun or the verb in the second half, will also be an illustration, provided it is implied in the foregoing assertion. It will not be a defect if it is necessary for the completion of the proposition. The fact of the matter is concerned with the statement of a subordinate part which is not strictly necessary being understood by implication.

XIII. *Abhavanmatayoga*—Failure of the intended syntactical connection. The sentence, where the intended grammatical connection between two words is not brought about, is a case of this poetical defect called '*Abhavanmatayoga*'. This failure of intended connection may arise in six ways. viz., (a) owing to the difference in case-endings, (b) owing to the deficiency of certain words, (c) owing to absence of an indispensable connection between the expressed and suggested meaning, (e) when a principal word is compounded with another word and (f) owing to the contravention of the natural relation. These are illustrated in the order :

(a) yeṣāṃ tāstridaśebha-dāna-saritaḥ pītāḥ pratāpoṣmabhir-
 līlā-pānabhuvaśca nandana-tarucchayāsu yaiḥ kalpitāḥ /
 yeṣāṃ humkṛtayaḥ kṛtāmara-pati-kṣobhāḥ kṣapācārīṇāṃ ,
 Kiṃ tais tvat-paritoṣa-kāri vihitāṃ kiñcit pravādocitam //

'What remarkable deed, which can bring satisfaction to you, has been done by these Rākṣasas? By the heat of whose prowess the streams of rut of the celestial elephants were dried up, by whom the forest of Nandana was transformed into a sportive and drinking place and whose thundering cries perturbed the Lord of Gods'. Here owing to the difference of the case-endings the intended connection is not understood. The sentences introduced by 'yat' (which or who) are only subordinate and they must be naturally connected with the principal substantive (noun). Here the principal noun 'Kṣapācārīṇām' is given in the sixth case-ending and so it is connected with 'veṣam' in the subordinate clause. In a complex sentence consisting of 'yat' and 'tai' (which and that) the pronoun 'tat' completes the meaning as it stands for the principal substantive. This connection could easily be effected by putting 'Kṣapācārīṇi' in third case-ending and connecting it with 'taiḥ' in the principal clause. But this is not done. Therefore the intended connection is not available. Mammaṭa in connection with this verse introduces a rule of interpretation endorsed by the Mīmāṃsā school. It may be put as follows :

Granted that the sentences introduced by 'yat' (which) are subordinate, why should not there be mutual connection between them? Why should their connection be made dependent upon the principal substantive qualified by 'tai' (that)? This question is answered by the dictum :²⁵

guṇānām ca parārthatvād asaṃbandhaḥ samatvāt syāt

There can be no independent connection between subordinate adjectival clauses or words, because they are all on an equal footing being subservient to the substantive'. The implication of the dictum is that relation, real or verbal, is always possible between principal and subordinate. In other words, the terms should be of an unequal status, one superior and another inferior. Thus there can be no relation between two or more principals or between two or more subordinates. This rule of exegesis is propounded in connection with the Vaidic injunction—arunayaikahāyanyā piṅākṣyā gavā somaṃ kṛiṇātī. The

25. J. S. III. 1.12. 22 (Quoted in K. P. p. 347).

sacrificer shall buy 'soma' plant with a red calf one year old, having yellow eyes'. As injunction always refers to an action it is the principal factor, to which others are subordinate. The act of buying will be completed if the 'soma' plant as the object be procured by means of the cow with the different adjective offered as the price. All these adjectives are connected with the principal action in the first instance and then become mutually connected in and through the substantive. This subsequent relation of adjectives takes place on account of the combination of the different factors with the principal one.

In the present case the principal substantive is 'kṣapācārīṇām' (night-rovers). But being in apposition with 'yeṣām', 'kṣapācārīṇām' becomes a part and parcel of the subordinate clause and as such cannot be connected with 'taiḥ' standing for the substantive—and consequently with the other subordinate objectives, which can be connected with one another only after syntactical connection with the principal substantive. Adjectives and so also adjectival clauses cannot be contrued with one another; they are connected first with the principal noun and their connection *inter se* is consequential. This can be brought home by a commonplace sentence, 'Sugar is sweet, hard and white'. The three adjectives will fall apart unless they each qualify the noun 'sugar' and the connection of the adjectives *inter se* is a consequential after-effect. What holds of adjectives is also true of nouns. 'Sugar, milk and water' is not a sentence, because there is no verb. The verb, so the Mīmāṃsist maintains, is the principal element with which other parts of speech are connected and the connection between the nouns and the adjectives with one another follows as a logical consequence and is never antecedently possible.

(b) tvamevaṃ-saudaryā sa ca ruciratāyāḥ paricītaḥ
 Kalānām sīmānām paramiḥa yuvām eva bhajataḥ /
 api dvandvaṃ diṣṭyā tad iti subhage samvadati vām
 atāḥ śeṣaṃ yat syāj jitaṃ iha tadānīm guṇitayā //

'You are endowed with such beauty, and he too is acquainted with (i.e. known for) handsomeness; both of you possess

singular proficiency in arts ; thus fortunately the pair of you two is quite compatible ; if the subsequent issue were what it should be then indeed would the endowment of qualities become duly glorified'. Here the last line states that if the unaccomplished union of the pair takes place it would be a case of triumph of worthiness. But the word 'yat' (which) does not succeed in bringing about the intended relation. It could do so if it meant 'yadi' (provided). But the word 'yat' cannot express the meaning. It would be a case of 'avācakatva' (inexpressiveness) if ever it intended for that. Secondly, 'yat' (which) could succeed if two words 'yat' 'tat' were supplied. This would further involve the defect *Nyūnapadatā*—the elliptical expression, without 'if' (yadi). It cannot be contended that *Nyūnapadatā* (ellipsis) should be included under this head—for ellipsis is made good by the inference of the requisite expressions. But the present defect only illustrates the incompetency of a particular word for intended meaning.

Saṅgrāmāṅgaṇam āgatena bhavatā cāpe samāropite
devākarnaya yena yena sahasā yadyat samāsāditam /
Kodaṇḍena śarāḥ śarair arisīras tenāpi bhūmaṇḍalam
tena tvam bhavatā ca kīrtir atulā kīrtyā ca lokatrayam //

'O king ; listen to what was obtained by what, when you reached the battlefield and mounted the string on your bow. The bow obtained the arrows, the arrows the enemies, head, this head the earth, the earth you, you matchless fame, and the fame, the three worlds'. Mammaṭa is very hard on the author of this verse. He maintains that the connection between two halves is not understandable. Words of two propositions can be related if (1) one is a verb or (2) a case (*kāraka*), or (3) a relative (*sambandin*), (4) or if it be a qualifying adjective of the preceding one or (5) if it sets forth a reason, (6) or if like the pronoun 'tat' (that) etc. it refers to the previous statement and connects the latter with what follows. Now the first, third, fourth and fifth alternatives are out of the question. The second half can be related with the first if the words in the former give the necessary 'kāraka' (case), *kartā* or *karma*

(nominative or objective cases). But the individual words are not stated either as an objective or as nominative cases.

It is, however, possible to construe the different clauses if 'samāsāditam' is changed and suitably modified into the plural or singular number in different genders. This is a plausible defence. But the syntactical relation between the two halves will not be established even by this proposed modification. Besides, this will involve the postulation of a plurality of propositions (*vākya-bheda*) which is regarded a serious defect of interpretation in the Mīmāṃsā school and this should be avoided particularly in poetry. The poet must be careful about the construction of sentences and must not make his composition subject to the dubious skill of an exegete.

(d) Cāpācāryas tripura-vijayī kārṭikeyo viyeyaḥ etc.

Here the first half pays compliment to Bhārgava. The second half expresses censure on the hatchet (*paraśu*), his weapon. Naturally the compliment and censure should relate to the same person. But this is frustrated by the wrong expression, 'kṛtavatā', which qualifies the hatchet. If it is changed into 'kṛtavataḥ' (sixth case-ending), making it an adjective of Bhārgava it will give out the necessary relation of praise and censure to the same person.

(e) catvāro vayamṛtvijāḥ sa bhagavān karmopadeṣṭā hariḥ
saṅgrāmādhvara-dīkṣito nara-patiḥ patnī gṛhita-vratā /
kauravyāḥ paśavaḥ priyāparibhava-kleśopasāntiḥ phalaṃ
rājanyopa-nimantraṇāya rasati sphṛtaṃ hato dundubhiḥ //

'We four are the sacrificial priests, the Lord Hari is the spiritual advisor; the king has been initiated for the sacrifice of battle; and the wife is keeping vows; the Kurus are the animals; the result intended is the removal of pain caused by the insult of our wife; the battle-drum is being sounded for inviting the warriors'. Here the word 'saṅgrāmādhvara' is subordinated to the word 'dīkṣita' and as such cannot be construed with the other clauses as it should be. If it were changed into *sangrāmādhvare* and not compounded the syntactical connection would follow.

(f) jaṅghakāṇḍorunālo nakhakiraṇa-
 lasat-kesārālī-karālah
 pratyagrā-lakta-kābhāprasara-
 kisalayo mañju-mañjira-bhṛṅgaḥ /
 bhartur nṛttā-nukāre jayati
 nijatanūsvaccha-lāvaṇya-vāpi-
 sambhūtāmbhoja-śobhām
 vidadhad abhinavo daṇḍapādo bhavānyāḥ //

‘Glorious is the *daṇḍapāda* (the raised foot) of Bhavāni when imitating her husband’s dance, which bears the splendour of the lotus blown in the tank of the charm of her body, having the foreleg for its bulky stalk, the lustrous nails for its filaments, the bright red paints on the feet for its petals and the jingling anklets for the bees hovering round it’. Here the expression ‘*nijatanu*’ is understood as referring to the *daṇḍapāda*. Tho words like ‘*nija*’, ‘*sva*’ (meaning own) etc. always refers to the principal part of speech. The intended relation of ‘*nija*’ with Bhavāni is not understood because the latter is subordinate to ‘*daṇḍapāda*’—the substantive, i.e. the nominative of the sentence.

XIII. *Anabhihitavācya*—The omission of necessary verbal expression is a defect. This defect arises in two ways :—(a) when the subject matter is stated in a way which is not the proper form of statement or (b) owing to the omission of a necessary particle.

(a) aprākṛtasya caritātiśayaiśca dṛṣṭair-
 atyāhṛtasya mama nāma tathāpi nāsthā /
 Ko’pyeṣa vīra-śīśuka-kṛtiraprameya-
 saundarya-sāra samudāyamayaḥ padārthaḥ //

‘I am charmed with splendour and wonderful performance of this extraordinary person (Rāma); yet I cannot give credence to it. This indescribable person, appearing as a heroic boy, is the embodiment of essence of immense beauty’. Here the word ‘*atyāhṛta*’ must be used as a predicate ‘*atyāhṛt-smi*’ instead of ‘*atyāhṛtasya*’ which make it a part of the subject. It is, no doubt, possible to contend that it necessarily involves the defect ‘*avimṛṣṭavidheyāmśa*’ (having the predicate

subordinated). The word '*atyāhṛtasmī*' (I am extremely charmed and transported with joy) should have been the proper mode of statement. But as it stands the poet makes it as an adjective of the subject and thus the predominance of the predicate is lost. Govinda Ṭhakkur admits the justice of the contention but observes that the defect of the subordination of the predicate (*vidheyāvimarśa*) is rather consequential. The expression *tathāpi* (yet) necessarily presupposes an independent sentence going before it and this necessitates the use of '*atyāhṛta*' as predicate. So the principal defect is '*anbhihitavācya*' and '*vidheyāvimarśa*' is only subordinate to it.

(b) praṇaya-bhaṅga parāṇmukha-cetasas-

tvayi nibaddha-rateḥ priyavādinah /

Kamaparādha-lavaṃ mama paśyasi

tyajasi mānini dāsa-janaṃ yataḥ //

'O angry one : what particle of fault do you see in me that you part with me, your humble servant? I, who love you, who speak words to you and who never think of the breach of your love'. Here the particle '*api*' (even) is omitted. It ought to have been said '*aparādhasyalavam-api*' (even a particle of fault) which would suggest the total negation of fault. Govinda Ṭhakkura observes that '*anabhihita-vācya*' should not be confused with the defect '*nyūnapada*'. The latter is a case where the expressive word is left out, while the former is possible in the case of the omission of some preposition or conjunction or adverb. The statement of '*api*' (even) is necessary without which it would give rise to an undesirable meaning, that is, not a particle of fault in me, but a major offence. Certainly this will be contrary to the spirit of the lover's statement. He cannot be supposed to confess a grave offence in order to propitiate his love. He simply pleads not guilty and this is quite appropriate.

The difference between the first and the second instance is that there is failure of the intended meaning in the first and the contrary meaning is suggested in the second.

XIV. *Apadaśthapada*—With a misplaced word. This defect arises when a word is placed in an inappropriate place. This blemish is related to a sentence as a whole, because the whole

of the sentence is needed to convey the meaning. As for example—

priyeṇa saṅgrathya vipakṣa-sannidhāv-
upāhitāṃ vakṣasi pīvarastane /
srajaṃ na kācid vijahau jalāvilāṃ
vasanti hi premṇi guṇā na vastuni //

A particular lady did not discard the garland, though withered by water, which has been prepared and put on the elevated breasts by the lover in presence of her rivals. The merits are in love and not in the thing (presented). Here the word 'na' is misplaced before 'kācit'. Thus 'na kācid vijahau' implies that all discarded, while the intended meaning is 'Kācit na vijahau', the particular lady did not discard in even it withered and lost its fragrance'.

The defect arises because a misplaced word makes the sentence yield a contrary meaning as shown above. The defect also arises when on account of wrong juxtaposition the expected meaning is not understood. As for example—

lagnaḥ kelikaca-grahaslatha-jaṭa-lambena nidrāntare
mudrāṅkaḥ śiti-kandhareṇdu śakalenāntaḥ kapolasthalam /
pārvatyā nakhalakṣma-saṅkita-sakhī-narmasmita-vrīḍayā
pronmrṣtaḥ karapaṅkajena kuṭilā-tāmracchaviḥ pātu vaḥ //

'May the curved red mark made on Pārvatī's cheek by Śiva's moon digit while she slept on his matted locks, dishevelled during dalliance, protect you. The marks wiped off by her tender hands, when she was abashed by the smiles of her companions who suspected the mark to be of nails'. Here the mark of the moon's digit on the cheek of Pārvatī is the ground for the suspicion of nail-mark which is a conventional part of dalliance. It should have been stated before 'Kutīlā-tāmracchavi'. It is a case of the fallacy called *hysteron-proteron*. The effect is stated first and the cause last.

XV. *Apadasthasamāsa*—Having a compound out of proper place. The diction is governed by the propriety of the speaker. If a speaker happens to be in angry mood the composition with compounds is quite appropriate. If a compound is employed without considering this propriety, it becomes a case of misplacement of compound. As for example—

adyāpi stana-śaila-durga-viṣame śīmantinīnām hṛdi
 sthātum vāñchati māna eṣa dhig iti krodhād ivālohitāḥ /
 udyaddūra-taraprasārita-karaḥ karṣatyasau tatkṣaṇot-
 phullat-kairava-koṣa-nihsarad-ali śreṇī-kṛpāṇim śaśi //

‘Does pride even now wish to live in the hearts of women fortified as it is with the hill of her breasts—O fie on me. Thus saying the rising moon, as if red with anger, stretching far his rays (hands), in a moment draws his sword in the shape of black-bees coming out from the blooming lilies.’ Here the long compounds are not used in the speech of the angry moon, where they would have been quite proper. They are used in the simple assertion of the poet. Hence it is a blemish. This defect is a new creation of Mammaṭa. Vidyānatha calls it ‘*asthānasthasamāsa*’, which is only a change of word without change of meaning. It should not be confused with ‘*pratikūlavarna*’ (discordant syllables) because a compound is not a syllable. Nor can it be regarded as a case of *patatprakarṣatā* (having its excellence falling of), because it is only possible if the elevated style in the first statement is shunned in the later statement. Here the case is the reverse of it. Moreover the loss of excellence occurs only when both the preceding and succeeding statements require the elevated style. But, here, only the former statement demands elevated composition and not the latter one. So the present defect is independent of both the cases.

XVI. *Samkirṇa*—Confused. This defect arises when words of one sentence are inserted into another sentence and make the sense confused. Mammaṭa points out the difference between ‘*Klista*’ and ‘*saṃkirṇa*’. The former takes place only in a single sentence while the latter is possible in more than one sentence. Mammaṭa borrows an example of this defect from the work of Rudraṭa.

Kimiti na paśyasi kopam pādanatam bahugunam grhāṇemam /
 nanu muñca hṛdaya-nātham kaṇthe manasas tamorūpam //
 ‘Why do you not look upon the lord of your heart, who is the abode of good qualities, fallen on your feet? Embrace him on the neck and give up your wrath, which hangs like a gloom on your heart.’ Here parts of one sentence are inserted into

others. It makes a confused mess of the meaning of the entire verse. The construction of the sentence makes it difficult for the hearer to understand the intended meaning.

XVII. *Garbhita*—Parenthetical. When a whole sentence is inserted in another sentence it is a case of '*Garbhita*.' As for example—

parāpakāraniratair durjanaiḥ saha saṃgatiḥ /
vadāmi bhavatas tattvaṃ na vidheyā kadācana //

'Association with wicked men, who are bent upon doing mischief to others, I tell you the truth, is never desired.' Here the third foot (which is a separate sentence) has been intercalated in a different sentence. The ground of the fault lies in obstructing the sense to be understood.

XVIII. *Prasiddhihata*—Disregard of usage. There are some well-known forms which have established usage in particular sense in poetry. Mammaṭa quotes a verse from Rudraṭa²⁶ and says it is customary to call the sound of '*mañjira*' (anklet) *raṇita* (tinkling) and that of *pakṣina* (birds), *Kūjita* (warbling); and that of the time of dalliance '*stanita*' and '*mañita*' (muttering and murmuring) and that of clouds '*garjita*' (roaring) and the like. When this usual practice is contravened it constitutes this defect.

mahāpralaya-māruta-kṣubhita-puṣkarāvartaka-
pracanda-ghana-garjita-pratirutānukārī muhuḥ /
ravaḥ śravaṇa-bhairavaḥ sthagita-rodasikandaraḥ
kuto'dya samarodadher ayamabhūta-pūrvāḥ puraḥ //

'Where from this unprecedented ear-splitting sound of the ocean of battle, pervading the entire valley between the earth and the heaven, matching the echo of the thundering of clouds tossed about by storms during universal dissolution'. Here for the lion-roar the use of word '*rava*' (which is applicable by usage to the sound of frogs) is a defect. The use of the word mentioned above is fixed by convention and a breach of it betokens the ignorance of the poet.

26. Rudraṭa, VI. 25.

mañjirādiṣu raṇitaprāyān pakṣiṣu ca kūjitaprabhṛtīn /
mañitaprāyān surate meghādiṣu garjita-prāyān //

XIX. *Bhagnaprakrama*—Violation of uniformity. When a word is used with same object in view it should be repeated in the same form in which it is done before. When it has the same reference its synonyms will not serve the purpose. In other words, no two words, however similar in meaning, can ever be identical in their signification. Meaning must vary with the change of words. There is a deep logical consideration underlying this proposition. A word denotes its meaning and also its own self. And so the meaning is coloured by the word and as such the meaning of one word must vary from that of its synonym, because the word is an adjunct to the meaning which will necessarily differ. The relation of word and meaning according to Bharṭṛhari²⁷ is too intimate and the word always coalesces with the meaning denoted by it. So the meaning of a word is a complex consisting of the referent as the substantive and the verbal expression attaching to it as an adjective. That this is the case is easily deducible from Pāṇini's aphorism²⁸ '*svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyā'śabda-saṁjñā*'. In grammar the word—form is more fundamental than meaning and hence the meaning is regarded as an adjectival adjunct to the word-form. Pāṇini had to frame this rule in order to show that the meaning of the word, though in ordinary parlance, is a complex of word-cum-meaning and the latter is the substantive and the former is apprehended as a qualifying adjective, in grammatical procedure the relation is reversed.

The dictum—*yāvantaḥ śabdāḥ tāvantaḥ arthāḥ*—i. e. there are as many meanings as there are words—is based on this principle. This question has been raised in connection with the possibility of *śleṣālankāra*—the figure of speech known as *double entendre*. The figure is possible only if one word can denote two different meanings. Logically considered this is not a permissible position. In poetry this passes muster because poets and students of poetry are not disposed to consider the

27. V. P. I. 50.

ātmarūpaṃ yathā jñāne jñeyarūpaṃ ca dṛśyate /
artharūpaṃ tathā śabde svarūpaṃ ca prakāśate //

28. Pāṇini I. I. 68.

difference in the shades of meanings and refuse to be logically fastidious. It is worthy of note that Mahima-Bhaṭṭa refuses to regard *śleṣa* (double entendre) as an impossibility and logically considered his view is unassailable. This position has been endorsed by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra in his *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*. That the meaning of a word is not a mere objective fact, but always embodies the verbal expression itself as a part of it, is also deducible from the proposition—*śabdajñānādīpāḥ trayāḥ prakāśāḥ sva-para prakāśāḥ*,²⁹ i. e., word, consciousness and light are three illuminators which illumine themselves and others. Word, therefore, expresses itself in the very act of expressing its meaning.

That it is the case is brought home by the ordinary example—

udeti savitā tāmraś tāmra evāstam eti ca /
saṃpattau ca vipattau ca mahatām ekarūpatā //

'The sun rises red, and sets red also; great beings retain the same condition both in prosperity and adversity.' Here the same word '*tāmra*' (copper-red) is to be repeated in order to bring home the uniformity of the behaviour of noble persons in prosperity and adversity alike. A different expression, however, close in meaning, will fail to emphasise sameness. It is not merely a peculiarity of Sanskrit idiom but seems to be true of all languages. Thus in English one has to put it as follows :—The sun rises red and sets red. If the word 'red' be replaced by a synonym in one of the clauses it will fail to produce the same impression. The substitution of the predicate '*tāmra*' by '*rakta*' naturally spells a shade of difference in meaning and this is regarded as a fault.

It has been urged that the repetition of the same word involves the defect of '*Kathitapadātā*.' But this defect of repetition of the same word is possible only in cases where there is no cross-reference (*uddeśya-pratinirdeśyabhāva*) and so this defect '*prakramabhaṅga*' is not sanctioned by the consideration of avoiding the defect of repetition. Repetition is a fault only when it is pointless.

XX. *Akrama*—Irregular in sequence. This defect arises when a word is used in a place other than where it should be used. As for example—

dvayaṃ gataṃ samprati śocanīyatām

samāgama-prārthanayā kapālināḥ /

Kalā ca sā kāntimatī kalāvatas-

tvam asya lokasya ca netra-kaumudī //

Here the particle 'ca' should be used after the word 'tvam.'

A question may be raised why should this defect of *akrama* (wrong sequence) be regarded as different from the *apadasthapadatā* (misplaced word)? It has been answered by an exponent as follows :

In '*apadasthapadatā*' it gives out a wrong sense which is contrary to the intended meaning. In the present case there is no difference in meaning caused by the wrong placing of words. The defect is due to the delayed understanding caused by it. But this is not a sound explanation, because it is based on partial appraisal. In the two examples given under the defect '*apadasthapadatā*' the first gives a contrary meaning on account of the misplaced word, but in the second there is no difference in the meaning. So this explanation does not square with facts. Govinda Ṭhakkura suggests that the defect is due to the fact that there are certain particles such as 'ca', 'iti', 'ittham', etc. which become significant only when they are placed immediately after the particular relevant word. These words cannot yield the intended connection when detached from the relevant term by intervention of other words. Govinda Ṭhakkura supports his contention by quotation from Mahima-Bhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka*, which sets forth the position adumbrated above. But this does not hold good of negative particle 'nañ' because it signifies the desired connection even when separated by an interval, c. f.

na khalu na khalu vāṇaḥ sannipatyō'yom asmin

The *raison d'être* of the defect lies in the failure of the desired meaning being not understood. It is a constant defect.

XXI. *Amatapārārtha*—Of undesirable second sense. Where the second meaning is contradictory to the context, e. g.

rāma-manmatha-śareṇa tāḍitā
 duḥ-sahena hṛdaye niśācarī /
 gandha-vad-rudhira-candano'kṣitā
 jīviteśa vasatiṃ jagāma sā //

'The Rākṣasī being wounded in the heart by the irresistible arrow of that cupid Rāma, besmeared with sandal-like-blood, as it were, went to the place of the lord of life.' Here the second sense suggestive of the erotic sentiment is not compatible with the predominant sentiment of abhorrence. So it is a case of wrong metaphor. Rāma should not have been described as 'manmatha' (cupid)—god of love. As set forth above the two sentiments of love and abhorrence are diametrically opposed and as such cannot be ascribed to the same person at the same time.

Arthadoṣas—defects of Sense

We next propose to deal with the defects of meanings (*arthadoṣas*) as given by Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa. They are as follows :—

- I. Apuṣṭa—irrelevant and not indispensable.
- II. Kaṣṭa—obscure.
- III. Vyāhata—contradictory.
- IV. Punarukta—tautological.
- V. Duṣkrama—improper in order.
- VI. Grāmya—vulgar.
- VII. Saṃdigdha—dubious.
- VIII. Nirhetu—inconsequential.
- IX. Prasiddhi-viruddha—opposed to prevalent ideas.
- X. Vidyā-viruddha—contrary to sciences.
- XI. Anavikṛta—wanting in novelty.
- XII. Saniyama-parivṛtta—unspecified.
- XIII. Aniyama-parivṛtta—specified.
- XIV. Viśeṣapariṇvṛtta—unrestricted.
- XV. Avišeṣapariṇvṛtta—restricted.
- XVI. Sākāṅkṣa—incomplete.
- XVII. Apadayukta—introduced in a wrong place.
- XVIII. Sahacarabhinna—dissimilar associates.

- XIX. Prakāśita-Viruddha—disagreeable.
 XX. Vidhyayukta—of improper predicate.
 XXI. Anuvādāyukta—of improper attribute.
 XXII. Tyakta-punaḥsvikṛta—resumption of concluded.
 XXIII. Aśhīla—indecorous.

I. *Apuṣṭa*—irrelevant : A meaning which is not indispensable to the development of the sense intended. For instance :

ativitata-gagana-saraṇi-prasaraṇa-
 parimukta-viśramānandaḥ /
 marud-ullāsita-saurabha-kamalā-
 kara-hāsa-kṛd ravir jayati //

‘Victorious is the sun making the lotus bloom whose odour is conveyed through air. The sun who has sacrificed all his pleasure of rest and covers the limitless expanded ethereal path.’ Here the word ‘*ativitata*’ (expanded), that is, the circumference of ethereal path being limitless, does not add to the sense because it is an inseparable characteristic of the sky. An adjective should be an attribute, which is not necessarily associated with the substantive it qualifies. Furthermore, the metaphorical identification of the sky (*gagana*) with path (*saraṇi*) and the fact that the odour of lotus is carried around by the wind does not contribute to the excellence of the sun which is the subject-matter of the poet.

It has been urged by some critic that these adjectival expressions and their meanings are quite unhelpful. But the limitlessly expanded is a case of tautology (*punarukta*), because it is understood as the connotation of the word sky. And the assertion of the adjective ‘*marudullāsita-saurabh*’ that is ‘the odour conveyed through the air’ is a case of the defect ‘*viruddha*’ (contradiction). For the lotus cannot give out its odour before it is made to bloom by the sun’s rays. So this adjective is not only uncontributive to the meaning, but rather contradicts the causal sequence. To these charges Govinda Ṭhakkura replies as follows :—

It is not a case of tautology though the limitless expanse is necessarily bound up with the connotation of the word sky.

(*gagana*) as has been observed by Bhoja.³⁰ "In poetry, history and narrative etc. the explicit statement of a fact implicit in the meaning of a word does not constitute a case of tautology." It is only in logical and philosophical works that this is regarded as a defect. It is not fair and proper to use the same yardstick for adjudication of poetry and logic. As regards the charge of contradiction (*viruddhārtha*) it also does not deserve serious consideration. The adjectival clause 'odour' etc. should be treated as an '*upalakṣaṇa*', i. e. simply as a qualification which only serves to express excellence of lotus without any bearing upon the subject-matter. Again poets do not scrupulously adhere to the causal sequence and sometimes reverse it for poetical effect (which terminates in the figure of speech called '*atiśayokti*').

Śrīvatsa, the author of the *Kāvyaparīkṣa*, seeks to dispense with the whole list of '*arthadoṣas*' and opines that they are capable of being subsumed under the different '*pada* and '*vākya-doṣas*.'³¹ The present defect of '*apuṣṭārtha*' (irrelevant) is subsumed by him under '*adhikapadatva*' (redundance). Both of them are incapable of contributing a necessary quota of meaning and so there can be no difference between them. It has been observed in defence that '*adhikapadatva*' is a defect of the sentence and is understood synchronously with the syntactical construction of the constituent words, whereas it is a material defect of the meaning as it is understood after the syntactical construction. But this defence is based on a wrong principle. The defence of material defect (*arthadoṣa*) from verbal defect (*śabdadoṣa*) relating to words and sentences is not determined by this criterion. In the *viruddhamatikṛt* (of repugnant implication) and *amataparārtha* (of undesirable sense) the defect is understood only after the comprehension of syntactical relation, yet they are regarded as verbal defects. Govinda Ṭhakkura lays down the criterion of material defect

30. S. K. Ā. Quoted in K. Pr. p. 232. 'Kāvyetiḥāsādāv arthavṛtityā labdhasya sākṣādbhaṇanam apaunaruktyāya.

31. Śrīvatsa, p. 50. ityete prācīnair arthadoṣāḥ kathitās te ukteṣu śabdadoṣeṣu antarbhavanīti na pṛthak pratipāditaḥ....

as follows : It is a case of material defect if the meaning is really intended and is liable to objection and does not cease to persist even when the verbal construction is changed, The criterion of verbal defect is that the defect persists so long as the words are not changed and disappear with the change of words. In the case of material defect it persists so long as the meaning is the same in spite of the change of verbal expression. As regards the contention that the defect '*apuṣṭārtha*' is a case of '*adhikapadatva*,' it is met by the consideration that in '*adhikapadatva*' the meaning is not actually intended by the speaker and its omission does not make any difference to the meaning of the sentence. But the poet uses such superfluous expressions in order to meet the exigencies of metre or padding out a sentence, though the meaning denoted by it is neither intended nor does it serve to contribute to the completion of the proposition.

The case of the defect '*apuṣṭārtha*' stands in a different category. The meaning is intended and is not opposed to the collective meaning of the sentence. But it is not deemed indispensable, because it is understood from the meaning of the substantive by invariable association, or because it does not contribute a relevant meaning. In the examples cited of the redundant defect the word '*ākṛti*' in '*sphaṭikākṛti*' etc. is not intended as the standard of comparison (*upamāna*), because the attributes of purity, etc. do not belong to it. But the meaning is somehow construed with that of other words though it is neither necessary nor relevant. As the meanings of words are intended in '*apuṣṭārtha*' it is a case of material defect (*arthadoṣa*). The two cases, i. e. '*adhikapadatva*' and '*apuṣṭārtha*' cannot be put on the same footing. It is regarded as a defect because it shows incompetency of the poet for choice of essential and exclusion of unessential words and meanings. It is not a constant defect since in '*yamaka*' etc. it does not seem to give offence. We have shown in our treatment of Vāmana's classification of defects that such expressions as '*Karṇāvataṃsa*' etc. are not defective, because they convey special significance.

II. *Kaṣṭa*—obscure. The meaning which is not easily understood is a case of this defect. As for example :

sadā madhye yāsām iyam amṛta-niḥsyanda-sarasā
sarasvaty uddāmā vahati bahu-mārgā parimalam /
prasādam tā etā ghana-paricayāḥ kena mahatām
mahā-kāvya-vyomni sphuritamadhurā yāntu rucayaḥ //

‘The great works of the poet wherein the goddess of speech traversing three ways—the soft, the diversified and the medium produces charm, how can such poetry be as lucid as the other types when it has become compact and profound in significance ? How can the sunshine, wherein flows the three-wayed river Gaṅgā, be lovely when covered with clouds ?’ Here the second meaning of this poem is not comprehended easily. It is regarded as the defect of the meaning, because the change of words will not affect improvement and clarity. In *Kliṣṭa* (obscure) the construction is involved and can be changed by different expressions having the same meaning. So it must be regarded as an independent defect of sense.

III. *Vyāhata*—contradictory. Having stated the excellence or inferiority of an object at first, if we declare it otherwise, it constitutes this defect, e. g.

jagati jayinas te te bhāvā navendu-kalādayaḥ
prakṛti-madhurāḥ santy evānye mano madayanti ye /
mama tu yadiyam yātā loke vilocana-chandrikā
nayanaviṣayaṃ janmany ekaḥ sa eva mahotsavaḥ //

‘There are in the world many glorious things such as the digit of the new moon which are naturally charming and fill the mind with delight. But to me that she has become the moon-shine is an event of festive occasion.’ Here in the first half of the verse the moon is belittled, but in the second half she is exalted. Thus it is a case of inconsistency, which is the defect under review. The change of words will not entail the disappearance of the defect. So it is a case of material defect, because the intended meaning itself is defective.

IV. *Punarukta*—tautological. It is of two types, viz. the meaning of a word (*pada*) and that of a sentence (*vākya*).

arere Arjuna Arjuna... .. /
 Kṛtaṃ anumataṃ dṛṣṭaṃ vā yai ridaṃ guru-pātaṃ
 Manuja-paśubhir nirmāyādair bhavadbhir udāyudhaiḥ /
 Naraka-ripuṇā sārddhaṃ teṣāṃ sa-bhīma-kirīṭinām-
 Ayam ahaṃ asṛg medo-māṃsaiḥ karomi diśāṃ balim //

Here the name of Arjuna is already called, the repetition of the same in 'sabhīma-kirīṭinām' is a case of tautology. Vidyānātha calls it '*ekārtha*.' It is the repetition of the meaning and not of mere words. It is therefore a material defect. Another example of the same we have in the sentence—

'Karnālaṃ sambhrameṇa' and '....ko bhayasyāvākāśaḥ'
 Here meaning of both the expressions is the same. It is a defect of sentential meaning.

V. *Duṣkrama*—Improper in order is a defect. As for example—

Bhūpāla-ratna nirdainya-pradāna-prathitotsava /
 Viśrāṇaya turaṅgaṃ me mātāṅgaṃ vā madālasam //

'O gem of the kings ! O one for whom the gift of wealth is an event of festival, Give me a horse or a mighty intoxicated elephant'. Here the proper order should have been to mention the elephant first and the horse next. One should ask for the things of superior value first and then the things of inferior value, if the former proposal and prayer is not acceptable. This violation of order often leads to a ridiculous situation like '*Kṛtodvāhasya lagna-parikṣaṇam*' (the examination of an auspicious moment after a person has already married, which is an instance of '*Duṣkrama*'.

VI. *Grāmyā*—vulgar. When the meaning is not refined is a case of this defect. As for example—

svapiti yāvad ayaṃ nikaṭe janaḥ
 svapimi tāvad ahaṃ kim apaiti te /
 tad apasamhara kūrpam āyataṃ
 tvaritam ūrum udañcaya kuñcitam //

'While this person is asleep, I sleep here, what does it harm to you ? So remove your bodice and expand your thighs'. Here the idea is rustic and vulgar. The linguistic change will not make it free from objection and so it is a case of material defect.

VII. *Sandigdha*—Dubious. When there is an absence of certainty as to which of the alternative meanings is intended, it is a case of 'Sandigdha', e. g.

mātsaryam utsārya vicārya kāryam
 āryāḥ samaryādam udāharantu /
 sevya nitambāḥ kimu bhūḍharāṇām
 uta smarasmeravilāsinInām //

Here the sense is doubtful because the context is not known and there is no crucial evidence in favour of the alternative. It cannot be subsumed under the '*sandigdha-pada*' in which it is the word form, e. g. '*vandyām*' which is dubious. Here the words are perfectly unambiguous and even the change of language will not remove the uncertainty. It is therefore regarded as a material defect because the intended meaning is not intelligible without insight into the personality of the speaker.

VIII. *Nirhetu*—Inconsequential. When the cause (*hetu*) of an action is not mentioned it is a defect. As for example—

gr̥hitaṃ yenā'siḥ paribhava-bhayān nocitamapi
 prabhāvād yasyā'bhūn na khalu tava kaścin na viṣayaḥ /
 parityaktaṃ tena tvamasi suta-śokān na tu bhayād
 vimokṣye śāstra tvām aham api yataḥ svasti bhavate //

'Farewell to you weapon, I too will quit you, you, who though improper to his caste were accepted by my father, fearing trouble; and through whose prowess, nothing was left to be your mark and now by whom you have been abandoned not through timidity but from grief for his son'. Here the reason for the laying aside of the weapon is not stated.

Does the omission of the reason make the meaning incomplete or not? On the latter alternative it is not a fault and on the former it will be a case of '*sākāṅkṣa*' (incomplete). One word is construed with another when both are mentioned. In the present case a word is wholly suppressed. This is the difference between the two. But this is not satisfactory. In the example given under the defect '*sākāṅkṣa*' the word, with which an expressed word is construed, is not expressed but inferred. It should be, therefore, maintained that in the defect '*Nirhetu*' (inconsequential) it is the word stating the reason is

suppressed and in the other case the suppressed word means other than reason. It is the special importance of reason which makes it necessary to put it in a different class on the maxim of the cow and bull (*gobalivardanyāya*). It is a permissible form of assertion. The cow is a useful animal and so also the bull. Though the bull belongs to the class cow it is stated separately in order to emphasise its specific importance. This is the principle underlying the differentiation here.

The defence is rather weak and appears like an after thought. Govinda Ṭhakkura in consciousness of it proposes an alternative explanation. In the 'sākāṅkṣa' the suppression of the essential word gives rise to an undersirable meaning. In the present case the meaning itself is incomplete. Śrīvatsa, the author of the *Kāvyaparikṣā* includes it under 'nyūnapada' (deficient in words), which is a defect of the sentence. But there is an important difference between the two. In 'nyūnapada' the deficiency of necessary expression causes the failure of the understanding of the proposition intended to be conveyed by the sentence. The sentence is incomplete. So it is a case of a verbal defect. In 'nirhetu' and so also 'sākāṅkṣa' the meaning intended is itself insufficient, though the sentence is *prima facie* complete. It is accordingly regarded as a case of material defect.

IX. *Prasiddhiviruddha* opposed to prevalent ideas. If an idea spoken of is opposed to notoriety and popular notion, it is a fault. As for example—

idaṃ te kenoktaṃ kathaya kamalātāṅka-vadane
yadetasmin hemnaḥ kaṭakam iti dhatse khalu dhiyam /
idaṃ tad duḥsādhākramaṇa-paramāstraṃ smṛti-bhuvā
tava prityā cakraṃ kara-kamala-mūle vinihitam //

'O thou, whose face abashes the lotus : who has told you this (fib) in pursuance of which thou entertainest the notion that this thing is a bangle of gold. This is the disc the Cupid has placed on your hands out of love for you. The disc is the great weapon which overpowers even the unvanquishable'. Here the disc of Cupid is not popularly known. He is always represented with a bow and five arrows of flowers. Thus the

conception of the bangle as a disc of Cupid is a new-fangled idea. This idea is not endorsed by previous poets or by popular conception.

It is to be noted here that there are objects which do not exist in the actual world but are established by convention of poets (*kavisamayāsiddha*). The description of such poetical conventions is not faulty. We meet with a long list of such poetic conventions in the works of later alaṅkārikas like Viśvanāthakavirāja and Keśava-Mishra. Viśvanātha in his *Sāhityadarpaṇa*³² states "The sky and sin are depicted as black; fame, laughter and glory are described as white; anger and love as red. *Paṅkaja* (lotus) and *Indivara* (blue lotus) flowers are said to be found in rivers and seas ; birds like duck are spoken of as visiting the receptacles of water. The *cakora* is described to be fond of drinking the moonlight ; and in the rains the duck (*haṃsa*) repair to the '*mānasa*' lake.

And accordingly in the following example :

susita-vasanā'laṅkārayām kadācana kaumudī-
mahasī sudṛṣi svairam yāntyām gato'stam abhūd vidhuḥ /
tadanu bhavataḥ kīrtiḥ kenāpy agīyata yena sā
priyagrhamagān muktā-śankā kva nāsi śubhapradaḥ //

'Once when the beloved dressed in white garments and ornaments was slowly going the moon set down. After that your glory was sung by someone, by which she without any fear went (or came back) to her lover's (husband's) place. Thus where are you not the bestower of benefit ?' This description of '*kīrti*' as white is not regarded as a defect because it is endorsed by the convention of poets.

A word of explanation seems necessary for one unacquainted with the poetic tradition of Sanskrit poets. Sanskrit poets find particular pleasure in describing the adventures of young women in love, who go out at night to the residence or trysted place of their lovers. In moonlit nights they put on immacula-

32. S. D. VII. 23.

Mālinyaṃ vyomni pāpe, yaśasi dhavalatā varṇyate hāsakṛītyoḥ
Raktau ca krodharāgau saridudadhigatam paṅkajendīvarādi, etc.

tely white clothes and in dark nights they cover themselves with black garment in order to elude detection. The white dress in a dark night is easily spotted out, In the present case the moonset put the lady in white in danger. But the fame of the king casually sung by an admirer freed her from anxiety Fame as white the moonlight dispelled the darkness and the lady reached the lover's residence undetected. The word '*pati*' (husband) may be replaced by '*priya*' (lover). As it stands, it may mean return journey from the lover's place to the husband's home and in that case she would be a faithless wife. Poets, however, are not afraid of describing illicit love.

X. *Vidyāviruddha*—Contrary to scripture or science. An idea described against the code of scripture or canons of science is a fault. As for example—

sadā snātvā nisīthinyāṃ sakalaṃ vāsaraṃ budhaḥ /
nānā-vidhāni śāstrāṇi vyācaṣṭe ca śṛṇoti ca //

'This learned man always having bathed in the night explains and listens to all kinds of śāstras during the whole day'. Here bathing during night is asserted which is against the *dharma-śāstra* (code of duty) except on special occasions such as lunar eclipse.

Śrīvatsa insists upon including this defect under '*anucita*' and calling it a defect of word. But this is too facile a procedure which ignores the difference of shades of meaning. In '*anucita*' the change of the word would remove the defect, whereas here the change of language will not have any effect because the proposition itself is faulty and not a word or sentence.

XI. *Anavikṛta*—Wanting in novelty. This fault arises when the different ideas are mentioned in the same manner and so beauty is added to it. The frequent adoption of the same form of speech makes poetry monotonous. Ānandavardhana³³ has said in his classical work '*Dhvanyāloka*' nor

33. D. Ā. IV. 4.

'dṛṣṭapūrvā api hy arthāḥ kāvye rasa-parigrahāt /
sarve navā ivābhānti madhu-māsa iva drumāḥ //

novelty is to be achieved even in the treatment of hackneyed and commonplace things on account of the influence of suggestion and suggestive elements. The following is the instance of the fault :

prāptāḥ śriyaḥ sakala-kāma-dughās tataḥ kim
dattam padam śirasi vidviṣatām tataḥ kim /
sammānitāḥ praṇayino vibhavaḥ tataḥ kim
kalpam sthitam tanu-bhṛtām tanubhis tataḥ kim //

'If all wish-fulfilling riches have been obtained—what then ? If enemies are insulted and subdued—what then ? If friends are satisfied with wealth—what then ? If the body of beings lasted for a '*Kalpa*' (cosmic period)—what then ?' Here in each of [the four cases the same idea has been expressed by the repetition of the expression '*tataḥ kim*'. We experience the monotony in this. It is not the same manner of statement, but the sameness of idea which makes it a defect. So it is different from the verbal defect '*Kathitapada*'. In '*Kathitapada*' the change of words suffices to eliminate this defect. Śrīvatsa regards it not as a case of positive defect but an absence of an excellence which is constituted by novelty. But this only shows his inordinate love of independence. Novelty of an idea or expression is not by itself capable of being regarded as a *guṇa* (excellence) without reference to *Rasa* (sentiment). The monotony of the idea rather eliminates the sympathy of the reader or shocks his æsthetic sense by showing inability of the poet for a novel idea and expression.

XII. *Saniyama-parivṛtta*—Unspecified. Where specification is needed but it is made improperly unlimited constitutes the case of this defect. As for example—

Yatrā'nullikhitā-khyam eva nikkhilam nirmāṇam etad vidher-
utkarṣa-pratīyogi-kalpanam api nyakkāra-koṭiḥ parā /
yātāḥ prāṇa-bhṛtām manoratha-gatir ullanghya yatsampada-
śasyā'bhāsa-maṇi-kṛtāsmasu maṇer aśmatvam evocitam //

'In presence of which entire creation of the Creator is fruitless ; to whom the mention of surpassing merit would be uttermost insult and whose riches exceed all bounds of men's desire ; this '*Cintāmaṇi*' when among the stones, made gem-like by

itself, must be named a stone only which made other stones gems by its light'. Here the last foot must have been specified by use of the word 'mātra' (only). *Cintāmaṇi* is possessed of all excellences but what has it done ? It has only converted other stones into gems by its light. But there should be a restrictive qualification added to light. The idea of this is that the other stones have been made gems only by possession of light but not other excellent qualities possessed by '*Cintāmaṇi*' (wish-fulfilling gem).

XIII. *Aniyama-parivṛtta*—specified. Where specification is not necessary and still it is done, it constitutes this defect, e.g.

vaktrāmbhojaṃ sarasvaty abhi-
 vasati sadā śoṇa evādharaḥ te
 bāhuḥ kākutstha-vīryā-smṛti-
 karaṇa-patur dakṣiṇas te samudraḥ /
 vāhinyaḥ pārśvam etāḥ kṣaṇam api
 bhavato naiva muñcanty abhikṣaṇam
 svacche'ntar mānaseśmin katham
 avanipate te'mbupānā-bhilāṣaḥ //

'Sarasvatī lives permanently in your lotus-like mouth ; your lips are 'Śoṇa' (red) alone ; your right arm which reminds one of the prowess of *Kākutstha* (Rāma), is the *samudra* (sea) (possessed of *mudrā*) ; these rivers (armies) never give up your side ; and in your inside is '*Mānasa*' lake (heart) ; why is there the desire for drinking water, O king ? Here the specification in '*Śoṇa eva*' is not essential. The use of word '*eva*' excludes the presence of other rivers. There is a pun. But the restrictive particle *eva* is utterly superfluous. On the contrary it suggests that only river *Śoṇa* is there and so there may be a desire for water of other rivers. It is not to be included under '*adhikapada*' because the poet intends the meaning expressed by '*eva*' without realising the logical absurdity. So it is a case of '*arthadoṣa*' and not of '*padadoṣa*'. Moreover, '*eva*' is indeclinable as such it is not expressive of meaning by its own unadded capacity but is only indicative. In '*adhikapada*' the superfluous expression denotes a meaning of its own. These conjunctive particles have no meanings of their own but

only serve as occasion for the associated word to denote³⁴ the specific sense.

XIV. *Viśeṣa-parivṛtta*—unrestricted. Where restriction is wanted and it is represented otherwise, it causes this defect, e.g.

śyāmāṃ śyāmalimānam ānayata
 bhoḥ sāndrair maṣīkūrcakair-
 mantram tantram atha prayujya
 harata śvetotpalānām śriyam /
 candram cūrṇayata kṣaṇāc ca
 kaṇaśaḥ kṛtvā śilāpaṭṭake
 yena draṣṭum ahaṃ kṣame
 daśadīśas tadvaktra-mudrāṅkitāḥ //

'Oh render the night dark with dense ink. Take away the splendour of white lotus with spell or other means. Break the moon to pieces on a piece of stone so that I could see the ten directions stamped with her face'. Here the night should be particularly specified as the moonlit night. But it is not done so. The general term is used which gives a sense which is not appropriate. This defect could be avoided by substituting 'Rākā'. But why should it not be regarded as a 'śabdadoṣa'? The meaning itself is intended by the speaker who did not go deep into its implication, so it is regarded as 'arthadoṣa'.

XV. *Aviśeṣapariṇṛtta*—restricted. Where no restriction is necessary and the object should be stated in general terms but it is done otherwise. A particular idea is conveyed in the place of general idea. For instance --

Kallola-vellita-dṛṣat-paruṣa-prahārair
 ratnāny amūni makarālaya mā'va-mamsthāḥ /
 Kim kaustubhena vihito bhavato na nāma
 yācñā-prasārita-karaḥ puruṣottamo'pi //

'O abode of crocodiles, do not insult these gems by ruthless assault of stones thrown by your waves moving to and fro. Was not even the best of males-Viṣṇu—made your mendicant by 'Kaustubha'? Here the gems in general should be referred to. The generic term should be used for specific like 'ekena'

34. L. M. p. 618. dyotakatvaṃ samabhivyāhṛtapadasya arthaviśeṣe tāt-parya-grāhakatvaṃ,

(one of them). If a particular gem like 'Kaustubha' is mentioned then the impropriety of insult towards gems in general is not implied.

XVI. *Sākāṅkṣa*—Incomplete. Where a meaning is not complete without reference to another meaning, it is a case of '*Sākāṅkṣa*'. *Ākāṅkṣā* consists in incompleteness of a meaning. The later *Naiyāyikas* have sought to reduce it to a property of word fit to be connected with one another. As for example—

arthitve prakaṭīkṛte'pi na
 phalaprāptiḥ prabhoḥ pratyuta
 druhyan dāśarathir viruddha-
 carito yuktas tayā kanyayā /
 utkarṣaṃ ca parasya māna-
 yaśasor visraṃsanaṃ cātmanaḥ
 strī-ratnaṃ ca jagat-patir daśa-
 mukho devaḥ kathaṃ mṛṣyate //

'Even showing the mendicancy the desire of my lord is not fulfilled, on the other hand the son of Daśaratha, the foe is united with that girl. How can the ten-faced lord of the world tolerate the excess of glory and fame of the foe and his own deterioration and that gem—a fair woman'. Here in this sentence the word '*upekṣitum*' (to ignore) is wanting after the word '*strīratnaṃ*'.

According to grammarians³⁵ '*ākāṅkṣā*' is a property of the sense and Mahimabhaṭṭa adopts the view of the grammarian. It is not a case of verbal defect—*nyūnapada*—which consists in the inability of words mentioned to convey the intended meaning. Here the intended meaning is conveyed by the expressed words. But the meaning itself is incomplete because it is not compatible with the predicate '*mṛṣyate*' (tolerates). Of course, the defect could be avoided if it were construed with '*parasya*' (of another) i.e. enemy. But that is not possible because it is already construed with '*utkarṣa*' (superiority) of fame and prestige. So it is not free and as such cannot be available for construction with '*strīratnaṃ*' (the gem of women). It cannot, again, be supposed to be a case of '*nyūnapada*'. The

35. L. M. p. 488. sū ca ekapadārthe...puruṣaṇiṣṭhā eva,

meaning that is conveyed by the sentence has its sence intended by the speaker and so it is a case of material defect. But why should it not be regarded as a case of failure of intended connection (*abhavanmatayoga*)? This is not possible because the latter defect arises only when the words are so formed as to preclude the intended syntax. But here the word is not incompetent for the syntactical construction.

XVII. *Apadayukta*—Introduction of an idea in a wrong place which gives contrary implication and perverts the intended meaning is a fault. As for example—

ājñā śakra-śikhāmaṇi-praṇayinī
 śāstrāṇi cakṣur navaṃ
 bhaktir bhūtapatau pinākini
 padaṃ laṅketi divyā purī /
 utpattir druhiṇānvaye ca
 tadaho nedṛg varo labhyate
 syāc ced eṣa na rāvaṇaḥ kva
 nu punaḥ sarvatra sarve guṇāḥ //

‘His order is borne by Indra on his crest-gem, the sciences are to him new eye, his devotion is to the lord of beings, who bears the ‘pināka’ bow, his residence is the beautiful city of *Laṅkā*; his birth is in the family of Brahman; such a bridegroom cannot be found, had he not been Rāvaṇa! But where are all excellences possible?’ Here the sentence ought to be concluded with the word Rāvaṇa. For the poet desires to convey that Sītā ought not to be married with Rāvaṇa, who is despised by good men in spite of all his accomplishments on the ground that he is the source of terror to the world. And this sense is well conveyed if the sentence closes at Rāvaṇa. But the ideas introduced further here lead the mind of audience astray. They rather serve to justify his eligibility as a groom which is against the intention of the poet. There is also another reading ‘*apadamukta*’. The latter nomenclature is also appropriate and stresses the point that the statement is not concluded at its proper place.

This is regarded as ‘*arthadoṣa*’ different from ‘*apadasthapada*’ which is a fault of composition and is easily avoided by suitable

transposition of words. Thus 'srajam na kācid vijahau' here if 'na' is read after 'kācid' the defect could be eliminated. But in the present case the adjustment of words or clauses will not exempt it from the charge. So it is a case of material defect. The reason of the defect lies in the fact that it conveys altogether a contrary meaning. We shall deal with '*prakāṣita-viruddha*' which also is a case of contrary implication. Apparently the two defects are in the same position. But the present defect '*apadayukta*' gives the contrary meaning because of its sequence. The last statement subverts the meaning of the penultimate clause which dismisses the claims of Rāvaṇa. In '*prakāṣitaviruddha*' the contrary meaning is suggested by the parenthetical expression 'viditam te'stu'. The defect under review has no reference to its position. The meaning would be suggested even if the position of the words be changed. Both are different from the '*viruddhamatikṛt*' which is necessarily a verbal defect due to a compound.

XVIII. *Sahacara-bhinna*—Dissimilar associates. If excellent subjects are associated with degrading ones it is a case of this fault, e.g.

śrutena buddhir vyasanena mūrkhatā
 madena nārī salilena nimnagā /
 niśā śaśāṅkena dhṛtiḥ samādhinā
 nayena cālankriyate narendratā //

'A (sharp) intellect is embellished by (knowledge of) science ; foolishness by pursuit of immortal acts such as gambling etc. river by water, a woman by intoxication, the night by the moon ; resignation by meditation and kingliness by polity'. Here agreeable objects like science, etc. are associated with disagreeable ones like foolishness, etc. This is an improper and heterogenous match. It is a defect. It is the ideas which are wrongly associated and not a mere combination of verbal expressions. So it is a case of material defect.

XIX. *Prakāṣitaviruddha*—disagreeable with the meaning expressed. If a sentence suggests an idea which is repugnant or contrary to the intended meaning it is a case of this defect. As for example—

langnam rāgā-vṛttāṅgyā sudṛḍham
 iha yayaiv āsiyaṣṭyā'rikaṇṭhe
 mātaṅgānām apīhopari para-
 puruṣair yā ca dṛṣṭā patanti /
 tat-sakto'yaṁ na kiñcid gaṇayati
 viditaṁ te'stu tenāsmi dattā
 bhṛtyebhyaḥ śrīniyogād gaditumiva
 gate'ty ambudhiṁ yasya kīrtiḥ //

'Whose glory went to the sea carrying the message under the command of Lakṣmi "O sea, this sword besmeared with *Rāga* (blood or love) which fell on the heads of enemies and which was seen by other people falling on *Mātaṅga* (elephants or candālas) being attached to this very sword (woman) this king, thinks of nothing else—be this known to you—and by him I am given away to servants'. Here the praise of the bravery of the king is desired by the poet, but the repugnant implication of the departure of goddess Lakṣmi is also hinted, which is not intended.

The poet intends to praise the king but this is stultified by the contrary idea that fortune is deserting the king. This, rather, amounts to his condemnation. We have already shown that it is a different species of defect which cannot be classed under '*viruddhamatikṛt*', etc. The attempt of Śrīvatsa³⁶ to put it under '*anucitārtha*' is not at all justified. The examples of '*anucitārtha*' are concerned with wrong expressions and not the meanings. The defect is removable by the change of expressions, whereas this is not possible for the defect under consideration. He also seeks to place the '*Sahacarabhinna*' under '*anucitārtha*'. This could be justified if the defect '*anucitārtha*' were used in a broad sense—impropriety. Every defect is a case of impropriety. All defects ultimately reduce to '*Rasadoṣa*' as Ānandavardhana has observed. It is impropriety alone³⁷ which is the

³⁶ 36. Śrīvatsa, p. 55. tathā prakāśitaviruddhasya' anucitārtha evāntar-
 bhāvaḥ.

³⁷ 37. Dh. A.

anaucityād ite nānyad rasabhaṅgasya kāraṇam /
 prasiddhaucitya-bandhas tu rasasyo'paniṣat parā //

cause of the thwarted development of 'Rasa'. Mahimabhaṭṭa also derives all poetic defects from this impropriety. Śrīharṣa in the *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khāḍya*, goes a step further and affirms that logical defects are also species of impropriety. If the defect 'anucitārtha' be taken in a comprehensive sense and identified with impropriety and these two defects are subsumed under it, there will be no point in this contention. All the defects may be regarded as cases of impropriety. But this will be too facile and too simple a procedure and the classification of defects would have no meaning. This is an absurd consequence of over-simplification.

XX. *Vidhyayukta*—of improper predication. When an attribute or action, which is not fit to be a predicate, is made a predicate it becomes a case of this defect, e.g.

prayatna-paribodhitaḥ stutibhir adya śeṣe niśām
akeśavam apāṇḍavam bhuvanam adya niḥsomakam /
iyam parisamāpyate raṇa-kathāḍya doḥ-śālinām
apaitu ripukānana'ti-gurur adya bhāro bhuvāḥ //

'Tonight you will enjoy such a peaceful sleep as to be aroused with praises. The world would be without 'keśava', Pāṇḍavas and the Pāṇcālas. Thus the talk of the battle of Kṣatriya will be over and be the world today free from the excessive weight of the forest of our enemies'. Here the proper predicate should be 'prayatnena bodhyase'—you will be aroused from deep sleep with considerable effort. The idea is that Duryodhana could not have peaceful sleep on account of his worries regarding Pāṇḍavas but with disappearance of Pāṇḍavas he would have a sound and undisturbed sleep and would be awakened in the morning after a prolonged recital of his praises. But a wrong thing is predicated.

Śrīvatsa considers it a case of 'Vidheyāvimarśa'. But this is due to his oversight of a vital difference. In 'vidheyāvimarśa' the predicate is not wrong, but its importance and prominence are not preserved in it. In the present case—*vidhyayukta*—it is a case of an entirely a wrong predication.

XXI. *Anuvādāyukta*—of an improper attribute. Where a wrong thing is made the subject, it is a case of this defect. For instance :

are rāmā-hastābharāṇa bhasala-śreṇi-śaraṇa
 smara-kṛīḍā vṛīḍa-samana virahi-prāṇa-damana /
 saro haṃsottamaśa pracaladala-nīlotpala-sakhe
 sakhedo'haṃ moham ślathaya kathaya kvendu-vadanā //

'O ornament of woman's hands! Shelter of black bees! remover of shame of love's dalliance! O suppressor of lives of the separated! O ornament of lake! O one whose leaves are shaking! O blue lotus, my friend; I am depressed, tell me where is my moon-faced love and remove my delusion'. Here in the speech of the separated lover—*Virahiprāṇa-damana* (suppressor of the lives of the separated) should not be made an attribute because of its conflict with the predicate—*Kathaya kvendu-vadanā* (report the whereabouts of my beloved with a moon-like face). He appeals to blue lotus for help and the adjective—'*Virahiprāṇa-damana*'—which connotes cruel disposition is obviously incompatible with his hope of getting help from the lotus.

XXII. *Tyaktapunah-svikṛta*—when the sentence is completed by conveying a complete meaning and again it is resumed for adding a supplementary clause it is a case of this defect, e.g.

lagnam rāgā vṛtāṅgyā etc.

Here the sense has come to an end with '*viditaṃ testu*' (be it known to you) but again it is resumed by the supplementary clause—'*tenāsmi dattā bhṛtyebhyaḥ*' (I am given by him to the servants).

It is different from '*samāpta-punarātta*' because there the sentence is resumed in order to add a fresh adjective whereas in the present case an independent clause is added without any logical necessity.

XXIII. *Aśīla*—indecorous.

For instance :

hantum eva pravṛttasya stabdhasya vivaraṣiṇaḥ
 yasthāsyā jāyate pāto na tathā punarunnatiḥ //

'The fall of a wicked person, who is always vain, ready to kill others and in search of finding holes, is such that he can never

rise again'. Here the second sense is indecorous. It is 'arthadoṣa' because the change of language does not eliminate this defect.

It is to be borne in mind that the examples given as illustrations of particular defects are not exclusive. There may be other defects also present in them and they have to be ascertained in accordance with the definition. Thus for example in verse 'Lagnaṃ rāgā vṛtāṅgyā . . . etc' there are four defects. In this way there may be more than one defect in instances, though they have been cited as specific examples for one particular defect for clear understanding.

Rasa-doṣas

Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa states the following *Rasadoṣas* (defects of sentiment)³⁸ :—

- I. Vyabhicāriṇaḥ Śabdavācyaṭā—the mention of the accompanying emotion by its own term.
- II. Rasasya Śabda-Vācyaṭā—the mention of the Rasa by its own term.
- III. Sthāyi-bhāvasya Śabdavācyaṭā—the mention of permanent mood by its own term.
- IV. Anubhāvasya Kaṣṭa-Kalpanayā Vyaktiḥ—farfetched somatic expression.
- V. Vibhāvasya Kaṣṭa-Kalpanayā Vyaktiḥ—farfetched stimulating condition.
- VI. Pratikūla-Vibhādi-grahaḥ—the admission of conflicting excitant or the like.
- VII. Punaḥ punardiṭiḥ—repeated heightenings.
- VIII. Akāṇḍe prathanam—unseasonable elaboration.
- IX. Akāṇḍe Chedaḥ—unseasonable interruption.
- X. Aṅgasya ativiṣṭiḥ—excessive expansion of subordinate elements.
- XI. Aṅgiṇo'nanusandhānam—overlooking of the principal element.
- XII. Prakṛtiṇām Viparyayaḥ—perversion of characters.
- XIII. Anaṅgasyābhidhānam—description of an unimportant object which has no bearing.

I. *Vyabhicārīṇaḥ Śabdavācyatā*—The mention of the accompanying emotion by its own term. When 'vyabhicāribhāvas' are mentioned by their own terms like *vriḍā* (bashfulness) etc. it constitutes the first hindrance to the realisation of æsthetic delight. The æsthetic delight or sentiment is never to be expressed by words denotative of them but is always to be suggested by '*anubhāva*'—physical expressions. As for example—

savriḍā dayitānane sakaruṇā mātaṅga-carmāmbare
satrāsā bhujage savismayarasā candre'mṛtasyandini /
serṣyā jahnusutā-valokana-vidhau dīnā kapālodare
pārvatīyā nava-saṅgama-praṇayīṇī dṛṣṭiḥ śivāyāstu vaḥ //

'May the eyes of Pārvati, showing love of first meeting, protect you—the eyes which are full of bashfulness when turned to her lover's face; saturated with pathos when turned to the dress of the skin of the elephant; filled with fear when turned to the serpent; imbued with wonder when turned to the moon, dropping nectar; feeling jealous when turned to the daughter of Jhnu (*Gaṅgā*) and dejected at the hollow cavity of the skull'. Here the *vyabhicārins* like *Vriḍā* (bashfulness) etc. have been mentioned by their names. It would have been proper to delineate the accessories through their physical expressions.

What is the logic behind this defect if the accessory feelings are described by names and not their effects? According to the interpretation of Ānandavardhana, which has become the accepted tradition, expression of feelings by their names does not contribute to the æsthetic enjoyment. But the point at issue can be settled by the consideration whether the external expressions, which are specifically suggestive of them, are known or not. If the physical expressions are perceived they will automatically reveal the sentiments and occasion æsthetic enjoyment. In other words, the statements of feelings by their names will not hinder the realisation of '*Rasa*'. If, on the other hand, the physical expressions (*anubhāvas*) be absent, this will mean that the conditions of *Rasa*—experience are not present. The statement of the feelings and sentiments by name will not produce any æsthetic effect owing to the lack of requi-

site condition. It is the presence of '*Vibhāva*'—the *ālambana* and the *Uddipana* and '*anubhava*'—i.e. physical expression and *vyabhicāribhāva* together contribute to the *Rasa*³⁹—experience. Such being the case why should the specific mention of feelings and sentiments—permanent mood, etc.—be regarded as faults? Govinda Ṭhakkura asserts in reply that specific mention by names of the feelings and sentiments when they are fully revealed by appropriate gestures and facial expressions and the like, really produces a repulsive effect on the hearer and spectator. The names are not only superfluous but serve as deterrents to the realisation of '*Rasa*'. This is a matter of experience and not a matter of logical speculation. These cases, therefore, are regarded as different categories of defect which are not to be explained away as cases of superfluity in the presence of revealing '*anubhāvas*' and of deficiency of expressions in the absence of the latter. It will be shown that specific mention of the '*Vyabhicāribhāvas*' does not constitute a fault if the appropriate physical expressions are not deemed conclusive. cf. '*autsukyena kṛtatvarā*' etc.

II. *Rasasya Śabdavācyatā* : The mention of *Rasa* by its own name, either in general terms as *Rasa* or in specific way as '*śṛṅgāra*' etc. is also a defect. The *Rasa* (sentiment) is never capable of being expressed (*vācya*) but always to be suggested (*vyāṅgya*). An instance of this defect is as follows :

ālokya komala-kapola-talābhiṣikta-
vyaktā-nurāga-subhagām abhirāma-mūrtim /
paśyaṣa bālyam ativr̥tya vivarta-mānaḥ
śṛṅgāra-sīmani taraṅgitam ātanoti //

'Behold this young man, who has just dropped his boyhood, is swimming in the stream of erotic, having seen the beautiful (damsel) who is charming on account of the blush on her cheeks'. Here the mention of erotic (*śṛṅgāra*) by name is defective, because the conditions for the revelation are not set forth.

III. *Sthayi-bhāvasya śabdavācyatā*—The mention of permanent mood by its own term, generic or specific, is also a defect, e.g.

39. N. S. '*Vibhāvā-nubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ*'

samprahāre praharaṇaiḥ prahārāṇām parasparam /
jhaṇatkāraiḥ śrutigatair utsāhas tasya ko'pyabhūt //

'An indescribable energy sprang up in him when he heard the sound of striking weapons in the battlefields'. Here the mention of *utsāha* (energy) by name is defective. The *Rasa* is not properly realised when these '*sthāvi-bhāvas*' or *Rasas* are mentioned by names. It is done so only when these are implicitly suggested by '*anubhāvas*'. The *raison d'être* of the defect lies in non-feasance of the æsthetic delight in the audience.

IV. *Anubhāvasya Kaṣṭa Kalpanayā Vyaktiḥ*—When the somatic expression is a far-fetched exponent and its comprehension is not easy, but difficult to understand and involves delay in realising *Rasa* on the part of the hearer or spectator, it constitutes a hindrance. As for example—

Karpūradhūli-dhava-dyuti-pūra-dhauta-
dīnmaṇḍale śīśira-rociṣi tasya yūnaḥ /
līlā-śiromaṣuka-niveśa-viśeṣa-klpti-
vyaktastanonnatir abhūn nayanā vanau sā //

Here the *uddīpana vibhāvas* (stimulating objective conditions) like the moon, etc. are present but none of the *anubhāvas* (somatic expressions) is mentioned in the young man who is the substratum of the erotic experience.

But is not the raising of the arm for proper adjustment of veil on the part of the lady in love a sufficient revealing condition? It is not so, in the opinion of old exponents. But Govinda Ṭhakkura does not agree with this interpretation. It is, no doubt, an *anubhāva* revealing the feeling of love on the part of the lady-love. But so far as the lover is concerned there is not the faintest indication of his reactions. His reaction is not definitely expressed in some physical change in his person. This has to be guessed and this guess, even successful, will involve delay and thus hamper the æsthetic experience.

37. *Vibhāvasya kaṣṭa-kalpanayā vyaktiḥ*—When *vibhāva* (the stimulating condition) is not clear and is to be inferred with difficulty it becomes a defect. As for example—

pariharati ratim matim lunlīte
skhalatitarām parivartate ca bhūyaḥ /

iti bata viṣamā daśaśya deham
paribhavati prasabhaṃ kim atra kurmaḥ //

'He keeps clear of pleasure, loses all self-possession, frequently falls down and rolls about. Thus, alas! a violent malady overpowers his person. How can we help?' Here the *anubhāvas*—the shunning of pleasure etc. are present but the *vibhāva* (the object-person) in the form of a woman is to be known with difficulty. The *anubhāvas* (actions) like shunning of pleasure are not invariably concomitant with erotic only but they are found in pathos also. So they cannot be of help in suggesting the *Ālambana vibhāva*.

VI. *Pratikūla-vibhāvādigrahaḥ*—Admission of conflicting *vibhāva* (the object person of the stimulating condition), *anubhāva* (somatic expression) and *vyabhicāribhāvas* (accompanying emotions) which belong to a sentiment not only different but opposed to the sentiment described is a flaw. For instance—

prasāde vartasva prakāṣaya
mudam saṃtyaja ruṣam
priye śuṣyanty aṅgāny amṛtam
iva te siñcatu vacaḥ /
nidhānam saukhyānām kṣaṇam
abhimukhaṃ sthāpaya mukham
na mugdhe pratyeturam
prabhavati gataḥ kālahariṇaḥ //

'O hear ; be pleased, show your bright appearance, give up anger, let your nectar-like voice sprinkle my withering limbs, keep your face, the above of all happiness, before me for a moment. O unsophisticated one, the youth once departed does not come back'. Here the lover tries to humour his beloved who is angry. But he announces transitoriness of worldly pleasure and self-disparagement, which are elements of quietistic sentiment (*śāntarasa*) and opposed to erotic sentiment, (*śṛṅgārarasa*). So their admission into erotic sentiment is improper.

VII. *Punaḥ punaḥ diptiḥ*—A repeated heightening of a sentiment even when it has been adequately elaborated is a flaw.

For instance, in the *Kumārasambhava* we have Rati's lamentation repeatedly heightened. Ānandavardhana has aptly compared the over-elaborated sentiment with a too much pressed and faded flower.⁴⁰

VIII. *Akāṇḍe prathanam*—unseasonable introduction of a disharmonious sentiment is great hindrance to the æsthetic delight. An instance of the introduction of it at a wrong place is in the second act of the *Veṇīsaṃhāra*. Here the representation of Duryodhana's love towards his wife, Bhānumati, at a time when a terrific battle is raging at its height spelling death to so many heroes, is certainly a serious flaw.

IX. *Akāṇḍe Chedaḥ*—Unseasonable interruption or unwarranted cessation of the delineation of sentiment is also a great hindrance towards the realisation of *Rasa*. An example of this type of interruption we have in the '*Mahāvīracarita*' of Bhavabhūti, Rāma saying—Kaṅkaṇa-mocanāya yāmi—(I go to take off my bracelet) at a time when the heroism of both Rāma and Paraśurāma has been raised to the highest pitch and the fight is just to begin. This episode serves to suggest timidity on the part of Rāma and escape from a critical situation.

X. *Aṅgasya ativistṛtiḥ*—An excessive expansion of the subordinate element which puts to shade the principal subject-matter and thus detracts from the realisation of *rasa*, is a blemish. This is considered to be a defect because the lengthy description of a subordinate element overshadows the principal sentiment. An instance of profuse expansion of the subordinate element we have in the '*Hayagrīva-Vadha*' where the poet appears to be primarily interested in describing the water-sports, love's dalliance of Hayagrīva and forgets altogether the hero Viṣṇu.

XI. *Aṅginaḥ ananu-sandhānam*—The overlooking of the principal element also puts a hindrance to the æsthetic delight. The poet has to be alert not to neglect the principal object as we have an instance in the fourth Act of the *Ratnāvalī*. Here,

40. Dh. Ā. p. 364. upabhukto hi rasaḥ sva-sāmagrī-labdha-paripo-
ṣaḥ punaḥ punaḥ parāmrśyamāṇaḥ parimlānakusuma-kalpāḥ
kalpate.

on the arrival of the chamber-lain Bābhravya, Sāgarikā, the heroine of the drama, is forgotten and neglected. Thus the breach of the erotic sentiment is almost complete.

XII. *Prakṛtinām Viparyayah*—Perversion of characters. Characters are firstly divine, human and semi-divine and these again are subdivided into firm and temperate (dhīrodātta), firm and haughty (dhīroddhata), firm and gay (dhīralalita) and firm and mild (dhiraśānta). These four have for their predominating elements the *rasas* heroic (*Vira*), furious (*Raudra*), erotic (*Śṛṅgāra*) and quietistic (*Śānta*) respectively. They again are subdivided into the best (*Uttama*), medium (*Madhyama*) and worst (*Adhama*) from another point of view. The representation of any of these must be in accordance with what they are. Any perversion of the nature of character is the fault known as '*prakṛtinām viparyayah*'. The element of verisimilitude is essential for the sympathetic realisation of *Rasa* and it can be only achieved if the propriety of the different character is ensured.

If a poet neglects this propriety of character and attributes divine qualities and superhuman feats of energy to human character, his delineation will appear false and will defeat the purpose of the poetry—an exhortation that one should behave like the heroes.⁴¹

All Indian thinkers on literary criticism are unanimously persuaded that poetry does not mean to give undiluted delight without any intellectual and moral upliftment. Of course the didactic poetry is not successful either as poetry or as a moral lesson. The poet is also a seeker of truth, though his method of approach is different in kind from that of the historian or the journalist. He, however, deals with various sides of human character, their inter-relation and reactions of different temperament. This produces a catharsis as Aristotle has observed. This catharsis is not only of emotions but also of the intellect

41. K. P. p. 444. adhikam tu nibadhyamānam asatya-pratibhāsanena 'nāyakavad vartitavyam na pratināyakavat' ity upadeśe na paryavasyet.

and volition.⁴² It unconsciously effects a change of the character in the audience. It stimulates the taste for beauty and a spontaneous preference for the good. In our day-to-day life we come across a conflict between our preference for the good and that for beautiful. What is pleasant is not always good and there is a moral conflict between them. The best poetry in the world has not only given mankind pure enjoyment but also in the very process strengthens love of truth and preference for the good. In one word, It has edified mankind. In support of our contention we may refer to the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, the works of Kālidāsa, Shakespeare, Milton and Bernard Shaw. Bernard Shaw is definitely of opinion that the poet has a definite philosophy of life and he edifies readers by enlisting their sympathy for the right cause.

This is the mission of our good poets, It can be achieved however by observing the limits, which are necessary for creating a sense of verisimilitude. The poet cannot bank upon running riot. The characters must be human enough in order to instil confidence in the capacity of a human being for reaching the level of perfection achieved by dramatis personae. This is the reason for the emphasis on propriety to be practised in every field.

XIII. *Anaṅgasyābhidhānam*—The celebration of an unimportant object which has no connection with the sentiment on hand, is also a serious blemish. As in the *Karpūramañjarī* the bard's description of the spring is highly celebrated neglecting that of the hero and heroine themselves.

Mamṣatā Bhaṭṭa after enumerating these defect of Rasa remarks—*Rasa doṣāḥ syur idṛśāḥ*—such-like others are the defects of Rasa. All cannot be mentioned. A theorist can give a few indications and the rest can be known from seeing the behaviour of the world. The poet should always remember the wholesome advice given by Ānandavardhana⁴³ who has

42. Aristotle's poetics.

43. Dh. Ā.

anuncityād ṛte nānyad rasabhaṅgasya kāranām
Prasiddhaucityabandhas tu rasasyopaniṣat parā.

said—"There is no other cause for a breach of Rasa except impropriety ; the great secret of Rasa is, simply, propriety of delineation".

Thus we feel that Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa has scientifically classified and critically studied the concept of literary defects. Like other conventional elements of poetics *doṣas* have been systematised by him once for ever. We have observed that there are *doṣas* which cease to be so and turn out to be excellences in special cases. *Bhāmaha* in the first chapter of his work introduces this idea of *doṣa* becoming *guṇa* and he cites an instance of collyrium-though a despicable thing in itself - being charming when applied to the eyes of a beautiful lady. That defect can become innocuous and harmless was recognised by writers like Daṇḍin and others. With the advent of the *dhvani* theory we find a clear and rational explanation of classification of faults into permanent and transitory. Ānandavardhana characterises defects like *śrutikaṭu* as *anitya*⁴⁴ (impermanent). Bhoja calls these *vaiśeṣika guṇas* (specific properties). Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa carries forward this scheme and discusses this topic as follows :—

I. *Apuṣṭa* (irrelevant) or *ekārtha* (redundant) is not a fault in case it helps to imply something over and above what is signified by another word, e. g.

asyāḥ karnāvatamsena jitam sarvaṃ vibhūṣaṇam /
tathaiva śobhate'tyartham asyāḥ śravaṇa-kunḍalam //

'All the ornaments have been defeated by her ear-ring (on her ear); similarly her *kunḍalā* shines on her ear'. An ear-ring when kept in iron-self is still called ear-ring. It is not necessary that it should always be worn. The addition of words like *Karṇa* (ear) signifies that the ear-ring is actually put on the ear. Thus the word *Karṇa* (ear) is not redundant because it signifies the actual contact of the ear-ring with the ear. Likewise the word *muktā* (pearl) in *muktāhāra* (necklace of

44. Ibid. p. 241.

Śrutiduṣṭādayo doṣā anityā ye ca darśitāḥ

dhvanyātmany eva śṛṅgāre te heyā ity udāhṛtāḥ.

pearl) may appear *prima facie* as redundant. But it is not so because it implies that the necklace is made of pure and superior pearls. Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa further observes that such uses are sanctioned only on the ground of established usages by writers of repute.⁴⁵ We ought not to coin new-fangled expressions by analogy. This view was propounded by Vāmana and is confirmed by Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa.

II. *Nirhetutā*—inconsequentiality ceases to be a fault when the meaning expressed is well-established and does not require justification.⁴⁶ For instance—

candram gatā padam-guṇān na bhuṅkte
padmā-śrita cāndramasīm abhikyām /
umāmukhaṃ to pratipadya lolā
dviśaṃśrayāṃ prītim avāpa lakṣmīḥ //

'*Lakṣmī* (grace) goddess of beauty could not enjoy lovely qualities of the lotus when residing in the moon. She could not again experience the charm of the moon when residing in the lotus. But coming to the face of Pārvatī however she had the satisfaction of unfettered enjoyment of the good of both'. Here it is a well established notion that the lotus contracts during the night and the moon fades and loses her charm during day. Thus this statement of the fact that the beauty of the moon and that of the lotus are inconsistent and are not found together is sanctioned by experience as well as convention. And so no question is raised regarding the reason there of.

III. All faults cease to be such when they are reproduced in imitation⁴⁷ or when the speaker is quoting the words of another person. As for example—

mṛgacakṣuṣaṃ adrākṣaṃ ityādi kathayaty ayam /
paśyaīṣa ca gavyāha sūtrāmāṇaṃ yajeti ca //

'This man says—I saw a fawn-eyed girl—he said—see the cow

45. K. P. p. 409....sthiteṣv etat samarthanam. cf. Vāmana, 'tad idam prayukteṣu' II. II. 19.

46. Ibid. p. 411. Khyāte'rthe nirhetor aduṣṭatā.

47. Ibid. p. 412. 'anukaraṇe tu sarveṣāṃ'

and worship Indra'. Here the word 'adrākṣam' is unmelodious in *śṛṅgūra* (erotic), 'go iti' is a case of 'cyuta-saṃskṛti' (grammatical impurity), because it is without any case-ending (apadaṃ na prayuñjita) and 'sutrāman' in the sense of Indra is 'aprayukta' (not in use among poets) because it is not used by poets. But as they are here used in imitation they do not produce repulsion and are not regarded as faulty.

The reason is obvious. The speaker only reports the words used by another person faithfully and as such cannot be held responsible for lapses on the part of the persons whose words are quoted by him. Thus the reporter of a newspaper should not be censured if he conveys a pleasant or unpleasant word of another person. On the contrary if he makes emendation he will be guilty of giving a false report.

IV. Because of the peculiarity of the character of the speaker and the subject matter sometimes defects turn to be merits and sometimes they are neither defects nor merits.⁴⁸ For instance when a great grammarian is addressed or himself he is the speaker or when the furious (*Raudra*) etc. are the *rasas* to be suggested Kaṣṭatva (harshness) turns out to be a merit. For example—

yadā tvām aham adrākṣam padavidyā-viśāradam /

upādhyāyam tadā'smārṣam samasprākṣam ca sampadam //

Here the use of words like 'adrākṣam' and 'asmārṣam' which are full of harsh sounds is quite appropriate because the person addressed is a grammarian.

V. The defects 'aprayukta' (not in use among poets) and 'nihatārtha' (suppressed meaning) are no defects in *sleṣa* (paranomasia) and the like.⁴⁹

VI. The defect 'aślīla' (indecorous) becomes a merit in erotic gossip⁵⁰ and also in a quietestic discourse implying condemnation of it.

48. Ibid. p. 412. Vaktrādy aucityavaśāb doṣo'pi guṇaḥ kvacin nobhau.

49. Ibid. p. 419. aprayukta-nihatārthau sleṣādav aduṣṭau

50. Ibid. p. 420. aślīlam kvacid guṇaḥ yathā suratārambhagoṣṭhyām.

VII. The defect '*sandigdha*' (dubious) becomes sometimes an excellence if it terminates in the figure of speech named '*Vyājastuti*' (disguised eulogy or artful praise), e. g.

pr̥thu kārtasvara-pātram
bhūṣita-niṣṣeṣa parijanaṃ deva /
Vilasatkareṇugahanam
samprati samam avayoḥ sadanam //

'Our houses, O lord, are now literally alike—yours abounds in vessels of massive gold (and mine full of distressful cries of children), yours full of members and servants decorated (and mine with the whole family lying on the ground), yours teeming with majestic elephants (mine filled with heaps of dust, ruined by rats and the like)'. Here the king is artfully praised by the apparent similarity of conditions, which may have a disparaging or complimentary implication. But the dubious implication (*sandigdha*) is deliberate and serves to emphasize the contrast.

VIII. The defect '*apratīta*' (unintelligibility) is merit when the speaker and the person addressed are both experts or the speaker thinks aloud and utters a soliloquy. As for example—

Ātmārāma vihita-matayo nirvikalpe samādhau, etc.
Here the technical words of *Yogaśāstra* have been used by Bhīmasena to his younger brother Sahadeva. As both the speaker and hearer are learned, there is no risk of being unintelligible.

IX. The defect called *grāmya* (vulgar and rustic) becomes an excellence in the speech of a low man.⁵¹ Thus vulgar expressions in lower class characters of the dramatic literature like the *Karpūramañjarī* are not regarded as faulty; on the other hand they enhance the charm due to their naturalness.

X. Similarly the defects '*nyūnapada*' (the deficiency in word), '*adhiṣṭapada*' (the redundant word) would be merits in the speech of one immersed in emotion. As for example—

Mā mā mānada mātīmāmalam iti etc. (Nay, nay, my lord not too much, enough)

51. Ibid. p. 425. 'adhamaprakṛty-uktiṣu grāmyo guṇaḥ'

Here there is deficiency of word '*piḍaya*' in '*mām alam*'. This broken sentence adds to the charm and intensifies emotion. Similarly '*adhikapada*' is an excellence when additional meaning is to be conveyed. Govinda Ṭhakkura observes that a word or a sentence is repeated under the influence of wonder, dejection, humility, emphatic statement ; as also in propitiation and in raptures of delight.⁵² *Kathitapada* (repetition of the same word in the same sense) is again a merit when it occurs in (a) *lātānuprāsa* (b) when the expressed meaning is transferred to another and (c) when a backward reference is made to the thing predicated before. Similarly *patatprakarṣa* (receding of excellence) is sometimes a merit. As for example '*prāgaprāpta*', etc. where the grandeur of language is shunned and soft tone is adopted to show reverence to the preceptor.

Samāpta-punarātta (the resumption of the concluded) is sometimes neither a merit nor a demerit where it assumes the form of a self-supporting sentence. Likewise *apadastha-samāsa* (misplaced compound) is sometimes a merit. *Garbhitatva* (parenthesis) is sometimes a merit where it is used to confirm the belief.

Exceptions to Rasadoṣas

Ānandavardhana has treated the topic in a perfect and comprehensive manner. We however propose to point out exceptions briefly after Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa.

I. Sometimes the mention of *sañcārīn* (accompanying emotions) by its proper name is not a blemish⁵³ when the *anubhāva* (somatic expression) is not peculiar to itself, but is equally attributable to others also. In other words when the distinct apprehension is not possible by mere mention of *vibhāva* (stimulating condition) and *anubhāva*. As for example :

52. K. Pr. p. 260.

'harṣā-śokādiyukte vaktari guṇatvam.

tvarādi-vyaktyā harṣādy-abhivyañjakatvāt'.

53. K. P., p. 445. 'na doṣaḥ svapadenoktav api sañcārīṇaḥ kvacit'

autsūkyene kṛtatvarā sahabhuvā vyāvartamānā hriyā

'She made haste through her eagerness, but was turning back through natural modesty'. Here the *sañcārins* (accompanying emotion), viz. *autsūkyā* (eagerness) and *hri* (bashfulness) have been mentioned by names. For if they had been left out to be understood by means of mere *anubhāva* (somatic expressions) the sense would not have been clear, because haste and turning aside are not peculiar to the relevant emotions, since they may also result from other emotions like anger, superior's command, etc. So it is legitimate to mention these *sañcārins* by their proper names and it is not regarded as a case of blemish.

II. The mention of conflicting accompanying emotions or the like with a view to their eventual suppression⁵⁴ is not a blemish. When an intended sentiment is fully developed, it would not be defect to delineate even conflicting elements, provided they serve as mere foils to the intended sentiment. In other words the negative mention is not a defect, on the other hand, it furthers the development of the predominating *rasa*. If hindrances are portrayed as foils they lose their hindering defects.

Kvā'kāryam śaśa-lakṣmaṇaḥ kva
ca kulaṃ bhūyo'pi dṛśyeta sā
doṣāṇām praśamāya naḥ śrutam
aho kope'pi kāntaṃ mukham /
Kim vakṣyanty apakalmaṣāḥ
kṛtadhiyaḥ svapne'pi sā durlabhā
Cetaḥ svāस्थ्यam upehi, kaḥ
khalu yuvā dhanyo'dharam pāsyati //

'Where improper deed and where the spotless race of the moon? Would I see her again? My education and training are meant to resist evil tendencies; but how lovely is her face in anger? What will the wise and pure men say? Oh, she is not to be got even in a dream. Take courage and be still, my heart. But who is that lucky youth to drink the nectar of her lips?' In this example the accompanying emotions,

54. Ibid. p. 447. Sañcāryāder bādhyasyo'ktir guṇāvahā.

reasoning, etc. which are helpful to quietism and self-control are superseded by wistful anticipation of the sight of the lady-love, and as such only enhance the development of the principal sentiment of love.

And again—

Satyam manoramā rāmāḥ
satyam ramyā vibhūṭayaḥ /
Kintu mattāṅganāpāṅga-
bhaṅgalolaṃ hi jīvitam //

'Women are no doubt heart-ravishing ; riches too are really pleasant ; but life itself is as unsteady as the glances of an intoxicated woman'. Here in the first half of the verse the *vibhāvas* (object persons) of erotic sentiment are portrayed, but they are suppressed in the later half. The consciousness of the fleeting nature of lovely objects, wealth, women, their lovely glances, strengthens the quietistic sentiment.

III. Sentiments which contradict each other, when occurring in one person, should be attributed to different substrata in order to avoid the conflict.⁵⁵ The heroic sentiment and the sentiment of terror are mutually contradictory in one person. If they are distributed between the hero and his enemy they lose opposition and enhance charm. Similarly the erotic sentiment and the quietistic sentiment are contradictory to each other when occurring in close succession. But their portrayal would be quite proper, if a third sentiment agreeable to both be introduced in between them.

IV. The opposition of two conflicting sentiments will disappear (a) if one is recalled together with the other or (b) if it is shown to be of unequal strength or (c) the opposite sentiments are made subordinate allies to the predominant.⁵⁶

55. K. P., p. 450

āśrayaikye viruddho yaḥ sa kāryo bhinna-saṃśrayaḥ /
rasāntareṇāntarito, nairantaryeṇa yo rasaḥ //

56. ibid. p. 453.

smāryamāṇo viruddho'pi sāmyenātha viakṣitaḥ /
aṅginy aṅgatvam āptau yau tau na duṣṭau paraśparam //

(a) ayam sa rasanotkarṣī pīna-stana-vimardanaḥ /
nābhyūru-jaghana-sparśī nīvi-visraṃsanaḥ karaḥ //

In this speech of Bhūriśravā's wife on seeing his arms when he lay dead in the battle-field, the recollection of its sportive activities in the past when he was living only aggravates the pathos.

Similarly the natural opposition between two opposite statements and actions ceases when they are made to subserve a particular mood. As for example—

ehi gaccha pato'ttiṣṭha
vada maunaṃ samācara /
evam āśāgrahagrastaiḥ
krīḍanti dhanino'rthibhiḥ //

'Wealthy persons play with their suppliants, who are under the spell of greed and hope of favour, directing them as follows : 'come in', 'go', 'fall down', 'get up', 'speak' and 'be silent'. Here in the verse quoted the different injunctions such as coming and going, falling and rising and speaking and keeping silence are really contradictory to each other. But they are all shown to be contributory factors to the principal action, namely 'Kriḍā', the sportive disposition of the rich man who finds particular delight in teasing the supplicants for their favour. All these contradictory facts and senses are the ways of the playing mood of the rich. Were the different directives portrayed independently, they would reflect inconsistency. But being subservient to the sportive mood of the fickle rich men, they do not strike one as absurd. If there is any absurdity that lies in the fickle ways of the rich.

And again—

Kṣipto haṣṭāvalagnaḥ prasabham
abhihato'pyādadānoṃsukāntam
grhṇān keśeṣv apāstas'caraṇa-
nipatito nekṣitaḥ sambhrameṇa /
ālīngan yo'vadhūtas tripura-
yuvatibhiḥ sāśranetrotpalābhiḥ
Kamivā'rdrāparādhaḥ sa dāhatu
duritaṃ śāmbhavo vaḥ śarāgniḥ //

'May the fire of Śiva's arrows burn your sin—the fire, which, upon embracing the damsels of Tripura, was shaken off by them with tearful eyes, which was thrown aside on touching their hands; which was swiftly struck back when catching hold of their cloth end, thrust aside, when touching their locks; which was not even perceived, through fury, when fallen on their feet; which thus appears like a guilty lover of theirs'. Here the sentiments, viz. the erotic and the pathetic do not conflict with one another as they both are made subordinate to the poet's love of God Śiva.

The idea is this. Things which are opposed to one another lose their opposition when they are made to subserve as subordinate elements the interest of a ruling principal fact. Thus fire and water are opposed to each other, but are made to subserve the purpose of cooking food. In support of this proposition Govinda Ṭhakkura quotes a statement of Kumārila⁵⁷ and Mammaṭa also uses the principle inculcated therein to clinch the issue. A subordinate element reinforced and strengthened by the service of another factor (though opposite to it) serves to further the efficacy of the principal action. The example given by us of fire and water illustrates this truth. The poet fancies the various acts and movements of the fire released by arrow of Śiva as the amorous dallies of a lover guilty of misbehaviour. The fire of the weapon is destructive in its effect upon the youthful wives of the demon Tripura. But this destructive activity is depicted in terms of love. There is a natural conflict between love and cruelty. But this conflict is shown to be apparent and is not allowed to develop independently. On the contrary they are made to exhibit the irresistible power of the Divine missile. The glorification of the Divine weapon culminated in reinforcing the poet's love for and devotion to God Śiva.

57. T. V.

'guṇaḥ kṛtāṭma-saṃskāraḥ pradhānam pratipadyate /
pradhānasyo' pakāre hi tathā bhūyasi vartate //

Alaṅkāra-doṣas

Bhāmaha⁵⁸ pointed out seven *doṣas* of Upamā (simile) as first observed by Medhāvin. Other writers on Sanskrit poetics, as we have seen, have also speculated on *doṣas* of only this figure. But in Mammaṭa Bhaṭṭa's work we find a marked evolution in the conception of *doṣas* of Alaṅkāra in general. In the last chapter of *Kāvya-prakāśa* Mammaṭa mentions faults of certain other *alaṅkāras* also. But he disagreed with his predecessors and asserts that these defects are to be included among the verbal and material defects already mentioned.⁵⁹ They have no independent status of their own, distinctive from that of the verbal and material defects which we have dealt with. We shall briefly point out here certain faults of figures.

The verbal figure called *anuprāsa* (alliteration) may suffer from three types of blemishes, viz.

- (a) prasiddhyabhāvaḥ—the absence of conventional sanction.
- (b) vaiphalyam—uselessness of verbal manipulation.
- (c) vṛttivirodhaḥ—disharmony of diction with the sentiment.

- (a) Cakrī cakrārapaṅktim harir api ca
harim dhurjatir dhurdhvajāgrān etc.

This description suffers from the lack of conventional sanction. The ideas conveyed are new-fangled and also not naturally conducive to glorification of the Sun god. These are adopted simply for the sake of alliteration. Thus there is no tradition and precedence that Viṣṇu praises the beauty of the wheels of the chariot of the sun. It is only the phonetic similarity of the word *cakra* (wheel) with the word *cakrīn* (Viṣṇu) which drives the poet to bring these two words together and for this purpose he makes Viṣṇu praise the beauty of the wheel. So also with the rest. Mammaṭa affirms that this is not entitled to recognition as a separate defect. It is a case of *prasiddhi-virodha*—already recognized.

58. Bhāmaha. II. 40 ta etc upamādoṣā sapta medhavino'ditāḥ.

59 K. P. p. 779.

cṣām doṣā yathāyogam sambhavanto'pi kecana /
ukteṣv antarbhavanti'ti na pṛthak pratipāditāḥ //

(b) bhaṇa taruṇi ramaṇa-mandiram
 ānanda-syandi-sundarendu-mukhi /
 yadi sallīlollāpini gacchasi
 tat kim tvadiyam me //

It is only a case of manipulation of phonetically agreeable sounds without regard to the meaning of the words. It may remind one of the adage an empty vessel sounds much. It is only so many sounds but the meaning yielded by them is out of all proportion meagre and paltry. It is so much bombast and tinsel. Mammaṭa would fain include it under the *apuṣṭārtha*-inadequate meaning.

(c) akuṇṭhotkaṇṭhayā pūrṇam
 ākaṇṭham kalakaṇṭhi mām /
 Kambu-Kaṇṭhyāḥ Kṣaṇam
 Kaṇṭhe kuru Kaṇṭhārtim uddhara //

It is the case of association of phonetically similar sounds which, however, are out of harmony with the principal sentiment of love. It is proper to subsume it under *praktikūla-varṇa*.

If in 'yamaka' a rhyme occurs only in three lines of a verse it is a fault.⁶⁰ This is contrary to the poets' usage and hence this *doṣa* may be included in 'aprayukta'

The faults of simile are also not to be regarded as separate ones. Mammaṭa cites examples of Upamā-doṣas given by his predecessors like Vāmana etc. and shows how these faults of simile are not different from those described in the chapter on *doṣa*.

Thus the faults *jātigatanyūnatva* (inferiority in species), *pramāṇagatanyūnatva* (inferiority of degree), *jātigādadhikātva* (excess in species) and *pramāṇagatā'dhikātva* (excess in degree) come under the fault *anucitārtha* (improper significance). For example—

'Caṇḍālair iva yusmābhiḥ sāhasam paramam kṛtam'

60. K. P. p. 772. 'yamakasya pādatrayagatātvena yamanam aprayuktatvaṃ doṣaḥ'.

Here the comparison of the brave persons with *cāṇḍālas* (the low born ruffians) is no doubt altogethe disagreeable and thus it can be included in *anucitārtha*. Likewise the rest of the cases are to be classed under the defects noted before.

The case of *dharmāśrayanyūnatva* and *dharmāśrayādhiakatva* i.e. the case of the attribute words being less or more are to be included under *nyūnapada* (deficiency of words) and *adhika-pada* (excess of words).

The difference of gender, number, tense, person and mood between the thing compared and that to which it is compared mars an unimpeded comprehension and thus it can be included under '*bhagnaprakarma*' violation of the symmetry.

The two *doṣas asādhīśya* (dissimilarity) and *asambhava* (impossibility) of *Upamā* also end in the *anucitārtha*. For instance—

grathnāmi kāvya-śaśinaṃ vitatārtha-raśmim

'I wreath a moon of poetry with rays of ideas'. This case of dissimilarity is a glaring instance of the fault, '*anucitārtha*'⁶¹ since no similarity is comprehended between poetry and the moon and between ideas and rays.

In the figure *utprekṣā* (poetic fancy) the use of the word '*yathā*' in the place of words like '*dhruva*' and '*iva*' is a fault. Because the word '*yathā*' cannot connote probability and presumption like '*iva*'. Thus it is the case of '*avācaka*' (inexpressive word).

In '*samāsokti*' (a brief insinuation) the *upamāna* is suppressed and is only understood by suggestion. The parallelism is implied either by the use of adjectival epithets which are common to both *upameya* and *upamāna* or by similarity of behaviour or by the use of genders : masculine and feminine which are apt to suggest the idea of a living person with which the comparison is suggested. The charm of this way of speech lies in the suggestion of the *upamāna*; and if this

61. K. P. p. 783

'ātra kāvyasya śaśinā arthānām ca raśmibhiḥ
sādharmyam kutrāpi na pratītam ity anucitārthatvam'.

upamāna is expressed by a word the figure will lose all its charm. It will be rather a case of expressed statement of implied fact. In the example :

spṛśati tigmarucau kakubhaḥ karair
dayitayeva vijṛmbhita-tāpayā /
atanu-māna-parigrahayā sthitam
rucirayā ciraya'pi dinaśriya //

'On the sun touching the quarters with his rays (hands), daylight oppressed with heat (grief) continued to be indignant for a long time, just like a girl beloved of him'. Here in the description of the sun and the quarters and goddess of the day, the idea of the sun behaving as a lover and quarters as his darlings and the beauty of the day as a crossed woman in love (*khaṇḍitā*) is easily suggested. The expressed statement of the beauty of the day (*dinaśrī*) as the favourite by the word '*dayitā*' is absolutely unnecessary. It on the contrary spoils the effect. The poet is guilty of infringing the salutary dictum, 'What is suggested should not be expressed'. Logically speaking it is a case of tautology of the sense. If however the expressed statement of an implied fact is not regarded as a case of tautology as has been observed by Bhojarāja, it must be regarded as a case of *apuṣṭārthatā*. Bhaṭṭojidikṣita alludes to this principle when he asserts that a fact which is expressed or implied should not be stated again—'*uktārthānām aprayogaḥ*'. So this is not a peculiar fault of *samāsokti*, but an instance of the general defect *Apuṣṭārthatā*. We refer the reader to our comments under these defects of sense.

In Mammaṭa's treatment of the so-called defects of *alaṅkāras*, we notice the working of an independent mind which is characterised by a fine logical sense of discrimination. He seems perfectly warranted in his animadversions upon the previous writers who made capital of these 'peculiar faults.' It is not the fact that the defects spotted out are not defects. Mammaṭa agrees with these writers that these are serious blemishes. But he takes exception to this specific treatment on the ground that they are only instances of the well-known

defects of words and meanings and as such are not entitled to separate recognition.⁶² They are not different categories. It may not be far from accurate to observe that Mammaṭa has given respectable reasons for his difference from the findings of his predecessors and in this he has followed the lead of Mahimabhaṭṭa.

62. K. P. p. 688. 'tad ete alaṅkāra-doṣā yathāsambhavinō' nyc'pi
 cvam jātiyakāḥ purvoktayaiva doṣajātyā antarbhāvitāḥ na prthak
 pratipādanam arhanti'.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

We have given a survey of the different classes of literary defects which the Indian writers on poetics have successively evolved—each successor being benefited by the labours of his predecessors. This is, no doubt, a thankless task or worse than that, that one has to occupy oneself with finding faults in the writings of celebrated poets. It bespeaks courage on the part of critics that they are not respecters of persons. One may feel justified in holding that this occupation which finds particular pleasure in picking holes in the writings of poets, scholars and writers of *belles-lettres*, betrays a sadistic tendency. There is a good deal of plausibility in this contention. A critic who takes upon himself the task of exposing defects and drawbacks in the literary works of others, positively runs the risk of courting unpopularity not only with writers, if living, but also with their admirers. Generally, very few can take with good grace to the exposure of faults and lapses in their writings. Intolerance of criticism is for good or evil a prevalent disposition. It is, however, some consolation, though poor, that the writers whose works have been dissected and faults pointed out, are not living to resent this captious undertaking of the critic.

One may excite ill will by one's adverse criticism among the living lovers of poetry and of particular poets of the past. But the distance of time may have served to blunt the edge of rancour and the critic may escape physical trouncing. Prudence should prompt a critic to desist from carping criticism of a living writer, because this only tends to create one's enemies. Even the most ingenious and penetrative critics have incurred odium. Mahimabhaṭṭa excelled in destructive criticism. But he was aware of the undesirable consequences which necessarily follow. The critic's is after all an unenviable profession. We, however, quote the

apology of Mahimabhaṭṭa and if any odium attaches to this work which, however, only reproduces the speculations of ancient writers with elucidatory comments, we will seek shelter behind the shield of Mahimabhaṭṭa.

Being a professor of Sanskrit the present writer has to lecture on the subject of literary defects. The present work, it is hoped, will go a long way in making the knotty problems and issues intelligible to the modern mind. Mahimabhaṭṭa was also a professor of poetics and necessarily had to lecture on this much-too-maligned subject. Silence on the part of a professor and reluctance to reply to the questions of the students may produce unwholesome impressions.¹ Is he (a professor) a stupid ignoramus or incompetent to give expression to his knowledge for lack of mastery over the language or does he observe silence with a view to withhold the knowledge out of jealousy so that his students may not become well-posted in niceties and thus become his equals in the field? These may be presumed to be the reasons for the reluctance of the teacher to answer questions put by students. Accordingly, at the instance of students, I abruptly abandoned the way of good men and adopted the path of criticism which is pursued by men condemned to be the targets of ill luck".

But the critic may be an unwelcome friend. He rudely reminds the poet or the speaker of the need of vigilance. A writer who aims at a literary production must be on his guard in the choice of words and construction of sentences. He must again be discriminative regarding his ideas and sentiments. Though the poet seeks to instill in the minds of readers love of truth and beauty and his appeal is more emotional and aesthetical than intellectual and logical, he cannot override the canons of logic without running the risk of stulti-

1. V. V., p. 152.

mugdhā kim kim asabhya eṣa bhajate mātṣaryamaunaṃ nu kim,
prīto na 'pratīvakti yaḥ kila janas tatreti sambhāvayet /
chātrābhyarthanayā tato'dya sahasaivotsrjya mārgaṃ satām,
paurobhāgyam abhāgya-bhājana-janā sevyaṃ mayāṅgīkṛtam //

fyng his mission. No doubt, the poet may draw upon the imagination² in the construction of plots and even in cases where he derives the frame-work of his plot from history or legends he has to supply flesh and blood to the skeleton and make it a lovely object—"a thing of beauty is joy for ever". Thus Kālidāsa's Śakuntalā is full of life and an object of universal affection and love. Bāṇabhaṭṭa's picture of Mahāśvetā is a veritable *tour de force* of creative imagination and in spite of the supernatural in her she is presented as an exalted human personage who excites our admiration.

The imagination of these poets has been controlled by sense of proportion and verisimilitude which prevent them from evaporating into airy nothing. We do not feel that these creatures of the poet's imagination are fantastic figments. They are as real as any living woman of flesh and blood. We know that they are much above the average women of the world, but none the less we are persuaded that they are living beings and have their individuality which sharply demarcates one from the other. Śakuntalā and Mahāśvetā are two different individuals. We may quote *ad libitum* the heroes and heroines created by Shakespeare and other poets of the world, It cannot be forgotten, except at their peril, by poets that they can execute a work of art and beauty if they have felicity of expression and an inexhaustible fund of ideas at their command and if they use these instruments with care and circumspection. Of course, to a man of genius,³ words and ideas present themselves spontaneously without any extra effort. A work of art cannot be laboured out. And here lies the criterion of best poetry. It embodies perfection of structure together with perfection of idea.

As external beauty is to a woman, so is graceful and faultless diction to poetry. As external beauty of the person without intellectual and moral excellence is not calculated to

2. Dh. Ā., p. 334.

Kathāśarīram utpādy vastu kāryam tathā tathā.
yathā rasamayam sarvam eva tatpratibhāsatē.

3. Dh. Ā., p. 537. 'na kāvyārtha-virāmo'sti yadi syāt pratibhāgaṇaḥ.

retain the admiration of a man of taste and culture for long, so also a poet, whose stock-in-trade consists only in beautiful words and melodious vocabulary but lacks in powerful ideas and captivating sentiments, cannot keep his hold on the admiration of lovers of poetry for long.

The writers on Sanskrit poetics have laid emphasis upon the intellectual equipment of poets' viz. 'vyutpatti' knowledge of the world, men, sciences, arts and so on and so forth. The poet must be on the alert to pick and choose words and in this task he must not violate the rules of grammar and logic alike. The breaches are inexcusable flaws. Critics have not been sparing in their fault-finding undertaking. We have given instances of solecism committed by poets. The list of verbal defects shows that wrong expressions are responsible for the failure of the poet to give aesthetic satisfaction. He fails to give delight for his carelessness. It may be that the critics have overdone his task. But in spite of the odium attaching to his profession the critic is a friend in disguise. It may not be feasible that the poet's production should be immune from the captious fault-finding. But the critic sets up the norm and ideal. Though the ideal may never be reached, it exerts a pull on the poet and prevents him from avoidable lapses. It is an amusing paradox that in Sanskrit one of the epithets of a scholar is 'doṣajña'⁴ one who has a flair for defects. A scholar must be possessed of discrimination and must be able to tell right from wrong. Of course he will not be worth the name if he is blind to the good points. He must be also a 'guṇajña'. The praise of an incompetent and ignorant man is worthless. A scholar particularly welcomes critics' exposure of defects if they are not inspired by malice. Udayana concludes his wonderful work the 'Āmatattvavivēka' by making a statement which is worthy of being remembered by all right-thinking persons⁵.

4. A. K. p. 251. Vidvān Vipāścid doṣajñaḥ saṁ sudhīḥ kovido budhaḥ.

5. A. T. V., p. 947.

nāsyā ślāghāmakalita-guṇaḥ poṣayan prīṭaye naḥ
Kondhais citrastuti-śatavidhau śilpinaḥ syāt prakarṣaḥ /
nindāmeva prathayatu janaḥ kintu doṣānnirūpya
prekṣansthāyas-khalita kathanaṁ prīṇayed eva bhūyaḥ //

"The praise of my work by a person, who is incapable of appreciating merits, does not give me satisfaction. Can the hundred words of compliments expressed by blind men for a portrait prove the excellence of the artist? Let critics express their censure provided it is based on the objective knowledge of the defects. The statement of real defects ought to be welcomed by a man of right understanding (as this will help him in rectifying his mistakes)".

In the treatment of literary defects the priority has been given to verbal defects (*śabdadoṣas*). This is natural since the poet expresses his ideas through words and we are directly acquainted with them only. Words are but thoughts externalised. Bhartṛhari and Croce have expounded the thesis that a conception without expression and the converse are impossible. According to Bhartṛhari⁶ word is the very life and soul of intellect. Knowledge minus word is an impossible fiction. Bereft of word a knowledge will fail to express facts. The successful expression of thought depends upon a medium, i. e. diction. Even a cursory acquaintance with a list of '*padadoṣas*' will convince the reader of the importance of language. Words must be appropriate to the thought and sentiment. An unsuitable expression will fail to yield the meaning intended by the poet. Apart from the semantic aspect of the phonetic value words must also be adjudged by the poet in conformity with the sentiment. Sound echoes the sense just as the tune of music reflects the sentiment underlying it. As the musician who has the ear for music and melody chooses the right tune spontaneously, so also has the poet the ear for the musical effect of his words. In mature writings of a poet it is difficult to replace his words without spoiling the effect. This is called '*pāka*'. i. e. ripe-

6. V. P., I. 124. 'na so'sti pratyapo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte /
anuviddham iva jñānam sarvaṃ śabdena bhāṣate //

N. S. XIV. 3 Vānmayāniha śāstrāṇi vān nisthāni tathaiva ca /
tasmād vācaḥ paraṃ nāsti vāghī sarvस्या काराणम् //

7. quoted by Vāmana on I. III. 15

'yat padāni tyajantyeva parivṛtti-sahiṣṇutām /
taṃ śabda-nyāsanīṣṇātāḥ śabda pākam pracakṣate //

ness of style. The defect of inharmonious sounds is called 'pratikūlavarn'. The sounds of the words must not grate upon the ear. This has to be carefully avoided particularly in soft sentiments such as love, etc. A spirited diction is necessary for conveying the heroic sentiment. The poet has, however, to be on his guard against unnecessary bombast. The phonetic aspect of poetry has received adequate attention in the treatment of verbal defects.

There are, however, a large number of defects which have reference to the meaning and yet are included in the list of verbal defects. What is then the criterion of a verbal defect (*padadoṣa*) in contradistinction to the defect of pure meaning, which we have called material defect? This criterion has been propounded by Govinda Ṭhakkura⁸—a most astute exponent of poetics, who had an uncommon aesthetic sense combined with acute logical insight and training as follows. Whether a defect pertains to word or sense can be determined by the application of the Joint method of 'anvayavyatireka'. If the substitution of words by their synonyms removes the defect, the latter should be regarded as pertaining to words. This is the test of 'śabdaparivṛttsahatva' i.e. the test furnished by the change of words without change of meaning". If is difficult to separate a word from meaning or vice-versa, because they are organically related. Thus for instance almost all the defects included in the list of *padadoṣa*, barring harshness of sound, have reference to meaning. It is the logical criterion in change of words, which is the equivalent of the Joint method, that helps the determination of a verbal from a material defect. It will be apparent from the general definition of literary defects that whatever delays or obstructs the spontaneous apprehension of meaning is regarded as a fault. A delayed understanding necessarily involves the failure of aesthetic satisfaction. Of

8. K. Pr., p. 299. 'doṣaguṇālankāraṇām śabdārthagatatvena yo Vibhāgaḥ so'nvaya-vyatirekābhym eva vyavatiṣṭhate, yatra hi paryāyāntara-parivṛtti-sahatvam tatra śabdagatatvam, yatra tu tadasahatvam tatārthagatatvam'.

course, a student of poetry is expected to have the minimum qualification for apprehension of poetry. But if to a student of poetry, well-equipped with the necessary qualification, viz. the knowledge of the language and aesthetic sense, the poet fails to convey the meaning and consequently aesthetic satisfaction, the blame should be laid at the door of the poet's bad craftsmanship. The poet expects that his poetry should be enjoyed and should give delight to his readers. In this world, full of worries and pin-pricks, suffering mankind resorts to poetry for the alleviation of his sorrow.⁹ This explanation may be belied if the poet's work demands extra labour on the part of the competent reader to understand his words or meaning. The analysis of the writers on Sanskrit poetics of verbal defects, if not, exhaustive, is at least comprehensive of the major drawbacks which an aspiring poet must avoid.

The study of this analysis and classification of defects fulfills a real need. It enables a student of poetry to make his understanding intelligent and accurate. An undefined enthusiasm or aversion should not pass for informed criticism. The critic must have a logical sense and be able to assess his emotional satisfaction or repulsion in intelligible terms. He must be in a position to justify his reaction by logical proof. A study of the defects of poetry classified by ancient writers on poetics will train his appreciation and chasten his hostile reaction. This, of course has reference to defects verbal and material alike. The study of verbal defects enables the student to appreciate the important role played by diction.

It may not be far from accurate to claim that the contribution of Sanskrit writers on poetics to the assessment of literary defects is possessed of perennial value, not only for the study of Sanskrit poetry but also perhaps of World Literature. In Sanskrit, poetics have been studied for centuries by generations of writers and scholars. This has resulted in a definite architectonic pattern. Poetics has become a necessary discipline,

9. S. D., P. I.

catur varga phale prāptiḥ sukhād alpādhiyām api /

kāvyaḍeva //

which a student of poetry has to study for understanding poetry as such. The defects of meaning as classified by Mammāṭa-bhaṭṭa are the culmination of centuries labour and thought. There may be room for difference of opinion in respect of particular defect, but the logic underlying them is unmistakable. As we observed before, poetry cannot steer clear of logic. Logic in its wider sense makes for consistency of thought, and inconsistency even on the part of a poet is not excusable. Besides logical defects the poet must be careful for avoiding purely literary defects. The poet does not propose to prove a theorem, no doubt; his appeal is more to the heart than to the head. But man's mind is a unique organism which no analysis into sections and compartments can exhaust. We have characterised it as an organism which may be regarded as unwarranted licence. But our point is to emphasise the unique unanalysable unity which expresses itself through different sections and transcends them at the same time. The aesthetic sense is also determined by logical coherence. Thus the fault called the undeveloped sense (*apuṣṭārtha*) and the too abstruse (*Kliṣṭa*) are purely aesthetic in character. But the contradictory (*vyāhata*) and unsymmetrical (*duṣkrama*) are a complex of the aesthetic and logical. Tautology (*punarukta*) is more logical than aesthetic. The vulgar (*grāmya*) is aesthetically repulsive.

The dubious (*sandigdha*) is offensive to the intellect. inconsequential (*nirhetu*) has a predominantly logical tone. Contravention of convention (*prasiddhiviruddha*), popular or scientific, has a dominant logical complexion. Mannerism (*anavikṛta*) consists in bald monotony and is aesthetically repellent. The inconsistency of the suggested sense is logical and aesthetic in character. In this way the defects of meaning may be found to partake of a predominantly logical or aesthetical character. But this compartmental assessment, though helpful to the understanding, is more symptomatic than real. The aesthetic and the logical are so blended that they refuse to be rent asunder. There is little doubt that all these defects serve to detract from the emotional value of poetry. This shows that poetry has a logic of its own and

because of the logic, poetry lends itself to critical analysis. This analysis helps and strengthens our appreciation. Were poetry a purely emotional affair there would be no common criterion for criticism. The classification of material defects seeks to bring together a series of facts which serve to show that poetry is not only to be enjoyed, but also to be appreciated.

Enjoyment without appreciation is precarious and shaky. The study of defects, which are mainly of negative character, has a positive significance. By understanding the defect we are better able to appreciate poetry and our enjoyment becomes secure. The study of poetical excellences (*guṇas*) lays stress on the positive side. In the present dissertation we have to deprive ourselves of the satisfaction that appreciation of merits yields. But the negative implication of defects is a pointer to the positive appeal of poetry. This appeal, though predominantly aesthetic and emotional, is controlled by logical implications. The emphasis on defects thus serves to make for intelligent appreciation of the aesthetic value of poetry. As we have observed before, the critic is a friend in disguise not only to the poet but also to the student of poetry.

It is not difficult to understand that the defects of meaning, i. e. of ideas, are of significance not only to the student of Sanskrit poetry but also to the students of world literature. A modern student equipped with the logic of defects set forth in Sanskrit poetics will be better posted up—in the assessment and appreciation of literature as such. It may be claimed that without appearing extravagant that the analysis of writers on Sanskrit poetics will be helpful to students of literature in general. We leave it to a future researcher to find application of these defects in other literatures and other languages.

Mahimabhaṭṭa has traced all literary defects to the sense of impropriety (*anaucitya*). The concept of impropriety is first introduced, so far as our knowledge goes, by Ānanda vardhana. It has got a very wide connotation which includes under it all sorts of irregularities and anomalies, logical, aesthetical, moral, conventional and so on and so forth. In logic fallacies are instances of anomalies which spring from

the breach of logical rules. Śrīharṣa, at the end of the 'Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khāḍya', a product of wonderful ingenuity and incisive analysis, puts all fallacies and conventional grounds for defeat (*nigrahasthānas*) under the concept of 'anaucitya'. And he pays a compliment to Mahimabhāṭṭa for setting forth 'anaucitya' (Impropriety) as the fountainhead of all poetical defects: "Mahimabhāṭṭa, who has attained to enviable pre-eminence among writers on poetics, has set forth the defect *anaucitya* with due regard in the *Vyaktiviveka* which may aptly be considered as the very organ of sight for poets".¹⁰ We have dealt with 'anaucitya' in our treatment of the 'Rasadoṣas' as propounded by Ānandavardhana in the *Dhvanyāloka*. Whatever is incompatible with the accepted data and conclusions is regarded as a case of lapse from the norm of propriety (*aucitya*). Kṣemendra, the disciple of Abhinavagupta, has written a treatise named *Aucitya-vicāra-carcā* in which he seeks to dispose of 'Dhvani' subsuming it under 'aucitya' (propriety). It is one of the reactionary works which tries to subvert the architectonic built by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. As we do not in the course of the present dissertation concern ourselves with the *Dhvani* theory and its opponents, we only make a reference to this work in order to draw notice to the conclusion of Ānandavardhana that impropriety is the invariable condition of 'Rasabhaṅga', i.e. frustration of aesthetic satisfaction and observance of 'aucitya' is the secret of *Rasa*. This conclusion has been accepted even by his opponents. In Kṣemendra's work we find an attempt to put the cart before the horse. He is guilty of the fallacy of *hysteron-proteron*. 'Aucitya' is the condition and not the result of *rasa* experience. Ānandavardhana has shown and his followers have confirmed it that the *raison-d'être* of 'doṣa' lies in its disservice to *Rasa*. Mahimabhāṭṭa¹¹ also classifies *doṣas* under two heads—inter-

10. K. K., p. 414

Doṣam Vyaktiviveke'muṁ kaviloka-vilocane /
Kāvya-mīmāṃsiṣu prāptamahimā mahimādrta //

11. V. V., p. 152. 'antaraṅga-bahiraṅga-bhāvaś cā'nayoḥ śākṣāt
pāramparyeṇ ca rasa-bhaṅga-hetutvād iṣṭaḥ.

nal (*antaraṅga*) and external (*bahiraṅga*). The defects of words, syllables, sentences and meanings are all external. since they injure realisation of *Rasa* through the medium of words and meanings. The *Rasa doṣas* are internal and direct. They are *doṣas* (defects) *par excellence*. We now propose to deal with the philosophy of *Rasadoṣas*. But as the subject-matter presupposes an acquaintance with the nature and conditions of *Rasa* we think it appropriate and helpful to average students of literature to make a few brief observations on this topic. This small digression will, we hope, not take from the symmetry of our treatment of *doṣa*.

It has now been accepted by all schools of Indian poetics which have sprung into existence after Ānandavardhana, that *Rasa* is the central essence of poetry. *Alaṅkāras* (figures of speech) which consist in striking mode of expressions were regarded by Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and their followers as the quintessence of poetry.

Kuntaka wrote his work '*Vakrokti-Jivita*' with the sole purpose of demolishing the '*Dhvani-theory*'. He preceded Mahimabhaṭṭa and also, perhaps, Abhinavagupta. The former severely criticises him (Kuntaka) and has cited a verse which he shows to be an example of serious defect. Kuntaka reverted to Bhāmaha's position that it is figures of speech, that is, unusual and unwanted modes of expression, that constitute the special charm of poetry. He calls these modes of expression '*Vakrokti*'—oblique statements. Kuntaka is not the original inventor of the nomenclature '*Vakrokti*'. Bhāmaha¹² calls '*atis'ayokti*' by the name of *Vakrokti* which consists in its departure from the hackneyed manner of statement used by ordinary untutored mass. The originality of Kuntaka lies in the extension of the meaning of this significant expression '*Vakrokti*' under which he subsumes all cases of '*Dhvani*'. Daṇḍin and Vāmana sought to account for the beauty of poetry

12. Bhāmaha II. 85.

'saiṣa sarvatra vakroktir anaya'ritho vibhāvyaṭe /
yanto'syāṁ kavinaṁ kāryaḥ ko'laṅkāro'nayā vinā //

by style or mode of arrangement of words. They laid stress on *guṇas*, i. e. qualities which characterise sound and sense. Ānandavardhana established the thesis that the charm of poetry lies in its suggestive power. It may suggest a fact or a figure, but the ultimate beauty and appeal of poetry are derived from the emotional æsthetic satisfaction which is produced by the suggestive power of words and meanings. Ultimately, it is the plenum of joy and peaceful repose, which are the characteristic features of *Rasa*, that make poetry an object of attraction and admiration.

But where does the joy come from ? It comes neither from the music or sounds nor from striking meaning, but from the innermost self of man. It is propounded in Vedānta and also in the *Pratyabhijñā* school of philosophy that man's essence is constituted by consciousness and bliss. This blissful nature of man is obscured by veils of ignorance which give rise to intellectual aberrations, moral unbalance and aesthetic insensitivity. These are accidental excrescences, which are bound to disappear by right conduct and correct vision. Religion has prescribed a protracted course of discipline as an antidote to these weaknesses. Poetry, however, gives a fore-taste of this blissful freedom from all worries and perplexities by making the man forget his petty ego. We read poetry or witness a dramatic performance which, somehow, lifts us out of the morass of our petty problems which ordinarily become the obsession of a person. By its subtle mysterious influence poetry makes us forget the present world and environment and puts us in a different climate and region. There man feels his freedom, and the depth and intensity of this enjoyment of freedom are in proportion to our forgetfulness of our personality. The innate joy in us shines forth in its fulness. This experience is called *Rasa*. The English phrase 'to enjoy oneself' unconsciously betrays a universal truth. 'Enjoyment of happiness consists in self-enjoyment.'

But this is effected by the poet by following a technique of his own. This technique consists in the proper adjustment of the characters, environments, the arousal of emotions and their

expression in and through the physical changes of the face, eyes etc. exhibited by actors and actresses, which at once rivet our focus of attention. These conditions have been set forth with abundant clarity and detail in the works of dramaturgy. Abhinavagupta has described the technique as the choice of expressions suitable for suggesting ideas and producing a harmonious current of thought and emotion. This has been called the universalising effect of words by Bhaṭṭanāyaka. He calls it *Bhāvanā* which serves to demolish the barrier between one person and another. Abhinavagupta¹³ calls it '*hṛdayasaṃvāda*' i.e. the harmony of all experiences, emotional and intellectual of all connoisseurs (*vidagdha*). Any faint suggestion of impropriety will mar this delicate dispositional attitude. *Rasa-doṣas* are pre-eminently cases of such impropriety. In our treatment of these defects we have elucidated the reasons for these emotional and aesthetic disturbances. An inappropriate expression, any foolish action and improper emotion will spoil the *Rasa*.

Rasa, i.e. æsthetic experience has been said to consist in the enjoyment of the inner self. It is one homogenous experience of joy and when it is enjoyed and experienced it does not admit of the introduction of any alien element (*vedyāntara-samparka-śūnya*). If *Rasa* be this, it cannot be disturbed by any defect. A defect of *Rasa* is thus an impossible fiction and contradiction in terms. What is then the justification of the treatment of *Rasa-doṣas* as they cannot spoil or detract from the purity of æsthetic experience?

The answer is this. Defects do not spoil the *Rasa*-experience, but are impediments to its emergence. Defects are always of the nature of negative conditions. Their presence frustrates the realisation of the necessary condition of such experience. In the presence of defects this ideal experience cannot come into being. Just as logical fallacies prevent the emergence of inferential judgement, so also poetic defects tend to frustrate the conditions for the realisation of *Rasa*-experience. It is not a fact that fallacies are known after

13. K. P., w. 93. '*sakala-hṛdaya-saṃvādabhāṣā sādharanyena...*'

inference has taken place. The *Rasa-doṣas* are defects of this kind which prevent the possibility of *Rasa*-experience. It is not meant that they detract from the *Rasa*-experience after it has emerged. This is obvious from the very definition of poetic defect as given by Mahimabhaṭṭa.¹⁴ The presence of defects is proof of the absence of the necessary condition for the realisation of æsthetic experience. This experience either takes place or not. It is not possible that the experience is made qualitatively or quantitatively deficient. In every case of causal operation it is assumed that the positive conditions are present in full plus the absence of negative conditions. Udayana¹⁵ makes the absence of the negative conditions a necessary part of the cause, which has been described by J. S. Mill as 'the totality of necessary conditions' and 'total cause' by Broad.¹⁶ The positive condition of *Rasa*-experience is the presence of *Vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicariḥvāva* plus the absence of defects. *Rasa-doṣas* are found in the last resort to belong to the conditions of *Rasa*, viz. *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, etc. They immobilise the '*vibhāvas*' and their attendants and thus make the emergence of *Rasa*-experience impossible.

They are called *Rasa-doṣas*, because they have remote bearing on *Rasa*; to be precise, they are the negative conditions of it. The so-called defects of *Rasa* are thus found to be seated in the conditions of *rasa* (*kāraṇa-doṣa*) understood in the positive sense. Regarded as *Rasa-doṣas* they can be justified only if they are understood in the sense of negative conditions (*Pratibandhas*) of *rasa*.

14. V. V. P. 152. Vivakṣita-rasādi-pratīti-vighna-vidhāyitvaṃ nāma sāmānya-lakṣaṇam.

15. N. K., I. 10.

bhāvo yathā-tathā'bhāvaḥ kāraṇam kāryavan mataḥ /

Pratibandho'visāmagrī. taddhetuḥ pratibandhakaḥ //

APPENDIX "A"

Poetic doṣas as given in the Agnipurāṇa

The Agnipurāṇa is prima facie an ambitious work. It contains summaries of all sciences and disciplines that were in vogue in the medieval period. It has a section dealing with dramaturgy and poetics. It is a hurried sketch deriving its contents from works which for the most part are not traceable. It is of course obvious that the compilation was made in the tenth or eleventh century. There are passages which are found in the works of Bhāmaha, Dāṇḍin, Vāmana and Ānandavardhana. It is syncractic in character and does not propound anything new or original. Nor does it throw any light on the tangled problems of poetics. It devotes a brief chapter to the consideration of poetic defects. The cryptic treatment makes many a sentence unintelligible and the confusion is worse confounded by the inexcusable corruption of the text, which is due to the haphazard and perfunctory editing of the text. We have made the best of a bad bargain. And in this we have been helped by our study of the ancient texts of Bhāmaha, Dāṇḍin, etc. In the Agnipurāṇa the poetic defect is defined¹ as one which causes concern to the critic. The writer enumerates the defects as follows :—

- I. Asādhū—solecism.
- II. Aprayukta—not used by poets, which is divided into five kinds : Chandas-Vedic, avispaṣṭa-obscure, Kaṣṭatva-harsh or difficult word, asāmayikatva—not conventional and grāmyatva-vulgar. The obscure again is divided into gūḍhārtha—the meaning of which is concealed, Viparyasta—contrary to accepted meaning and Sandigdha-doubtful. This list is framed after Bhāmaha and Vāmana sometimes with linguistic variations. No examples are given. These defects are presumed to belong to individual verbal expressions (*padadoṣa*).

1. A. P. I. 346. Udvēgajanako doṣaḥ Sabhyānām.

About *arthadoṣa* (the defects of meaning) the writer gives two varieties, viz. general and particular. Under the first head he gives five defects :—

- I. Kriyākāraka-bhramṣa—the omission of verb and case.
- II. Visandhi—bad euphonic combination
- III. Punarukta—tautology
- IV. Vyastasambaddhatā—consisting in causing the understanding of different relation or want of relation on account of the separation of irrelevant word or insertion of unrelated words and sentence.

Thess defeccts are general, which are not quite intelligible. We find a list of logical fallacies which the speaker speaks of in imitation of Bhāmaha. They are :—

- I. Asiddha—non-existent.
- II. Viruddha—contradictory.
- III. Anaikāntika—inconclusive.
- IV. Satpratipakṣa—antimonic.
- V. Kālāṭīta—contradictory.

Then he speaks of *gūḍhārtha*—hidden meaning. It does not function as a fault in difficult constructions involving *yamaka* and *prahelikā*. He follows Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin and shows exceptions to the defects.

APPENDIX "B"

Doṣas as dealt with by Bhojarāja

Bhojarāja, who flourished most probably between 1010 and 1055 A. D. has written two books on poetics. He has spoken of literary blemishes in the ninth chapter of his *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* but in the *Sarasvatī-Kaṇṭhābharana* Bhoja takes a particular delight in elaboration. The special value of his treatment lies in elaborate classification of doṣas under separate heads (a) padadoṣa (defects of words), (b) vākya-doṣas (defects of sentences) and (c) vākyārtha doṣas (defects of the meaning of the sentence). He mentions¹ the following *Pada doṣas* :—

- I. Asādhū—grammatically incorrect.
- II. Aprayukta—that which is not used by poets.
- III. Kaṣṭha—harsh to the ear.
- IV. Anarthaka—A particle which is used only to complete a metre.
- V. Anyārtha—having a meaning that is not conventional.
- VI. Apuṣṭa—useless addition of qualifying words.
- VII. Asamartha—incapable of giving the sense in which it is used.
- VIII. Apratīta—technical terms of particular Science.
- IX. Kliṣṭa—obscure.
- X. Gūḍha—use of a word in a less known meaning.
- XI. Neyārtha—meaning to be guessed out.
- XII. Sandigdha—dubious.
- XIII. Viruddha—contrary.
- XIV. Aprayojaka—use of a qualifying word without significance.
- XV. Deśya—a word which has no etymological meaning.
- XVI. Grāmya—indecent

Of these sixteen pada-doṣas Bhojarāja has taken asādhū, kaṣṭha, anarthaka, anyārthaka, apratīta, kliṣṭa, gūḍhārtha,

neyātha and grāmya from his predecessor, Bhāmaha and Vāmana, and apuṣṭārtha, asamartha and deśya are taken from Rudraṭa. The remaining three—sandigdha, aprayukta and viruddha are to be seen in the earlier works in some other forms. Thus we find that there is no original addition to the list.

II. *Vākya-doṣas* are the following² :—

- I. Śabdahīna—ungrammatical.
- II. Kramabhraṣṭa—impropriety of words.
- III. Visandhi—disjunction, where words are not well-knit.
- IV. Punaruktimat—tautology.
- V. Vyākīrṇa—haphazard scattered position of subject and predicate.
- VI. Apadam—inappropriate and unpleasant words.
- VII. Vākya-garbhita—parenthetical.
- VIII. Bhinnaliṅga—diversity of gender.
- IX. Bhinnavacana—diversity of number.
- X. Nyūnopama—deficiency in simile.
- XI. Adhikopama—excess in simile.
- XII. Bhagnacchanda—defective in metre.
- XIII. Bhagnayati—defective in caesura.
- XVI. Aśarīra—absence of the verb in a sentence.
- XV. Arītimat—non-conformity with a *riti* or style of composition.
- XVI. Vākyasaṅkīrṇa—confused.

Here also we may see that most of the doṣas enumerated by Bhoja are mentioned by his predecessors, Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Rudraṭa. For example, Visandhi, Bhinnavacana, Bhinnayati and the four upamā doṣas are found in the list of Vāmana. Śabdahīna of Bhoja is asādhū of Bhāmaha. Kramabhraṣṭa is apakrama of Vāmana. Punaruktimat is Ekārtīna of Bhāmaha. Vākyasaṅkīrṇa and Garbhita are taken from Rudraṭa.

III. Vākya-rtha-doṣa (defects of sentence).³

- I. Apārtha—absence of complete sense.
- II. Vyārtha—the purposeless.
- III. Ekārtha—tautology.
- IV. Sasamśaya—the dubious.
- V. Apakrama—The non-sequent.
- VI. Khinna—paucity of capacity to describe.
- VII. Atimātra—enormity of exaggeration.
- VIII. Paruṣa—of repulsive significance; hurting the susceptibilities of the person addressed.
- IX. Virasa—incompatible sentiment.
- X. Hīnopama—deficiency.
- XI. Adhikopama—redundancy in upamāna.
- XII. Asadṛśopama—dissimilarity.
- XIII. Aprasiddhopama—strangeness of the standard of comparison.
- XIV. Niralaṅkāra—charmless, bald and blunt.
- XV. Aśliṭa—indecorous, vulgar meaning.
- XVI. Viruddha—contradictory.

Bhoja has followed his predecessors and taken almost all doṣas from them. For instance he has taken apārtha, vyārtha, ekārtha, sasamśaya, apakrama and viruddha from Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. Atimātra and virasa are taken from Rudraṭa, Aśliṭa, hīnopama, adhikopama, asadṛśopama and aprasiddhopama and niralaṅkāra are also taken from early writers. Khinna and paruṣa are his new additions.

He defines *Khinna* as *Jaty-ādyuktāv-anirvyūḍham* (poet's incapacity to continue an idea) and *paruṣa* as *Krūrārtham* (of repulsive sense). Bhoja includes Bhāmaha's *pratijñāhāni* etc. in *Virodha* which has been classified under three heads, viz. *pratyakṣa-virodha*, *anumānavirodha* and *āgamavirodha*. Bhoja mentions *Prabandha-doṣa* also. Though not original his treatment is elaborate and clear. It is not ambiguous like that of the *Agnipurāṇa*.

3. S. K. A. I. 44-46.

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
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